On the circularity of democratic justice

Thompson, S. (2009) On the circularity of democratic justice. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 35 (9). pp. 1079-1098. ISSN 0191-4537 Available from: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/10921

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453709343391


In this article, I argue that justice and democracy stand in a circular relationship: just outcomes emerge from democratic deliberations, but only if such deliberations meet the standards of justice. I develop my argument by engaging in a critical dialogue with Nancy Fraser. Contending that she fails to deal with the danger that unfair deliberative procedures and inadequate norms of justice may reinforce one another, I show what a satisfactory account of democratic justice would look like. Going beyond Fraser’s theory, I maintain that although ustice and democracy do form a circular relationship, it is essential to give the former greater weight than the latter. I finesse my account by showing what this differential weighting would entail in practice. The result is an account of democratic justice that is significantly different from and a marked improvement on that of Fraser.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:democracy, Nancy Fraser, good enough deliberation, justice, parity of participation
Faculty/Department:Faculty of Health and Applied Sciences > Department of Health and Social Sciences
Faculty of Arts, Creative Industries and Education > Department of Arts and Cultural Industries
ID Code:10921
Deposited By: Dr S. Thompson
Deposited On:19 Aug 2010 08:06
Last Modified:02 May 2018 17:07

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