Introduction

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[A] Social science and human feelings

It seems odd that, whilst acceptance of the role of the emotions in public and political life was once commonplace, it is only now being rediscovered after decades of neglect. The Greeks debated the role of the emotions in public rhetoric, Machiavelli analyzed the contribution of love and fear to the exercise of power, and Hume examined the contribution of the moral sentiments to human reason. But for much of the last century political studies eschewed consideration of the emotions. It was assumed that political subjects were essentially rational actors busily maximizing their strategic interests even whilst sometimes constrained by their limited information-processing abilities. This strange and lopsided account of the political subject split cognition from emotion and reason from passion. To some extent, what happened in political studies simply echoed what was going on elsewhere in the social sciences, where, throughout much of the period after the Second World War, the grip of positivism and behaviouralism was powerful. Only slowly was this tide to be turned: first, through what has sometimes been referred to as the ‘discursive turn’ in the social sciences, that is, through the interest in language, meaning and discourse which gathered force in the 1980s; second, and more recently, through what is sometimes referred to as the ‘affective turn’ in the social sciences.
This renewal of academic interest in human feelings has been greatly facilitated by a number of traditions and disciplines. One strand within continental philosophy, focusing primarily on the affective dimension of our feeling lives, can be traced from Nietzsche through Bergson and Scheler to the postmodernists such as Deleuze and Guattari (1999). Almost as enduring has been the contribution of psychoanalysis, from Freud through Klein and Lacan to the present day (Anderson 1992; Dor 1999). More recently, developments in mainstream psychology involving the work of Ekman (1994), Plutchik (2002) and Tomkins (2008) have facilitated greater understanding of the different categories of human feeling, including distinctions between basic and secondary emotions. Contemporary psychological theories in turn have influenced and been influenced by advances in neuroscience which have provided scientific evidence of the distinctive location, functioning and organization of the ‘feeling brain’ (Damasio, 2000; Dennett, 1992). Finally the human sciences themselves, particularly sociology (e.g. Hochschild, 1983) have provided us with ways of understanding the cultural and institutional organization of feelings, so that we now are beginning to realize that, although feelings are individually experienced, they are often embodied in the cultures of occupations and corporations.

Of course, it might be argued that by means of these theoretical developments the social sciences have done no more than begin the long process of catching up with the world that unfolds around them. It seems bizarre that the determined refusal to admit the feeling world into the social sciences and political studies occurred in a global society.
characterized by eruptions of nihilistic hatred (the Holocaust and, later, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Rwanda), rule by terror and paranoia in successive communist regimes, the background threat of Mutually Assured Destruction and its flashpoints during the Cuban Missile crisis, and, later, the Tehran hostage crisis. To brighten the landscape, the refusal to admit feelings also occurred at the same time as the waves of hope-fueled progressive social movements swept across the West in the 1960s, Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, and the ‘Arab Spring’ today. Indeed, to bring matters up to date, we have seen repeated evidence of the powerful and formative role of human feelings in public life in the last decade from the waves of contagious panic which fueled the crash in the financial markets in 2008, to the triumph of Barack Obama’s ‘politics of hope’ over the Republicans’ ‘politics of resentment’ in the same year.

[A] Conceptual distinctions

In one sense, the so-called ‘affective turn’ in the social sciences to which we have just referred is misleadingly named. This is because we can distinguish between affect and emotion as two forms, overlapping and not mutually exclusive, that human feelings can assume. Affect concerns the more embodied, unformed and less conscious dimension of human feeling, whereas emotion concerns the feelings which are more conscious since they are more anchored in language and meaning. An affect such as anxiety is experienced in a bodily way, while an emotion such as jealousy is directed towards objects (a lover, a rival) which give it meaning, focus and intentionality. The distinctive thing about anxiety is the way in which its object constantly shifts from one thing to
another, almost as if the object is secondary to the feeling. Thus, whereas emotion is embedded in discourse, affect appears to be more detached from it. We typically know if someone is anxious by how they look, walk, carry themselves, by the gestures they deploy, by the tension that may be visible in their bodies; all this we register before they even speak.

In making this distinction between affect and emotion, we want to suggest that purely cognitivist accounts of human feelings, such as that developed by Robert Solomon (2007), give insufficient account of that dimension of our feeling lives which is more impulsive, indeterminate and unformed. We believe that this is important for analyses of the role of human passions in political life. Because affect is less anchored in discourse, it is more labile and fluid, and thus more susceptible to spreading rapidly through groups, even beyond face-to-face groups. Originally such movement was construed by Freud and others in terms of ‘contagion’ (Freud, 1921); nowadays we are more likely to understand it in terms of the operation of ‘affective networks’ (Hoggett, 2009, pp. 10-11). The affective dimension of feelings therefore helps us understand their unruliness and unpredictability. Nowhere is this more so than in public life where anxiety, rage, panic, paranoia and other feelings, once they gather momentum, become difficult forces to control. Political actors, such as populist politicians, who seek to manipulate such feelings are just as likely to be destroyed by the forces they try to control.

For methodological individualists, the idea that a feeling such as anxiety or guilt may be a property of a group is likely to prove puzzling. Seeing the individual as the basic unit in
society, they are led to assume that feelings, like meanings and intentions, are somehow the ‘property’ of the individual. This under-socialised concept of the human subject, one shared by some traditions within mainstream psychology, is unable to see how feelings bind the group, contributing substantially to group coherence. Affect and emotion shape the structure and texture of society at its various levels, from the family group, through to organizations and beyond to the wider social movements in civil society. Various concepts have been put forward recently as ways of trying to grasp such socially structured feelings. For example, Debbie Gould, a contributor to the present volume, has suggested the concept of ‘emotional habitus’ (Gould, 2009) as a way of grasping the tacit, taken for granted, affective patterns that characterize social movement subcultures. In a similar vein, James Jasper, in his study of political mobilization, distinguishes between fleeting emotional reactions and what he termed ‘abiding affects’. These are enduring and organized feelings such as fear or anger which provide the motivational basis for political action (Jasper, 1998). Another valuable concept is that of ‘structures of feeling’, an idea developed by the Marxist literary critic Raymond Williams (Williams, 1997). For Williams, a structure of feeling may characterize a whole society or group of societies during a particular period of history. So, for example, the pervasive nature of moral and risk anxiety in advanced capitalist societies such as the US, UK and Japan could be seen as a ‘structure of feeling’ which manifests itself in everything from the design of homes and buildings, patterns of use of outdoor urban spaces, film, art and music and even in everyday public interaction. To illustrate the latter, some of our own recent research revealed how many men living in working class areas of the city would no longer say
‘hello’ to strangers in their neighbourhood for fear of being thought of as ‘weird’ or even a ‘paedo’ (Beedell et al. 2010).

[A] Feelings in Politics: Some Themes

This collection of essays is based upon a seminar series which ran over a period of eighteen months between December 2006 and June 2008. The series, called ‘Politics and the Emotions’, was supported financially by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council. We sought to use this series as a way of taking a closer look at some of the thematic areas which were emerging as foci for study and debate in political studies, and in the social sciences more widely. Some of these themes, such as the ‘politics of fear’ surrounding 9/11 and subsequent Western interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, were current and very topical. Others, such as the rise of therapeutic culture and its impact on public policy, related more to trends covering several decades. Whilst work in this whole field of politics and the emotions is still quite scattered, it is now becoming easier to discern some of the contours and clusters, only some of which we have managed to include in this volume.

First, and this takes us right back to Aristotle and the Greeks, there is the relation between the emotions and political discourse, narrative and rhetoric. At times, some of the more rationalist currents within political studies have tacitly assumed that if discourse is to be truly reasonable it should be free of passion. Indeed, we have argued that at times accounts of political deliberation have posited an ideal of communicative rationality
shorn of the emotions (Hoggett and Thompson, 2002). Of course such an ideal assumes that our reasoning capacities are enhanced when freed from emotion. We argue, quite to the contrary, that so long as these emotions are not overwhelming, they provide both the motivational basis for our intellectual lives and enhance our reasoning capacities. Thus, for example, George Marcus (2002) has found that moderate levels of anxiety facilitate the search for, and processing of, political information among voters: anxious voters are likely to be more discerning voters, so long as this anxiety is contained within comfortable limits. The same is true of the anger voters feel when they perceive an injustice has been done. This emotion motivates them to search out information, and to take a more critical stance towards arguments which they may have previously accepted at face value. And, in terms of their own communication to others, strong feelings can make their own arguments more powerful.

For the Greeks, the use of emotion in political argumentation was the subject of much debate. Avoiding the more rationalist strain in Plato, Aristotle saw rhetoric as essential to practical debate and the ability to win over the soul of the other. More generally, we suggest that all communication has what might be called ‘affective registers’ (Newman, 2011), and such communication includes the narratives elicited through interviews conducted by political journalists. The affective register may support the narrative content as, for example, when a policy-maker speaks hopefully about a new development. But the affect may not support the narrative, and it is these incongruities between affect and discourse which take us into the complexities of rhetoric – the threat
lurking in the warm words of the authoritarian ruler, the condescension present in the reasoned tone of the political patrician, and so on.

Second, and this is illustrated to some extent by the contributions of Cunningham, Kaindaneh and Rigby in this volume, feelings are integral to the dynamics of conflict and post-conflict situations. This is vividly illustrated in situations of conflict where hatred of the other group is inextricably bound to love of one’s own group. Paradoxically, therefore, love, the basis for ‘fellow feeling’, can provide the platform for highly regressive and authoritarian forms of group bonding (Ahmed, 2004). The patterning of love and hate in conflict situations also provides a glimpse of the way in which feelings contribute to the dynamic ordering of public life. As Žižek (1993) has noted, since we enjoy our hatreds, they are not easily given up. In fantasy, aggressors imagine themselves to be the victim, wrapping themselves up in the victim’s moral virtue. In conflict situations, aggressors cannot be ‘educated’ out of their misdeeds; for change to occur, the emotional roots of group identities have to be understood. Change for both real victims and real perpetrators involves loss, guilt and regret, and some now argue that institutional mechanisms providing for reparative justice – e.g. memorialisations, truth commissions – need to be constructed if such feelings are to be worked through (Minow, 1998).

Third, the role of feelings in social movements has been a subject of considerable interest. The renewed interest in the role of passion in politics was largely prompted by the work of political sociologists in the US such as Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper who have analyzed the role of feelings such as love, shame, anger and humour in the
mobilization of political and social movements (Goodwin, Jasper and Poletta, 2001). These writers tended to draw on sociological and anthropological accounts which emphasized the way in which feelings were socially constructed through movement discourses and the ‘framing’ activities of activists and elites. Gould, for example, has looked at the efforts of gay and lesbian movement activists in the US during the AIDS crisis in the 1980s to reframe the shame and loss that pervaded their community into pride and anger, thereby enabling this community to move from being positioned as an object of fear, anxiety and contempt to the position of an active political subject (Gould, 2001, 2002).

A fourth area where an understanding of the emotions can contribute to politics is in the area of political campaigning and communication. Ever since the early work of Philip Converse (1964), the idea that voters are rational information processors or dispassionate reasoners has been subject to challenge. The typical voter makes decisions on small amounts of information which have been selectively filtered. They make little use of abstract categories such as ‘egalitarianism’. There may be little consistency in the opinions that they have, and they can be powerfully influenced by how they imagine ‘people like us’ think and feel about the same issues (Luskin, 2002). In a powerful critique of Democratic Party campaigning, Drew Westen (2007) has argued that Republicans had been consistently more adept in understanding the ‘non-rational’ dimensions of voter behaviour including, for example, the power of narratives (good stories) as well as facts and information. Drawing on recent advances in neuroscience which revealed the role of the emotions in thinking, reasoning and decision-making,
Westen has concluded that political campaigning is about winning both hearts and minds, and that the Democrats have lost out to their opponents in the past by focusing only on the latter.

Fifth, the emotions are also intimately involved in the processes of governance and policy-making. In late modernity, the state becomes the focus of social anxieties which manifest themselves in recurrent moral and risk panics. What attitude does the state take to such anxieties? Does it face them proactively or reactively? Does it even recognize the emotional ground upon which it is working? If governments cannot contain such anxieties, then they will project, enact or embody these feelings. Projection occurs where a government colludes with powerful anxieties by focusing them upon a particular target group which becomes construed as a social problem. Enactment occurs when a government, faced with a panic of some form, succumbs to the intense pressure to be seen to be doing something. This is very much the territory of Murray Edelman’s ‘symbolic policy making’ (Edelman, 1964). Alternatively, the state and its institutions may come to embody social anxieties through its rules, systems, structures and procedures. The state may seek to deal with recurring risks though ever-increasing attempts at control, thereby proliferating rules, rigidifying procedures and structures. Such reactions can be seen as ‘social defences against anxiety’ (Menzies Lyth, 1959).

The idea that policies and institutions may embody unreflexively organized defences or coping responses provides a valuable contribution to our understanding of the propensity of the state towards bureaucracy. Here the resort to hierarchical control by, for example, forcing staff to adhere rigidly to detailed procedure manuals, can be an illusory quest to
eliminate risk in complex situations – such as child protection, street crime and immigration – which provoke massive social anxieties.

A sixth area which has been developed recently concerns the contribution that an understanding of the emotions can make to the humanitarian impulse in politics. Interesting arguments have developed concerning the nature of compassion, its normative dimensions, its relation to other feelings and impulses such as sympathy and pity, and its connections to altruism and other forms of social solidarity (Berlant, 2004; Linklater, 2007; Monroe, 1998; Nussbaum, 1996, 2001; Whitebook, 2002). The attempt to restore the status of compassion as a political virtue has had to deal with important objections (Arendt, 1973), but in a globalised society the need to expand the reach of democratic principles and practices has motivated the search for ways of enriching and deepening democratic values, and for some writers compassion captures this idea of a sentiment or impulse which is both democratic and cosmopolitan.

Finally, there has been a recent emergence of interest in emotion in international relations (Mercer 2005; Ross 2006). The contributions by Northcott and Lucas in this volume represent one very specific aspect of this – the role of fear and paranoia in the post 9/11 world. This closely parallels growing interest in the role of fear, humiliation and ‘group love’ in what might be called ‘the politics of violence’, particularly with reference to the Middle East (Ayyash 2010; Fattah & Fierke 2009; Melander 2009; Sasley 2010)

[A] A Typology of Political Feelings
Another way of explaining the importance of an understanding of the human passions to public life is by developing typologies of human emotions and then observing the connection between each of these different typologies and politics. Several attempts have been made in mainstream psychology to typologize emotions in this way, from Paul Ekman’s attempts to isolate the ‘basic emotions’ (Ekman, 1993) through to Robert Plutchik’s ‘wheel of emotions’ (Plutchik, 2004). The following categorization of feelings draws upon some of these previous typologies.

**Positive moral emotions:** There are a range of feeling states which are specifically bound up with our moral and ethical lives; these can be divided between positive and negative moral emotions. Positive moral feelings, such as compassion, concern, sympathy and forgiveness, draw us towards the object of our emotion. We have already mentioned the extensive ongoing debate about the nature of compassion by political theorists. These debates also have considerable practical relevance. For example, in the UK a group of leading NGOs engaged in action around humanitarian and environmental issues, produced the report *Common Cause* as a way of highlighting the deepening relevance of ‘pro social’ values in market-driven societies. As they put it:

> The values that must be strengthened – values that are commonly held and which can be brought to the fore – include: empathy towards those who are facing the effects of humanitarian and environmental crises, concern for future generations,
and recognition that human prosperity resides in relationships – both with one another and with the natural world (Crompton, 2010).

**Negative moral emotions:** by contrast, negative feelings repel us from their object. The most powerful negative moral emotions aimed at the other are disgust and contempt. These are often implicated in the powerful moral reactions which characterize moral panics (Cohen, 1972; Glassner, 1999) where a particular outgroup – ‘paedos’, ‘trailer trash’, ‘chavs’, ‘feral’ children – are subject to organized moral hostility. Whilst such feelings can be directed towards the self, more common self-directed negative feelings include guilt, remorse and regret. These feelings are clearly implicated in the ‘politics of forgiveness,’ but whether they are the necessary condition for the emergence of such a politics is an issue explored by Michael Cunningham in this volume.

**Positive feelings (of attraction):** The organization of good feelings in public life, although a pervasive phenomenon, has still not been systematically examined. Good feelings mediate both horizontal and vertical social relations, and there is also a third cluster of good feelings which seem to refer more to an internal state having no particular object. Feelings such as love, trust and gratitude play a key role in mediating our relations with each other. This remains relatively under-explored, the one exception being the study of trust and the vital role it plays in maintaining social networks, contracts and inter-organizational relations (Fox, 1974; Granovetter, 1992), and as a basic currency in the formation of social capital (Sullivan and Transue, 1999). Love, admiration and awe also mediate our positive relations to something higher, whether this be a loved political
or religious leader, or a set of beliefs or symbols. Studies of charisma clearly reveal the idealization of political leaders, even those of the most autocratic nature (Overy, 2004). But ‘leader love’ is not necessarily the creation of charismatic relations; it may be based upon non-idealized love and gratitude towards political figures who have earned such respect through their courage, fortitude or generosity. The third group of positive feelings are in some ways the most intangible; perhaps closely approximating to affects, they include hope, optimism, joy, happiness and enthusiasm. Within millenarian traditions, including political belief systems with strong millenarian foundations, optimism is based upon a teleology which suggests that history is somehow on the movement’s side. As is well known, the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci sought to counter this impulse within the early communist movement by insisting that the only realistic foundation for optimism would come from ‘a pessimism of the intellect’ (Gramsci, 1971) – that is, the capacity to face the world as it is rather than as we would like it to be. Nevertheless, there is evidence that ‘positive illusions’ can play an important role in sustaining health and wellbeing (Snyder 1989). Perhaps for most of us Gramsci’s paradox – think critically and face reality unblinkingly whilst retaining an unswerving hope in the capacity of oneself and one’s fellows to change life for the better – is just too difficult to sustain. Indeed, psychoanalysts such as D. W. Winnicott made precisely this point when insisting that imagination, as opposed to delusion, plays an essentially constructive role in individual and cultural development (Winnicott, 1971). Like other affects, optimism has a propensity towards contagiousness, something revealed vividly in the recent credit-fueled bubble that preceded the 2008 financial crash. Here we could say that at some point ‘positive illusions’ became transformed into ‘negative delusions’ as the contagion
amplified the initial optimism into something which became uncontainable. The concept of positive illusions takes us to the issue of happiness, something which has become a focus for both researchers and policy makers in recent years. Martin Seligman has become particularly associated with the development of what has become called ‘positive psychology’, the focus of which is the study of happiness or wellbeing (Seligman, 2011). Given the accumulating evidence (Rutter and Smith, 1995; Lane, 2000; Layard, 2005) that at a certain point the correlation between increased material prosperity and increased wellbeing begins to lessen, policy makers in the prosperous West have become increasingly preoccupied with the search for alternative measures of ‘wealth’ to GDP. The work of Amartya Sen has been very influential here, not only in informing the Human Development Index for the United Nations but, more recently, in influencing both the UK and French governments. Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2001) have argued for the continued relevance of Aristotelean notions of human flourishing as against more narrowly utilitarian notions of happiness.

Negative feelings (of repulsion): The strongest negative feelings towards the other include hatred, envy, spite, malice and loathing. In public life, this cocktail of toxic feelings is most closely associated with the phenomenon of ressentiment, a particular kind of resentment first glimpsed by Nietzsche, then analyzed further by Max Scheler (1992), and now widely understood to be the affective foundation for reactionary and authoritarian forms of populism (Brown, 1995; Demertzis, 2006; Hage, 2003). Ressentiment is seen as the feeling of the powerless who are forced to suppress the resentment and anger they feel about their position so that their bitterness turns in upon
itself. In ressentiment, the original object of grievance is given up but the affect is held on to; the sense of grievance is nursed, finding expression in a litany of complaints, criticisms and denigrations which becomes the material for populist politicians and movements. Racism, nationalism and welfare chauvinism (hostility to those perceived as non-nationals who are benefiting from public services such as education and health care) are routes through which ressentiment may be channeled. There is also a group of more intangible negative feelings whose ‘object’ is not so much the other but life or time itself. Here we can include pessimism, cynicism and despair. Peter Sloterdijk (1984; 1988) was one of the first to examine cynicism as an organized cultural phenomenon, and several studies have now been conducted of cynicism in institutions such as the police force (Regoli, et al, 1989) and education (Southwell and Welch, 2006). For some, the modernization of politics and the creation of new political/media elites has led to a growing disenchantment with democratic processes and institutions giving rise to a generalized cynicism and disengagement.

Feelings associated with loss: The feelings associated with loss – grief, sorrow, disappointment, disillusionment, sadness, melancholy – are among some of the most powerful to be experienced by individuals and groups. As Peter Marris has argued, all change involves loss (Marris 1974), and therefore loss and the feelings attendant upon it are the inevitably accompaniment of social and economic change, including experiences of urbanization and development, industrial restructuring and migration. The more recent tradition of post-colonial studies sees loss as the companion to domination, and melancholia as integral to racialised, gendered and other ‘othered’ subject positions (Eng
and Kassanjian, 2003). If loss can be worked through by accessing the symbolic resources (politics, literature, music, film) necessary for the loss to be mourned, then new collective identities (cultural, national, etc.) can be constructed. From a different direction, the creative uses of grief and grieving have also been examined, particularly by Gail Holst Warhaft (2000) in her fascinating study *Cue for Passion: Grief and its Political Uses*. One of the possibilities that emerges from this work concerns the possibility of ‘frozen grief’ which – unlike the ‘inability to mourn’ of melancholia – assumes the form of a ‘refusal to mourn’ as, in the celebrated case of the Mothers of Disappeared in Argentina, the victims of the junta use their grief to sustain their struggle for justice.

**Feelings associated with hurt:** Groups which are the object of negative emotions such as hatred, disgust and contempt will be affected by such sustained attacks. Any social group requires a degree of healthy narcissism to sustain its positive sense of itself. Injuries to such narcissism, the consequence of unequal relations of power, result in shame and humiliation. For example, in an almost routinised way, social class differences are reproduced through processes of disrespecting and shaming (Sennett and Cobb, 1993; Reay, 2005). Similar processes can occur along lines of cultural difference, particularly where these have become racialized. In his influential book *The Geopolitics of Emotion* (2010), Dominique Moisi argues, in an implicit critique of Samuel Huntington’s thesis concerning the clash of civilizations, that tension between the West and Middle Eastern countries is best understood in terms of the relationship between a culture of fear in the US and a culture of Arab and Muslim humiliation, the legacy of at least two centuries of colonial and imperial interference. The role of rage as a defence against feelings of
shame and humiliation has been examined by Thomas Scheff amongst others (Scheff and Retzinger. 1991). Scheff suggests that shame and rage have played an important role in sustaining some forms of conflict such as that in Northern Ireland. To take a final case, based on face-to-face interviews with militant Islamists in the post 9/11 period, Jessica Stern, in her book *Terror in the Name of God*, traces the links between humiliation and religious rage (Stern, 2004).

**Feelings associated with injustice**: Anger, resentment, grievance and outrage lie at the heart of the emotions of protest. However, the mediating role of framing processes crucially influence the perception, or failure to perceive, injustice. Thompson (2006) has argued, against Axel Honneth, that anger is not the automatic response to misrecognition, nor is it intuitively guided towards the source of injustice. It all depends crucially upon the way in which the experience is framed.

**Feelings related to ‘flight’**: Anxiety, fear, terror and horror can have a powerful influence on public life. For example, fear and sometimes even terror typically accompany the eruption of moral and risk panics (Sunstein, 2005). Paranoia constitutes a particular and interesting form of fear where the object of the fear response is largely imaginary. The ‘paranoid style’ of politics in the US has been a focus of analysis since the McCarthy period of the 1950s (Hofstadter, 1979; Rogan, 1987), and, as we have just noted, it surfaces again in Moisi’s (2010) analysis of the culture of fear in the US. The contributions of Northcott and Lucas in the present volume continue this line of analysis,
adding to the literature on the climate of paranoia in the US after 9/11 (Clarke and Hoggett, 2004).

[A] Chapter by chapter

Part I of this book focuses on the complex and multi-faceted relationships between emotions, antagonism and deliberation. In her chapter, Marion Barnes focuses on the place of emotions in the various sorts of deliberative forums which are now quite commonly used in policy-making processes. In particular, she seeks to determine which sort of forum is best able handle the emotional experience of welfare service users in order to shape policies for these users in the fairest and most effective way. To this end, Barnes investigates two particular cases. The first, a citizens’ jury held in Belfast in 1998, sought to find out how people felt about proposed changes to health and social care services. The second case is that of a legislation subcommittee which was charged with implementing reforms to Ontario’s community mental health services. Barnes contrasts the understanding of these forums as spaces in which reasoned argument is intended to lead to good policy making with the importance of values and emotions in motivating action within social movements. Her conclusion is that, since the expression of legitimate and important emotional experiences needs to have its place in deliberation about social policies, ‘deliberative forums should be judged on their capacity to encompass such expression’.
Bas van Stokkom’s argument in Chapter 3 complements Barnes’s well. Like Barnes, he also argues for a broader conception of deliberation than that characteristically assumed by the designers of deliberative spaces. He does so in the belief that the argumentation process can be enriched by drawing upon affective and narrative types of communication within public discussion. To make this point, van Stokkom examines a number of Dutch interactive policy experiments in the fields of urban and landscape renewal. Focusing on the emotional dynamics of such experiments, he notes that it is not rational argumentation which changes the views of the participants, but rather their encounter with particular stories, metaphors or design-presentations. The emotional energy that comes with these encounters may change not just the views but also the very identities of the participants. Barnes would not disagree with van Stokkom’s conclusion that ‘we are in need of deliberative bodies in which persons do not have to leave their emotions behind’.

In Part II, the authors address the intimate and powerful role that fear plays in our political lives. For Michael Northcott, the shape of the contemporary politics of fear is most clearly seen in the doctrine of the ‘war on terror’ which emerged after 2001. He argues that the United States government used this idea in order to sustain an ‘atmosphere of fear’ in which it was possible to ensure the quiescence of the American public as a reinvigorated set of foreign policy objectives was developed. However, Northcott argues, ‘far from reducing the risk of terrorist attacks, and fear of such attacks, the war on terror actually advanced both the fear and the reality of terror and violence’. Taking a step back from contemporary events, Northcott suggests that the origins of the modern politics of fear may be traced back to Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. For Hobbes, fear is the
quintessential political emotion, since it is only fear that is capable of forcing us into political association with one another. Northcott ends his chapter by asking ‘where we might find resources for the recovery of a more hopeful and peaceable vision of politics’. For him, Augustine may provide the answer. In sharp contrast to Hobbes’s dark vision of Leviathan, Augustine’s ‘commonwealth is a multitude of people who are bound together by their “common objects of love”’.

In his contribution to this book, Scott Lucas agrees with Northcott that ‘a far-from-benign “culture of fear”’ is to be found in contemporary American political discourse. Such a culture, Lucas argues, plays an important role in the making of US foreign policy, both now and in the past. The Soviet Union of the 1950s, and the Islamist terrorists of today, are both ‘constructed nightmares’ which are used ‘to justify the projection of American power around the world’. Just as anti-communism justified American policy during the Cold War, so the war on terror now justifies the US government’s attempts to secure a worldwide ‘preponderance of power’. Lucas’s worrying final thought is that it is not clear how this contemporary politics of fear may be exhausted, since, ‘unlike the Cold War, there is no symbolic marker – no fall of the Wall, no end to an enemy system such as Communism – that can offer long-term absolution of the fear that has been cultivated in past generations and, in particular, in the first years of this century’.

Part III of this book examines what we have called the affective dimension of political mobilization. In her chapter, Deborah Gould conducts an intriguing examination of the nature of political despair. This sense that nothing can be done, that nothing will change,
may of course lead to the demoralization and demobilization of would-be political activists. More surprisingly, Gould argues, this emotion may also have productive potential. Despair and its companion feelings – such as hopelessness, desperation and a sense of being overwhelmed – may actually inspire political action. In order to make these arguments, Gould draws on the case of the direct action AIDS movement in the United States, ACT UP. After a moving account of the workings of despair in this movement, she concludes on a more hopeful note. Without seeking to deny or repress feelings of despair, Gould suggests, it may be possible for political activists for acknowledge, collectivize, politicize and even mobilize on the basis of despair. Her account of the First Annual Parade of the Politically Depressed held in Chicago on May Day 2003 suggests that there might even be playful ways of facing up to and dealing with despair.

In Chapter 7, Mary Holmes agrees with Gould that the connections between the emotions and political mobilisation are complex. For evidence of this, she looks at the tangle of emotions involved in feminist political processes, drawing in particular on second-wave feminist writings from the 1970s and first half of the 80s in Aotearoa/New Zealand. In examining this body of writing, Holmes draws our attention to ‘the importance of emotional reflexivity in navigating a complex contemporary world and especially in using political means to try and change that world’. By taking such reflexivity into account, we can see that people are not just moved by emotions, almost against their knowledge and will, but rather that they understand who they are, and they present themselves to the world, in terms of certain emotional dispositions. In shaping their organizations, the feminists on
whom Holmes focuses sought to reject ‘the cold rationality traditionally associated with political decision making in favour of more (emotionally) expressive participatory models’. However, their attempts continually to establish consensus meant that these feminists struggled to acknowledge and thus to deal with dissent. Too often, their answer was to exclude or silence the dissenters. Holmes ends on a more positive note: ‘Experience helped some feminists find emotional styles and practices that worked for them rather than against them, and many were able to turn their undoubted emotional commitment to women’s interests to impressive political effect’.

The penultimate part of this book focuses on the emotions at work in the politics of reparation. In chapter 8, Michael Cunningham investigates the role of the apology in politics. More specifically, he considers the relationship between the apology and emotions, presents an analysis of the emergence of the public apology in the contemporary period, considers the philosophical issues such an apology raises, and finally asks whether it has any use in politics today. With reference specifically to emotions, Cunningham’s suggestion is that ‘guilt, shame and remorse may be features of the apologizing party and hurt and anger may be features of the party seeking or being granted an apology’. However, since in many instances state actors are apologizing for events long in the past – such as Tony Blair’s 1997 apology for the Irish Famine – he suggests that emotions are less likely to play a role in these cases. Cunningham’s conclusion is that apologies ‘demonstrate that citizens and their leaders can reflect critically on past actions for which they, or at least some of the citizenry, feel shame or regret’ Hence such public declarations ‘can attend, at least in part, to the hurt and humiliation of other groups’.
In their chapter, Steven Kaindaneh and Andrew Rigby investigate the role of emotions in efforts to build peace in ‘post-conflict’ situations. Focusing on the case of Sierra Leone, they suggest that emotions play a vital role in efforts ‘to promote co-existence and harmony between those that have been divided through destructive and violent conflict’. Skilfully sketching an ‘emotional history’ of Sierra Leone before, during and after the civil war of the 1990s, Kaindaneh and Rigby show how important a part ‘anger, fear and anxiety’ played in this case. On the basis of this analysis, they argue that if peace-building after violent conflict is to be successful, it must find ways cultivate ‘more positive emotions such as compassion, forgiveness, trust and hope’. The conclusion that Kaindaneh and Rigby reach is that ‘those who seek to engage in constructive conflict transformation work should factor into their analysis and practice not only the emotional dynamics of any conflict, but also the centrality of emotions in any peace-building project’.

In different ways, both of the authors in Part V of this book address what we have called ‘politics and the triumph of the therapeutic’. In Chapter 10, Tim Dartington argues that within neo-liberal welfare regimes, the importance of relationships has become eroded in the development of personalised services that are responsive to an opportunity agenda of social policy. He argues that the apparent emphasis on relationship in a culture which is both therapeutic and performative obscures the ways that relationship is in fact discounted and discredited through a distorted vision of the rights and responsibilities of the consumers and providers of public goods and services. For example, in the NHS
today, patients regarded as consumers of services efficiently delivered by doctors, rather than as one half of the doctor-patient relationship. In parallel, Dartington suggests that we also live in a therapeutic culture that holds out the promise of ‘quick fixes’ – such as short courses of therapy focusing on individuals in isolation, to the neglect of the relationships in which they are inevitably located. After insightfully analyzed these developments, Dartington concludes that they are intimated connected: against the anxieties created by ‘the freedoms of a market economy’, ‘a therapeutic culture that indulges the fantasy of personal growth and salvation without the necessity for a committed relationship provides a very necessary defensive environment’.

In the final chapter of this book, Cas Wouters take a long-term view of what he refers to as ‘processes of informalization of manners and “emancipation of emotions”’. During the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, emotions that had been denied and repressed (re)gained access to consciousness and wider acceptance in more informal social codes. As a example of such emotional emancipation, while soldiers in World War II could not admit to feeling fear, it was almost expected that those who fought in the Gulf War would do so. Drawing on his own highly-regarded work on the history of manners, Wouters suggests that such an emancipation calls for a stronger and yet more flexible self-regulation. Towards the end of his chapter, he considers a counter-trend: in societies in which all individuals are regarded as each other’s equals, it becomes necessary to repress feelings of superiority or inferiority. Wouter’s final question: will what he calls the ‘controlled decontrolling of emotional controls’ come to include these feelings too?
[A] References


