
We recommend you cite the published version.
The publisher’s URL is: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14759551.2014.894515

Refereed: Yes

Published on?line: 3 April 2014. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis Group in Culture and Organization in 2014, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/14759551.2014.894515

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we consider the implications of the ideas of journeying and the experiential gaze for research practice. We do so by drawing first upon Plato’s allegory of the Cave as a representation of the journey of the philosopher to see reality, invisible and unknown, but constituting the underlying truth of what we experience through our senses. We use this as a metaphor for research as a journey of discovery. Recognising that, for some, ancient philosophy may not provide the most convincing model for a consideration of research practice, we suggest that a parallel process is evident in the approach of the eminent British psychoanalyst, Wilfred Bion. We suggest that this metaphor offers a basis for understanding theorizing as a form of knowing that, whilst absent from a large proportion of modern scientific discourse, is again emerging in some recent developments in organizational research.
Journeying and the Experiential Gaze in Research:

Theorizing as a form of knowing

In this paper we are primarily concerned with the experience of the researcher rather than with recommendations for research practice and methodology, although the latter clearly have a part to play. Our interest is in what the researcher sees and experiences through the experiential gaze, an interpretation of the philosopher’s *theoria*, and how this is then described – to self and other. We suggest that the research journey is a way of seeing things, which is also one way of understanding the purpose of theory: to offer a new perspective, a new way of seeing. However, modern notions of theorizing have lost touch with its linguistic roots in *theoria* and, indeed, actively exclude aspects of the vision that was central to more ancient forms of contemplative knowing (Case, French and Simpson 2012).

Throughout the paper we contrast the researcher’s journey with Plato’s allegory of the Cave as a representation of the philosopher’s journey to contemplate the underlying truth of what we experience through our senses. Plato referred to this underlying truth as *eidos*, the Form or Idea (typically capitalised). Recognising that, for some, ancient philosophy may not provide the most convincing model for a consideration of research practice, we suggest that a parallel process is evident in the approach of the eminent British psychoanalyst, Wilfred Bion. This leads to a discussion of Bion’s model of mental growth as a basis for considering the development of insight and theorizing in the process of research.

We suggest that some recent developments in research methods, like organizational ethnography, could be an indication of a (re-) turn to an awareness of the place of the experiential gaze in organizational research. Such a turn is also reflected in Corvellec’s (2013) call to organizational researchers ‘to understand theory as something dynamic, that is to say, an invitation to focus on theorizing rather than on theory’ (23).

**Plato’s Cave and Research as Journey**

In his allegory of the Cave, Plato represents the ordinary human being as shackled in the darkness, oblivious to the reality beyond the shadows of unseen spectacles projected onto the cave wall as they pass in front of an unseen fire. The philosophical journey is represented by the analogy of the person who becomes free from these restraining shackles and – with some trepidation – makes a journey not merely towards the fire but also beyond, outside the Cave and into the light of the Sun. This is a journey of enlightenment, of discovery, as things unseen become known in their true light. Ironically, but perhaps predictably, when the traveller returns to the cave and tries to explain what has been seen, the account is incomprehensible. To those satisfied with the pale representation of knowledge within the Cave, the truth is unrecognisable and, therefore, unknowable. As this allegory provides an idealised view of the philosophical journey – idealised in the sense that such a journey is
beyond human capability in anything but a partial sense – the underlying meaning is that we are all in the Cave and would struggle to understand the truth even if it were revealed to us. Philosophical practice is thus framed as fundamentally aspirational, knowledge of reality only partial and even then difficult to comprehend and accept.

In Greece in the fourth century BCE, there was a common practice that involved communities in sending a theoros on a journey, a pilgrimage, to a religious festival or oracle. The pilgrim would return and share what had been seen and experienced. The metaphor of the theoros, the one who goes to see, was subsequently used by the ancient philosophers to represent the philosophical journey. This provided the linguistic root of the term theoria, which we tentatively translate as contemplative knowing. The whole journey had its focus on seeing the event or object, often through participation in a sacred ritual. The theoros would return and recount the story of the journey in order to transmit to the community what had been seen.

Central to both Plato’s and Bion’s thinking is the acknowledgement that what is seen through such contemplative vision is both unknown and unknowable but can still have a transformational impact upon us and knowledge may be gained through attention to such transformations. This is mimesis, the practice by which the philosopher constructs representations of unknowable reality. In a similar sense, the researcher may engage in the creation of representations that constitute newly formed knowledge. However, we are reminded of the demands of post-positivist inquiry for professional humility. We understand this process of theorizing as a form of knowing whilst seeking to remain aware that any knowledge gained is always tentative, provisional, and that theory is ‘dynamic’ (Corvellec 2013, 23).

In Plato’s philosophy, theoria, is the direct vision of reality – direct in the sense of entirely unmediated by concepts. This is the direct perception of the true Forms, the eidos, and included the divine – the Form of the Good:

Mystical theology, or perhaps better, a doctrine of contemplation, is not simply an element in Plato’s philosophy, but something that penetrates and informs his whole understanding of the world. ... The soul is naturally divine and seeks to return to the divine realm. And it does this in the act of contemplation – theoria – of Being, Truth, Beauty, Goodness. This act of theoria is not simply consideration or understanding; it is union with, participation in, the true objects of true knowledge. (Louth 1981, 1-3)

However, notions such as ‘union with’ or ‘participation in’ are problematic when it comes to communicating such experiences through language. It is clearly hard to express in words any deep experience – at least in a form that communicates to the reader the actual texture of the experience. It is precisely the desire to express for others the insights from their experience of theoria that leads poets and mystics of all religious traditions to push beyond the limits of the possibilities of language (Sells 1994). We might say something similar of academic discourses. They seek to go beyond merely talking about what they know in an attempt to initiate the attentive reader into a form of knowing, which ‘is always experience, or rather it is an inner metamorphosis.’ (Hadot 1993, 48). It is in this sense that we consider here the implications of the experiential gaze for research practice and theorizing as a form of knowing.
The Intellectual Journey in Bion’s Grid

It is perhaps easy to dismiss Plato’s philosophical allegory as outdated and irrelevant in the modern era, particularly with its language of divine truth. Its apparently religious rather than scientific overtones can meet with scepticism, even prejudice. We do not intend to attempt to counter this critique entirely, for an important aspect of our thesis is that most dominant modes of research in the modern era have lost connection with notions of mystery that are important to our humanity and that actually require a denial or bracketing-out of aspects of the researcher’s experience. However, we will draw upon the work of Wilfred Bion, one of the most important British psychoanalysts of the modern era, to provide an additional source of support for the view that the knowable and the unknowable are not the contradictory poles of a duality but may be represented as different aspects of the research journey.

For Freud the reality principle was employed in the service of the pleasure principle, with pleasure deferred in order to engage more effectively with reality in order to maximise pleasure at a later point. In contrast, Bion conceived of the fundamental human drive as seeking emotional growth through the pursuit of truth. In fact, Symington and Symington (1996) have suggested that Bion made only one assumption, that ‘the mind grows through exposure to truth’ (p. 3), or, as Bion put it, ‘truth seems to be essential for psychic growth’ (1962, 56; see also Grotstein 2004).

Bion used the symbol K to represent knowing and the symbol O to represent his notion of truth, which, in direct contrast to K, he defined as both unknown and unknowable. We suggest that the choice of the symbol O, also the shape of Plato’s Sun, the Form of the Good and the ultimate representation of reality, is not coincidental. Other traditions make similar use of this symbol. For example there are echoes of its use in the Zen discipline of painting, in which O is regarded as ‘an expression of enlightenment - an experience of completeness - at each moment’ (Tanahashi 1994, ix; Tanahashi et al 1994). The circle has held similar meanings in Western art and architecture (see, for example, Burckhardt 1995, 102-4; Campbell 1988, 214-8; Moore 1982, 128).

O is often described as ultimate truth, the godhead or, in Bion’s borrowing from Milton, as the ‘formless infinite’ ([1970] 1984, 31). Bion’s notion of O becomes more accessible, however, - and more usable - when another aspect is brought into play: that the truth of O is also ‘imminent’ ([1965] 1984, 147); that is, O is the reality of the here and now, the present moment. He described the encounter between analyst and patient as ‘the intersection of an evolving O with another evolving O’ ([1970] 1984, 118).

In order to better appreciate the notion of theorizing as a form of knowing, it is important to note that it is not possible intellectually to know the full reality of each passing instant: ‘O does not fall in the domain of knowledge or learning save incidentally; it can be “become”, but it cannot be “known”’ ([1970] 1984, 26). It might therefore be more appropriate to consider theorizing as a form of becoming. However, it is Bion’s assumption that exposure to truth can lead to growth of mind. Such unknown and unknowable truth is, therefore, worth pursuing because it has an impact upon us and can lead to the generation of knowledge, K.

Our interest here is broader than the psychoanalytic context, and concerns research more generally, but it is helpful to consider Bion’s approach to working with this notion of O within a scientific
context. One of the ways in which he developed his thinking in this regard was through the development of the Grid (see figure 1).

![Image of The Grid](image.jpg)

**Figure 1: The Grid (Bion ([1967] 1987, 6))**

We have stated above that Bion operated with a single assumption: that growth of mind occurs through exposure to truth, O. The Grid is relevant to our purposes because it ‘describes the essence of his elucidation of the growth of thought’ (Symington and Symington 1996, 31), with the vertical axis representing the development of thoughts (from top to bottom) and the horizontal representing the uses to which thoughts may be put (from left to right). It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full description of how Bion used the Grid but we suggest that the movement from the top left to the bottom right, which depicts growth of mind, could be thought of as a visual representation of the movement from Plato’s Cave of shadowy ignorance in the journey out into the light of the Sun, metaphorically to O, the Form of the Good. We will also focus on two aspects of Bion’s use of the Grid that are important aspects of the experiential gaze in research that are too frequently overlooked. These aspects are captured in the notions of ‘evenly suspended attention’ (Freud [1912] 1958, 111) and transformation.

**The First Blindness: Attention and Negative Capability**

The initial process of transformation in the journey from Plato’s Cave is represented by the first of two episodes of blindness experienced by the philosopher. On leaving the shadowy darkness of the
Cave the philosopher is blinded by the light of the Forms. It takes some time for the philosopher’s eyes to adjust. Of course, this is the ideal philosopher and so the analogy does not describe the experience of the all-too-human philosopher. The latter never fully overcomes the blindness but may receive partial vision, some level of insight. Prior to insight, however, this experience of blindness is troubling. Plato (1971) suggests that in the experience of being unshackled and coming out of the Cave ‘...all these actions gave him pain, and that he was too dazed to see the objects whose shadow he had been watching before.’ (Republic VII 515).

Following Freud, Bion argued that the analyst’s approach in a session with a client should be one of evenly suspended attention, which is located at D4 in the Grid. In this place the pre-conception of the analyst – the mind that is brought to the session to engage with the mind of the client – is unsaturated. This can be likened to the experiential gaze of theoría. Importantly for our comparison with research, Bion contrasts this with a defensive reaction to this experience of blindness in the form of Column 2 interventions...

.... It is made when the analyst cannot tolerate not understanding the material and therefore having to wait for clarification of the analytic situation to occur. It is a case of the analyst not being able to bear the frustration. He tells himself that he knows and makes an interpretation accordingly. By making this untruthful statement the unfolding of the real meaning of the current situation is interrupted. Thus column 2 interpretations prevent the emergence of something else which could reveal the truth. This sort of interpretation is an attempt to bypass the pain associated with not understanding and with uncertainty. (Symington and Symington 1996, 37-8)

Throughout Bion’s writings we find the notion that clinging to the illusion of knowing can be a defence against the emotional experience of encountering truth (French and Simpson 2003). Although being at the edge of discovery, moving to the entrance of the Cave, as it were, can be exciting and invigorating, the confusion and unsettling anxiety that also accompanies the experience often frightens us off at the very moment when something new might be discovered. We say ‘moment’, but of course this experience of disorientation in the research process might last for a considerable time, even years. Increasingly the context in European universities, particularly in relation to the requirements for acquiring research funding, contributes to the potential terror that prevents the researcher from persisting with the blindness, acknowledging ignorance and a lack of answers. Such blind ignorance is inevitably associated with the experience of threat, the fear of an inability to publish or to win further grants.

The challenge for the researcher is to endeavour to persist with the journey in order to see what is actually going on, in contrast to what was planned for or has been experienced in the past. For example, Shotter (2006) claims that a way an organizational researcher could be open to see what is going on is by trying to experience “from within” instead of “from outside”. In order to assess the impact of events, and to adapt as necessary, researchers may have to put their knowledge and familiar ways of thinking to one side, in order to allow their minds be changed by the truth. Such an approach to research may even require the capacity to downplay what at first sight appear to be more productive and potentially profitable lines of inquiry. Ironically, it may only be by changing and re-visioning the unfolding reality as it evolves that a researcher can preserve a focus on the research question – as opposed to previously conceived answers.
The practice of evenly suspended attention requires the ‘positive discipline of eschewing memory and desire’ (Bion [1970] 1984, 31). The task for the analyst in each new session is to tune into whatever the patient hopes to communicate \textit{that day}, whether in a story or a silence, a dream or a particular emotional tone. In Bion’s view, therefore, the effectiveness of a psychoanalytic training did not lie in the acquisition of theoretical knowledge \textit{per se}, however important that might be, but in the far more difficult acquisition of a capacity to work with the experiential gaze of \textit{theoria}, in the present moment ‘without memory, desire, understanding’ (Bion [1970] 1984, 43). By analogy we suggest that the same is true of researchers, and that there is an essential requirement – rarely discussed – to be aware of the potential for theory to be used defensively: ‘We learn these theories – Freud’s, Jung’s, Klein’s – and try to get them absolutely rigid so as to avoid having to do any more thinking’ (Bion 1978, 6).

Bion used the simple word patience to capture the essence of this capacity. To describe the required state of mind he also borrowed from the poet Keats the term ‘negative capability’ (Keats 1970, 43; see also Bennis [1989] 1998, 148; Bion [1970] 1984, 125; Chia and Holt 2009; Handy 1989; Simpson \textit{et al} 2002). Such patience demands passivity – a word that has overtones of the suffering that comes with blindness as well as of inaction and receptivity - and is based on listening and on waiting, rather than on the more obvious academic modes of knowing and professing. Bion did not advocate patience for its own sake, however. For him, as for Keats, the intended outcome of negative capability was achievement.

Not knowing tends to stimulate high levels of uncertainty and anxiety and is a threat to fresh thinking, whether in the analytic pair or for the researcher in an organizational context. As a result, there is often pressure to invoke prior knowledge – that may no longer apply – or to adopt a new certainty too quickly, before a new pattern has had the chance to evolve (Bion [1970] 1984, 124). This is the movement away from evenly suspended attention (D4) to interventions characteristic of Column 2 in the Grid. Hence Eisold’s definition of negative capability as, ‘precisely the ability to tolerate anxiety and fear, to stay in the place of uncertainty in order to allow for the emergence of new thoughts or perceptions’ (Eisold 2000, 65). The more turbulent and uncertain the experience, the more the ability of the researcher to produce results may depend precisely on a negative capability that allows the toleration of ambiguity and the capacity to remain ‘content with half knowledge’ (Ward 1963, 161).

\textbf{The Second Blindness: Transformation and Mimesis}

If the anxiety of the first blindness can be overcome, the philosopher continues out of the Cave and the Forms are contemplated directly. With the light of insight, the philosopher returns back to the Cave but an inner transformation means that everything has changed. Adjusting to this new appreciation of reality takes time as new sense must be made of the old – for self and others.

This suggests two dimensions for the organizational researcher to consider. Firstly, the challenge of managing this second experience of blindness for oneself. The dark knowing of the experiential gaze must be interpreted for oneself and an imitation, or representation, of what has been seen must be produced within the limitations of prevailing discourses. Secondly, the researcher must consider how to communicate the insights from the journey to others.
The researcher does well to acknowledge that such an experience is emotional as well as rational. Bion identified the human capacity to contain emotion on behalf of self and other as the central mechanism in the evolution of thought, transforming chaotic, uncertain and disturbing experiences and emotions into something bearable and manageable. Bion’s work on the development of the capacity for thinking follows from this notion of inter-personal containment. It is of particular relevance in understanding the development of thought through research in a social context. It describes the relationship between the capacity for the containment of emotion and the transformation into thought and action that can result. In Bion’s view, this relationship between emotion and thought is basic not only to the work of psychoanalysis but to all human activity. It is clear that some organizational researchers are giving greater attention to this relationship between not knowing, emotion and thought. For example, Warden (2013) reflects explicitly on the anxiety she felt in her research practice that arose from the experience not knowing and the lack of definitive answers.

For Bion the pursuit of truth is not merely an intellectual process — it is emotional in all its aspects. We can see this represented in Plato’s allegory of journey from and back to the Cave: we see the fear of the unknown, the excitement, delight and wonder of enlightenment, and the confusion and frustration of returning to the shadows and seeking to communicate what has been seen. In the Grid we see Bion’s attempt to articulate the range of transformations that take place from an engagement with truth — not merely in growth of mind and knowledge but also in the use of that knowledge. The darkness of the Cave is readily seen towards the top of the Grid, the raw inexpressible experience of Beta and Alpha elements, whilst the enlightenment of the eidos, the higher Forms, is represented towards the bottom through higher calculus and other, as yet undefined, representations. Growth of mind, the development of knowledge, occurs in each element of the Grid, and multiple micro-transformations together combine in the intellectual journey from top left to bottom right and constitute the transformation from the darkness of the Cave to the enlightenment of theoria. This process of transformation ends back in the Cave with mimesis.

Mimesis is a term that can mean many different things but we will consider it in its broadest definition, that of representation. For the idealised philosopher, mimesis is the representation of what has been seen through the experiential gaze of theoria in a form that is intelligible within the Cave, the realm of Bion’s K, knowledge.

Plato valued most highly the direct engagement with truth by the philosopher through the experiential gaze of theoria. Mimesis requires us to consider and engage with the implications of different levels of knowing reflected in different levels of representation. In this regard, Carli (2010) provides an illuminating discussion of different levels of mimesis in a review of Aristotle’s proposition that poetry is more philosophical than history. This is of relevance to our consideration of the experiential gaze in research because it suggests that history, the more empirical discipline, may be less representative of truth than poetry:

Just as the object of the philosopher’s theoria is that which is most knowable in itself, the product of the poet’s activity is a story in which the reasons of the dramatic characters’ happiness or unhappiness appear with incomparable clarity. The poet brings to the fore the structured regularity of unitary chains of events, and thus enables us to comprehend not
only that something happened, but also why, given the nature of the dramatic characters involved and of the circumstances in which their lives unfolded, they were bound to suffer or flourish. Indeed we can say that while his mimetic activity is a making... it is not a making up or invention but rather the discovery of the \textit{eidos} of actions. (p.334 – Italics in the original)

Czarniawska (2013) provides a helpful modern equivalent in relation to organizational research. She uses a different analogy, literary invention, to explore the notion of theorizing suggesting that such an approach does not create a fiction but rather provides a means to engage with reality by using a narrative plot to explore and make sense of the complexities of organizational practice and context. This suggests that developments in what have been called ‘creative methods in organizational research’ (Broussine 2008), including dialogue, stories, poetry, theatre, art and drawing may be worthy of serious consideration. Further, recent writings on organizational ethnography focus on the notion that truth is essentially unknowable in any objective or generalizable sense, but it is the interpretations, representations and experiences of the researcher that take center stage. Gaggiotti \textit{et al} (2014) argue that organizational ethnography has the potential to become a mode of doing social science centered on the researcher’s commitment to the social. It is suggested that this simultaneously allows the researcher to understand from the intellectual distance of the sociological imagination (Mills 2007) and to empathize through the sensuousness of the ethnographic imagination (Willis 2000). In contemporary organizational research it is becoming not only acceptable but a professional practice to demonstrate evidence of the researcher’s reflexivity, humility and limitations (see, among others Spicer \textit{et al} 2009 and Alvesson and Spicer 2012).

However, if we are to give greater credence to the poetic, it is also necessary to scrutinize the research process and to interrogate whether the focus of attention is, indeed, truth or a shadowy engagement with experience. Neither Aristotle nor Plato argued that \textit{all} poetry should be conceived in this light – only that poetry which exhibits the clear connection with \textit{eidos}. What is highly valued is the ability of the poet to allow the reader to gain insight into previously unknown \textit{Forms}, to gain knowledge of universals. Indeed, representation of the familiar or known in art is a form of \textit{mimesis} that is not valued highly by Plato. This can lead to some confusion:

- Plato’s dialogues themselves are an example of mimetic behaviour. They depict Socrates in philosophical conversation with other people. This Platonic representation can be understood as a mimesis of the philosophising of Socrates... There is an element of contradiction in the fact that Plato criticises art as mimesis in principle but at the same time works mimetically in producing dialogues in which artistic elements are present. (Gebauer and Wulf 1995, 31)

Whilst Plato was not consistent in his use of the term \textit{mimesis}, and so some contradiction is apparent, there is no contradiction in the sense that mimetic representation through narrative of what the philosopher has seen of \textit{eidos} is valued more highly than artistic representation of the shadowy images of the Cave. A shadowy engagement with experience will lead to a representation of reality at several levels removed – what we might consider to be a representation of a representation of a representation, perhaps, with the degradation of connection between the reality and image that this would imply.

However, this relates to another aspect of the challenge facing the returning philosopher - that the cave dwellers do not recognise the philosopher’s account of the Forms, or even that the Forms exist
and are worthy of attention. This is a challenge of communication for the organizational researcher through representation, *mimesis*, in a manner that connects what has been seen through the experiential gaze of *theoria* with the understandings encoded within the representations of existing knowledge. The first requirement is to find a way to make sense of this unknown and unknowable reality. Making a replication of the real, particularly the social, and managing it — because the real is unmanageable — is a practice of social justification that must be enacted in the context of the modern and contemporary world (Boltanski and Thévenot [1991] 2006). In the second stage, because of the knowledge acquired in managing the mimetic object, the aspiration is to return to a consideration of the real; together with others an engagement with the original becomes possible, to an extent, thanks to the knowledge acquired in managing the mimetic object. In practice this is imperfect but of value as the mimetic object contributes to dissolving this difference by creating the fantasy that the replica is fully “touchable”, knowable, and through it, the original (for a more developed discussion of this point, see Gaggiotti 2012).

**Implications**

In this paper we have drawn upon Plato’s myth of the philosophical journey from the Cave into the light of the Sun to consider the experiential gaze in research. This mythical journey draws upon the historical journeys in ancient times of the *theoros*, who travelled on behalf of his or her community to witness important spectacles, typically oracles or religious festivals. Plato used this practice as a metaphor for the contemplative knowing of the philosopher, *theoria*. We have suggested that this offers a basis for theorizing as a form of knowing that is actively excluded from a large proportion of modern scientific discourse but appears to be emerging in some recent developments in organizational research.

A view of the research journey has been proposed that entails multiple stages, including: identifying the quest as the pursuit of truth; undertaking the journey; experiencing the encounter and gazing upon truth; undergoing transformation not merely in knowledge or thought, but at a more profound level, in identity; and the attempt to construct representations of that transformation in a manner that is not only authentic for the researcher but also capable of forming the basis of engaging in knowledge development with others in the academic community.

We have demonstrated that the experience of blindness in the research journey implied in the Plato’s allegory supports the belief in the importance of professional humility in post-positivist inquiry. We have offered one example of a practice that embodies such humility: evenly suspended attention. The notion of research as journey encourages an acknowledgement that periods of blindness are essential aspects of meaningful research and that there are times when the researcher does not have to be, indeed cannot be, the ‘one who is supposed to know’ (Lacan 1979, 232).

The metaphor of the journey also encourages a conception of research that is embodied and the researcher fully present as a human being. As a traveller, the journey is rich in experiences and the truth of these experiences has an impact upon the person of the researcher. Thus, despite the metaphor of blindness alluding to the anxiety implicit in the research process, the pursuit of an unknown and unknowable reality is meaningful because of the transformational impact, the changes that are brought about in the researcher. The experiential gaze is not an abstract perception from
the safety of the intellect: it is a fully emotional, lived gaze that requires an engagement of the whole person, which ultimately transforms the researcher’s identity. Recent developments in methodological approaches in organizational research seem, in some measure, to offer the potential to re-discover this ancient knowledge. For example, Russell (1999) has pointed out that autoethnography produces a subjective space that combines anthropologist and informant, subject and object of the gaze, where identity becomes ‘a representation of the self as a performance’ (276). We have considered the transformation of such a representation, the mimetic object, as a metaphor for the process of knowledge creation that emerges from such an approach to research.

Finally, the end of the journey, returning to the Cave, involves active engagement on the part of the researcher in processes of representation – for self and other. For the researcher we considered the critical role of mimesis arising from an encounter with truth, the challenge of representing the unknown, unknowable, and unnameable in a manner that is authentic and sufficiently consistent with the experiential gaze. The second challenge is to find representations that may also permit adequate communication with others who have not taken part in the journey.
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