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From war culture to civil society: Francoism, social change, and memories of the Spanish Civil War

(1) Subjectivity and memories of civil war

In her moving account of Catalan Civil War exiles in Nazi prison camps, the author Montserrat Roig, speaks about her own inspiration found in the wartime letters of the Republican Pere Vives i Clavé who died in Mauthausen in October 1941 as a result of a Nazi doctors’ experiment involving an injection of petrol into the heart. She also talks of the novel about life in the camp by Vives’ friend Joaquim Amat-Piniella which was left unpublished for years because the Franco censors considered that it ‘lacked objectivity’. Reflecting a belief in the necessarily intimate relation between subjectivity and historical memory, she writes, ‘I believe that it was precisely his urge to be objective, balanced, to find a harmony between a diseased memory (‘la memoria enferma’) and understanding of a crazed world (‘un mundo trastornado’), that killed Joaquim Amat-Piniella for a second time in the summer of 1974’.\(^1\)

Historical information gleaned from the study of memory is essentially of two types. First, memory reveals positive facts about past events and about the experience of those events, be they wars, revolutions, or everyday realities in ‘times of normality’. Second, and more important, it tells us how recollections of events are acquired and subsequently altered in the constant forming and re-forming of identities. Memory is shaped by our changing surroundings and the way we interpret them. Certain methodological issues arise from this. Whatever the period in question, the time-frame of memory stretches from the ‘moment’ events take place until the day memories are recalled and articulated. Thus, an important part

of the historical interest in memory is the dynamic relationship between events and
subsequent other facts. The relationship between the habitual and the exceptional is an
example that is rich in clues about how memory works. The ambiguities of acquisition,
retention and retrieval are complicated once memories are expressed through language.  
‘Silence’ was the appropriate metaphor often used to describe the sense of repression in the
Spanish post-war years. But in everyday life the official discourse was likely to be distorted or
subverted. Irony was a conduit for a popular counterpoint to the public monopoly of martial
language. 3 It could be said to have kept alive a flicker of civil culture (and memory), but the
overwhelming sense was one of silencing.

Collective and individual ways of explaining or dealing with traumatic events, in
particular, focus the psychological and methodological dilemmas. How is the unexpressable
to be expressed? Trauma is inherently about memory and forgetting. Awful experiences,
especially of loss, are impossible to forget because they are beyond normal human
comprehension or existing schemata and cannot be assimilated into personal and collective
narratives. The horrific experience of internment in wartime extermination camps is only the
most obvious and dreadful example from twentieth-century Europe. 4

Memory is shaped by the nature of the events remembered. The relationship between
remembering traumatic events, politically, culturally and psychologically, and ‘forgetting’
them is part of our collective framework of understanding the past and communicating about
the future. The Spanish conflict of the 1930s had major social implications and was an
important, though never uniform, focus of memory (and forgetting). The war became a
battlefield of memories as both sides drew on the conflict as a source of political and moral

2 Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, (Cambridge, MA, 1979), 22.
3 Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Crónica sentimental de España, (Madrid, 1971).
lessons. It became the founding myth of Franco’s state, defining ‘the nation’ and its ‘destiny’. War memories, naturally selective, were also the focus of post-1939 political divisions of the political left (‘the defeated’). The post-war Republican recriminations, mostly conducted in exile, may have contributed to the dilution of the folk memory and culture of Spanish Republicanism, anarchism and socialism, though the destruction of this heritage owed considerably more to the post-war purge by the Francoist authorities and exile itself. In the end, memory of the war became a haunting presence during the peaceful transition to democracy after Franco’s death in 1975.

Many of the issues that are key to looking at the Spanish Civil War and memory are the same as those encountered in analysis of memories of Vichy France, or Fascist Italy, or, indeed, Nazi Germany. Several other European societies experienced something similar to a ‘civil war’ during the era of the world wars. In Spain, as elsewhere, the relationship between war and post-war is at the heart of collective memories of the twentieth century. How is trauma dealt with in a context of ‘normalisation’ and unprecedented economic development? Do memories of war shape responses to re-building and ‘making peace’? Memories of violence, terror and loss seem inevitably to be part of everyday features of life (and ‘development’), as suggested in post-war attitudes towards work (sacrifice), family (morals, guilt and generational conflict), and even housing (migration at any cost).

Memories of these several European ‘civil wars’ were later repressed in many senses. This ‘repression’ was made easier precisely because national events (related to long-standing

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4 For a broad overview of this and other issues of history and memory, see Josefina Cuesta Bustillo (ed), *Memoria e historia, Ayer* 32, (1998).

patterns of social relations and rhythms of life) became incrusted in the global ideological conflict. Part of the recent gradual process of historical ‘normalization’ of these conflictive European conjunctures has been precisely the study of every-day life, the shaping of popular perceptions, behavior, beliefs, and forms of social relations. Such a framework, in part based on the methodological insights of participant observation, (though in practice this is usually not identical to the ethnographic technique), could usefully be incorporated into historical practice in relation to contemporary Spain.

There can be little doubt about the trauma of the Spanish Civil War and the dense traces of painful memory it left. It has been calculated that there were some 350,000 deaths during the Civil War period of 1936-1939 in Spain in excess of the number that might have been expected had there been no war. A disturbingly high proportion of these were deaths away from the battlefield. An additional 214,000 excess mortalities have been calculated for the period 1940-42, as a result of hunger, disease and political repression related to the conflict, though the real effects may have been worse still. Probably around 500,000 people

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9 Juan Díez Nicolás, ‘La mortalidad en la guerra civil española’, *Boletín de demografía histórica*, III, 1, (March 1985), 52-3.
fled into exile at the end of the war.\textsuperscript{10} At the end of 1939, according to government statistics, there were more than 270,000 held in the regime's prisons from where political executions took place and where punishment beatings, starvation and lethal epidemics were commonplace.\textsuperscript{11} Thousands of others were forced into imprisonment in France after fleeing the Nationalist armies.\textsuperscript{12} Substantial numbers of Spanish Republicans fought in the French resistance and many were returned to face a firing squad as Germany occupied France in 1940, or were interned in Nazi concentration camps as 'stateless' enemies. Between six and seven thousand republicans from Spain were to die in the extermination camp of Mauthausen. The latent or delayed memory of the felt quality of such experiences, typical of trauma, or \textquote{memoria enferma}, is evidenced in emotional breakdown during re-telling and recollection of shocking events.\textsuperscript{13} 

A connection can thus be made between two ways of understanding memories of the Spanish Civil War which have been relatively little developed historiographically. These two areas are subjectivity and social history.\textsuperscript{14} The marginalization of civil society in the early

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} It is estimated that around 50\% were women and children. A.A.Bravo-Tellado, \textit{El peso de la derrota 1939-1944: la tragedia de medio millón de españoles}, (Madrid, 1974); Vicente Llorens, \textit{El exilio español de 1939}, (Madrid, 1976), 99-112.
\item \textsuperscript{11} \textit{Anuario Estadistico}, (Madrid, 1942), 1099. It is doubtful that these figures tell the whole story, however. The official average prison population for the period 1930-4 was around 9,000. By the end of 1942, according to the authorities, almost 125,000 remained in prison.
\item \textsuperscript{13} See Roig, \textit{Noche y niebla}; Eduardo Pons Prades, \textit{Morir por la libertad: españoles en los campos de exterminio nazis}, (Madrid, 1995).
\item \textsuperscript{14} ‘Social history’ in the sense of \textit{human} history, underlining the role of experience, though this alternative terminology is not unproblematic.
\end{itemize}
post-war decades means that Spanish memories need all the more to be explored as both sociological and psychological (collective and individual). The point of departure is the hypothesis that memory, collective and individual, is always embedded in social change (in the broadest sense) as well as political change. In order to show this it is necessary to look closely at the subjective: the felt effects of war and repression at a personal level and their expression by individuals and groups. The relationship of state and society and of the public and the private is therefore key to understanding Spanish post-war collective memories.

(2) The Francoist liturgy of memory

Out of the wartime rhetoric and the sources of its ideological justification, its imagery, and mentality, a concerted attempt was made in the post-war period to disseminate the inherent values of the Nationalist élites, as a continuation of the Francoist ‘Crusade’. In Franco’s Spain this meant the sacralization of politics and of memory through consecrating heroes (principal Franco himself) and martyrs (José Antonio Primo de Rivera, José Calvo Sotelo), constructing symbols (the flag of red and gold – ‘Spanish blood and earth’, the Alcázar of Toledo – ‘steadfastness’, ‘virility’, ‘sacrifice’) and celebrating anniversaries (18 July, 2 May, 15

Merely in secondary education, for example, see the Ley de la Jefatura del Estado sobre reforma de la Enseñanza Media, pronounced by Nationalist Minister of Education, Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez, Boletín del Estado, 23 September 1938, on ‘the definitive extirpation of anti-Hispanic and foreignizing pessimism, child of apostasy and of the hateful and lying black legend’. Also, Andrés Sopeña Monsalve, El flórido pensil. Memoria de la escuela nacionalcatólica, (Barcelona, 1994); Gregorio Cámara Villar, Nacional-catolicismo y escuela. La socialización política del franquismo (1936-1951), (Jaén, 1984). There were also a large number of books and pamphlets produced by the Falangist Movimiento and its off-shoots for women and youth, the SF and the Frente de Juventudes, as well as courses on ‘formación política’ and ‘formación familiar y social’ (for women and girls), most of which included sections about Franco and the war.
Saints’ Days\textsuperscript{16}. An ideological community coalesced around a state narration of triumph, aiming to inoculate society against forgetting or deviations. In this interpretation Spain was incarnated as a quasi-person, a unique and permanent being, whose ‘organic continuity’ reached back to the Catholic \textit{Reconquista} of Spain from the Moors and the Jews culminating in the 15\textsuperscript{th} century. The ‘spirit of 1936’ depended on perpetuating the story of the ‘unvarying constants’ of Spain’s ‘being’: her ‘sense’ and ‘direction’. The Civil War was used by Nationalist ideologues to deny any truth to the \textit{leyenda negra} (‘black legend’) associated with Spain’s inquisitorial past. According to the Francoist view, there never had been a ‘progressive Spain’ (good) and a ‘traditional Spain’ (bad), as liberals claimed, but simply the ‘Anti-Spain’ and the ‘eternal Spain’. This was the simple totalitarian duality portrayed in many school texts of the post-war era. It is not surprising that many Spanish children grew up believing that ‘\textit{la guerra de España}’ was fought by Spaniards against foreigners.\textsuperscript{17} The ‘real’ historian, the officials claimed, had to be more than an aseptic and impassive exhibitor of the successive political hegemonies of the mythical ‘Two Spains’. The relativism, as it was seen, of the ‘Two Spains’ thesis was cancelled out by the ‘Crusade’, which, by definition, signified an irreducible opposition between ‘the nation’ (\textit{one Spain}) and ‘others’.

\textsuperscript{16} On the struggle over 2 May (1808) as a symbol during the conflictual years of the Republic, see, eg, General Jorge Vigón Sueiordiaz, ‘Dimensión nacional del 2 de mayo’, \textit{Acción Española}, 52, 1 May 1934, who saw it as superior (more faithful to the Spanish temperament) than the workers’ holiday of 1 May, stressing ‘catholicism, monarchism, individualism, violence and rebellion: Spain without foreignness’. See also local commemorations following Nationalist occupations during the Civil War. Eg, ‘La Fiesta Nacional del 2 de Mayo en Málaga’, \textit{Boinas Rojas}, 4 May 1937, 9.

\textsuperscript{17} Eg, Julián Grau Santos (born in 1937): ‘Gradually it was instilled in me and I always believed that Spain had won the war against foreign enemies of our historic greatness’. Rafael Borràs Betriu, \textit{Los que no hicimos la guerra}, (Barcelona, 1971), 481.
This remained true into the 1960s for substantial sections of the Francoist élite, especially within the army, which responded aggressively to ‘modernizers’ who wished ‘to forget’. The unity of blood spilt in common could be an effective social agglutinative and this could be read, by some, as the meaning of the Fundamental Principles of the Movement as promulgated by Franco in May 1958. But a divisive sense of ‘oblivion’ (olvido) was deliberately being cultivated, at the same time, as a weapon to negate Spain’s historical identity. In reality, the gaining of Francoist hegemony in post-Civil War Spain was problematic since power was defined by the victory of one part of society (albeit of relatively multifarious political and social background) over another. Although the so-called ‘Fundamental Laws of the State’ did not explicitly distinguish between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, this concession was compromised by the doubtful proposition that this ‘constitutional evolution’ amounted to the formation of ‘a nation’. Grander symbols, like the monumental temple and crypt of the Valle de los Caídos, a kind of pantheon of the 'Crusade', similarly

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18 Eg, Luciano de la Calzada Rodríguez, ‘El espíritu del 18 de julio, como realidad histórica y proyección hacia el futuro’, in Publicación de la Cátedra “General Palafox”, de Cultura Militar, La guerra de liberación nacional, (Zaragoza, 1961), 601-643.

19 The meaning of these principles, which were claimed to represent ‘constitutional evolution’, is open to interpretation. They were certainly far from unproblematic, not least since they were based on the idea of a ‘Spanish nation’. The fundamental principles, according to the preamble, are a sharing of a ‘communion of Spaniards in the ideals that gave life to the Crusade’. ‘Unity of Spain’ and of Spaniards was a ‘sacred duty’ (art.1). The ‘national community’ was constituted by ‘past, present and future generations….. subordinated to the common good of the nation’. (art.5). ‘Participation of the people in legislative tasks’ would be facilitated through ‘the family, the municipality and the syndicate’ as ‘organic representation’. All political organization outside this framework ‘will be considered illegal’ (art.8), etc.

20 These laws, which were quasi-sacred texts to regime insiders, were: the Fuero del Trabajo (March 1938), the Ley Constitutiva de las Cortes (July 1942), the Fuero de los Españoles (July 1945), the Ley de Sucesión (March 1947); the Ley de Principios Fundamentales (May 1958); the Ley Orgánica del Estado (November 1966), etc.
never became a genuinely national focus of memory. Real social issues could not be covered over by myths and mysticism, though, by contrast, they became quite successfully ‘buried’ by socio-economic change in the 1960s.

Gradual ‘forgetting’ was assisted by the fragmentation of the Nationalist wartime coalition into various communities of memory rather than a single monolithic memory of victory and conquest. The example of the ‘bunker’ mentality within the army has already been mentioned. Another which has recently been researched with impressive results is that of Carlism in Navarre and the Basque Country. The complex and uneasy relationship between local traditions, competing identities, clientalist networks, and patterns of social modernization by the 1930s, meant that Carlism, once the war was over, rarely presented the Franco state with unqualified support or an unambiguous or usable collective memory.

Another were the ‘mandos’ (leading cadres) of the Sección Femenina (SF - women’s section of the state party), of whom there were some 15,000 at national and local level. The SF leadership certainly worked to keep alive memories of wartime sacrifices, particularly that of Falangist martyrs killed in action or executed who were in many cases relatives of particular mandos. The SF also gave unqualified public loyalty to Franco, a gesture which has obviously gendered connotations. But the extensive political and social tasks given to the women of the SF involved them in very active roles, something that contradicted the official discourse about the public passivity of the ideal woman. The messages that activists conveyed to women,

21 It is important that the real change was brought about by the Ley de Ordenación Económica (July 1959) - the so-called Stabilization Plan. This was the ‘Decree Law’ for dismantling the autarkic system and liberalising the economy, though its ultimate benefits are debatable.

while giving advice on child health to working class families, for example, could not always be controlled by other (male) authorities like Churchmen.\textsuperscript{23} Idealist Falangists, many of them from the pre-war days, (‘Camisas Viejas’ or ‘Old Shirts’), could be seen as a particular ‘warrior community’, with its own set of memories. Contradictions within each of these ‘communities’ abounded. Amongst Nationalist veteran brotherhoods, including \textit{falgangistas}, volunteering, rather than conscription, was an important part of the currency of community loyalty and reward, for example, provoking internal divisions. The junior officers, or lieutenants (alféreces provisionales), taken on by the Nationalist army during the Civil War, tended to be more politicised than others and therefore more socially radical and more hard-line in relation to the fate of memories.\textsuperscript{24} Even in this case, however, there were important gradations and divisions.\textsuperscript{25} It is significant that the power of most of these groups, with the exception of the army itself in a monolithic sense, was considerably reduced by the 1950s.

The gradual ‘negation’ of the ‘old’ Francoist memory was sponsored by individuals with state influence. This challenge celebrated the achievement of peace and security rather than the triumph of 1936-39 as such, and avoided conjuring up wartime effigies even as Franco himself frequently resorted to justificatory horror stories. The ‘modernizers’ relied on


\textsuperscript{25} Franco’s controversial liberal Catholic education minister (1951-56), Joaquín Ruiz-Giménez, who became something of a figurehead of political and social reform in the 1960s as director of the influential liberal journal \textit{Cuadernos Para el Diálogo}, valued his memories of the war among other alféreces provisionales. See Ruiz-Giménez, ‘Guerra y paz en el alma del hombre español’, intervention at the University of Zaragoza, 1959, in Ruiz-Giménez, \textit{Del ser de España}, (Madrid, 1963), 102.
memory principally to illustrate the alleged ‘chaos’ of the pre-war Republican years in contrast to the post-war ‘peace of Franco’. This was part of the demystification of the Civil War which recognized that its resonance to bind together successive generations was fast diminishing.

Rationalized ‘forgetting’, a product of social and generational (or ‘biological’) change, was echoed by the state and exemplified in the liberalizing activities of, for example, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism from 1962 to 1969, who became a symbol of the ‘new openness’ or ‘apertura’ in the mid-1960s. The concentration on ‘peace’ and even of reconciliation, as in Fraga’s organization of the celebrations of the ’25 años de paz’ in 1964, was partly a recognition that social harmony was a pre-requisite of successful economic development and of international geo-political pressures. By 1970, one of Fraga’s lieutenants was able to declare that ‘(economic) development and demythologization….. produce citizens (who are) enormously sensitized (‘sensibilizados’) to the value of peace and respectful of divergent attitudes’. Fraga’s attempt to rationalize memory rested on a realization of social change and on recognition of historical realities. It played down the mythical time of the hitherto official discourse, which had deliberately discarded the ‘liberal-Masonic-heterodox’ nineteenth century, in favor of what he called ‘real sociology’. In

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27 Jesús Unciti Urniza, the director of Editora Nacional del Ministerio de Información y Turismo. Borrás, Los que no, 98-99. See also, ibid, 27-8.

28 Before becoming Minister, Fraga was Professor at Madrid University and director of the Instituto de Estudios Políticos. Some continuity is visible with the post-war ‘new humanism’ of ambivalent Civil War Falangists. See, for example, Fraga’s favourable view, in his Las transformaciones de la sociedad española contemporánea, (Madrid, 1959), [12], of Pedro Lain Entralgo’s essay, España como problema, (1949, [later published, Madrid, 1956]).
significant speeches given in Pontevedra and Oviedo in March 1958, for example, shortly before the declaration of the Fundamental Principles, he resolutely demonstrated that Spain had become modern in the early nineteenth century, (making a sociological rather than symbolic claim on 1808), a transition that had to be embraced 150 years later. With an ironic jab at the epic or heroic version of Francoist memory, he placed reform of historic memory at the center of modernization: ‘The process that was initiated with the French invasion (1808) is certainly not gratifying (grato); but this is no reason to avoid facing up to it. It is more agreeable, of course, to study the glorious times of the Catholic Monarchs; but the historian or the theorist of the social sciences cannot be so selective (…..) Here we will hardly be talking about the religious problem; we will leave the history of the heterodoxes to Menéndez Pelayo and that of the secret societies to Don Vicente de la Fuente’.  

How does this discourse relate to the interests of Francoism’s more humble social and political constituency or audience? In modern societies the contest to shape the meaning of ‘the nation’, partly through memory, is ever present and on-going, but it becomes urgent in times of war. This struggle to control memory takes place within what we might tentatively call a ‘war culture’. The remembered or reconstructed experience of the war is cultural in the sense that it attempts to give meaning to the war. Remembering, in the beginning, is part of survival, since war entails human loss, violence, forced migration and exile. Memory, after inter-state wars, has the potential to re-connect political cultures, times, places, family and generations, and, in this sense is an essential part of cultural demobilization. But after civil

29 Fraga Iribarne, Las transformaciones, 7,8. Fraga was hugely prolific and this is one example of his work chosen because it exemplifies his aim of reconfiguring the official sense of history and control of historic memory. Although he does not talk about the Civil War, this realignment had major implications for contemporary understanding of the place of the war in Spain’s development and in ‘Spain’s memory’.

wars this never easy process is much more difficult. In this case, the war as a collective effort is only officially remembered as far as those who considered themselves ‘triumphant’ are concerned. Effectively, the rhetoric of the state granted an exclusive right to patriotic sentiments, self-justification, a sense of community, and a sense of sacrifice to the victors.\(^{31}\) While redemption of the Nationalist sacrifice was facilitated with the aid of the state, the Republican war effort and social revolution was depicted exclusively as a problem of public order and ‘a crime’. This ‘sin’, rather than sacrifice, could only be redeemed through punishment.\(^{32}\) Within a mental structure of repentance and expiation, work, hard labor, was enshrined as the inevitable means of redemption.\(^{33}\) It can be assumed that ‘Republican mourning’, although rather a clumsy term which would not have been used in the post-war period, was consequently mostly very private. Privately submerging mourning within ‘forgetting’ was inevitably less psychologically painful for those who had supported the Republic, though it may have increased psychological harm in the long run.

Given the exclusivity of public memory, it is evident that an important part of the war culture in Spain was felt as a culture of repression as far as the defeated are concerned. The Republican war effort is denied expression, representation and public ritualization. This is


\(^{32}\) *Dictamen de la comisión sobre ilegitimidad de poderes actuantes en 18 de julio de 1936*, (Barcelona, 1939); *The Second and Third Reports on the Communist Atrocities*, (London, 1937); *Ministerio de Justicia, Causa general: La dominación roja en España. Avance de la información instruida por el Ministerio público*, (Madrid, 1943). The 4\(^{th}\) edition of this last appeared unchanged in 1961 through the Dirección General de Información.

\(^{33}\) This was through the Patronato Central para la Redención de Penas por el Trabajo, which imposed disciplinary labour on thousands of prisoners (both men and women) from 1938, as a means to personal redemption and to a gradual remission of sentences. José Antonio Pérez del Pulgar, *La solución que España da al problema de sus presos políticos*, (Valladolid, 1939).
essentially a continuation of the war through symbolic violence. Unlike the experience of veterans in a national war against an external enemy, there is no ‘homecoming’ in Spain in 1939 except for the heroes of the Nationalist cause, expressed, perhaps, in the message of the triumphalist Francoist poster that declared ‘Spain has arrived’. Republicans would wait until after 1975 for a sort of ‘homecoming’ and even then part of the tacit agreement to ‘forget the past’ was that this be ‘silent’, individualized and atomized.34

The concept of sacrifice is united to memory in cultures of war. Perhaps this is even more the case in a Catholic context where the lives (and deaths) of ‘martyrs’ are recalled as witness.35 A vast edifice was built upon the collective (though contested) memory of the Catholic family of martyrs and saints and the ideals they invoked and exemplified. Ritualized public devotions, like the open-air Masses that accompanied the occupation of towns and cities, were a continuation, either directly or indirectly, of the myth of the providential victory. They implicitly reaffirmed the dominance of social élites linked to the victory and to Francoism since their representatives figured prominently in the ritual. At the same time, popular devotion to local patrons was usually tolerated because they were seen as demonstrations of virtuous religiosity or piety.36 Although the resonance of religious meditation on the war and sublimation through victory diminished with time, in order to redeem the sacrifice, moral and political constraints were imposed on the whole of society. In

34 There was never any homage to Republican veterans even to the modest extent of that paid by the Spanish parliament to International Brigade veterans in November 1996 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of their arrival in Spain to aid the government.

35 A part of the emotional appeal of religion and of the rituals (especially Catholicism) is inherently to do with remembering and commemoration. The sense of the family of the Church reinforces the emotional impact of this.

36 The cultural and political significance varied from place to place. Carlos Álvarez Santaló, María Jesús Buxó i Rey, Salvador Rodríguez Becerra (eds), La religiosidad popular, 3 vols, (Barcelona, 1989).
war cultures, sacrifice at the front and in the rearguard is perpetuated as a rhetoric of discipline and austerity in the post-war context.\(^{37}\) This is the case in Spain in the instance of post-war employment, both in public and private sectors, and in war and widows pensions, where ex-combatants were favored by state legislation.\(^{38}\) Sacrifice was redeemed through religious sublimation, but also at the cost of repressing ‘the defeated’. Ultimately, as in other war cultures, sacrifice would eventually be rewarded materially with improvements in state social insurance and sickness benefits, though this was also partly motivated by the exigencies of modernization.\(^{39}\) The repressive environment eased, not only for political reasons, but because of social-cultural change. But the exclusive acknowledgment of only ‘Francoist’ sacrifice made the dismantling of wartime mentalities problematic.

(3) Memory and social change

The first memories of children recalling the initial days of the war in the summer of 1936 are invariably dominated by disturbing visual images. These were particularly of spectacular revolutionary gestures, like the burning of churches and their sacred relics, (destruction of the past), and of the desperation of adults, parents and family, in recitation of the Rosary, away

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\(^{37}\) Although, because of the extreme polarisation of society and the motivation and opportunity for domination, in post-civil war societies the rhetoric of denial and abnegation is often swamped by state corruption and dubious political habits.


\(^{39}\) Into the 1960s, measures of social justice were associated with Franco’s victory, as acts of charity had been in the early 1940s. Eg, the 1962 commission of the First Nacional Assembly of Mutualidades Laborales presented the Minister of Labour with a ‘placa con el parte de la Victoria de la Justicia Social’ in honour of Franco’s 25 years of ‘Caudillaje’ (leadership). *ABC*, 2 May 1962.
from the parish church, or taking communion from priests in hiding. Soon these images would be lodged in the mind beside memories of Republican prisoners in chains and of execution squads. Neurological science can nowadays begin to explain why memory often deals in pictures, but understanding these images (and, ultimately forgetting them) is a cultural-psychological process.

Those who gave testimony in the 1960s and 1970s about the war often emphasized that the post-war was more devastating than the war itself, an important point about memory of civil wars in general. The human mind remembers desperate hunger and extreme cold very clearly. There may be long-lasting physical effects: defective physical growth of 1940s working class children was a reminder of the consequences of the war. But the psychological pressure of hunger can, with time, usually be dealt with. The loss of a mother painfully and permanently reshapes an individual’s world, however.


Trauma is also evident in the experience of exile. The novelist Luis de Castresana, who lived through temporary wartime exile as a child, and later met many Spanish exiles in several countries, commented in 1970, that they remained psychologically ‘fixed’ (‘anclados’) in the year 1936, and mentally in the ‘forbidden territory’ which was Spain, beginning a never-ending parenthesis. For Castresana, also expressing metaphorically his profound patriotism, it seemed as if ‘surgically transplanting a person’s heart’ could be less painful and easier than ‘transplanting a human being geographically’, against his will. Thus, a distinction needs to be drawn between the memory of exiles and of those who could remain to make a life in Spain. The temporal boundaries (and the ‘frontiers of memory’) that subdivided the Franco years were perceived differently for an exile since the passage of time itself was experienced differently. This struggle with identity meant that later integration was difficult and the experience of return, often to once rural towns no longer surrounded by countryside and with a population increased perhaps by 6-fold, was of disillusionment and a sense of ‘schizophrenia’, of life cut in two. In this question, where the evidence is usually


44 This distinction is brought out in Paloma Aguilar Fernández, ‘Agents of Memory: Spanish Civil War veterans and disabled soldiers’, in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge, UK, 1999), 84-103.

45 On sacred time and space, see Michael Richards, A Time of Silence. Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945, (Cambridge, UK, 1998), 67-74. Borrowing from social anthropology, the cultural-mental effects of temporal and spatial displacement might be viewed through the notion of ‘destructionation’.

from ‘subjective’ sources, important generational distinctions overlap with geographical differences.

The Spanish Civil War was not only a focus of memories but also a turning point in social terms. In a sense, it represented the painful beginning of a forced modernization based on a frantic movement from place to place and above all a sense of sacrifice. Part of this was the gradual destruction of old communities, (and cultural inheritance, values and forms of identity), and the problematic development of new communities.\(^\text{47}\) In demographic terms, the conflict represented what one observer, attempting to explain the spread of post-war epidemics, dubbed ‘the dance of the Spaniards’.\(^\text{48}\) The war represented a rupture, in many ways, not least of memory, of personal and collective narratives of identity. Consider, for example, the destabilizing social effects of the exploitative black market which became a second economy (bigger than the first) in the 1940s, or the psychological effects of forced migration in the 1950s or emigration in the 1960s, and the effects on family, community and politics. The demands of material necessity were linked to recollection: the association between (or comparison between) past hopes and present frustrated expectations, on the one hand, and what the future might hold, desires and prospects, on the other. The outcome of the Civil War ended hopes of land reform, for example, producing a sense of resignation that could only be sublimated for many people through sacrifice, not in religious terms, but materially, in terms of silent work, determined auto-didacticism, hard physical endeavor. It amounted to the sacrifice of one generation in the interests of the next.\(^\text{49}\)

Re-building a sense of community, especially around loss, was difficult in small towns, polarized before 1936 and traumatized by violence during the war. The social life of

\(^{47}\) Eg, Claudio Esteva Fabregat, *Industrialización e integración social*, (Madrid, 1960), esp. 21-29.

\(^{48}\) Dr José Palanca, ‘Hacia el fin de una epidemia’, *Semana Médica Española*, 4, 2 (1941), 432.
the hard but comparatively harmonious rural Catholic society of Castille and much of northern Spain, for example, revolved around the local priest, doctor and schoolteacher, who sponsored the ‘healthy’ life of ‘organic memory’. This seemed to be threatened by the urban preference of 1930s’ Republican politics and culture. The war, usually blamed on Republican politicians and trade union organizations, (though the real ‘culprit’ was modernization), signified the loss of these values and of an enormous popular culture ‘forgotten by liberalism’.  

In the purge of priests and other religious personnel at the beginning of the Civil War almost 7,000 religious were killed and campaigns were begun after 1939 to encourage young men to the priesthood.  

In the Catalan province of Lérida, for example, 270 priests were killed during the war, some 65% of the total. By 1943 there were only some 100 priests there to attend to the 352 towns and villages, although, in fact, the decline in religious vocations had begun well before July 1936.  

The bitterness of the pre-1936 ‘war’ over

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49 Eg, Manuel Irurózqui, preface to Mihail Manoilescu, *Teoría del proteccionismo y del comercio internacional*, (Madrid, 1943), xiii-xiv.


52 *Ecclesia*, 1 October 1941. Vocations had declined by 48% in the period 1926-35. Medical doctors appear also to have been a target for revolutionary violence in the countryside. According to the Dirección General de Orden Público, more than twice the number, on average, of priests, Civil Guard officers, judges, and medical doctors were killed in the revolution than other professions. ‘Los asesinatos de médicos rurales’, *Semana Médica*

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secular as against religious education spilled over into the Civil War itself resulting in purges of teachers. The struggle over symbols, like the violence done to school crucifixes and the politicized ritual of their recovery, seems to have had a powerful effect on memory. But, in spite of everything, some level of Catholic, conservative community, within which memory played an important part, was salvaged from the wreckage of family, Church, municipality, and ‘Patria’.

On the other hand, salvaging a community of memory in left-liberal circles was virtually impossible as liberal associations, political parties, the social clubs and Casas del Pueblo of the Socialist workers’ movement and trade unions were made illegal and closed down. The post-war experience was marked by direct incursions by the Francoist authorities into the realms of labor. A period in a labor battalion or penal detachment was designed to punish past political affiliations and explicitly to remind Republicans of the damage caused by the war. The Dirección General de Regiones Devastadas put prisoners to work on the reconstruction of battle sites like Teruel, Belchite and Brunete as a way of allocating culpability and enforcing memory of ‘the futile destruction wrought by communism’. These places would also have monuments to those ‘Fallen for God and for the Patria’. Children at the time remembered years later that some friends who had no fathers could read their names,

53 Eg, *Diario de Navarra*, 30 August 1936, 1; 2/6 September 1936, 1/3; *El Ideal Gallego*, 28 August 1936, 1; *El Correo de Andalucía*, 5 September 1936; *Heraldo de Aragón*, 3 September 1936; *La Vanguardia Española*, 1 August 1939, 1. See also Francisco Morente Valero, *La escuela y el estado nuevo: la depuración del magisterio nacional (1936-1943)*, (Valladolid, 1997); Wenceslao Álvarez Oblanca, *La represión de postguerra en León: depuración de la enseñanza, 1936-1943*, (León, 1986).

54 Eg, *Reconstrucción*, Año 1, no. 1, 6-16 on the ‘destruction’ and ‘heroism’ of Belchite.
inscribed on similar memorials, while other dead fathers’ names had left no trace. These
memorials were less grandiose versions of Franco’s Valle de los Caídos, again constructed
principally by the forced labor of Republican prisoners. But the socially integrating potential
was limited because the ‘triumph of the Cross’ was always, in some part, an obviously
ideological proposition in Franco’s Spain.

The daily structure of work was also affected by pressure from the state through its
system of sindicatos verticales (vertical unions) given over to the Falangist Movimiento to
administer as recognition of victory in the war. A system of rewards for workers was soon
begun to commemorate auspicious days, like the small bonus marking 18 July (the start of
‘the war of liberation’ in 1936) and the day off on 1 October to commemorate Franco
becoming Head of the Nationalist State on that date during the first year of the war (el Día del
Caudillo). Neither of these can hugely have affected ordinary working class lives when post-
war wages, for example, did not return to 1936 levels until 1959.

Before 1936, 29% of the Spanish population lived in urban centers of more than
20,000 inhabitants; by 1958 (even before the ‘boom’ of the 1960s) this proportion had grown
to 40%. Landless laborers, tenant families and small-holders all migrated in large numbers.
Approximately half a million farms would be swallowed up by larger concerns in the ten
years beginning in 1962. An important part of the migratory transition was from small

55 Eg, Pedro Altare to Borràs, Los que no, 387.
56 The professed aim was to ensure that sacrifices would not be lost in the silence of the past. However, the
popular perception was that the Valle sanctified Franco’s victory rather than the sacrifice of thousands of lives.
Only reluctantly, and somewhat in contradiction with the triumphalist rhetoric, were Republican dead permitted
a resting place here, although very many families, on both sides, were resistant. Daniel Sueiro, La verdadera
historia del Valle de los Caídos, (Madrid, 1976); Paloma Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil
española, (Madrid, 1996), 116-30. On plans to construct a 'Monument to the Counter-Reformation', see Angel
Llorente, Arte e ideología en el franquismo, (1936-1951), (Madrid, 1995), 78.
population nuclei and communities of rural habitat constructed of groups formed from direct ('natural’ or ‘primary’) contact to large industrial conglomerations ('mass societies’) of complex, indirect contact groups. The shift was rapid and continued in the 1960s, and took place within the space of little more than a generation. In 1950, one of every four persons active in agriculture was a waged worker. By 1965 the proportion was one of every ten. The process of reconstructing post-war social relations based on a collective memory made of recognized beliefs and practices, was never a uniform process in the confused post-war situation. A kind of cultural ‘aphasia’ seems to have inflicted minority social groups whose common identity was based on long-standing, even ancestral, working patterns and politics. One example are the ‘maketo’ miners in Cantabria studied by Abdón Mateos, who suggests that suppression of any social voice in this case was an example of self-silencing (or ‘forgetting’) under the force of threatened repression.57

This ‘fear as prudence’ is also recognizable in the process of the destruction of bracero (land laborer) communities in Andalucía during the war. The Civil War marked a watershed in the rural latifundio province of Jaén, dependent on the mono-cultural economy of the huge olive estates (latifundia) and rife with devastating poverty in the first post-war decade.58 Jaén was transformed rapidly from an area of pre-war population growth into a situation of depopulation and degradation. The turning point was precisely the Civil War. There was a psychological change involved in the disappointment of expectations of land reform in the 1930s and the violence and dislocation of the war itself. Bringing about change had been the main reference point of left-wing political identity. It was from this that a collective memory of the left sprung linking the past with an idealized future. The Civil War

57 Abdón Mateos, ‘La contemporaneidad de la izquierdas españolas y las fuentes de la memoria’, in Alted, Entre el pasado y el presente, 96. Also Esteva Fabregat, Industrialización e integración, 22.
caused a rupture between this past and the future, creating a deep psychological and political crisis and heightened a sense of resignation about the prospect of change. The previous relative balance between acceptance of honorable manual labor and rejection of the system was upset in the immediate post-war years. The ‘people’s rising against the señoritos’ in 1936, and the experiment of comunismo libertario had been ultimately defeated. Memories of the repression were still ‘live’ in the 1960s, but their political ‘value’ was re-oriented by the extent of social change.\textsuperscript{59} Resignation reinforced a dissociation with the past more broadly, with previous generations, and with the culture and forms of identity of the pueblo.\textsuperscript{60}

Migration amounted to 10\% of the provincial population of Jaén in the period 1941-50 and another 10\% from 1951-5. By 1955 very few municipal zones of the province could claim a stable population.\textsuperscript{61} ‘Of course, we are full of misery here, but nothing could compare with what we have lived through in the pueblo. Disease, hunger, cold, and each year another child’.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{58} See, for example, the letter of the Civil Governor of the province to the Minister of Trade and Industry, Juan Antonio Suanzes, 21 April 1951, AGA, Presidencia, SGM, caja.72.


\textsuperscript{60} Though the attempt to hold onto the past went as far as rural immigrants bringing the venerated image of the Holy Virgin, the regional holy patron, to the city with them, (as in Cornellá de Llobregat, Barcelona). See, eg, Esteva Fabregat, \textit{Industrialización e integración}, 27.


Separated from their new surroundings by the sacrifice of accumulated cultural capital and social status, rural immigrants in the 1950s and 60s were forced to ‘invent’ a new way of living and new ways of relating to groups around them. ‘Collective memory’, in complex societies, like social identity itself, is produced through a diversity of interactions freely undertaken within the public sphere. For obvious reasons, only very slowly did a developed civil society, based on such a situation, emerge in the post-war martial era in Spain. The revolution and Civil War could only be integrated into the ‘normal’ narrative of memory under the pressure of profoundly changing circumstances, extreme exploitation, provisionality and fear, ‘invented’ identities, and a dictatorial political system. Inevitably, in effect, this meant ‘forgetting’. Migrants’ relationship to the state also changed, though the insecurity of employment, as casual Madrid construction laborers found, was little different from latifundismo. Many families were motivated to migrate by the prospect of social security, sickness insurance and urban health dispensaries, though poor pay and work conditions were all too familiar. All of this, and the fact that it was the ‘men with ideas’ who were targeted in the Civil War repression, inevitably affected the way political memory shaped activities. Much of the evidence suggests that the move to Barcelona or Madrid, (or, indeed, provincial cities), once undertaken, entailed also a mental shift, from thinking about the past to a concentration on the future. Life, and how it might improve, often became child-centered, for example, suggesting a significant deferment of expectations. The one thing that all Jaén immigrants in the Madrid chabolas (‘shanty-towns’) at the end of the 1950s agreed on, in spite of the dreadful hardships in the city and the lack of a social and political infrastructure, was that they would never go back.63

This sense of deferred social gratification depends on an understanding of the hardships endured in the 20 years or more after 1939. The year 1959, which saw the initiation of a radical re-direction of political economy, more closely in line with social desires, can therefore be seen as an alternative symbolic frontier to 1939. In a sense, more than 60 years after the end of the Civil War, 1959 might better mark the ‘borderline’ between ‘history’ (the war and first post-war decades) and ‘memory’ (economic take off, higher standard of living, ‘prospects’). This is accentuated by the ‘biological decline’ of those who actually experienced the war and the effects of the global culture. Whereas in 1970 it took some mental effort (and a degree of wishful thinking) to argue that the war was ‘history’ because the year 2000 was closer in time than 1936, in the year 2001 the case is somewhat easier to put.

Another example that was much studied as a contemporary phenomenon was the impact of immigration in the Barcelona industrial suburb of Hospitalet de Llobregat in the 1960s. Almost 50,000 people arrived here in the period 1961-65 and settled in culturally strongly demarcated areas, though immigrants had been arriving in large numbers before the war and especially since 1939. The ‘natural’ population, established in the nineteenth century, identified itself with quite traditional religious values, attended the Centro Católico, and maintained strong associations with the past (including the tradition of the Catalan language). Then there were the first workers’ barrios where a level of spontaneous participation in the political and syndical life of the area before the war had acted as a social agglutinate and an important part of identity. But the effects of the war were again traumatic in the extent of the disarticulation of political memory and identity: ‘After the war of ’36, the general context of the country and, in particular, its laws, dismembered the dynamism and specificity of these barrios and the old associations gradually disappeared. Only the associations of the Church still managed to maintain any activity, though not spontaneously, but promoted by a few people, more or less linked to an ideology that was not exactly the most widespread. Some
groups of quaint enthusiasts survived with their marginal activities: pigeon-fanciers, societies of bird-lovers, choral societies, etc... Gradually, a style of life associated with a consumer society and mass culture became generalized. The more recent arrivals, mainly from Andalucía, lived in other zones, even further from the center, and were also kept culturally separated.

Memory is related to mentality, language and culture and, therefore, historical interpretation of memory is only feasible through reference to a range of shifting, contingent influences: what oral history specialists call the ‘scenification’ of memory. The contention is that both individuals and collectivities, as well as their memories, are all part of social history. Any social history of post-war Spain is likely to be weak without an analysis of memory. Individual and collective memories tell us something about the significance (often changing) of major events (like the Civil War), and about popular and élite mentalities. Because memory is intrinsically historical, it helps to explain change over time and, because memories are subjective, or felt, they help us to gauge the effects of change at several levels, allowing space for the role of individual agency.

The ‘silence’ that surrounded children’s lives in the 1940s is often recalled as something stubbornly intangible. Some people speak of growing up with a profound, though

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64 Angels Pascual, ‘El impacto de la inmigración en una ciudad de la comarca de Barcelona: Hospitalet’, in Antoni Jutglar et al (eds), La inmigración en Cataluña, (Barcelona, 1968), 74. The apparently ‘unifying’ effects of the marketplace are not least of the social changes that ought to be considered.

65 This is the oral history approach exemplified in, eg, Mercedes Vilanova (ed), El poder en la sociedad, (Barcelona, 1986); José Manuel Trujillano and José María Gago González (eds), Historia y memoria del franquismo, 1936-1978, Actas IV Jornadas Ávila, (1994), (Ávila, 1994); Luisa Passerini, ‘Introduction’, Passerini (ed), Memory and Totalitarianism, (Oxford, UK, 1992), 1-19. See also the 3 volumes of Julio Aróstegui (ed), Historia y memoria de la guerra civil, (Castilla-León, 1988). ‘Orality’, however, is also part of the written traces of the past and need not be restricted to spoken interviews.
inexplicable, sense of instability during the early Franco decades, when the year 1936 acted as a barrier within the family, widening the generational gap. The Spanish reality was contemplated as a provisional situation, and many children conveyed an unfathomable but pervasive sense of frustration and anguish.\textsuperscript{66} It has often been argued that it was ‘evasion’ and ‘apathy’, rather than consent or support (or resistance) that characterized state-social relations from the 1950s in Spain.\textsuperscript{67} This seems to be borne out by other evidence from ‘the obedient generation’ growing up in the post-war, struggling against a ‘monolithic conspiracy of silence’.\textsuperscript{68} But the silent compliance of the majority in the 1950s and 1960s may not have been motivated by apathy or a fear of repression as such. Rather, it could be that it became accepted that one had to keep quiet, to hide one’s opinions not only about politics but about acquaintances, individuals and seemingly innocent non-political issues. The psychiatrist Carlos Castilla del Pino, speaking with the authority of amassed case-histories from the period, has claimed that ‘prudencia’ was the key. Making careful judgements about what was permissible and what could not be done was part of everyday existence. The legacy of the war and the harsh disciplining of the 1940s was a form of self-censorship and repression: ‘the Spanish inhabitant acquired a subtle perception of the reality and refined his/her sense of this to adapt to the rules of the game of the existing socio-political context’.\textsuperscript{69} It may be here that the subjective sense of ‘totalitarianism’ becomes important. This ‘silencing’ was inevitably felt by many as repression of a sense of identity in many respects. Behavior that in the early

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{66} Eg, Carles Santacana i Torres, Victoriosos i derrotats: el franquisme a l’Hospitalet, 1939-1951, (Barcelona, 1994), 113; Borràs, Los que no, 154, 204, 487, 527.

\textsuperscript{67} See, eg, Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, Spain. Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1979).

\textsuperscript{68} Borràs, Los que no, 160, 513.

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years would be considered ‘desafecto al régimen’ (‘hostile to the regime’), was later incorporated into daily life as ‘failure to adapt’ (‘inadaptación’), as social self-marginalization or abnormality. In a sense, the stifling ‘closure’ (‘clausura’) of the Franco era, amounted to the transplantation of what we might today call a ‘small-town mentality’ to wider society. Effectively, this was a form of asocialization or forced ‘privatization’ of the individual. Prudence, born out of a more or less sub-conscious sense of fear and adhering to the motto ‘no hay que meterse en nada’ (‘one mustn’t get involved in anything’), is, it could be argued, somewhat different from ‘consent’, just as it is also not straightforwardly a case of ‘forgetting’.  

The stubborn psychological effects of the Spanish war and repression and imprisonment, including physical war disablement on the Republican side, were buried during the Franco years by both politics and social change. First, they were submerged beneath the struggle for mere survival in the years of autarky: forced economic self-sufficiency, repression, and migration. Then they were silenced by the claustrophobic atmosphere created by the anti-communist politics of the 1950s that conjured up the ‘chaos’ of the past. Later, memories were more or less brushed aside during the popular rush to economic development in the 1960s, a kind of collective release of tension after the first post-war decades. Finally, painful war memories were too sensitive to debate publicly during the peaceful transition to democracy after the death of Franco in 1975, though they may well have subliminally influenced social and political behavior during the process.

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70 Testimony about ‘clausura’, of ‘confinement and sadness’ (‘de una época encerrada y tristísima’): Borràs, Los que no, 83-85, 135, 207.

‘Amnesia’, individual and collective, came gradually to be seen as ‘the best medicine’ for Spain. This prognosis was in line with the generalized and tacit agreement in the 1960s and 1970s that the Civil War had been a tragic act of ‘madness’ for which all Spaniards were to blame. The logical corollary of this was that Spaniards were somehow innately ‘bad’, though this was rarely explored: ‘it has been said over and over again (‘hasta la saciedad’) that in Spain we cannot enjoy the freedoms that they have in other countries because we are ungovernable, because we have “fire in our veins”, because we are uncultured, because, because…..’ It remained difficult to forget that the political system, as it functioned at the beginning of the 1970s, had been born with the ‘punishment’ of the Civil War and at the cost of basic liberties. A sense of original sin with its sequel of ‘frustrations and guilt complexes’ continued to be felt while Francoist power prevailed. Acceptance of equally shared responsibility for the war implied that the ‘baptism of blood’ and the ‘purification’ and ‘purge’ of dictatorship were somehow justified. This ‘justification’ was articulated in the official discourse of the Franco regime.

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72 Eg, comments to Borràs, Los que no, 248. Forgetting has also been likened to an ‘anaesthetic’ or ‘narcotic’. Passerini, ‘Introduction’, 14. A conscious strategy of ‘forgetting’ pre-supposes that the war was in fact very much remembered. This dialectic is explored in political terms in Aguilar Fernández, Memoria y olvido.

73 Enrique Meneses to Borràs, Los que no, 249.

74 According to Franco, ‘the suffering of a nation at a particular point of its history is no caprice; it is spiritual punishment, the punishment which God imposes upon a distorted life, upon an unclean history’. (‘No es un capricho el sufrimiento de una nación en un punto de su historia; es el castigo espiritual, castigo que Dios impone a una vida torcida, a una historia no limpia’). ‘Discurso pronunciado con motivo de la entrega, a los comisionados de Jaén, de la reliquia del Santo Rostro’, Jaén, 18 March 1940, Palabras del Caudillo, 19 abril 1937 – 7 diciembre 1942, (Madrid, 1943), 157.

75 Arturo Pardos Batiste to Borràs, Los que no, 541-2. On the expiation of guilt through suffering in the 1940s and the sharing of guilt and responsibility during the transition to democracy, see Víctor M. Pérez Díaz, The Return of Civil Society: The Emergence of Democratic Spain, (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 24.
The danger of relying on this discourse is that the Spanish population is depicted homogeneously as somewhat passive, as mere recipient of the cultural and political diktat. In fact, Spain was witnessing a huge social resurgence during these years. As Fraga said in the late-1950s, this was a bigger and more ‘energetic’ society than ever before. The manipulation of collective memory ‘from above’ suggests a political functionalism which is more mechanistic than the complicated reality. Personal and collective Civil War memories demonstrated that the link between the past, the present, and the future was far from harmonious. The Franco state was inevitably forced to evolve. ‘Bunker’ elements grudgingly responded to pressure from slowly maturing civil society as it located intermediaries able to act within the state arena. This was a task of active social agency. But the evolution of state and society (and the relative ‘spaces’ occupied by each) was not merely a unilinear and positive road to modernity. Tracing the fate of post-war collective memories shows that remembering could be imposed through forms of repression more than freely expressed in the public sphere. Memory was also, however, subject to the uncertain exigencies of profound social change and displacement. The development of collective memories was as much about an often contradictory social process as it was about simple social ‘progress’.

76 By the early 1970s, being ‘left’ or ‘right’, politically, though it remained a guide, did not determine an inevitable position on the subject of the Civil War. (To Fraga, for example, José María Gil Robles, was merely one of the ‘traditionalists’.) But this indicated as much about the extent of social change since the war as it did about the extent of ‘political maturity’.