(Re)imagining Eurasianism: (Geo)political and (geo)cultural practices of Kazakhstan in the preservation of its security

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Paper prepared for
British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference
27-29 April, 2011
Manchester, UK
Introduction

It is commonly accepted that geographic location to a great extent determines a state’s foreign and security policies. In her analysis of Kazakhstan’s political, social, economic and military policies, Olcott observes that Kazakhstan is ‘blessed with resources, but cursed by geography’ (Olcott, 2002: 10). It is this equation of geographic space and security that I would like to explore today. I focus on the official practices of Kazakhstani political elite and the ways in which ‘the curse’ of geographic space in fact has been (re)imagined and (re)produced to preserve security of the state. My aim is to trace, illuminate and problematise the existence of analytical connections between space and security. To this end, I explore the ways in which the political elite, in the period 1991-2005, situated Kazakhstan within a specific geopolitical location, at the ‘meeting point’ or ‘crossroads’ of European and Asian civilizations and represented the state as an ‘Eurasian Bridge’.

I employ the concept of geopolitics as advanced by critical geopolitical theory wherein the physical location of a state is not meaningful in and of itself, but must be made meaningful through discursive practices. That is, through detailed analysis I demonstrate ‘the anti-geographical quality of geopolitical reasoning’ (O’Tuathail 1992: 191) in relation to Kazakhstan’s particular spatial location. I acknowledge that ideas such as ‘Eurasian State’, the ‘Eurasian Bridge’, and policies of ‘Eurasianism’ are certainly contested. However, I argue in this paper that the discourse on ‘Eurasia’ orders both the internal and external construction of Kazakhstan and frames the dangers confronting this identity.

This paper is divided into three parts. First, I offer a brief overview of the idea of ‘Eurasianism’ and explain the ways in which this idea has been introduced and understood in contemporary Kazakhstan. Second, I investigate the official spatial reading of Kazakhstan as the ‘Eurasian Bridge’. Third, I explore the ways in which this spatial reading of Kazakhstan is constituted by and constitutive of security practices of Kazakhstan. I argue that as practices of constructing a particular state identity necessarily include and exclude certain identities, so practices of locating the state necessarily divide or join, and accordingly constitute ‘difference’ or ‘otherness’.
Idea of ‘Eurasianism’

The Russian historian Gumilev argued that the idea of Eurasia stems from the fact that Russia is geographically located in both Europe and Asia, and is inhabited by both Slavic and Turkic nations; Russian culture contains both European and Asian elements, and nations following both Christianity and Islam (Gumilev, 1970). If Gumilev positioned Russia simultaneously in Europe and Asia, then Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan since independence 1991, situates Kazakhstan as between Europe and Asia, and represents the state as one of the bridges linking the two continents. Nazarbayev articulates and clearly delimits his understanding of Kazakhstan as the ‘Eurasian state’, which is reflected in his proposal for the creation of the ‘Eurasian Union’ in 1994. In contrast to Gumilev, Nazarbayev does not represent Kazakhstan located in Europe and Asia, but rather suggests that Kazakhstan is located between these two continents and hence performs the function of the link.

The concepts of ‘Eurasia’, ‘Eurasian State’, ‘Eurasian Bridge’, ‘Eurasian Space’, are inherently open and flexible, since they consist of the mix of two spaces that are both relatively contested in their nature. In other words, where does ‘Europe’ end and ‘Asia’ begin? Where is ‘south’ and where is ‘north’ and where are the borders delimiting these spaces? These kind of questions cannot be answered in broad terms, but in this paper I seek to answer them by analysing the specific case study of Kazakhstan and draw attention to the ways in which official elites effectively ‘draw’ such border lines, at the same time giving them particular characteristics which in turn perform particular functions, such as securing the state. When asked where Kazakhstan is, one might give several various answers: Kazakhstan is in Asia; it is located to the south of Russia; it borders both China and Russia.

Using a classical or neo-realist approach, it would be common to respond that the country is locked between Russia (north), China (east), the Caspian Sea (west) and Islamic states (south), that this location is inherently dangerous and disadvantageous and that the newly independent Kazakhstani state should seek to protect itself. It is rare to hear that Kazakhstan is located in Eurasia. In contrast to the above descriptions, the official representation of Kazakhstan’s location, since 1994 and the introduction of the concept of ‘Eurasian Union’, that it is the central Eurasian state and the centre of the geopolitical imaginary that is ‘Eurasia’. The construction of Kazakhstan as the Eurasian state is vital, where ‘Europeanness’ plus ‘Asianess’ equals Kazakhstani. The social collective and the state merge in the pursuit of security in Kazakhstan (LNS, 1998), but crucially both are constituted as
Kazakhstani – neither Kazakh nor Russian, neither Asia nor Europe, neither East nor West, but Eurasian:

[n]ow our new state, having denied false principles of totalitarianism is executing really unique function – ensures equitable and sanguineous development of all national cultures. They determine new quality of common Kazakhstani culture … Development of culture is determined by its inclusion into system of rules of world culture, joining two new conceptual and emotional contexts of modern world. In fact it is the manifestation of Eurasian idea (Nazarbayev, 1997a, emphasis added).

However, (re)imagining the space in a certain way necessarily involves two sets of practices: (geo)political and (geo)cultural practices. It is imperative to highlight here that when I refer to (geo)political and (geo)cultural practices I do not only mean the official practices of political elite, but also those practices which challenge the official process of (re)imagination of Kazakhstan from being a ‘Soviet’ state into an ‘independent’, ‘Eurasian’ state which performs the function of a bridge between Europe and Asia. In the following section I unpack both (geo)political and (geo)cultural practices.

Kazakhstan as the Eurasian Bridge – (Geo)political reasoning or (geo)cultural practices?

The territory of Kazakhstan was, at the advent of independence, fragile, permeable, contested, and susceptible to the possibility of transgression and invasion. The territorial contested practices in the 1990s continuously questioned and challenged the official reading of Kazakhstan. For example, the most contested territories of Kazakhstan have been northern territories. The (re)production of the northern regions as those of ‘Russia’ and the ‘Russian’ essentially included the classification of Kazakhstan into two ultimately different spaces. The demographic distribution of Kazakhstan, where the Kazakhs constitute the majority in the South of the state, and the Russians in the North had been utilized in ultra-nationalist discourse in order to make meaning-full the division of Kazakhstan into the ‘Russian’ North, ‘ours’, the ‘Russian’ and the ‘Kazakh’ South, ‘theirs’ the ‘Kazakh’ and to ensure that this representation was accepted as ‘common sense’, the ‘reality’ Kazakhstani space.

The spatial ultra-nationalist division and the Soviet representation of Kazakhstan as the ‘gateway’ Republic together envision ‘independent’ Kazakhstan as belonging to Asia. The divisive spatial reading, in turn, was not only seen by the political elite as threatening to Kazakhstan’s identity as a ‘territorially integral’ state but also questioned official
(re)productive practices of Kazakhstan’s identity as ‘Eurasian’ in the preservation of Kazakhstan’s identity as the ‘sovereign’ state. Additionally, the practices of the Kazakh ‘nationalists’ and their assiduous attempts at homogenizing the ‘Kazakh’ state, further complicated the task of the official elite to preserve Kazakhstan’s security. Drawing on their anti-Russian/anti-Soviet practices, the Kazakh ‘nationalists’ positioned Kazakhstan as a Turkic state, and attempted to fix this spatial identity through articulating cultural and historical similarity with states to the South, in order to construct Kazakhstan as one of the states of ‘Great Turkestan’ (KazTag, 1992: 1).

The official practices including integrative ‘internal’ (Kazakhs and Russians) and integrative ‘external’ (Kazakhstan and Russia) practices are actively disciplined by the official discursive commitment to ‘Eurasia’, where Kazakhstan is represented as a Eurasian state, which in turn is performative of the ‘only responsible formula’ for the construction of Kazakhstan as an independent state (Nazarbayev, 1995) manifested in the ‘integration of people via preservation of ethnic uniqueness, and hence political sovereignty’ (ibid.). However, the internal integration of the people of Kazakhstan (in this case ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians) could have not been done without simultaneous external integration with Russia.

External/internal integrative practices in the preservation of Kazakhstan’s sovereignty are at work in the official construction of Kazakhstan as a ‘common space’ for its multi-national collectivity, which in turn together constitute the identity of Kazakhstan as a ‘Eurasian state’. A ‘Eurasian state’ – Kazakhstan – occupies the common Eurasian space together with another ‘Eurasian State’ – Russia. This discursive blurring of spatial imaginary, however, has been challenged by aforementioned discourses, which had to be made either marginal or illegitimate. In this sense a certain representation of Kazakhstan had to function to preserve an independent ‘uniqueness’ of the Republic from Russia. In other words, spatializing Kazakhstan as an independent state with its own voice in defining and making meaning-full to its collectivity what new, sovereign and independent Kazakhstan was in relation to ‘them’, necessitated the articulation of ‘modern’ Russia, which is principally different to ‘Tsarist autocracy’ and the ‘Soviet regime’ (Nazarbayev, 1997b: 88). The (re)interpellation of Russia as ‘new’, ‘modern’ and different to what it was before and the construction of the relationship of ‘friendship and cooperation’ (ibid.: 89) with ‘this kind’ of Russia in essence reveals the official attempt to erase the historical memory of Kazakh Land as ‘adjunct of Imperial Russia and then of Soviet Russia’ (ibid.: 89, emphasis added). Kazakhstan’s physical space was represented as the ‘southern’ shield’ (KazTag 1995: 2) in the Soviet discourse, and performed
the function of dividing Russia from the South. In contrast, the Kazakhstani elite were able to draw on more suitable historical-cultural materials that would allow for the existence of an independent, Kazakhstani territory, where:

Unique harmonization of ethno-cultural stratum – the fusion of Europe and Asia – take place. Land, where every culture is valuable in itself, but together they constitute the invaluable treasure – sovereignty and territorial integrity – the loss of which would be irreplaceable (Grab, 1992: 2).

The fusion of Europe and Asia in the cultural discursive realm of Kazakhstan’s identity and mapping this ‘invaluable’ fusion on the Kazakhstani land, together form the spatial ideal of ‘our’ (Kazakhstani citizens and government) mission to construct ‘a state, where there is no fear, there is no fruitful ground for separatism’ (Kazhakhanov and Stepanenko, 1992: 3). The integrative, harmonizing cultural order in the state is constructive of the spatial imaginary of Kazakhstan as the ‘Eurasian bridge’, which places Kazakhstan not as a ‘dividing shield’ between the West and the East, but rather as the ‘bridge’ which links two inherently different spaces. The spatial reading of Kazakhstan as the ‘Eurasian bridge’ performs three mutually inclusive functions. First, the (re)interpellation of ‘shield’ into ‘bridge’, replaces the ‘old’ ‘Soviet’ territorial identity of Kazakhstan and puts forward the new, independent ‘Kazakhstani’ territorial identity. Second, imagining the geographical location as the ‘Eurasian bridge’ orders and further stabilizes state’s identity as an ‘Eurasian state’ with a distinct territory apart from Russia. Finally, spatially representing Kazakhstan as the ‘Eurasian bridge’ necessarily writes the state on the ‘world map’ with its inherent characteristics, goals, and practices.

**Eurasian State, Eurasian Bridge**

It is important to understand what is meant by a ‘Eurasian bridge’, or, in particular, to explore what makes Kazakhstan the ‘Eurasian bridge’. ‘Eurasianism’ is an identity which is articulated as blending and intermeshing ethnic and religious differences. Locating both Russia and Kazakhstan within the broader Eurasian space mentioned above automatically renders them both Eurasian states. However, at the same time it was necessary to imagine a spatial order of Kazakhstan which is intrinsically different from Russia, so as to delimit the state and constitute Kazakhstan as sovereign and with territorial integrity. A Eurasian state and the Eurasian bridge and the policy of Eurasianism (internal and external integration) is
certainly contested, but the point is that the discourse on ‘Eurasia’ orders both the internal and external construction of Kazakhstan, frames the dangers confronting this identity, and together these construct Kazakhstan’s relationship with Russia. Further investigation of the representation of the Eurasian space, where Kazakhstan is the centre in the middle of ‘everything’, shows that this identity is produced through and productive of Kazakhstani foreign and domestic policy. Kazakhstan is an active initiator of and participant in various organizations,

[T]he President’s right foreign policy and all-round Russian-Kazakhstani cooperation in political, economic and humanitarian spheres have become key factors of Kazakhstan’s rapid development. It is proved by time and real achievements. Kazakhstan is a permanent member of all international organisations on post-Soviet space (CIS, EUASEC, SHOC, Custom Union), where Russia plays a leading role. But it would be more justly said that we are acting together. Here we have a Eurasian tango, which meets the interests of the two countries and provides peace and security in the region (Davletov, 2005, emphasis added).

In short, constructing the Eurasian (Kazakhstani) state could not have been achieved without constructing a particular representation of Russia, positing a particular relationship between Kazakhstan and Russia and writing the identity of the Kazakhstani state such that the potential threats of national extremism, factionalism and separatism were never made possible. That is, they were made unintelligible, marginal and illegitimate – it would have been unimaginable given the dominant official discourse to pursue extremist or separatist policies that would in turn have constituted a very different kind of relationship with Russia to that which exists, for instance hostile. The relationship would have been militarised, Russia would have been a foe and there would have been no possibility of peaceful co-existence of ethnic Kazakhs with ethnic Russians on Kazakhstani territory. Thus,

Kazakhstani-Russian relationship carries fundamental significance for both states. This relationship is an important factor in intra- and inter-national stability and cooperation on Eurasian space (Nazarbayev and Yeltsin 1998a: 187).

Practicing ‘Eurasianism’

One of the most important practices in achieving the inscription of Kazakhstan as the centre of Eurasia was the movement of the capital of Kazakhstan in 1997. Locating the state in the heart of Eurasia was simultaneously accomplished through moving the capital to the middle
of the Kazakhstani state, that is, geographically situating official position discursive position in the middle. In this sense, Nazarbayev elaborated that ‘any state, which became a sovereign must think about its capital, about the capital’s territorial location’ (Nazarbayev, 1994: 270), and he further questioned whether ‘it is better if the capital is located in the centre of the state’ (ibid.: 270). Thus, the movement of the capital performed two mutually constitutive functions: situating Kazakhstan at the heart of Eurasia and situating Eurasia in Kazakhstan. Internal and external accord is embodied in the relocation of the capital from Almaty to Astana. It has been argued that the movement of the capital was to ‘control’ the Russian North (Schatz, 2004; Wolfel, 2002). However, the official political elite, drawing on the already established (and publicly appealing) Eurasian discourse, explained that the two spaces should be bridged, such that any distinction between ‘Russian North’ and ‘Kazakh South’ fails to have meaning:

[T]he people of Kazakhstan is inter-mixed, consist of various nationalities, and this inter-mix are residing in the centre of the Republic. And people mostly in this area are more concerned and unsettled, […], we need to move the capital there where the people need it mostly and where the people are more concerned. That is why we need to calm them down, and let them be aware that the state would protect their rights (Nazarbayev, 1994: 270, emphasis added).

Thus, the new Kazakhstani state declared itself able to protect its citizens – the Kazakhstani population – hence de-legitimizing any contesting claims or threats to the sovereignty of the state, such as those issuing from Kazakh ‘nationalists’ or Cossacks. Moreover, looking at the map below, Astana is not geographically/geometrically located in the middle of the state, or at the heart of Eurasia.
Maps acquire meanings through particular discursive structuring; they are silent, not meaningful in themselves. This is important because it challenges any conventional geopolitical account of the state. If the centre can be read – and communicated as such – when it is clearly not the centre, then other geopolitical ‘truths’ can be similarly contested.

Official reasons for the movement of the capital were many and various, ranging from the affirmation of Kazakhstan as a qualitatively new state (and therefore in need of a new capital), to making sure that the capital is far away from external borders, particularly the international border with China. Of critical importance is the articulation of the capital as breaking away from the old Soviet regime, embodied in Almaty, and constructing the new ‘Multinational, ‘common home’, ‘Eurasian’ – Kazakhstani sovereign state. Of particular interest is the fact that Astana is closer to Moscow by thousand kilometres than Almaty – this was joked about by Nazarbayev himself at the inauguration ceremony of the new capital, and was not necessarily taken as a joke (Mansurov, 2001: 596). The movement of the capital as a non-linguistic practice was accompanied by the re-interpellation of Kazakhstani identity as a ‘snow leopard’, which relates to Almaty but also represents Astana. In this sense one symbol in itself links two physically and culturally divided spaces, functioning to unify the new Kazakhstani state.
Island of stability: Safeguarding the Eurasian Bridge/State

As it can be seen from the above analysis, the formation and unification of the Kazakhstani state entailed the reproduction of various identities and, further, the nullification of various threats to these identities. Identity of ‘Snow Leopard’, which embodies the symbolic characteristics of multi-nationalism, commonality, and Eurasianism, constitutes the writing and the reading of Kazakhstan as an island of stability. However, the processes of producing this new identity are inherently constituted by and constitutive of certain new threats. Thus to ‘fix’ the identity formation of Kazakhstan as the island of stability it was necessary to imagine new boundaries and new spaces.

The (re)imagined space of Kazakhstan constituted not only the boundary of the new Kazakhstani state but also the boundary of the new identity of Kazakhstan. However, in response to global political events, notably the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the importance of the border was again re-read. As Nazarbayev said: ‘We must place a reliable barrier to those who try to endanger our peace and our stability’ (Nazarbayev, 2000). This ‘reliable barrier’ was articulated as a necessary protection against the ‘explosive’ situation in Afghanistan and the rest of the southern states (Nazarbayev, 1998b). The events of 11 September 2001 in the USA, and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, featured in the discourse of the official elite as the context for the construction of ‘new’ threats. Paradoxically, these threats were hailed as ‘objectively existing threats of the 21st century’ (Nazarbayev, 2005), such was the dominance of US discourse on this issue. ‘The spreading of religious extremism in the region, unabated drug trafficking, international terrorism’ were articulated as ‘a serious obstacle to further economic, political and social modernisation of Kazakhstan’ (ibid.). In this sense I illuminate an evident shift in the discourse, where national extremism (as discussed briefly above) was replaced with international extremism and ethnicity with religion. Whereas national extremism and ethnic nationalism were represented as threatening to the construction of Kazakhstan as a newly independent state, international terrorism and religious extremism were a threat to the ‘fully independent state’ (Nazarbayev 2002), to the kind of state that ‘became an inseparable part of globalisation’ (ibid.).

Just as dealing with the internal threats required internal and external integration (within the state and with Russia), dealing with the ‘new’ threats required deeper external and wider regional integration. This was achieved through establishing certain inter-regional organizations such as the CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia), the inaugural conference of which was in 1999. The purpose of such organisations is to strengthen the extant ‘zones of stability’ and to expand its borders. The second vital regional organisation in dealing with ‘new’ threats is SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation). Although it was formed towards the end of the 1990s, after the events of 11 September 2001 the organisation became notably more active. This is interesting in itself as the Kazakhstani state was thus able to further ‘fix’ its ‘disadvantageous’ geographical location as advantageous, or to (re)imagine its geographical ‘curse’ into geopolitical blessing.

Conclusion

In this paper I demonstrated that the production of ‘Eurasian’ spatial and state identity of Kazakhstan functions to preserve state’s security. I argued that the discourse on ‘Eurasia’ orders both the internal and external construction of Kazakhstan. The way in which identity of the state is constructed, as Eurasian state, performs certain functions. In constructing the state’s identity, the state is spatially located and, simultaneously, the physical territory occupied by the state is ascribed an identity. So, for example, certain behaviours are demanded of a sovereign and territorially integral state. Just as I illustrated in this paper the inscription of Kazakhstan as a Eurasian state (derived from its physical location) creates certain responsibilities that the state must perform: it must behave in an appropriately ‘Eurasian’ way, as defined by the official discourse. Part of this is performing peacefulness, integration and a balancing act between East and West. The very concepts of territory and security are mutually constitutive and require difference, which may or may not be rendered as threatening. It is not only concepts and objects that are inscribed with identity through discursive processes, but also physical and conceptual space – that is, the spaces or realms identified as ‘cultural’ or ‘political’.
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