Art, Aesthetics and Supplementarity:

Re-evaluating the Distinctions between the Work of Art and Supporting Material.

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May 2015

Word Count: 83,899
Abstract

This thesis analyses the importance of supplementary material for art history and philosophy by addressing its shifting and problematic relationship to the ‘work of art’. Through the use of philosophical and critical theories, including Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, Deleuze and Derrida, the nature and status of artworks are explored through different uses of supplementarity that are identified and developed in order to re-evaluate the cultural significance of supplementarity itself. This theoretical analysis is complemented by a cultural history that demonstrates, through a discussion of changes in artistic practices, theoretical perceptions, markets and ‘cultures of display’, the ways in which conceptions of the work of art and supplementarity are historically contingent.

The main body of the thesis is composed of four case studies. In the first, Heidegger’s distinction between art and equipment and his notion of causality is used to analyse Henry Moore’s maquettes, plasters, and bronze works, in order to distinguish preliminary and preparatory material from complete works of art. The second focuses on hierarchy and supplementarity, developing Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum by showing how the drawings and sketches of Antonio Sant’Elia can be considered works of art, despite being traditionally identified as supporting material. Walter Benjamin’s theory of aura, and Theodor Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness, are deployed in a third case study that analyses the significance of the relocation of Francis Bacon’s studio from London to Dublin, and the use of biographical material to foreground the creative process. The final case study deploys Jacques Derrida’s analysis of Antonin Artaud’s works on paper that problematises prevailing classifications of art, and Derrida’s interpretation of Artaud’s notion of the subjectile, in order to emphasise the often ambiguous status of ostensibly supplementary material.

Overall, the thesis re-evaluates the cultural significance of supplementarity for aesthetics by analysing the ways in which supplementary material affects how works of art are experienced and understood.
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Introduction and Methodology

The subject of this thesis is the use and evaluation of supplementary material and its relation to ‘the work of art’. As will be developed throughout this study, supplementarity is a generic, umbrella term for anything that is evaluated or made use of in some way where a *supporting role* is asserted – where what is supported is at the same time asserted as the work of art properly speaking. Within gallery and museum settings, supplementary material may consist of preliminary or preparatory works, sketch books, and former studios. Supplementarity can also extend to the wall-mounted descriptions, gallery leaflets, online resources, objects with a direct biographical association with an artist, and immaterial forms such as the psychological state of mind of an artist that can nevertheless be asserted and represented through physical material such as letters or psychiatric reports. Furthermore, books and essays on art constitute forms of supplementarity by providing additional information that influences the ways in which this or that artist, and this or that work of art, might be interpreted.

Supplementary material can be found across the major art galleries and museums of the Western world; exhibitions have included whole sections dedicated to the contents of studios; countless numbers of objects have been classified as non-art, yet deemed valuable enough to store away in archives. Such is the ubiquitous use of supplementarity within museum and gallery settings that the inclusion of preparatory material alongside conventionally established works of art is widely accepted as a natural and unproblematic

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1 For example, Van Gogh’s letters to his brother.
method of revealing information and insights into the creative process behind the art.²

Yet what does the employment of such methods of revealing, itself reveal about prevailing or changing approaches to art and artists? What value judgements and choices of categorisation are made when distinguishing between art and non-art, between what is (or at least may come to be) deemed worthy of display? Who makes these decisions? Do all forms of supplementary material supplement the work and/or artist in the same ways? To what extent could supplementary material possibly be considered to form significant cultural objects in their own right?

The three primary objectives of this thesis can be defined as:

- To explore the ways in which supplementary materials affect and alter the meaning of ‘the work of art’ as theorised through different philosophical and sociological viewpoints.

- To analyse the various ways in which supplementary materials used, produced by, or otherwise associated with artists have been archived, preserved and displayed.

- To understand these various forms of supplementarity as ‘cultural objects’ that have their own significance, as well as playing an important role in how works are produced, received and interpreted.

² For example, The Tate, in London, has approximately 37,000 works by the artist J.M.W. Turner that consist of sketches, watercolours, and other drawings contained in his sketchbooks. See www.tate.org.uk/about/projects/jmw-turner-sketchbooks-drawings-watercolours (accessed 10 November 2014).
These objectives can be summarised as: *supplementarity in relation to the work of art*, *supplementarity in relation to archives and displays*, and *supplementarity itself*.

To address these objectives I will draw upon specific philosophical and art-historical concepts, as well as concepts emerging or made possible by ‘works of art’ themselves, so as to open up and illuminate the importance of the supplement for contemporary research into both the creative process and the ways in which art is used in public displays.

This thesis is not an attempt to combine different philosophical theories into a unified whole. Instead, it shows how these particular theories – each allowing different approaches to the question of ‘what is a work of art?’ – have a significant relationship to supplementarity, which in turn is of relevance to art theory and art practice. Their implications extend to discussions of the supplement, and are also extended into new areas of philosophical and historical importance for a re-evaluation of the status of the supplement. Therefore this thesis is not intended as a challenge to the philosophical concepts employed, but as an investigation into their implications for supplementarity.

The methodological approach of this thesis is now established by explaining the context in which this research is taking place, the key questions of the thesis, the rationale behind the selection and use of particular philosophical concepts, concepts emerging from the history of supplementarity, and the artists and works that will form the subjects of the four main case studies in chapters three, four, five, and six. This introduction will also establish how these areas each interrelate, where philosophical and historical approaches
to works of art, as well works of art themselves, emerge out of, and in response to one another. Through this I will show the importance of the supplement for past developments in these areas, as well as highlighting how each of these areas can be utilised to argue for a new interpretation of the value of different types of material that is currently predominantly reduced to a supporting role. What follows will be an adumbration of the key works analysed throughout the thesis, with full references provided in subsequent chapters.

Research Context

One of the motivations for undertaking this project is to explore an underdeveloped area of art theory, the philosophy of art, and art history in general. Many works used throughout this thesis have touched upon the issue of supplementarity; however, there has never been a sustained, theorised and historically situated analysis of supplementarity itself.

In the following sections of this introduction and methodology I show how key works by philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Martin Heidegger, Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida, directly or indirectly discuss the supplement and art without developing a full historical or theoretical account of supplementarity.

These philosophical concepts do not emerge in isolation, but within a reciprocal relationship of responses to, and influences upon, events in art history - including the
production of works of art, art criticism, the art market, archiving, and displaying of works. For this reason, the chapter on the key philosophical concepts of importance for the thesis is followed by a chapter revealing a history of the supplement that is found in the history of art production and art theory. Chapters one and two therefore provide a detailed discussion of the key philosophical concepts, and concepts emerging from the history of the supplement, that shape this thesis. What follows is a broad overview of important works of both art history and the philosophy of art that relate to supplementarity, with a more comprehensive discussion provided in the following sections and chapters one and two.

Of the philosophers listed above, it is Kant who first addresses the supplement in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790), by introducing the notion of the *parergon* as the ornamental aspect attached to, but outside of, the work of art. However, Kant’s concern is with the definition of the work of art itself. Heidegger’s ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1935-1937), and ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ (1955) both have implications for the status of the supplement, but neither explicitly address its relationship to works of art. Throughout Adorno’s *Aesthetic Theory* (1970), as well as in the essay written with Max Horkheimer, ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ (1944), he is concerned with the role works of art have in culture, as well as the ways in which the experience of encountering works of art has been affected by technology and changing attitudes. However, Adorno views supplementarity as an obstacle to understanding works of art, rather than considering it as an important area for investigation and analysis in itself. Michel Foucault’s ‘What is an Author?’ (1969) explores how the definition of ‘the work’ is distinguished from other forms of writing produced by the same author, but
without specifying how such additional works might be defined. Jacques Derrida, in both *The Truth in Painting* (1978), and ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’ (1986), identifies the importance of supplementarity in the exploration of the ambiguous nature of defining the work of art, primarily by developing Kant’s notion of *parerga*, but he does not propose or develop a theory of supplementarity itself.

The issues about the nature of the work of art have been addressed in a number of important recent studies in cultural history that, as will be highlighted throughout the thesis, are both influenced by, and an influence upon, art practice and philosophy. In *The Social Production of Art* (1981), Janet Wolff discusses how economic and political forces influence the production and reception of works of art. However, Wolff’s interest is in the ways in which works of art are influenced by these contextual factors, rather than with the specific role played by supplementarity in their production and reception. *Art Worlds* (1982) by Howard S. Becker, explores the importance of factors surrounding works of art, but he does not concern himself with a discussion of the cultural significance of supplementarity. Naomi Schor’s *Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine* (1987) provides an important discussion of how the gendered politics involved in the hierarchical and neo-classical literary commentary on the ‘detail’ (as opposed to the totality of a work) has been historically ‘reduced’ to ornamentation and a negative association with femininity. However, the focus of Schor’s writing is not directed towards a more general inquiry into the hierarchical evaluation of the supplement.

Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbell in *The Love of Art* (1991) frequently mention uses of supplementary material such as catalogues, brochures, and wall descriptions, but
specifically in the context of the significance of education in understanding works of art. Carol Duncan discusses the notion of ‘liminality’ in Civilizing Rituals: Inside the Public Art Museum (1995), without extending this discussion to an account of the role supplementary material plays in this notion. In a major collection of essays, Contemporary Cultures of Display (1999), edited by Emma Barker, shifting attitudes and approaches towards museums, archives, and other ways of experiencing works of art, are analysed. Here, the work of art in relation to its context remains of central importance, rather than the significance of how supplementary material has been used.

John Hope Mason’s The Value of Creativity: The Origins and Emergence of a Modern Belief (2003), explores the notion of creativity through its historical and theoretical developments, but Mason does not attempt to formulate an account of how the status of supplementary material has both influenced, and been influenced by, these changes. Larry Shiner’s The Invention of Art (2003) raises the possibility of moving “beyond the modern system of art” towards a re-classification of the creative act that would recognise the importance of craftsmanship, but does not carry out a discussion of supplementarity’s own historical development. A more recent work, Briony Fer’s Eva Hesse: Studiowork (2009) provides a detailed discussion of the meaning and nature of Hesse’s use of incomplete or fragmented pieces produced during the creative process; however this valuable specific discussion does not extend their relevance to philosophical and art-historical theories and developments in general. As both editor of, and contributor to

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Support Structures (2009), Céline Condorelli brings together a number of essays that explore the importance of framing and the role of the support in both art-production and society in general, but this variety of perspectives does not constitute a concentrated analysis of the relationship between works of art and supplementarity. Lastly, Deanna Petherbridge’s *The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice* (2010) provides an important contribution to the construction of the value of works on paper, arguing that their significance for the creative process is often overlooked and relegated to a supporting role. However, Petherbridge does not extend the implications of her analysis to other areas of supplementarity.

These works outline the research that is of importance to the context of this study of the supplement, whilst indicating the need for a thesis that consolidates their respective analyses into a work that places supplementarity itself at the centre of the discussion.

**Key Questions**

There are four central questions, both asked and addressed, that dictate the methodology of this thesis: what is the supplement? How and why is the supplement classified in a particular way? Why is the supplement important? How is the supplement problematic for understanding the definition of ‘the work of art’?

The address to these questions is made over the course of four corresponding chapters, with each one utilising a case study of an artist and their works that have been selected due to their suitability for responding to these questions. These four case studies are
analysed through the employment of specific philosophical and art historical concepts that not only correspond to the questions outlined above, but which are pivotal for identifying the aspects of supplementarity that I intend to bring into the open in order to establish its importance for contemporary research. This research includes the philosophy of aesthetics and technology, the history and study of art, and creative practice itself.

Of particular importance is the way in which the majority of the philosophical concepts used in this thesis were not concerned with the supplement, but instead applied to the definition of the work of art. These concepts were both shaped by, and helped establish, historical interpretations of what the work of art might be, with artists both influenced by, and challenging, such definitions. This reciprocal development of philosophical, historical, and artistic approaches may have predominantly focused on the work of art, but it also, often inadvertently, charts an historical path of the value of supplementarity, whilst providing the means to re-evaluate the importance of the supplement. This thesis returns to the questions being asked of the work of art with a change of emphasis, turning attention towards the implications that these questions have for understanding what the supplement is, how and why it has been classified in certain ways, why it is important, and where it becomes problematic for the definition of the work of art.

**What is the Supplement?**

This question concerns the status of the supplement as it is distinguished from the work of art. Different forms and uses of support, such as biographical material, preliminary and
preparatory material, and educational devices are all identified in chapter three, with a particular emphasis on the distinctions and definitions of artwork and equipment.

The purpose of this question is to analyse the degrees to which works-for-art (works produced by artists that are not conventionally considered to be ‘complete’) and works-of-art (completed works) converge with one another, or are distinguished in specific ways. The status of the supplement is shown in chapter one to have been a concern in the philosophy of art since Kant (where the evidence of working, or the use of ornamentation, are considered to distract from the work of art), and Schopenhauer (where the early stages of the creative process are celebrated as evidencing inspiration in a way that is superior to complete works). In chapter two, the complex status and cultural importance of equipment and technology used in the creative process is shown to have shifted historically, with the example of Dürer’s use of woodblocks to create multiple copies of works, contrasted with their elevated significance within contemporary museums, where the ‘hand’ or trace of the artist is emphasised. The historical shifts in approaches to the art market, commodification, technology, the notion of the artist as producer, and the ambiguity that can appear between works produced in creative practice, and works deemed worth of display (whether by the artist, or by other parties), are all shown in chapter three to have implications for the status of the supplement. These areas of art history are explored further in chapter two, included a detailed discussion of the different positions taken by Janet Wolff when analysing the role of the artist as producer, and in Briony Fer’s study of the problematic studio works of the artist, Eva Hesse.
Through a discussion of the different stages in the working process of the sculptor, Henry Moore, the distinction between equipment and works of art is explored through my interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of causality, which illuminates important convergences between works-for-art such as Moore’s maquettes, and the monumental sculptures that can be derived from them. Through this study of concepts emerging from art history, the history of philosophy, and Moore’s creative practice, the complexity and contingent status of the supplement is opened up for analysis.

**How is the Supplement Classified?**

This question concerns the classification of the supplement, which is addressed in chapter four. This question develops the analysis of the status of the supplement via a careful discussion of historically hierarchical classifications of works-for-art and works-of-art, together with the ways in which such works can be appropriated.

Two pivotal concepts of the philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, are employed here to extend the investigation into the distinctions between work and support: the ‘sign’ and the ‘simulacrum’. Deleuze’s work is seen as an important part of (or strongly associated with) the French Post-Structuralist movement. Due to the emergence of Post-Structuralism in the late 1960s, and its continuation up to the 1990s, it draws parallels with the development of Postmodernism (in particular, a shared concern with relativism and an overturning of traditional values). It is within this context that key works by Deleuze would appear: *Difference and Repetition* (1968), *Proust and Signs* (1972), and ‘Plato and the Simulacrum’ (1983).
The concept of the simulacrum concerns an ‘overturning’ of what Deleuze calls the ‘image of thought’ that has dominated Western thinking since Plato, and has implications for hierarchical classification of works, and what it means to experience ‘art’. Deleuze’s concept of the ‘sign’ is a development of this new notion of the experience of art, placing an emphasis on sensation over interpretations of meaning. These concepts therefore constitute a challenge to dominant ideas and values that have emerged in the history of art. In particular, the systems of classification that began with the introduction of the signature and the importance of identification that emerged as the European art market grew in the Eighteenth Century, which is discussed further in chapter two.

The notion of hierarchical classification is addressed in chapter two, through a discussion of Petherbridge’s assertion that the importance of drawing as “the locus of invention and reinvention” has been historically overlooked in comparison to ‘complete’ works. Deleuze’s concepts of the ‘sign’ and the simulacrum are utilised in order to call into question the grounds of such hierarchical classification through an analysis of the works on paper of the Italian architect, Antonio Sant’Elia, and their subsequent appropriation by Filippo Marinetti and the Futurist movement. This study of Sant’Elia’s atypical works explores the conceptual ways in which their qualities as individual moments of creativity can be identified and experienced. The circumstances of the appropriation and commodification of Sant’Elia’s works is also shown to lift them beyond historically hierarchical modes of classification. This question of the classification of the supplement

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therefore highlights and challenges the reduction of works-for-art to the role of subservient supporting material.

**Why is the Supplement important?**

If the first two case studies and questions concern particular works-for-art and their approximation to works-of-art (complicating their classification as supporting material), this question and its corresponding case study focuses on material that is predominantly biographical. Why, and in what way, is such supplementary material important? How can material used in a supporting role be re-evaluated in order to expand its significance?

Chapter Two discusses the historical emergence of the ‘cult of personality’ and biography, as the status of artists changed. The Humanist turn that followed the Renaissance, along with the increased interest in artists that manifested itself in written biographies and higher social standing for successful artists, is encapsulated by the preservation of artists’ houses. In 1871, Albrecht Dürer’s former home became one of the first examples of a location being assigned historical importance due to its association with an artist, and in 1911, Rembrandt’s former residence was opened to the public. What made these places of interest to the public? This is discussed further in chapter Two.

The subject of the third case study is the reconstructed studio of the painter, Francis Bacon, which can be seen as a modern continuation of the interest shown in locations associated with celebrated artists. Great care was taken to relocate the studio from London, and reconstruct it in Ireland. The contents were also subject to the most
I address this question of significance through a consideration of key concepts of two philosophers; Walter Benjamin and his notion of ‘aura’ put forward in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’ (1936), and Theodor Adorno’s concepts of ‘enigmativeness’ and ‘entkundung’ (deaestheticisation). Both Benjamin and Adorno were responding to the implications that technological developments in the early Twentieth Century had for the production and consumption of works of art. Highly influenced by the works of Karl Marx, their approaches analyse in detail the social role of artists and their works. For Benjamin, technologically reproducible works of art signalled the death of aura, the intangible value attached to an original work of art, its history, and location, all of which are addressed in chapter two through the historically emerging importance of the ‘hand’ of the artist as evidence of authenticity.

For Adorno, an increased cultural interest in works of art threatened to reduce them to commodities to be explained and consumed (deaestheticisation), countering this demystification with his notion of enigmativeness, where the importance of works of art is found in their mystery, rather than supposed resolutions. Forms of apparent deaestheticisation are discussed in chapter two, by addressing the importance of the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA), New York, for providing the template for subsequent uses of works of art that emphasise narrative and education. The implications of using education devices within art museums is also explored in chapter two, through a consideration of Bourdieu and Darbel’s *The Love of Art*. 
In chapter five, I discuss how Benjamin’s notion of aura still appears to be evident in the evaluation of Bacon’s relocated studio, echoing the historical examples of venerating artists’ environments described above. I also discuss how Bacon’s studio, rather than being a matter of demystification, can be argued to have its own enigmaticalness in a way that underlines the importance of the supplement for encouraging public interest in the creative process itself.

**How is the Supplement Problematic for Works of Art?**

The first three case studies all share concerns with the same three areas, whilst focusing primarily on one: the status of the supplement, the value of the supplement, and the importance of biography for the supplement. The fourth case study is a culmination of these discussions, whilst explicitly addressing how the implications of these discussions call for a re-evaluation of the relationships and distinctions between works of art and supplementary material.

As with the second case study on Sant’Elia and Deleuze, the historical context of the philosophical concepts being employed – Jacques Derrida’s notions of ‘parerga’ and the ‘subjectile’ - is that of Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism. Following developments in linguistics and semiotics initiated by Ferdinand de Saussure in the early Twentieth Century, and continued by Claude Lévi-Strauss in works such as *Structural Anthropology* (1958), the relationship between work and authorship received heightened attention. Roland Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ (1967), and Michel Foucault’s ‘What is an Author? (1969)’ both engage with problems of authorship and interpretation that challenge the
centrality of the author that had become established in art and literature from the 1700s (as explored in chapters one and two, through the discussion of Moritz). In a later work, Foucault outlines the difficulties of defining an oeuvre: “Does the name of an author designate in the same way a text that he has published under his name, a text that he has presented under a pseudonym, another found after his death in the form of an unfinished draft, and another that is merely a collection of jottings, a notebook?”

This quotation highlights the same issues of value, classification, and biography that Derrida explores in both *The Truth in Painting*, and ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. The latter concerns the works on paper of the artist, Antonin Artaud, produced during and after his incarceration in mental institutions during World War Two. This concluding case study discusses the interrelations of sanity, genius, myth-building, hierarchies of material, institutionalisation, distinctions between works of art and supporting material (consciously rendered ambiguous by Artaud), and the role of biographical material for the assessment of an artist’s output. These themes are explored in chapter two, revealing historical developments in works such as those of the Goncourt Brothers, which emphasise the role of biographical information for interpreting works of art.

Through a consideration of Artaud’s works on paper in chapter six, the historical notions of authorship, biography, and the process of production, are brought together to show how supplementarity has become intertwined with the making, interpretation, and displaying of works of art. The incorporation of supplementarity into the creative process

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is shown to illuminate struggles against institutionalisation, and emerges as a problematic issue for identifying, archiving, and displaying works of art.

**Case Studies**

The methodology of this thesis consists of a careful unfolding of the main themes relating to supplementarity. There is of course the possibility of a migration of concepts – of both theory and practice – along with multiple combinations. The intention here is to bring together theories and practice that resonate vividly, allowing clarity in the analysis. It could be possible to do without philosophical concepts altogether, and simply interrogate a variety of case studies under a general theory of the supplement, showing different ways in which the issue of support might be encountered. However, what is of central importance here is to identify key philosophical and historical approaches to the question of art and the artist. This will show how supplementarity not only extends these approaches into new territories, raising further questions and providing new support for their views, but which also shows how such concepts can be used to open up dynamic reconsiderations of art practice.

It is not by accident that all four case studies concern artists from the Modernist era. As much as this thesis draws upon concepts and events from the histories of art and practice, it is also an analysis of contemporary approaches to, and implications for, supplementarity. By selecting artists from the Modernist era, rather than more recent or contemporary art practice, I am able to show more clearly the evidence of historical influences upon the production, archiving, and displaying of works of art and
supplementary material, and the ways in which these approaches can and must be re-considered today.

Given the wide-ranging potential for philosophical and historical concepts to be applied to all manners of art practice, there is the danger that my method of approach might appear arbitrary. Deleuze wrote a book on Bacon - could his ideas of ‘the sign’ and simulacra not be used in my chapter on Bacon? Is it not possible to discuss Sant’Elia’s works on paper by using the debate on aura between Benjamin and Adorno? And why these particular case studies and not others? For this reason it is necessary to provide some clarification regarding my choice of case studies, and my reasons for applying specific philosophical concepts to them.

Moore and Heidegger

In this, and subsequent chapters, I decided that concentrating on one particular artist would prevent the discussion from becoming diluted and too broad, allowing for a detailed examination of how the issue of the supplement can pervade multiple aspects of an artist’s method of working, and the use made of that work. The choice of case study in this instance is determined by the necessity of opening with a discussion of the classification and distinction of art and equipment, and to see how preliminary and preparatory works-for-art might seemingly apply to both. This chapter therefore addresses the problem of classifying works of art that was shown to unfold in the history of art discussed above, as well as showing how Heidegger’s philosophical works on the meaning and value of equipment can problematise such classifications. Heidegger’s
studies of the nature of art, the artist, and equipment, provide an opportunity to
investigate where preliminary and preparatory works would apply to his analyses, and for
this reason it was imperative to select an artist who made use of different forms of
preliminary and preparatory work during their creative process. What makes Henry
Moore so suitable for carrying out this analysis is that on the one hand, his complete
works are seemingly very familiar and seemingly unproblematic (which allows for a
greater juxtaposition between these well-known pieces, and my analysis of his less
defined preliminary and preparatory works), and on the other, the use he made of such
material was a conventional one. For Moore, there is a clear distinction between the
small maquettes, the plasters, and the full-scale sculptures. At no point does Moore
attempt to make his works-for-art the focus of his creative practice, which would make
the analysis in this section less clear. Heidegger’s approach also makes a clear distinction
between art and equipment, and between Moore and Heidegger arises the opportunity
to question whether a careful discussion of Heidegger’s theories, and Moore’s practice
might reveal how such a distinction may not be as clear as it initially appears.

Moore often wrote about his working process, and this provides a strong foundation for
being able to develop Heidegger’s notion of causality, which links his approaches to art
and equipment. Instead of merely illustrating Heidegger’s ideas, Moore’s working
process allows these ideas to be both demonstrated and challenged by way of clear
examples, supported by the artist’s own accounts. Further, the role of the Henry Moore
Foundation in classifying and distributing Moore’s preliminary and preparatory material
allows for the issue of the supplement’s status to be expanded to the realms of display
and utilisation. This provides an introduction to a core theme of this thesis; namely, the
problems that arise when works specifically categorised as supporting material begin to encroach upon the public space of completed works of art. Another important benefit of selecting Moore as the subject of this case study is that his process of working represents a choice between developing initial ideas (and the different ways this might be done), or deciding to abandon them to their status as incomplete pieces. This allows for a greater contrast to the work that forms the focus of the following case study, which in turn emphasises crucial differences between types of preliminary and preparatory works that are dependent upon the circumstances of their formation and appropriation.

**Sant’Elia and Deleuze**

The rationale behind choosing Sant’Elia’s preliminary and preparatory works as the subject of a case study was directly influenced by the decision to write about Moore’s maquettes. Though both the maquettes and Sant’Elia’s architectural works on paper seemingly share the property of incompleteness, there is a sharp contrast in the value attached to them that arises from the circumstances of their use. Moore lived into his eighties, and retained considerable control over decisions about developing or abandoning his initial ideas. His catalogue of completed works emphasises the process-value of these initial ideas in relation to his overall practice, whilst more easily defining them as supporting material for those who displayed the works Moore produced. In contrast, Sant’Elia’s early death has left his works on paper in a severed, more ambiguous state, where the absence of completed works bestows greater significance upon them as the only evidence of his ambitious and speculative projects. This caused me to consider their importance for showing how, under certain conditions otherwise supplementary
material might occupy a similar (if not completely identical) role to that of completed works, as well as the processes involved in appropriating such material. Two important concepts arose from my consideration of Sant’Elia’s work; the possibility of preliminary and preparatory works to encroach upon the territory usually reserved for completed works (which challenges conventional approaches to the hierarchical categorisation of works of art, and the manner in which such categorisation has become established in the history of art); and the importance of appropriation when the artist’s own power to control the uses of his work is diminished or absent (which relates to the developments in museum and exhibition displays addressed in chapter two).

Whilst Moore’s work was selected due to its suitability for exploring Heidegger’s theories of art and equipment, Sant’Elia’s work was chosen because of the way in which it contrasted and resonated with the concepts that appeared from my study of Moore and Heidegger. This does not mean that the decision to apply the concepts of Deleuze to Sant’Elia’s work was arbitrary. Had Sant’Elia’s work not been appropriate for furthering the discussion of the key philosophical concepts I wished to explore, it would have been set aside. Perhaps more than any other philosopher discussed in this thesis, Deleuze’s theories (especially that of the ‘sign’) could be drawn upon to re-interpret a wide range of works of artists. However, his notion of the simulacrum, and in particular its relevance for bringing into question a dominant approach to representation that had persisted since

7 Though it should be pointed out that from the earliest stages of my research I was looking at numerous artists and their works that could potentially be of use for this investigation, including Sant’Elia. As my method of approach developed, the appropriateness of my research became clearer and more refined. For example, although Kandinsky’s drawings have the potential to be developed into a discussion of supplementarity and design, I decided that they were not suitable for unfolding the thesis in a way that would allow for the opening up of the key themes.
Plato, finds an ideal counterpoint in Sant’Elia’s work. The content of Sant’Elia’s works on paper are already simulations of architectural structures, yet they are copies without models, outlines without fulfilment. The privileged position afforded to these otherwise supportive works by the circumstances of Sant’Elia’s death allows for the notion of the simulacrum as something that should be encountered on its own terms to be clearly highlighted and developed. Furthermore, the implications Deleuze’s notion of the ‘sign’ has for evaluating the artistic ‘qualities’ that distinguish a work of art can be vividly applied here in order to reveal the possibility of a radical reconsideration of supplementary material such as preliminary and preparatory works. If the chapter on Moore and Heidegger indicates the ways in which supplementarity might be identified, this chapter shows how supplementarity might be re-positioned. Sant’Elia and Deleuze complement one another in such a way that allows the assertion and implications of this re-positioning to be expressed with clarity.

**Bacon, Benjamin, and Adorno**

With the popularisation of the ‘artist-genius’ notion came an increased interest in understanding the origins and processes of the creative act. Today it continues to be common for exhibitions to include not only biographical material that was not immediately part of the production of art, but which in some cases is connected only by coming from a shared historical period. That this approach remains popular in museums and displays ensures that the debates about aura and deaestheticisation raised by

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Benjamin and Adorno continue to be relevant – particularly in a discussion on supplementarity. These critical approaches highlight key concerns about the ways in which the ‘art experience’ might be hindered or improved, and provide the thesis with an important theoretical context concerning supposed or potential negative aspects of the use of supplementarity. However, in Adorno’s theory of enigmaticalness (which he develops in opposition to deaesthetisisation, as that which is threatened by the latter), there emerges another possibility; the same process that retains this sense of enigmaticalness in historical works of art that have lost their original context and have become re-rendered as ‘hieroglyphic puzzles’, can not only be found in some forms of supplementary material, but will be argued to constitute their primary value when displayed. The focus of this chapter is to outline the criticism directed towards forms of supplementarity that have apparently become increasingly distanced from works of art, whilst showing, conversely, that an affirmation of such material (made possible by Adorno himself) can transform their significance and re-constitute them as culturally important in a way that is no longer reduced to mere support.

At an early stage of my research I was already looking at Francis Bacon’s relocated studio, and had recognised that it held particular importance in being able to raise questions about the re-distribution of meaning, context, the elevation of the biographical, and processes of mystification and demystification involved in their use. Initially, I considered exploring this studio-display by way of Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια (see Appendix 1), as this allowed me to address what was lost and what was preserved in each

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9 It is the act of relocation and the precise re-rendering of Bacon’s studio that makes it more appropriate for discussion than other art studios, such as Constantin Brâncuși’s ‘atelier’ in Paris, or Jackson Pollock and Lee Krasner’s studios at the Pollock-Krasner House in New York.
stage of the studio’s existence. My interview with Barbara Dawson, the Director of The Hugh Lane Municipal Gallery of Modern Art who oversaw the relocation of Bacon’s studio, was carried out with the ramifications of Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια in mind. However, as my research into Heidegger, Benjamin, and (particularly) Adorno developed, it soon became apparent that this approach would need to be reconsidered. Heidegger’s theories on causality and equipment made me realise that this would warrant a more thorough discussion, accompanied by a case study that would allow my own interpretation of their importance to be more appropriately emphasised. Equally, it became clear to me that the significance of Bacon’s relocated studio for this discussion of supplementarity was to be found in its relevance for exploring and furthering research, not only in debates about aura and deaesthetisation, but also in re-evaluating supplementary material as something having significant cultural and artistic value. Whilst the Moore chapter represents a case study chosen for its overall suitability, and as general introduction to the problems of classifying supplementarity, the relocated studio of Francis Bacon is a unique event that allows for the discussion of aura, deaesthetisation, and enigmaticalness to be illuminated.

**Artaud and Derrida**

The reasoning behind the choice of my final case study involved the consideration of several factors. It is a culmination of the key ideas previously discussed, whilst emphasising the problematic nature of supplementarity for approaches to practice, display and theory. One of the primary reasons for Artaud’s use in this thesis lies in the ways in which his works on paper knowingly addressed the problematic status of the
complete work of art.\textsuperscript{10} This can be seen in his ‘spells’ and ‘ébauches’, and his use of supplementary written material to challenge any efforts to interpret them in accordance with ‘conventional’ approaches to unfinished or complete works. Artaud’s work constitutes an important example of how a questioning of prevailing notions of the use and hierarchical ordering can be incorporated into the creative act itself, in a way that is not present in the other case studies. However, it is also of great value for the way it highlights the practical problems of displaying such work (such as Artaud’s numerous notebooks), as well as extending my study of appropriation and the use of the biographical to the artist’s mental state itself.

The issue of ‘madness’ explored in this section directly relates to the characterisation of artists as troubled geniuses that, following Kant’s artist-genius, became popularised in the Romantic period. As well as showing the mechanisms of hierarchical classification taking place that distinguished ‘art brut’ from more recognised figures such as Artaud, it also reveals the extent to which mental illness can be allowed to dominate the way in which works are packaged and presented, transforming and undermining the artist’s own intentions by focusing on the biographical circumstances surrounding their creation. Artaud’s work – a challenge to the meaning and status of the supplement – itself becomes a supplement to the ‘mad’ historical figure of ‘Artaud’.

\textsuperscript{10} I had considered basing this case study on the works of Marcel Duchamp, due to a similar awareness of the problematic status of his works. However, it became apparent that in addition to the difficulties that would be faced by attempting to align Duchamp’s own, very specific theories to the concerns of this thesis, Derrida’s works on Artaud provided a more precise and clearer opportunity to bring the various aspects of this thesis together.
It was not a matter of ‘applying’ Derrida to Artaud (or vice versa). Unlike the other case studies discussed here, Artaud’s influence extended to his written works as well as his art, with his writing playing a part in shaping the philosophies of both Deleuze and Derrida. The mutual influence of art and theory is seen clearly in Artaud’s work (both written and on paper), with Artaud himself referenced by Deleuze in his rejection of the historical ‘image of thought’ that forms the crux of chapter five. However, as with his book on Bacon, the fact that Deleuze had referenced the influence of Artaud was not in itself a reason to ‘couple’ him with that particular artist. Instead, the combinations I have selected are based on what can generate the most productive discussions. Not only did Derrida provide a key text that explored the issue of Artaud, mental illness, and ‘the work’, he also developed his theory of the ‘parergon’ by specifically addressing a concept invented (or at least extensively re-invented) by Artaud – the ‘subjectile’. Both the parergon and the subjectile are significant concepts for this discussion of supplementarity, whereby the role, value, and use of the support are exposed to a sustained philosophical study. Via Artaud’s works on paper, and Derrida’s analysis of the support (itself directly influenced by Artaud), this case study represents a culmination point where practical and theoretical concerns with the borders and limits of the work of art meet my own investigation of supplementarity. This collision does not result in a mere summary or overview of their respective projects. Instead it draws upon them in order to forward this discussion by revealing how concerns regarding the definition and use of what is called the supplement are not only already to be found to have emerged in both practice and theory, but have combined to form the ground upon which this thesis is built.
Chapter One: The Supplement and Philosophy

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the key positions and concepts of particular thinkers in relation to this project, establishing the foundations of the ideas to be discussed, as well as providing more detailed overviews of specific concepts and ideas that will be used throughout the thesis.

This chapter will introduce the general positions of certain key thinkers in relation to art, before focusing on the relevance of aspects of their theories that are central to the issue of supplementarity. The primary thinkers I will be drawing upon will be Kant, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Adorno, Benjamin, Plato, Deleuze (alone, or in collaboration with Guattari), and Derrida.

Kant

In his essay ‘Toward a Unification of All the Fine Arts and Letters under the Concept of Self-Sufficiency’ (1785), Karl Philipp Moritz put forward the view that fine or ‘higher’ art should not be judged or evaluated on its ability to please an audience, but that its ‘true’ qualities are in their internal perfection. This was the first significant stage in the development of theories of art as being autonomous rather than merely instrumental. Moritz describes the pleasure in the higher arts as being a matter of losing oneself in their beauty, an involvement that constitutes ‘disinterested’ pleasure. In this way, Emma Barker argues: “The relative ineffectuality of beautiful art, instead of rendering its value
problematic, can be construed as evidence of its very excellence.”¹¹ Five years after Moritz’s essay, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) concluded his three famous philosophical Critiques in 1790, with the publication of The Critique of Judgement. This work can be viewed as a continuation and development of Moritz’s notion of disinterested pleasure inspired by the internal qualities of works of art.¹² Instead of art being considered as a passive quality contained in works such as paintings or sculptures that could be merely contemplated and appreciated, Kant redefined art as something experienced under specific laws of reason that formed part of the makeup of our mental faculties. For Kant, the experience and understanding of art is ultimately derived from what he terms the ‘aesthetic idea’, which he describes as “that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible”.¹³

The aesthetic idea is aesthetic precisely because it is primarily concerned with sensation – it pleases or displeases the senses in a way separate to (and beyond) any conceptual or reasoned response. Such an object of cognition induces a representation in thought with which no concept is capable of being suitably aligned, causing the resulting idea produced by it to be a matter of sensation.


Kant argued for the primacy of universal *a priori* laws that formed the foundation of all reason, and from which all possible experience was subsequently derived. If there was to be such a thing as an aesthetic idea that related to the senses, that too would by necessity need to be established on universal *a priori* laws that ultimately existed within the faculties of the mind, and the judgements of reason resulting from these faculties. As Kant argues: “Judgement in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the universal.”\(^{14}\)

For Kant, the universality of the experience of art centred upon judgements of taste in relation to the beautiful, and the key to this was the possibility of *disinterested interest*. In the natural world, a flower or a mountain range might be said to induce an aesthetic idea by stimulating the senses in such a way as to cause pleasure, yet without the possibility of being reduced to a concept of reason that explains such pleasure. In Kantian terms, for this pleasure to be pure and free from any concept of reason, it must be the result of a disinterested interest, whereby the pleasure cannot be said to result from any individual judgment of agreeableness or disagreeableness. Kant argues this point when he says that “everyone must allow that a judgement on the beautiful which is tinged with the slightest interest, is very partial and not a pure judgement of taste.”\(^{15}\)

With his criteria in place, Kant establishes a method of evaluating works of art in terms of their capacity to induce a judgment of beauty that is free from any particular interest. For Kant, the great work of art begins with form. It is the construction of this form that above

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\(^{14}\) Ibid, p. 18.

\(^{15}\) Ibid, p. 43.
all renders a work beautiful. Kant argues: “In painting, sculpture, and in fact in all the formative arts, in architecture and horticulture, so far as fine arts, the *design* is what is essential.”\(^{16}\) The designer of the beautiful work of art is, for Kant, the genius.\(^{17}\) Kant emphasises a notion of the artistic genius that is essentially on a lower level to learned figures in intellectual disciplines because their skills are ‘gifted’ to them from birth, rather than being acquired through hard work and discipline (though the latter may play an important part in refining their talents). Kant’s notion of the artist/genius as a gifted and unusual figure in society would have significant implications for the notion of the romanticised portrayal of the isolated artist (discussed in chapter two), unable to understand their own abilities, that continues to influence ways in which artists (and the materials associated with them) are characterised today.

Kant arrived at the conclusion that “the design is what is essential” by a process of reduction that removed any aspect of a work that may be said to appeal to individual preferences, such as the use of colour or expensive materials. Such appeals to individual preferences Kant distinguishes as *charms*. Charms such as colour merely gratify the senses, whereas the form of a work induces pleasure in its own right.\(^{18}\) Kant argues that: “the real meaning rather is that this makes the form more clearly, definitely, and completely intuitable, and besides stimulates the representation by their charm, as they excite and sustain the attention directed to the object itself”.\(^{19}\) On one hand the work of

\(^{16}\) Ibid, p. 67 (original emphasis).

\(^{17}\) Ibid, p. 168.

\(^{18}\) Ibid, p. 67.

\(^{19}\) Ibid, p. 68.
art is by necessity something where “some work of man is understood”. 20 On the other hand, in order for it to be art it must be the result of “an occupation which is agreeable on its own account”. 21 Work resulting from a process concerned merely with what is produced is considered “industrial art” that belongs to the realm of handicraft, and is therefore already concerned with a specific interest. 22 In contrast to Schopenhauer, Kant also insists that the work of art must consist of an “absence of laboured effect” – a requirement that underlines Kant’s belief that the work must induce a perfect representation of nature through its form, instead of drawing attention to its ‘createdness’. 23 Indeed, the initial, unrefined moments of expression later championed by Schopenhauer are, for Kant, of use only as a means of refinement. He argues that “The artist, having practised and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature or art, controls his work and, after many, and often laborious, attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commends itself to him.” 24 Thus, for Kant, preliminary and preparatory works have value only in their potential ability to refine works of art yet to come.

In the context of this thesis the most significant part of Kant’s writing on the work of art relates to his discussion of charm, and the distinction he makes between the employment of this concept to positively support and emphasise the form of the work, and that which,  

20 Ibid, p. 163.  
21 Ibid, p. 164.  
22 Ibid.  
whilst ostensibly a type of charm, becomes something that Kant considers a hindrance to the work. Kant introduces the notion of *ornamentation* or *parerga* (the plural of *parergon*, that is; ‘para’ (beyond or alongside) ‘ergon’ - work, or ‘to work’). Such ornamentation is considered outside or alongside the work of art, and is concerned only with an appeal to the senses (and thus obscuring the path to a disinterested interest).

Kant argues: “If the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of the beautiful form – if it is introduced like a gold frame merely to win approval for the picture by means of its charm – it is called *finery* and it takes away from the genuine beauty.”

Supplementarity is therefore introduced by Kant as a potential aspect of the experience of art, in the form of parerga, but in a specifically negative sense of detraction.

This notion of parerga will form the direct inspiration for Derrida’s own concept of the *parergon* (which will be discussed in chapter six), and establishes the first major theoretical discussion of the distinction between artistic and non-artistic aspects of the experience of a work of art. More generally, Kant’s writing on the work of art introduce key concepts of relevance to the present thesis, including; the notion of art as a cognitive experience; the idea of the artist/genius; the primacy of form and design; the utilisation of *charm* to positively emphasise elements of an artwork; and the supposedly negative inclusion of *parerga as finery* to embellish a work of art through the inclusion of supplementarity.

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25 Ibid, p. 68 (original emphasis).
In 1818, Arthur Schopenhauer provided the first major philosophical perspective on the importance of preliminary and preparatory works in the creative process:

The very best in art is too spiritual to be given directly to the senses; it must be born in the beholder’s imagination, it is due to this that the sketches of great masters are often more effective than their finished paintings. Of course another advantage contributes to this, namely that they are completed at one stroke in the moment of conception, whereas the finished painting is *brought about* only through continued efforts by means of clever deliberation and persistent premeditation, for the inspiration cannot last until the painting is completed.  

Schopenhauer argues “only that idea which was *perceived* before it was thought has suggestive and stimulating force when it is communicated”. He contends that the instinctual and immediate nature of sketches and initial representations of the inspirational idea:

have the great merit of being the pure work of the rapture of the moment, of the inspiration, of the free impulse of genius, without any admixture of deliberation and reflection. They are therefore delightful and enjoyable through and through, without shell and kernel, and their effort is much more infallible than is that of the greatest works of art of slow and deliberate execution.

This represents an extreme view of art in which what matters is the *origin* of the creative thought, which loses its impact and proximity to its genesis the more it is refined and ‘perfected’, where: “Understanding, technical skill, and routine must fill up here the gaps

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27 Ibid, p. 409 (original emphasis).

28 Ibid.
left by the conception and inspiration of genius, and all kinds of necessary subsidiary work must run through the really only genuine and brilliant part as their cement."\(^{29}\)

Whilst amounting to a brief commentary, this perspective is an important historical contribution to the present discussion of the significance of the supplement. Schopenhauer identifies the initial stages of the creative process as being more profound than the works derived from them by elevating the relevance of creative inspiration above its adaptations to a more palpable, and therefore more marketable, form. If Kant introduces the philosophical consideration of the supplement in art, by way of parerga, Schopenhauer introduces the implied centrality of the creative process itself, in which the earliest material manifestations have the most value through their proximity to inspiration.

**Heidegger**

After *The Critique of Judgement* appeared, new theories of art continued to be advanced that challenged and/or developed the ideas Kant had raised. Highly influential works such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art* (1835), maintained art’s position as an object of serious academic study, and of its varying degrees of importance in society. However, writing in 1876, Friedrich Nietzsche acknowledged the lack of interest in the construction of works of art, stating that “When something is perfect, we tend to neglect to ask about its evolution, delighting rather in

\(^{29}\) Ibid, p. 410.
what is present, as if it had risen from the ground by magic.” The audience wants the work of art to appear in such a way in order for the sensation of art to be felt more fully. Nietzsche identifies a ground for the complicity of the audience in this relation to art: “The wealth of religious feeling, swollen to a river, breaks out again and again, and seeks to conquer new realms: but growing enlightenment has shaken the dogmas of religion and generated a thorough mistrust of it; therefore, feeling, forced out of the religious sphere by enlightenment, throws itself into art.” This observation by Nietzsche accounts for the space created for an audience willing to embrace art through a displacement of religious feeling. An understanding of this displacement is essential in contextualising the theory of art that would, after Nietzsche, be put forward by Heidegger.

An important part of my theoretical methodology is the ontological project of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), and particularly his interpretations of causality, truth, and the distinctions between equipment, and the artwork. For Heidegger, the very history of mankind occurs through mankind’s varying relations to the issue of Being, in our confrontation with the questions of what is, and what we are. Beings that confront the issue of what it is to be, regardless of the extent of this confrontation, Heidegger calls ‘Dasein’. Dasein (roughly translated from German as here/there-being) is the thinking being that has awareness of its existence within a world.

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For Heidegger, the relationship Dasein has to equipment is one of forgetting the thing itself, and instead utilising it for mankind’s own ends. Such things are, for mankind, ‘ready-to-hand’; they have the quality of ‘readiness-to-hand’, with Heidegger asserting that equipment is always said of a plurality of things in relation to one another, instead of applying to individual objects (the hammer, the nail, the wood, the door, the house, etc.). They function best as equipment when they require no consideration, as their properties, origin and existence are subsumed within the carrying out of some task, and where: “The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is – as equipment.” \( ^{32} \) Heidegger’s use of this term – unveiledly – is related to his interpretation of the Greek word for truth, \( \text{ἀλήθεια} \) (alétheia). Heidegger claimed that the original sense of this word - that truth is something that emerges out of the hidden or concealed, and for the person apprehending or experiencing this truth it is thus unconcealed or unveiled – had become obscured and forgotten.

Truth as \( \text{ἀλήθεια} \) has no universal or singular meaning. Instead it is a temporal process that reveals a thing, a life, or a society for what it is (at least at the moment when truth becomes unconcealed). It is an unveiling that allows the construction of values, the relations between things within this construction, and the relations between this construction and the natural world, to become dis-closed. As such, truth is meant here as a revelation that allows an ontological sense of Being to transcend the ontical (that is, the everyday and ‘matter-of-fact’) concerns of a phenomenological ‘reality’. The latter,

through repeated familiarity and conditioning, obscures the former. Truth as unconcealment is therefore not only a revealing of the constructed nature of such a reality, it is also a manifestation of the continuously temporal, fluctuating relationship Dasein has with both concealment and unconcealment.

Traits, concepts, associations and meaning persist in things, or else they sink into the abyss of the forgotten, where: “in forgetting not only does something slip from us, but the forgetting slips into a concealment of such a kind that we ourselves fall into concealedness precisely in our relation to the forgotten”.33 Here, Heidegger is referring to our estimation of the truth as something that can only be assessed through what is evident for our consideration at a given moment, and where precisely what is concealed is unable to play a conscious role in our grasping of a thing. Heidegger posits the opposite of truth not as falsity, but as ‘oblivion’ (his translation of the Greek λήθή, or ‘lethe’), where the unconcealed truth, through not being preserved, becomes obliterated from the world – becomes concealed, and becomes a truth to which people are now oblivious.

Heidegger argues: “since ἀλήθεια is the overcoming of λήθή, what is unconcealed must be saved in unconcealedness and be secured in it”.34 To secure something in unconcealedness is to preserve it in its unconcealed state, and consequently from λήθή, from a ‘withdrawing concealment’. The ongoing interplay here between ἀλήθεια and λήθή constitutes the site where Dasein receives Being, where what is received is sometimes preserved, sometimes forsaken and allowed to withdraw into oblivion.

34Ibid, p. 124.
From 1935 to 1937, Heidegger worked on a lecture series he delivered earlier in the decade that evaluated art in terms of ἀλήθεια, Being, preservation, duration, and equipment. This would later be published under the title ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In Heidegger’s philosophy, a distinction is made between the usefulness of equipment, which comes to the fore the more its own existence as an object fades into forgetfulness, and the work of art, which Heidegger understands as something that, unlike the piece of equipment, is capable of allowing the being of truth (as ἀλήθεια) to come forth into unconcealment, where something essential to Being itself is revealed, instead of the everyday or ontic experiences which disappear into the background. The artwork exudes an unconcealed truth of Being that allows an experience of truth, and pulls Dasein out of the ‘ontic’ everyday being within a world.

For Heidegger, the work of art occupies a special significance for Dasein, and for the relationship between Dasein and ἀλήθεια. Equipment is no doubt important and necessary for Dasein, however its significance remains at the level of the ontic, that is, the level of our dealing with-in Being, rather than our dealing with Being itself that Heidegger argues is made possible by great works of art. Yet the preliminary and preparatory work is precisely that which falls between artwork and equipment – the non-art-work (or work-for-art) of the artist. The significance of these distinctions between equipment, works of art, and works-for-art for this thesis is in their implications for the classification of supplementary material that appears to exist between equipment and artwork. Heidegger defines great works of art as that which reveal, in very specific ways, a sense of truth about the worlds they appear within, and which are only preserved for a short time. In contrast, equipment is defined in terms of being forgotten or concealed in its utility. It
is the possibility that the problematic nature of works-for-art can be identified between these two definitions, and therefore opened up for clearer analysis, that forms the basis of the case study of Henry Moore.

For Heidegger, the work of art is not something made, like a hammer, shoe or pen, but something created. The work of art is the coming-into-existence of a truth that relies on no other purpose or function than to abide as a work of art in-itself. The work of art is capable of disclosing something of the essence of Being, precisely because its existence - its ‘what-it-is’ - is not immediately concealed within the demands of functionality. The work thrusts forward in its self-disclosing truth, where “the thrust that the work, as this work, is and the unceasingness of this inconspicuous thrust constitute the constancy of the self-subsistence of the work”.35 However, for both the equipment and the work of art, concealment is required in order for them to ‘fulfil’ their purpose, though in entirely contrasting ways. With the work of art it is “precisely where the artist and the process and circumstances of the genesis of the work remain unknown, this thrust, this ‘that it is’ of createdness, emerges into view most purely from the work”.36 Here, Heidegger indicates that for the work of art to step into view, to step out of concealment into ἀλήθεια, it must be devoid of any trace that would draw attention to its mode of production, or to the interventions of any producer whatsoever. The ‘being’ of the artist is, in such instances, concealed.


36 Ibid.
Similarly, where the piece of equipment avoids drawing attention to the materials that constitute it, and the processes that formed it, it is considered to best fulfil its purpose. However, here this purpose is most successfully achieved by moving in the very opposite direction to the work of art, away from the unconcealed light of self-evidence and instead towards a concealed existence where the equipment is considered to succeed the better it is subsumed within the fulfilment of an act (in contrast to, for example, the light bulb only considered when it blows).

Heidegger’s notion of causality that appeared in ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, develops his theories of equipment, production, and work (including art-work) in terms of how four causes (discussed in chapter three) combine to ‘induce’ work. This notion of causality, when considered in relation to works-for-art (such as sketches, maquettes, or preliminary paintings) provides a bridge between the opposing forms of equipment and art that Heidegger asserts, with works-for-art being both equipmental art, and artistic equipment. The detailed discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy of art and equipment therefore prepares the ground for the detailed discussion of causality that is the subject of chapter three.

It is important to emphasise the historical and social necessity of Heidegger’s understanding of great works of art, and the role of the creative process. Heidegger traces the historical movement away from the relationship between great artworks and truth by showing the gradual shift in the ancient Greek understanding of the act of creation. Originally the term techne had the sense of designating a form of knowledge that constituted an active engagement with the world of beings (physis). This
engagement could apply to the production of both utensils and works of art due to the involvement of the “kind of knowledge that guides and grounds confrontation with and mastery over beings, in which new and other beings are expressly produced and generated in addition to and on the basis of the beings that have already come to be (physis)”. No distinction was considered relevant or necessary between the creators of utensils and the creators of works of art. Instead, the fundamental consideration was not the properties, qualities, significance of what was being produced, but rather a consideration of that within and against which they were produced. As such, the craftsman and the artist were both equally considered technites.

Heidegger argues that this conception changed after Plato, with the notion of beings (all things in nature/physis) being distinguished and evaluated in terms of both their inner and outer limits, where “what limits is form, what is limited is matter”. This emphasises a conceptual pairing of matter and form (hylé-morphé) that would dictate the way in which art was to be interpreted. It is at this stage, Heidegger argues, that the notion of the beautiful, as that which “properly shows itself and is most radiant of all” becomes the paramount qualitative measure of a work of art and its ‘greatness’. For Heidegger this was the origin of the branch of interpreting art called ‘aesthetics’, whereby:

The work is represented as the bearer and provoker of the beautiful with relation to our state of feeling. The artwork is posited as the “object” for a “subject”; definitive for aesthetic consideration is the subject-object relation, indeed as a

38 Ibid, p. 80.
39 Ibid.
relation of feeling. The work becomes an object in terms of that surface which is accessible to “lived experience.”

As such, the original sense of art as the bringing forth of a world, and the disclosing of ἀλήθεια becomes lost, replaced by a new branch of human studies that is increasingly removed from the greatness of great art, with even the notion of the beautiful becoming transformed over the centuries. During a lecture series of 1935, Heidegger contended: “For us today, the beautiful is the relaxing, what is restful and thus intended for enjoyment. Art then belongs to the domain of the pastry chef.” It is a blunt and damming summary of the decline of the profound importance of art, alluding to its new, superficial, disposable, even edible status. Heidegger echoes the famous statement from Hegel, who declared that: “Art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for us a thing of the past. Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and occupying its higher place.”

In reference to this statement, Heidegger concludes his own account of the historical progression of aesthetics away from art’s original capacity as that which ‘unconceals truth’ by interpreting Hegel’s words in terms of art’s incapacity to make manifest “what beings as a whole are”. He argues:

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40 ibid, p. 78.


Hegel never wished to deny the possibility that also in the future individual works of art would originate and be esteemed. The fact of such individual works, which exist as works only for the enjoyment of a few sectors of the population, does not speak against Hegel but for him. It is proof that art has lost its power to be the absolute, has lost its absolute power.⁴³

Of course the decline of art’s “absolute power” could be sutured to the corresponding decline of art’s religious function, or its ‘cult-value’ as it had already been termed by Walter Benjamin in ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’. Whilst Heidegger had no interest in preserving religious connotations in art, he nevertheless seemed to retain a belief in the profound potential of great works of art, and looked back, perhaps paradoxically and romantically, to a distant age where the most admired works of what we now call art were revered as resonating an indeterminate aspect of divinity. It is precisely the echoes of this apparent indeterminate profundity (and its possible continuation) that, concurrently with Heidegger’s own lectures and writing on art, formed the locus of the debate between Benjamin and Adorno that is developed in chapter five.

Heidegger’s writing on works of art, equipment, and causality, are of value to the present thesis due to their importance for engaging with the question of ‘what is the supplement?’ that guides chapter three. Heidegger’s theories on the work of art, equipment, and in particular, causality (where I argue that slippage appears between artwork and equipment), provide an invaluable framework to which the status of various forms of supplementary material can be applied and questioned.

⁴³Heidegger, Nietzsche Volume 1: The Will to Power as Art, p. 85.
Benjamin and Adorno

During the mid 1940s, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer collaborated on the essay ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’. At the heart of their work was a concern for the deliberate and systematic cultural ‘dumbing down’, whereby every aspect of Western culture was increasingly simplified and reduced to an easily consumable state, with the ultimate intention of pacifying the general public and decreasing the likelihood of radical political action. For Adorno, ‘high culture’ and ‘high art’ would (and for him, had already begun) to suffer from this process. Adorno coined the term ‘entkunstung’ (deaestheticisation) to represent the various forces that act upon or around a work of art in such a way as to disrupt the aesthetic experience. As an (albeit negative) concept that addresses the ‘outside’ influences that affect the art experience, this will be a key term for this discussion of supplementarity – one which links the relevance of this thesis to philosophical, curatorial, and art practice debates about the boundaries and considerations of display that can bear upon the reception of a work. Adorno explains that “Those who have been duped by the culture industry and are eager for its commodities push for the deaestheticisation of art. Its unmistakeable symptom is the passion to touch everything, to allow no work to be what it is, to dress it up, to narrow its distance from the viewer.”

This narrowing of the distance from the viewer takes place through educational mechanisms, via concerted efforts to reduce the complexities of works of art (whether painting, music, or film) so as to increase their accessibility, and consequently, their

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popularity. For Adorno, it is precisely the difficulty and unfamiliarity in works of art that is at the very heart of what makes a great work. The most successful works would be those that must be ‘worked at’ in order to appreciate them, rather than being made immediately available.

The most ‘successful’ artworks had what Adorno called their ‘enigmaticalness’. Central to this concept was the way in which the greatest artworks operated beyond standard forms of logical analysis, whilst simultaneously seeming to emerge from an internal logic beyond our comprehension – creating questions to which there are no answers. In their unfamiliarity and their mysteriousness, great artworks find their power. Consequently it is the unravelling of this mystery, and the familiarisation with the work, that undermines it. Adorno contended: “the better an artwork is understood, the more it is unpuzzled on one level and the more obscure its constitutive enigmaticalness becomes”. He argues that “those who peruse art solely with comprehension make it into something straightforward, which is furthest from what it is”.

Adorno draws a clear distinction between understanding and experiencing an artwork. The enigmatic artwork presents itself as a puzzle, but it is precisely this puzzlement and enigmaticalness that generates its effectiveness, and leads to the pleasure that can be experienced (in contrast to the passive ease of popular culture). The ‘interpreters’ writing about artists and their works are drawn into the puzzles they consider to have been

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46 Ibid, p. 162.
presented to them, and feel compelled to overcome the questions by locating the solutions. The ‘educators’ are then able to gather the fruits of the research undertaken, and present the ‘answers’ in an easily consumable form to the general public. Understanding is then offered in place of experiencing, as the enigmaticalness of a work is rendered impotent beneath a bombardment of facts, solutions, and instructions on how to ‘decipher’ its meaning, its historical context, and its value. In this respect, supplementarity would, for Adorno, be an obstacle to the enigmaticalness of a work due to its supposed revelatory qualities. However, I will develop this concept in chapter five in order to show how enigmaticalness can in fact be connected to certain uses of supplementary material. I will show how the apparently demystifying traits of such material both mystify and emphasise in a unique way the puzzling nature not only of the works of art, but of both the supporting materials themselves, and the significance of the creative process.

The increased emphasis on understanding – as opposed to experiencing - a work, seemingly began to affect the production of works themselves. Part of the enigmaticalness of an artwork would, for Adorno, lie in its ability to transcend its formal existence, allowing the physical medium to slip smoothly from the viewer’s awareness as they dwell within the experience that the work generates. However, Adorno could see a marked change appearing in the construction of artworks that indicated a move towards a transparency of the means of production, which heretofore had been largely or entirely absent. Artworks had been arrows pointing away from their physical ‘thingness’ or the act of being created; now artists, musicians, filmmakers and other practitioners of the arts were increasingly willing to create works that conformed or played upon their
anticipated reception. The value of artworks was – for Adorno at least – beginning to shift significantly away from being the locus of a profound experience.

In contrast to the enigmaticalness that had previously proved to be the measure of an artwork’s charm and value, a new clamour for understanding was prevailing, with the medium itself highly scrutinised for the slightest signs of clues that could lead to a resolution of the puzzles before them. This took hold to such an extent that the ‘unfathomableness’ or esoteric quality of a work would begin to be seen as a negative value, whereas the ‘graspability’ of a work – its ability to be decoded and communicated to all – would be seen as a measure of its success. The criteria for what made a successful work of art was shifting from its enigmaticalness to its capacity to be understood. Adorno argues that: “In contrast to traditional art, new art accents the once hidden element of being something made, something produced. The portion of it that is ἑσεῖ grew to such an extent that all effort to secret away the process of production in the work could not but fail.”\(^{47}\)

It is clear that Adorno is describing critically the increased tendency of artists (at least of the time) to ensure that their works make no attempts to conceal their form, but instead focus on this, emphasise it and champion it.\(^{48}\) When Adorno talks of ‘

\(^{47}\) Adorno, ‘Situation’. In *Aesthetic Theory*, p. 33.

\(^{48}\) An example of this is the Process art of the 1960s that emphasised the material used, and the act of making. A more recent example is the use of CGI and 3D technology in cinema, which is often utilised and celebrated over the strengths of storytelling, acting performances, or inventive directing.
and in the above statement, he means in the sense of a founding property of artworks, but one that had predominantly started to become more and more prominent. This ‘process of production’, and(the), are important terms for the argument of this thesis – as I argue in chapter five that ‘madeness’ becomes emphasised and elevated in importance as museums and galleries make use of supplementary material. There is also a parallel to be drawn here between Adorno’s ‘enigmaticalness’ and the concept of ‘aura’ put forward by Adorno’s friend and colleague, Walter Benjamin, with whom Adorno developed a close academic relationship through their shared association with the Frankfurt School.

The aura of a work, for Benjamin, could be loosely described as an experienceable ‘quality’ that issues forth from an ‘actual’ individual or unique object/work – one that included the trace of its history within itself. Prior to the advent of photography, paintings and sculptures could be experienced only by the act of going to see them. This emphasised the significance of ‘presence’ in relation to the experiencing of a work. This constituted one of the two extreme poles in which Benjamin perceived artworks to be received and valued: ‘cult value’, which in its most extreme cases lay in the inaccessible, and the mystically clandestine status of a work of art which created a powerful aura around it. Such works were produced and utilised so as to be received with reverence, because they occupied the role of magical or religious transmitters. Benjamin describes them thus: “Artistic production begins with ceremonial objects destined to serve in a cult. One may assume that what mattered was their existence, not their being on view.”

exclusive position of the cult object and its accompanying cult value began to wane, as the skills of artists were increasingly used to produce non-ritualistic works. For Benjamin, this saw works being progressively produced, received and valued in terms of the opposite pole to cult value; ‘exhibition value’. The key characteristic of works of art that are received in terms of their exhibition value is that of inducing pleasure and/or appreciation without requiring any ceremonial function.

As the religious prominence deteriorated, the reverential character (cult value) lingered (and lingers) on, with public religious sentiment displaced and replaced, as Nietzsche observed, by a new form of reverence. Mechanical reproduction, ushered in by photography and film, meant that the exclusive power of presence (and the ‘aura’ of the work that emanated from this) was reduced. Mass reproduction removed the distance between a prospective viewer and the work they wished to see, and as a result the aura of such works was, at least in part, eroded. On the other hand, this new technology created the possibility of future works of endlessly reproducible art in which the last traces of aura (and the associated cultism of the object) would no longer be present. At the same time, reproduction also disclosed more clearly the properties of that form of art which Benjamin claimed it would render redundant. Howard Caygill explains that “it was the development of the technology of reproduction which enabled the category of the authentic to emerge and lend authority to the original work”.

Emma Barker makes a similar observation, saying that “despite the significance of Benjamin’s analysis, it is undeniable that the fascination of the unique original has been substantially enhanced by the mass production of images - if copies did not exist, it would be impossible to define

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any object as an original”. Though the category of the authentic had already marked a decisive shift towards the prominence of the artist during the Eighteenth Century, as dealers and collectors increasingly sought evidence of authorship as a way of determining value (a point discussed further in the next chapter), the emergence of mass reproduction radically transformed the meaning of the original work of art.

Though not mutually compatible in their meaning, Adorno’s notion of ‘enigmaticalness’ and Benjamin’s notion of ‘aura’ had points of comparison and similarity. Both addressed a property of art that was intangible, and which had a powerful effect on the way in which a work could be potentially experienced. Both notions were also ones that were considered to be highly vulnerable. Adorno and Benjamin considered the vulnerability of enigmaticalness and aura in different ways. Adorno (together with Horkheimer) spoke of the ‘culture industry’ in negative terms. The subtitle for their essay ‘The Culture Industry’ - ‘Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ - clearly indicates the view that the new media of the time, and the forms of art that accompanied this media, were pacifying the masses under the false impression that they were being supplied ‘culture’, that they were able to participate in what had previously been available only to a select few. Mass produced art forms such as film and photography, along with the introduced reproducibility of paintings and sculptures, now meant that such works were being experienced in a way that could seemingly be grasped by everyone. This was regardless of their education and/or social standing, as the makers of works of art increasingly utilised their mass presentation.

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reproducibility for financial gain via the medium of entertainment, as the embryonic form of what would be deemed ‘pop culture’ began to take shape.

As technological developments allowed works of art to reach a much wider audience than ever anticipated, a new problem emerged. For the privileged few, an appreciation of the ‘enigmaticalness’ of a work had been largely nurtured from youth, however suddenly there was a substantially increased audience (or potential audience) that had little or no notion of this ‘enigmaticalness’. The issue of a ‘correct’ way of appreciating a work of art - which had previously been the concern mainly of the philosophers of aesthetics and art historians, was now a matter of public interest (and is discussed further in chapter three). With this came an increased need (and demand) for guidance and explanation to assist the uninitiated in their efforts to participate in culture, and consequently to better appear ‘cultured’. For Adorno and Horkheimer:

> The work of art, by completely assimilating itself to need, deceitfully deprives men of precisely that liberation from the principle of utility which it should inaugurate. What might be called use value in the reception of cultural commodities is replaced by exchange value; in place of enjoyment there are gallery-visiting and factual knowledge: The prestige seeker replaces the connoisseur. 52

Adorno lamented the process of deaestheticisation that changed the production and consumption of artworks in such a way as to conceal the enigmaticalness of works beneath utilitarian purposes as objects of mere cultural education. Walter Benjamin, however, was more optimistic about the potential such a dramatic change could bring. For him the decline in the “authority of the object”, and with it the ‘cult value’ of works of

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art, cleared the path for art to occupy a new role and value. When Benjamin says “the greatly increased mass of participants has produced a change in the mode of participation”, he does not see this negatively, but instead emphasises that what both he and Adorno were discussing constituted the *beginning* of this new mode of participation, and as such, it would take time for society to adjust.\(^5^3\)

The different receptions given to this new technology by Adorno and Benjamin occurred at a point in history where the political climate had pushed the utilisation of such technology to its most extreme limits. The world was in a state of confusion and uncertainty. Susan Buck-Morss reminds us that: “It must be recalled that for Benjamin as for Adorno, truth was relative to the historical present. This means that Benjamin’s interpretation of the dialectical development of art was a construction of the past as it formed a constellation within existing conditions.”\(^5^4\) This observation is of particular relevance to the preservation and subsequent use made of supplementary material by galleries and museums, where decisions to persevere with, or return to, such material in display settings carries with it the influence of the values of the time – values that can become crystallised in the permanence of the museum setting.

Both Adorno and Benjamin were sensitive to the shifting values brought about by the new technology, having witnessed the initial waves of change becoming incorporated for increasingly politicised ends. Whilst to an extent both Adorno and Benjamin recognised the ‘magical’ and ritualistic role of the earliest works of art, the *apparent* echoes of this


function were interpreted in different ways. Adorno felt that the enigmaticalness of ritualistic works was a property that was not born out of the ‘cult’ value and left lingering as a trace in works that later shed any semblance of outwardly ceremonial purposes. Instead, it was a characteristic of the work of art that made it so suitable for the task of evoking the otherworldly and spiritual. In other words, the enigmaticalness came before the ‘cult value’ of the earliest works rather than being a necessarily associated product of it. It is the enigmaticalness of the work that makes a work ‘work’. It does not require a religious or ritualistic value (or even an echo of this) in order to do this.

For Adorno, this would ultimately cause the developments in mechanical reproduction to have a severe effect on this character of art. Adorno argues that “If one is within the artwork, if one participates in its immanent completion, this enigmaticalness makes itself invisible; if one steps outside the work, breaking the contract with its immanent context, this enigmaticalness returns like a spirit.” Here, Adorno highlights the way in which the enigmatic existence and character of the work - that causes a spectator to become ‘lost’ in the suspension of functional and tangible reality – is made apparent by any attempts to understand a work, thereby banishing any possibility of ‘genuinely’ experiencing it.

With the technological developments that brought art into the sphere of mass exposure came, as I have touched upon, an interest in understanding such works, due to the majority of the ‘new audience’ being ill equipped to experience them without some scepticism and hesitation, and therefore requiring not simply guidance, but convincing. However, Adorno summarises the problem of such a task:

It is impossible to explain art to those who have no feeling for it; they are not able to bring an intellectual understanding of it into their living experience. For them the reality principle is such an obsession that it places a taboo on aesthetic comportment as a whole; incited by the cultural approbation of art, alienness to art often changes into aggression, not the least of the causes of the contemporary deatheticisation of art.\textsuperscript{56}

Whilst Adorno sought to detail the destructive effects of deaestheticisation that (for him) caused works of art to be reduced to the status of mere problems or question marks at the expense of an ‘appropriate’ experience, Benjamin looked upon the developments from another perspective.

Benjamin anticipated an inevitable demise of aura, and with it the last vestiges of ‘cult value’. The ‘authentic’ work – defined by its presence in space and time (and consequently its historical existence) was in the process of losing its authority, as technical reproducibility bypassed the limitations of traditional works in favour of a more intimate proximity. Benjamin outlines an important factor in the traditional relationship between an audience and a work of art: “Distance is the opposite of closeness. The essentially distant object is the unapproachable one. Unapproachability is indeed a major quality of the cult image. True to its nature, it remains distant, however close it may be.”\textsuperscript{57}

This distance was increasingly dissolved by the multiplicity and subsequent availability of the work through reproductions. The experiencing of a work that had historically been governed by its physical presence – shaped by the significance of its context and

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

persisting existence (and consequently its particular attributed value in the hands of its preservers) - was transformed. It was no longer even necessary for a work to exist in order for it to be seen. However, what was being seen was for Benjamin something altogether new. Benjamin explains that:

The technique of reproduction detaches the reproduced object from the domain of tradition. By making many reproductions it substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence. And in permitting the reproduction to meet the beholder or listener in his own particular situation, it reactivates the object reproduced.58

This ‘reactivation’ occurs free of any reliance upon the continuing existence of the ‘original’ work. The ‘original’ may or may not exist, but it in no way dictates the experiencing of the copy. The formal properties of the ‘original’ work of art in question are partially replicated in the copy, with the size, weight and texture of the original (in painting), and both volume and depth (in music) for the most part missing. In the case of size, the dimensions of a painting could easily be replicated, but for the sake of pragmatism (namely, easy distribution) it is usually reduced. In the case of weight and texture, these physical properties would remain beyond the abilities of mechanical reproduction. Already it can be seen that a copy jettisons particular properties that remain attached to the presence of the original, and as such it indicates a reduction of a work to its most transmittable qualities (a point that will be returned to in chapter Six). It is therefore only these transmittable qualities of the original that forms a significant part of the experience to be had by the beholder or listener of the copy. The authority of the original is undermined by the act of taking that part of it which is deemed most significant, whilst leaving other aspects of it aside. It is as if the process of reproduction

highlights the ‘insignificance’ of aspects of an original work, and by attaching the isolated ‘significant’ properties to new qualities such as durability and transmittability, the authority of the original is surpassed.

Furthermore, the copy is experienced by its audience in their “own particular situation”, and it is these new contexts the work is thrown into that most drastically ‘reactivate’ the reproduced work. No longer fixed to the location and context of an original work, the reproduction is free to be experienced in any number of particular environments. The ‘cult value’ is nullified by a reduction of the distance that is engendered by the presence of the original work within its particular location. For Benjamin, the distance between the work of art and the viewer is never greater than when the latter is confronted with the material existence of the former. It is raised on a pedestal, placed out of reach even when within touching distance.

The original work’s object-value is highlighted by additional aspects such as the number of viewers, the presence of security, the protective frame, the surrounding works, and the very design of the room within which it is displayed. In the case of supplementary material, its inclusion serves both an educational and symbolic value, as that which appears to reinforce the authority of the work it supplements. In this catalogue of additional content that informs such an experience of art, Derrida’s notion of the parergon is at its most evident. It is also here where the divergence of opinion between Benjamin’s and Adorno’s approach can begin to be more clearly delineated. Adorno writes:
Conceived non-dialectically the theory of aura lends itself to misuse. It becomes a slogan for the deaestheticisation of art that is under way in the age of the technical reproducibility of the artwork. Aura is not—as Benjamin claimed—the here and now of the artwork, it is whatever goes beyond its factual givenness, its content; one cannot abolish it and still want art. Even demystified artworks are more than what is literally the case.⁵⁹

For Adorno, that which “goes beyond (the artwork’s) factual givenness” is pivotal in experiencing it. It is also an important acknowledgement (one that is of pertinence for chapter six) that aspects of what goes beyond an artwork’s content is also essential for making art possible. Having criticised the processes of deaestheticisation at work in the displaying of works alongside supporting material, Adorno’s statement affirms the essential role played by that which extends the art experience beyond the work’s “factual givenness” and towards its content. This will be shown to have significance for my interpretation of the use of supplementary material in museums and galleries (and for contemporary discussions of such uses), where the value of such material is not reduced to historical and educational use alone.

For Benjamin, auratic works (with all the mechanisms of preservation and veneration involved in maintaining them) become, in the wake of technological reproducibility, anachronisms that look to defy historical developments of cultures, styles, tastes, and values. Caygill explains:

The auratic work of art which pretends to be immune to the passage of time is in truth only a particular way of negotiating finitude, that is, by denying it. Such works, as monumental, literally refuse their future, since time is arrested in their claims to uniqueness and duration.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Adorno, ‘Situation’. In Aesthetic Theory, p. 56.

⁶⁰ Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, p.93.
Rather than constituting a clean break with auratic work, the developments of technical reproducibility in art during the early to mid-Twentieth Century produced two new notions – those of the *authentic original*, and *multiple copies*. The tension between these two poles would (and continues to) divide interpretations of value, display, and the production of art itself. The effect of technical reproducibility upon the cultural relevance of the authentic original is critical to understanding the use and evaluation of supplementarity, and will be explored in more detail throughout this thesis.

Aura, the ‘original’, deaestheticisation, and enigmaticalness are identified in this section as key concerns for the thesis as a whole, wherein the importance of biography, the model and copy, educational processes, and the ‘mystifying’ qualities of artworks, have implications for all four case studies. These notions and concepts are addressed directly in chapter five, in the case study of Bacon’s relocated studio.

**Deleuze, Derrida, and Plato**

Both Deleuze and Derrida would appear, on the surface, to have many similarities. Both were born around the same time, and lived in or around Paris for a similar period (Derrida 1930-2004; Deleuze 1925-1995); both knew each other during their academic training; both were broadly associated with the Post-Structuralist movement of philosophy; both made their mark on the philosophical ‘scene’ in the late 1960s; and both could be loosely described as thinkers concerned with the notion of ‘difference’ as a neglected concept. It
is a mark of the widespread acknowledgement of the proximity of their approaches that Leonard Lawlor, in ‘The Beginning of Thought: The Fundamental Experience in Derrida and Deleuze’, explores the subtle but significant ways in which they could be distinguished from one another. Lawlor describes their shared starting point:

Although both Derrida and Deleuze will abandon later the idea of the simulacrum that they developed in the Sixties, it functions as their point of diffraction. In most general terms, the simulacrum is a repetition, and image, that has no model or original. Since the idea of the simulacrum consisted in lacking an original, both Derrida and Deleuze could use it in their project of reversing Platonism. For both, reversing Platonism consists in destroying the hierarchy of the image and original.61

This reversal of Platonism is discussed in chapter four, however an outline of Plato’s views on art and artists is necessary to support that section. Plato criticises the illusory qualities of poetry and painting which obscure the activity of the rational mind to understand the world, but also encouraged distorted emotional responses and unrealistic desires. Such was Plato’s conviction that poetry and painting were corrosive influences that in his proposed ideal society they would be forbidden.62 In order to account for the most intelligent and insightful works of poetry, Plato formulated his theory of ‘inspiration’, whereby poets were mere instruments through which gods would communicate, thus downplaying the contribution of the individual poets themselves. Within Plato’s hierarchical ordering of human occupations, poets and artisans were allotted a lowly status. As one of the most important intellectual figures in history, it is difficult to overstate the influence Plato had on subsequent thinking and notions of art and culture.

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62 Plato, Republic, p. 358.
As such, his negative assessment of individual ‘creativity’ dominated Western attitudes towards artists for centuries.

Deleuze and Derrida’s re-interpretations of Plato’s philosophy of identity is important for this thesis due to the ways in which their distinct approaches engage with, and open up, historically established methods of hierarchical classification. In chapter four, Deleuze’s approach allows predominant attitudes towards the classification of works produced by artists (including conventionally defined supporting material) to be clarified and questioned. In chapter six, Derrida’s exploration of ambiguities and slippage of both meaning and use in apparently distinguished areas of art and supplementarity, enables an analysis and questioning of such distinctions that can take place within the creative process itself, and how the same established methods of hierarchical classification, alluded to above, accommodate or resist such problematic ways of working.

Deleuze

Deleuze, alone and with the psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, developed a complex form of philosophy that can be generally described as affirming the notion of difference itself. This philosophy of affirmation rejected the solidifying of structures (including those found in notions of identity, representation, psychoanalysis, and art) that would form apparently closed systems of meaning and value, in favour of an open-ended series of interconnecting ‘intensities’ of experience (whether physical, mental, imaginary, etc.). As with Derrida, there is a resistance to the permanence of meaning in Deleuze’s thought that acts as a dynamic ‘method’ of engaging with, and evaluating (in a fluid, temporal
manner) the world and the structures that exist within it. As such, it is all too easy to become caught up in the array of colourful terminology populated with desiring-machines, bodies without organs, and lines of flight. However, this is not to say that Deleuze (as well as Guattari) was not highly systematic and thorough in his/their approach, where beneath the variety of terms and phrases lies an extremely developed logic (even when it is a logic of the illogical) that encounters and re-evaluates the entire history of philosophy itself. Nevertheless, it is important, precisely due to the scale of the concepts they deploy, to remain clear in my selection and application of their ideas within the context of this investigation. The significance of Deleuze for this thesis will be the ways in which his notion of works of art as ‘signs’ and his theory of the simulacrum provide a new way of understanding both the status of, and historical forms of hierarchically classifying, supplementary material.

Deleuze, writing in 1969, outlines his views on a notion of modern art that is irreducible to a single system or theory, whilst at the same time confronting the Kantian model of aesthetics:

Aesthetics suffers from a wrenching duality. On the one hand, it designates the theory of sensibility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it designates the theory of art as the reflection of real experience. For these two meanings to be tied together the conditions of experience in general must be conditions of real experience; in this case, the work would really appear as experimentation. We know, for example, that certain literary procedures (the same holds for other arts) permit several stories to be told at once. This is, without doubt, the essential characteristic of the modern work of art. It is not at all a question of different points of view on one story supposedly the same; for points of view would still be submitted to a rule of convergence. It is rather a question of different and divergent stories, as if an absolutely distinct landscape corresponded to each point of view.

To expand on this briefly, Deleuze returns to two forms of sensation defined by Plato. On one hand, there is the object of unproblematic recognition (Plato uses the example of a finger). It provokes no further thought when considered in isolation. On the other hand, Plato considers all its fingers together, in terms of size, weight, solidity, etc. The distinctive properties and their combinations must, for Plato, be questioned and thought, and thus such a sensation becomes that of the intelligible realm (as that which is thought-provoking) rather than remaining purely in the visible realm as unproblematic recognition. Deleuze recognises in Kant a correlation between Plato’s recognition and identification of objects in general, and Kant’s corresponding formulation of common sense, in which the I think of the subject is the harmonious unity of the faculties of consciousness that at the same time recognises the object. Deleuze relates this to what he calls the image of thought; a classical approach to thinking consistently preoccupied with specific notions of identity. Whilst it is not practical to carry out a full explanation here, it should be noted that within the image of thought, and in Kant’s formulation of it in particular, thinking becomes subordinated to representation, with Deleuze describing the key ways in which representation was defined: “Identity with regard to concepts, opposition with regard to the determination of concepts, analogy with regard to judgement, resemblance with regard to objects.”

Deleuze also drew a correlation between the second form of sensation described by Plato, that which puzzles and provokes thought, and the brief moment in Kant’s Critique

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65 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 137.
of Judgement where Kant details the confrontation between the faculty of the imagination, and the sublime – in which a sensation is so overwhelming, no representation of it is possible. As Daniel W. Smith explains:

In confronting its own limit, the imagination at the same time goes beyond this limit, albeit in a negative way, by representing to itself the inaccessibility of this rational Idea. It presents to itself the fact that the unrepresentable exists, and that it exists in sensible nature. From the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and unimaginable; but from a transcendental point of view, it is that which can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the imagination in its transcendental exercise. 66

Between Plato’s ‘thought-provoking’ sensations, and Kant’s ‘unrepresentable’ sensations, Deleuze designates what he calls signs. The ‘sign’ can be understood in general terms as that which poses a problem or puzzle for thought, and that which (crucially) is only capable of being sensed. Here Deleuze understands signs (as sensations), as consisting of intensities (that can only be sensed), and which are intensities inasmuch as they are different in kind to one another. Difference is therefore the being of the sensible itself. 67

In this way, Deleuze creates the concept of the virtual, as that field of unrepresentable differences that can only be sensed, and not thought. As these differences are combined into intensities and subsequently ordered, homogenised and cancelled out in our experience, they appear as qualities that become empirically graspable, and, as Deleuze puts it, become actualised. This actualisation of the virtual constitutes the condition of experience. In contrast to the classical ‘image of thought’, identity, opposition, analogy, and resemblance, do not form the condition of experience, but are merely derived from


It. The importance of Deleuze’s concepts of the virtual, and ‘signs’ for a re-interpretation of the value of works-for-art, will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.

Deleuze determines a notion of thought without image, and is able to reject both the Platonist understanding of art as mere imitation, and the Kantian notion of art as a reflection upon a representation – both of which rely upon understandings of resemblance in art. Instead, Deleuze puts forward the claim of an aesthetics that, if it is to be understood correctly, finds its compositional conditions united with the conditions of real experience - as issuing forth from sensation. However, art not only issues forth from sensation, but crucially, produces sensation itself. As Deleuze and Guattari would later argue, “the work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else”. Art creates a sign that perplexes thought and can only be sensed. Smith explains that “the work of art, as a compound of sensations, is not a unification or totalisation of differences, but rather the production of a new difference”.

Art for both Deleuze and Guattari is not reducible to a theory or system, and they are explicit on this point – “In no way do we believe in a fine-arts system; we believe in very diverse problems whose solutions are found in heterogeneous arts. To us, Art is a fake concept, a solely nominal concept.” As expressed throughout their works, the question

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69 Smith, ‘Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality’. In Deleuze: A Critical Reader, p. 48 (original emphasis).

70 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism & Schizophrenia, pp. 300-301.
posed of any composition or combination of disparate elements is not ‘what does it mean?’, but “how does it work?”\textsuperscript{71}

This “how does it work?” constitutes the point of departure for my own application of Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of art to that of the issue of the classification of supplementarity. In chapter four I will develop this notion of the virtual, and in particular Deleuze’s distinctive re-interpretation of the Platonic concept of the simulacrum, in order to engage with the relationship between supplementarity and hierarchical systems. These hierarchical systems will be addressed in terms of the traditional, dominant ‘image of thought’ that has dictated the ways in which supplementarity in art has been commonly organised and interpreted, whilst establishing the implications for supplementarity when the fundamental principles of this approach are challenged and undermined.

\textbf{Derrida}

Derrida states that: “One of the gestures of deconstruction is not to naturalise what isn’t natural, to not assume that what is conditioned by history, institutions, or society is natural.”\textsuperscript{72} This comment indicates that the “gestures of deconstruction” are not established beforehand as some unified whole.


The specific gesture of deconstruction is not determined beforehand in any given situation, but can only be made in the moment of engagement with that which it deconstructs. Derrida chose this word in order to emphasise its multi-faceted use as that which simultaneously destructs that which it constructs – and conversely a destruction that is constructive. In its most generalised use, deconstruction has become a popular byword for theoretical approaches that expose the fallacy of certainty in a text (of any sort), and also of showing that a text in and of itself is unable to contain any meaning, with this instead being a construct formed between the text and the one who engages with it, within a context of other texts (such as historical, institutional, cultural and societal). As such, the very movement of deconstruction is one that constantly undermines itself, with Derrida saying that “the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work”.73 Exposing the very framework of that which carries out the exposition, deconstruction is always in a precarious situation of its own making.

With this in mind, it can be better understood why there is an inevitable sense of uncertainty in Derrida’s discussions of given topics. It is a necessary uncertainty that is consistent with the very inconsistency of that which Derrida is deconstructing. This approach is apparent in his 1994 lecture (and subsequent book) *Archive Fever*, in which his discussion, taking place at the Freud Museum in London, turns on the meaning of the museum itself, as well as a notion of the archive as it is understood not in terms of the past, but of the play of forces that govern the act of archiving. The relevance of the archive for this discussion of supplementarity is pivotal, with the main themes of the thesis ultimately relating back to the issues of selection and preservation. Therefore it is

important to include this brief discussion prior to a more extended exploration of some of Derrida’s idea later in the thesis.

In a very real sense, any work of art that is preserved is essentially archived; all the more so if it is preserved within a public institution such as a gallery or museum. The contents of the archive imply decisions of selection, rejection, categorisation, and function, along with all the events that inform those choices (and who choose). As shall be seen in the four case studies, supplementary material exists in a variety of forms that can be loosely determined as preliminary, preparatory, biographical, and historical. In all those forms their availability for use as supplementary material requires processes of initial and continual preservation. Derrida situates the act of archiving not only in the present (as that which determines the archive), but in a particular relationship between the present and the future:

In an enigmatic sense, which will clarify itself perhaps (perhaps, because nothing should be sure here, for essential reasons), the question of the archive is not, we repeat, a question of the past. It is not the question of the concept dealing with the past that might already be at our disposal, an archivable concept of the archive. It is a question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a response, of a promise and a responsibility for tomorrow. The archive: if we want to know what that will have meant, we will only know in times to come. Perhaps. Not tomorrow but in times to come, later on or perhaps never.74

There is here an echo of Heidegger’s understanding of the preserved and the forgotten, where the truly forgotten is precisely that which cannot be recalled or encountered. The archive becomes the promise of a history for the future. Carolyn Steedman observes

that: “In Derrida’s description, the *arkhe* – the archive – appears to represent the *now* of whatever kind of power is being exercised, anywhere, in any place or time.”

It is both the represented *now* of the moment of archiving, and in a very real sense also the represented *now* of its continued archiving. The meticulously maintained maquettes at Henry Moore’s former studio at Perry Green, the extensively catalogued collection of Sant’Elia’s drawings and sketches in Como, the comprehensive database of debris from Francis Bacon’s studio at the Hugh Lane in Dublin, and the ongoing digitisation of Artaud’s notebooks in the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris all represent, in quite distinctive ways, power being exercised in an historical *now* that initiated such archiving. In addition to this, they also represent the *now* of their continued preservation, where “what this will have meant” awaits a (potential) future present.

The importance of a close scrutiny, not only of this or that body of supplementary material, but of the particular power relations, motivations, and underlying constructions of value involved, becomes imperative for understanding the complexities of varying points of divergence and convergence necessary in forming a theory of the supplementary. Two ways in which Derrida explores such issues are to be found in his work on the ‘*subjectile*’ (a term used by Antonin Artaud), and the related notion of the *parergon* (a term developed from Kant’s own discussion of ornamentation in relation to a work of art). Between these two terms, Derrida establishes an approach to art and the creative process that is continuously confronting established limits, definitions, standards, and systems of both expression and interpretation. The ramifications of this confrontation for supplementarity consist of a challenge to accepted orderings of such

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material in ways that allow for a more in-depth analysis of the subtle (and often ambiguous) distinctions between various forms of creative production, and their subsequent division into categories and orders of significance. It is within this ‘framework’ that I will make use of Derrida’s concepts and arguments. The significance of Derrida’s work on the ‘subjectile’ and the ‘parergon’ will be important for re-evaluating the permeable borders and interrelating layers of meanings that exist between and within works of art, supporting material, the mythologising of personality, and mechanisms of institutionalisation.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter has been to show that supplementarity has been, directly and indirectly, intertwined with the historical philosophy of art, whilst introducing the concepts of most importance for the intentions of this thesis. This chapter opened with a discussion of Kant, who was responsible for theorising a new way of experiencing art that continues to be influential. Kant begins the philosophical consideration of supplementarity through his observations on ornamentation and parerga.

Schopenhauer offers the first major philosophical argument for overturning traditional approaches to the classification of supplementary material, by asserting that the works produced in the early stages of the creative process are superior in value to complete works, due to their closeness in time to the moment of creative inspiration. The complete work is in turn chastised as a compromise and appeal to taste and the art market.
Heidegger’s distinct approach to art and equipment is discussed in detail in order to prepare the ground for the analysis and interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of causality in chapter three. I will argue that certain works-for-art such as sketches and maquettes, when considered in relation to Heidegger’s framework of causality, can be revealed to share qualities of being both artwork and equipment, despite Heidegger placing these two forms of ‘work’ in opposition to one another. Heidegger’s concepts of truth as unconcealment, equipment as concealed ‘readiness-to-hand’, preservation and oblivion, and causality, will be invaluable for revealing the problematic and fluctuating status of works-for-art and other forms of supplementarity.

The section on Benjamin and Adorno also goes into detail due to the implications their concepts and ideas have for all areas of this thesis. In particular, aura, the ‘original’, deaesthetisation, and enigmaticalness, are all important issues that concern the different ways in which supplementary material has been archived, discussed, employed as educational devices, and displayed in specific contexts in relation to complete works of art. Technological developments, changes to creative practice, and approaches to the marketing and displaying of works of art, are all shown to respond to one another in ways that have implications for the experience of works of art, and for supplementarity.

The discussion of Deleuze and Derrida reveals the importance of their rejection of Plato’s philosophy of representation, which, in different ways, they identify as having a powerful, but restrictive influence on Western society that continues to the modern day. The analysis of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘sign’, and his re-interpretation of Plato’s concept of
simulacra, will be valuable for forming a framework within which to consider the ‘location’ and classification of art and supplementarity in chapter four. Derrida’s philosophical analysis of the nature of the archive is addressed, which whilst not being directly discussed in any of the four case studies, is revealed to be an important underlying concern of the thesis as a whole, wherein the supplement is heavily dependent upon the value judgements of the past that allow specific material to be archived at all. Derrida’s interpretation of Kant’s concept of parerga, and Artaud’s use of the term ‘subjectile’ (both pivotal for the discussion in chapter six), are also introduced here, where their significance as concentrated studies of dissolving distinctions between artwork, support, process, and institutionalisation, is asserted.

As distinct but important parts of much wider philosophical projects, the concepts and ideas of the thinkers outlined above cannot be made to fit together seamlessly without encountering numerous conflicts and contradictions. Instead, the concepts discussed in this chapter are carefully employed over the course of this thesis in order to open up specific, problematic, and productive areas of supplementarity so as to arrive at a detailed theory of this important, yet under-developed area of study.
Chapter Two: The Supplement in Art History

This chapter provides a complementary historical perspective to the philosophical debates discussed in the previous chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate the key events in art history where supplementarity is directly or indirectly involved, and to show how its role and importance for art has fluctuated and become established as a major consideration for the creation, interpretation, and experience of art. The chapter begins with an overview of historical events that have shaped the concept of supplementarity. This is followed by sections that explore the categories of ‘interpretation and display’, ‘the production of value’, and ‘technology, equipment and the supplement’. These categories explore the impact of supplementarity in art history, through detailed discussions of specific examples.

Historical Overview of the Supplement

The ‘birth’ of supplementarity can be located in the work of Phidias (480 – 430 BC), who acquired a considerable reputation as a sculptor and painter. This reputation allowed Phidias to become one of the first known examples of an artisan who was able to create a body of work through developing his own practice.76 As well as being one of the earliest examples of an artisan being appreciated and celebrated in their own right, thus enjoying the status normally associated with the figure of the ‘artist’, Phidias was responsible for

76 See, Arthur James Grant, Greece in the Age of Pericles, University of Michigan, 1893 (digitised 2006).
producing what could be classified as the earliest supplementary material to later be recognised and revered for its own sake.

In the 1950s, archaeologists excavated a site believed to be the location of Phidias’ workshop, and discovered various artefacts such as moulds and tools, as well as a wine glass with an inscription that identified it as belonging to Phidias. Because the vast majority of ancient Greek art, including Phidias’ most famous work, the Statue of Zeus, have been lost, these moulds and tools took on immense historical significance despite their merely functional origins. Indeed, these moulds survived because of their lack of value or significance which led to them being buried in the first place. The moulds now constitute the only tangible evidence of an artisan whose work has since attained legendary status, and are now presented under glass in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin, along with detailed written explanations of their significance.

A key moment of change in the role and significance of the artist occurred during the Renaissance. Catherine King notes how Giovanni Villani’s writing on famous Florentines, in the Fourteenth Century work, New Chronicles, included a biography of the artist Giotto, an indication that the artist was beginning to be considered of sufficient interest and status to be ranked alongside other ‘famous’ figures in Florentine society.

Within a century, artists’ reputations for producing high quality works began to be an important consideration, with King stating that: “Fifteenth-Century contracts for

commissions increasingly show patrons insisting that they were paying for the personal skills of an individual artist rather than merely expensive and showy pigments and gold leaf.”

The culmination of this new perception of the role of the artist and its concomitant conception that art had a history came in Giorgio Vasari’s *The Lives of the Most Excellent Italian Painters, Sculptors, and Architects, from Cimabue to Our Times*, which was first published in 1550. Generally accepted as the first encyclopaedia of artists, *The Lives* charted developments in Italian art history from the Thirteenth to the mid-Sixteenth Century, focusing upon the individual qualities of each artist, and the validity or shortcomings of their particular methods for furthering the progress of Italian art.

Developments in technology at this time allowed work to be distributed on a larger scale. Paul Wood writes of how Albrecht Dürer’s work and reputation benefited from the technology that allowed him to make numerous prints from woodcuts: “Mechanical reproducibility was central to Dürer’s practice as an artist. Wide distribution on both sides of the Alps fostered both his fame and his commercial success.”

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By the Seventeenth Century, the Protestant Reformation was sweeping through Europe, and this had a profound, if unintentional, effect on the social role art would play. Kim Woods, referring particularly to one of the centres of commercial art trade – Haarlem - explains how: “The Protestant Reformation saw the demise of religious sculpture. Many Protestant reformers regarded images as at best inessential and at worst idolatrous.”

The result was to quickly create a large group of skilled artists who had now lost their most significant source of trade, leaving few options other than to make smaller, inexpensive works, and to rely on private patronage. This marked an important change to the work of art later discussed by Walter Benjamin (and explored in chapter one), where ‘cult-value’ started to be replaced by ‘exhibition-value’.

As ‘exhibition-value’ became more popular in the Eighteenth Century, the art market grew considerably. The notion of ‘old masters’ appeared, and with it came a hierarchical ordering of works deemed to be of greater or lesser value. For the art dealers and collectors of the Eighteenth Century, it was vital to have an understanding of which works could be attributed to which artists. Barker asserts that: “Instead of assuming that the beauty of a particular painting was what mattered most, the art market foregrounded attribution as its principal concern.” It was at this stage that the ‘hand’ of the artist began to become all-important to those with a financial interest in fine arts, opening the way for the importance of biographical and historical association that continues to dominate uses of supplementary material in gallery and museum displays.


The art market was also beginning to become more influential in establishing reputations by emphasising unique qualities in works that brought the attentions of collectors to their individuality, where collectors would have the opportunities to distinguish themselves from others. Barker explains that: “In the late Eighteenth Century, art dealers started to realise that buyers could be attracted not just by famous names but also by the special cachet of rarity and unfamiliarity.” The limited output of an artist was now being turned into a virtue in which the very exiguity of the work need not hinder the establishment of an artist’s reputation. This foreshadows the commodification of supplementary material that was to come, where archived material not recognised as complete works would be promoted for their novelty.

In *The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics* (1994), Martha Woodmansee traces the historical developments that affected the meaning and value of art itself that took place in the Eighteenth Century. Woodmansee discusses Abbé Charles Battaix’s treatise ‘The Fine Arts Reduced to a Common Principle’ (1746), Moses Mendelssohn’s essay ‘Reflections on the Sources and Relations of the Fine Arts and Letters’ (1757), and, in particular, Karl Philipp Moritz’s essay ‘Toward a Unification of All the Fine Arts and Letters under the Concept of Self-Sufficiency’ (1785). These works introduced a new approach to artists and their works, emphasising the individual genius of artists and the special nature of the greatest works of art that, as discussed in chapter one, would become an important influence on Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*.

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Towards the end of the Eighteenth Century another major development occurred in art history – the first public museums displaying works of art began to appear. Arguably the most important public art museum to emerge during this period was the Louvre in 1793. Gradually, other countries would follow this example. By making works of art available to the public in this way, the cultural status of artists and their works would considerably increase, and with it an interest in the artists themselves.

Romanticism saw a defining shift towards individuality and originality. Kant’s ‘genius’ artist, gifted by nature with intangible and indefinable skills, began to become an increasingly popular view. The expensive deals involving works of ‘old masters’ altered the potential social status of artists, and in the Romantic era of liberated individualism, artists were encouraged to give free reign to their imaginations. As Barker, Webb, and Woods argue, in their collaborative introduction to *The Changing Status of the Artist*: “It was only around 1800 that the emphasis shifted decisively away from the skill of the painter or sculptor to the exceptional personality of the creative artist. It has since been popularised in countless biographies, novels, and films.”

During this period, the distinctions between biography and mythology began to blur.

Linda Walsh sites the work of the Goncourt Brothers, *French Eighteenth Century Painters* (1859-1875), as an important moment in a shift of writing on art towards retrospectively applying the prevailing concerns of Romanticism to ‘mythologise’ the lives of artists of the past, concentrating on the example of their description of Jean-Antoine Watteau that

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characterised him as a tragic and melancholic artist, ushering in the ‘cult of personality’ or the biographical. This approach served to build an image not only of the artist themselves, but to deploy such characterisation as a method of gaining insights into their works. Walsh states that: “with such attitudes in mind the exploration of an artist’s life and feelings became viewed as a legitimate way of deriving meaning from and attributing status to his or her works of art”. With written works such as those of the Goncourt Brothers, ‘outside’ factors such as the events and emotions of the individual lives of artists started to be utilised in order to supplement the work itself.

The Nineteenth Century saw the image of the ‘tragic’ artist become widespread. Paul Wood, in his study of Dürer, charts the origins of this characterisation of the artist back to the Fifteenth Century, with the artist beginning to be portrayed as being both introverted and melancholy, where: “at the extremity of self-consciousness is the recognition of one’s own mortality”. Wood, aware of the strength this image of the artist still retains, is careful to point out that “this notion of eccentricity has become so overworked in the modern period that the portrayal of the misunderstood artist, forced into incomprehensibility by a creative urge he barely controls, has descended into cliché”. Such ‘characterisation’ has particular resonance for the chapters on Sant’Elia (the tragic ‘heroic’ death), Bacon (the ‘chaos’ of the creative process), and Artaud (the ‘insane genius’).

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86 Ibid.


88 Ibid.
In 1871, one of the earliest reconstructions of an artist’s dwellings took place in Nuremberg, when the house that Dürer lived in from 1509 to 1528 was converted into a museum almost 350 years after his death. With no surviving furnishings the artist, Friedrich Wilhelm Wanderer, was asked to redesign the house in a manner that came close to reproducing the appearance it might have had during Dürer’s time there. Such was the change to the cultural status of artists and their biographical traces that when the house occupied by Rembrandt between 1639 and 1656 was reconstructed in 1906, it was opened by Queen Wilhelmina. These examples represent a dramatic shift towards raising the level of an artist to that of an historical (and not just creative) figure, around which an entire simulated transportation to another century was produced.

The end of the Nineteenth Century, and early Twentieth Century, saw dramatic changes for both approaches to, and forms of, works of art. The Modernist period led to movements such as Dada, Cubism, Futurism, and Surrealism, with each challenging conventional approaches to the work of art, whilst artists showed a greater awareness of their own techniques and the social role of art. Technological developments in photography and film not only changed the ways in which works of art could be produced and defined, but also altered the ways in which works of art could be seen, discussed, and by whom. The changing relationship between art and the public can be seen in the reaction to the theft of Leonardo Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa in 1911. The media attention, including photographs of the empty wall space where the Mona Lisa had hung, saw a surge in attendance to the Louvre, as the French public clamoured to become involved in

89 http://museums.nuremberg.de/duerer-house/panoramic-view.html
this dramatised event. The empty wall space, the abandoned frame, the photographs, newspaper articles, and even Da Vinci’s former home as the site of vigils, would all become supplementary material to the missing painting.  

By 1929, New York’s MoMA had opened, inviting the public to take a journey through the ‘evolution’ of Modernist European painting and sculpture, signalling an increase in displaying works of art within an educational context. By the 1960’s, Conceptual art and Process art were pushing the boundaries of what it meant to create works, and complicating the manner in which they could be interpreted by critics and the public.

In 1966, American conceptual artist, Mel Bochner, was asked to produce a display of drawings for the art history department of the New York School of Visual Arts. The display, ‘Working Drawings and Other Visible Things on Paper Not Necessarily Meant To Be Viewed as Art’ (1966), consisted of numerous drawings, musical scores, receipts, and other ‘visible things on paper’. These were gathered from Bochner’s friends, including Sol LeWitt, Donald Judd, John Cage, and Dan Flavin, Xeroxed a hundred times, placed in notebooks, and then placed on four sculpture plinths. This is an early example whereby conventionally defined supplementary material was re-represented as the focal point of an exhibition (emphasised through the use of conventional approaches to displaying artworks), rather than as support. Tony Godfrey argues that this exhibition “has often, with good reason, been cited as the first exhibition specifically of Conceptual art. The viewer became a reader, an active participant: as there was no immediately obvious art

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on show, the readers had to make or deduce the art experience for themselves”. Not only does this indicate an important moment in the use of supplementary material within the history of art, but the notion of viewers becoming readers having to make or deduce the art experience is of central importance for chapter five.

Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel, in *The Love of Art* (1969), explored the implications of how museums and galleries addressed the different audiences, analysing the backgrounds of gallery-attending demographics and how they engaged with the plethora of educational devices (including wall-mounted descriptions, guided tours, leaflets, and exhibition catalogues). The types of works being produced at this time, along with the increase in new audiences (often with little education in the history of art) called for this discussion of such supplementary approaches to displays.

The problematic nature of the supplement and its relationship to works of art was explored in Rosalind E. Krauss’ essay ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde (1981), in which she questioned the legitimacy of the installation of Auguste Rodin’s *The Gates of Hell* at the National Gallery in Washington. Cast in 1978, *The Gates of Hell* made use of Rodin’s plasters to create an imagined version of this unfinished work, rendering the plasters “potential multiples” without an original. Accompanied by a film showing the casting, this unashamedly speculative project provoked Krauss to argue that “what is at stake are...
the aesthetic rights of style based on a culture of originals” before declaring the temptation to label the work as a “fake”. Such themes of originality and casting are addressed in the case study of Henry Moore.

Another work from 1981, Janet Wolff’s *The Social Production of Art*, explored the implications of a variety of Marxist theories for understanding the conditions under which both artists and their works are produced. Six years later, Naomi Schor’s *Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine*, called attention to the ways ‘the detail’ had been historically rendered as supplementary and of lesser concern than the whole, whilst aligning the detail with the feminine in a hierarchically ‘lower’ position. Schor’s writing on the detail draws attention to the ways in which interpretations of works of art can be dictated and framed by prejudice and entrenched attitudes, which are themes that apply to this thesis in its discussions of hierarchy, institutionalisation, and the classification of supplementary material.96

Carol Duncan’s *Civilizing Rituals: Inside the Public Art Museum* (1995) analyses the ritualistic nature of experiencing art within museums, highlighting the notion of ‘liminality’ as the act of entering a space that transforms everyday experience.97 In 1997, the National Gallery in London used the transformative effect of the gallery space to

emphasise the revelatory nature of supplementary material in their series of ‘Making and Meaning’ exhibitions.98

The 1990s also saw two significant technological developments, with the emergence of the World Wide Web, and digital technology. As with the emergence of film and photography at the turn of the Twentieth Century, these developments would usher in new approaches to the market, theory, production, and archiving of works of art. Artists such as Mark Amerika began to make internet-based works, and collaborative online artworks such as ‘The Thing’ (initiated by Wolfgang Staehle) increased in both size and popularity.99 Adapting to this new way of engaging with works of art, museums across the world started to establish online archives of their works, occasionally with ‘virtual tours’ that redefined the experience of ‘seeing’ exhibitions.

The internet and digital technology has important implications for supplementarity. Online projects change the manner in which the ‘hand’ of the artist, and the use of supporting material, are involved in making works of art, whilst digital technology offers new possibilities for digital archiving and re-assessments of archived material. However, as digital archiving has developed, there has often been an increased concern for issues of originality, authenticity, and authorship. The digital archiving website, ‘The Rhizome ArtBase’ (1999 to the present), partly named after a philosophical concept of Deleuze and Guattari, had originally set out to enable greater interaction, sharing of ideas, and the


availability of a wide variety of art projects. Whilst these values are maintained, a considerable amount of care is now taken to emphasise the importance of the site for supporting or backing up (and therefore preserving) art projects, and ensuring that links to original websites are available. As digital conservator for ‘The Rhizome ArtBase’, Ben Fino-Radin, states “what began as a web platform for presenting and sharing art works, grew into an effort more conscious of preservation and bibliographic practices”. As with the emergence of reproducible technology, historical concerns for originality and authorship are not necessarily usurped by the possibility of availability and multiplication (as Benjamin had hoped), but can retain their importance in an industry where bibliographic identification and promotion is often necessary for maintaining and advancing careers.

In more recent years, the supplement has continued to be a prominent part of art production, the art market, and art theory. In 2009, a preparatory drawing by Raphael, ‘Head of a Muse’ (1508-1511), sold for £29.2m – a record for a work on paper. Benjamin Peronnet, of Christie’s, describing the importance of the piece, declared that “this truly exceptional drawing offers us a glimpse into the working mind of a genius”. This continues the use of ‘genius’ as a description of artists initiated by Moritz and Kant, and further popularised by Romanticism. In the same year, Briony Fer’s Eva Hesse: Studioworks (2009) explored the problems of defining Hesse’s works-for-art, as well as

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Hesse’s own reassessment of her practice. Deanna Petherbridge’s *The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice* (2010) represents a major study of how drawing should be considered to be more than a mere support. The 2010-11 exhibition at Tate Britain, ‘Rachel Whiteread Drawings’, was dedicated to the preliminary and preparatory works of Whiteread. In words that echo Peronnet’s comments on an artist that lived half a millennium earlier, the Tate website explains that “these collages and drawings provide a fascinating and intimate insight into the creative process behind Whiteread’s work. While her sculptures are often large-scale and involve a team of fabricators, these paper works provide a more personal, mobile counterpoint”.

In August 2014, MoMA announced that they would utilise digital technology to convert their collection of Andy Warhol’s films, thus supplementing the original films with copies that will not only better preserve their content, but also enable a much wider use of footage for exhibitions, study, and performances.

Although this historical overview does not claim to be comprehensive, it highlights the important developments that have directly, or indirectly, concerned the production, evaluation, consumption, and archiving of the supplement. I will now address three categories emerging from this overview that are of importance for this thesis – classification in displays, the production of value, and technology, equipment and the supplement.

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Interpretation and Display

This category is of importance to the thesis as it addresses the processes of appropriation and commodification that are evident in the highly influential construction of MoMA, as well as Bourdieu and Darbel’s major study of the implications of supplementarity for the interpretation of displayed works of art, discussing the role of educational framing of displays. The relationship between art and education is crucial for understanding one of the primary uses of supplementary material. Academic education can supplement the experience of works of art by providing exhibition-goers with the tools to understand historical developments, as well as prevailing analyses of what certain works ‘mean’. Educational techniques employed by galleries and museums involve using a variety of devices (such as leaflets and wall-mounted descriptions) to make works of art more widely accessible. These devices, as I argue, can also have the effect of switching the experience of art away from the appreciation of works, towards an experience and appreciation of the creative process.

The benchmark for a new form of art presentation was established by MoMA in New York. Founded in 1929, MoMA created methods of spacing, lighting, and overall context that were adopted across the world, and which continue to dominate contemporary cultures of display. The first director of MoMA, Alfred H. Barr Jr., and the head of its architectural department, Philip Johnson, formulated the visual presentation of the new gallery after their experiences when visiting art exhibitions in Europe during the 1920s
and early 1930s. Small galleries and temporary shows had started to present artworks in plain white spaces, in order to emulate the appearance of art studios.  

MoMA was the first museum to be devoted entirely to displaying modern art, and from the beginning Barr envisioned the museum as serving both a cultural and an educational function. This included a special concern for showing the ‘evolution’ of art as a “sequence of movements developing out of each other”. Here, the layout itself becomes a supplement to the works on display, framing the way in which the works are experienced whilst simultaneously appropriating the works to establish a narrative.

It is important to consider briefly the relevance of the appearance, and continuing endurance, of the ‘white cube’ model established by MoMA. Brian O’Doherty, the first to use the term, describes how:

The ideal gallery subtracts from the artwork all cues that interfere with the fact that it is ‘art.’ The work is isolated from everything that would detract from its own evaluation of itself. This gives the space a presence possessed by other spaces where conventions are preserved through the repetition of a closed system of values. Some of the sanctity of the church, the formality of the courtroom, the mystique of the experimental laboratory joins with chic design to produce a unique chamber of esthetics.

This statement highlights an important issue concerning the displaying of supplementary material within such a setting. If, as O’Doherty asserts, the work is “isolated from

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106 Ibid. p.36.

everything that would detract from its own evaluation”, the addition of supplementary material of any kind would by necessity either assist with, or avoid hindering, this process of evaluation. However, this assertion becomes problematic if supplementary material disrupts or distorts this process when used to assist in the construction of a narrative, or as educational devices. One of the themes that will be developed throughout this thesis is the relationship between supplementarity and works of art, with the inclusion of supplementary material in displays often significantly altering the evaluation of the works it appears alongside. The ‘sanctity’ and ‘mystique’ of the space not only serves to present the works of art as ‘sacred’ objects removed from the outside world, but also ensures that any supplementary material appearing within such a space is also elevated to a level of prominence.¹⁰⁸

The approach to displaying works of art initiated by MoMA encouraged simultaneously an educational engagement with these works, as well as experiencing them within a sanctified environment. Presenting works of art from different movements in a way that encourages an ‘evolutionary’ interpretation both supplements the works by framing these works in an historical context, as well as moving the works of art themselves to supplementary status, as they support such an interpretation. The introduction of works-for-art into the gallery setting as educational material further complicates the issue of what is being experienced. On one hand, the use of works-for-art and more evidently educational devices, looks to explain the works of art, with the latter remaining of central importance. Works-for-art such as preliminary and preparatory works are commodified

¹⁰⁸ Such is the concentrated atmosphere of ‘white cube’ spaces that stories of people being uncertain as to whether even purely functional objects such as fire extinguishers and light switches form part of an exhibition are commonplace.
by museums and galleries so as to emphasise their revelatory value, which itself translates to their market value. On the other hand, a by-product of such commodification, as well as the inclusion of explanatory devices, is the attention it gives to the creative process itself. Production and product are brought together within the concentrated atmosphere of the white cube, allowing works of art themselves to become supplements to a centralised re-positioning of the creative act.

The approach to displaying works of art that began with MoMA marks an historical shift in emphasis for the experience of art, where ways of working start to jostle with the results of this work, for a position of importance within the gallery setting. Rather than remaining stable in a supporting role, educational devices open the door for a re-classification of supplementarity as evidence and puzzles of the enigmatic creative act. It is this possibility that dictates my re-interpretation and application of Adorno’s concept of enigmaticalness that is analysed in chapter five. The commodification of works-for-art by museums and galleries changes the experience of art by creating a new way of engaging with displayed material. Simon Sheikh states that “making things public is also an attempt to make a public”, however, whilst I agree with this statement, the implications of encouraging a new audience for displayed works are unpredictable.¹⁰⁹

Some of these implications were explored in detail by Pierre Bourdieu and Alain Darbel, in *The Love of Art* (1969). This included a series of opinion polls and interviews taken from people attending free-admittance museums and galleries across Europe, with particular

attention given to revealing the social, economic, and educational background of the museum-visiting demographic. Broadly speaking, the results (and their analysis) revealed that there was a distinct correlation between higher levels of education, economic wealth, and the likelihood of both attending and ‘appreciating’ art exhibitions. Correspondingly, the less wealthy and less formally educated were far less likely to visit museums, or to feel competent in their interpretation of the works. Bourdieu and Darbel are clear in their view that the work of art is not something self-evident and universally accessible, but instead “as with all cultural objects, a work of art can reveal different levels of meanings according to the interpretative framework applied to it”.\footnote{Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Darbel, \textit{The Love of Art}, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 45.}

Their study revealed that galleries and museums would approach this issue of accessibility in different ways, with some choosing to provide educational aids (such as explanatory panels, arrows, guides, etc.), whereas others preferred to let the work ‘speak for itself’. Depending on social class and/or formal education, educational aids in Bourdieu and Darbel’s study are considered largely unnecessary, or unbecoming. However, Bourdieu and Darbel point out the symbolic value in the inclusion of aids. They identify a common feeling of esotericism experienced by the working-class visitors, where the lack of educational aids in effect serves to exclude them from gaining a more informed appreciation of what they see before them. On the other hand, Bourdieu and Darbel argue: “Arrows, notices, guidebooks, guides or receptionists would not really make up for a lack of education, but they would proclaim, simply by existing, the right to be uninformed, the right to be there.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 49.} Bourdieu and Darbel’s study of such educational aids
devices constitutes an important exploration of the effects of supplementarity on how art is experienced, though not on the meaning of supplementarity itself.

As Bourdieu and Darbel argue, museums and galleries play a significant role in the ways in which supplementary material is classified and commodified, as well as how it is used and consumed by audiences. Not only is such material frequently used to establish a biographical and/or educational narrative that supplements the work of an artist, the work itself exists within a larger art-historical narrative consisting of revered figures and celebrated art movements. Hierarchies of historical prominence become established, with supplementary material often utilised as a way of embellishing reputations. However, such embellishment within an educational framing of the gallery or museum experience transforms the cultural focus of the creative act itself, and therefore calls for a re-evaluation of the distinctive forms and significance of supplementary material that is central to this shift in focus.

**The Production of Value**

The relevance of this category for the overarching concerns of this thesis is its focus on the problem of interpreting and defining the production of works of art, and the role of supplementarity in such processes of definition. The discussion centres on two conflicting positions: Janet Wolff’s definition, following Karl Marx, of art as manufacture, and Briony Fer’s assertion that not only is the creative process more complex and far-reaching than this definition allows, but that the supplement occupies an important position in complicating such a perspective. This section provides a frame within which Heidegger’s
The sociological role of both art and artists began to be explored in greater detail from the mid-Twentieth Century, as the influence of Karl Marx became increasingly important. Though Marx's major works appeared a century earlier, it was only at this point that an interest in his conception of the role of art and artists developed alongside the increased availability of Marx's work - important works such as *Grundrisse* were not available in the West until 1953. This became the occasion through which to re-evaluate the role and function of art and artists within society. In Marxist terms, the artist was a *worker*, and the creative process consisted of 'producing' *products*. Instead of the artist being considered to be detached from society, transcending the conventions and concerns of their time, Marxist and associated sociological interpretations emphasised the importance of the market and an intricately interwoven series of social conditions in determining both the type of works being produced, and the likelihood of their success or failure (both critically and commercially). This application of Marxist analysis renders the work of art a commodity, and like any other commodity, its exchange-value is determined by the producer and the consumer. In this context, Wolff argues that: “art is *always*
‘manufacture’.¹¹⁴ The success or failure of an artist’s products would therefore be interwoven with their reception.

Writers such as E.D. Hirsch Jr., and Jeremy Hawthorn have explored this issue of reception and evaluation, raising questions about the temporal nature of meaning, the dominant ideologies that might influence or dictate an interpretation of a work, and the issue of whether or not there is a single ‘correct’ way of consuming creative products. With such considerations in mind, Wolff argues against the prominent role of the individual practitioner/author in interpreting their works:

A monolithic and unifying entity, to which all works known to be by a particular person have to be referred, and in terms of whose supposed personality and characteristics they have to be explained, is mistaken both because it usually depends on an unanalytical concept of the subject (as ‘free’ and creative), and also because it necessarily operates with a partial analysis of the author (constructed in terms of an imputed set of defining characteristics). The way in which authors are produced, or constructed, must be explicated. And the complexity of their works, which escapes any unifying formula, must be capable of recognition.¹¹⁵

Wolff is unequivocal in her view on the prominence of interpreting works of art through their relation to their authors, stating that “any history of art as a history of artists has to be rejected”.¹¹⁶ Instead, both artists and their artworks should rather be approached as themselves products of social structures, codes and conventions, as should any current or future evaluation. Wolff’s analysis raises significant issues about supplementarity as it argues that this is part of the social and historical construction of both the author and the


¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 123.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. 126.
work of art, with the author or artist becoming of secondary or little importance for understanding their works.

Briony Fer’s essay for the 2009 exhibition catalogue, *Eva Hesse: Studioworks*, adopts an altogether different position on the production and definition of works of art, and the importance of the role of the artist for their interpretation. The exhibition itself is an illustration of the interweaving relationships between archive theory, its use in art criticism and cultural practice, and reassessments of artists’ own practice. The German-born American sculptor, Eva Hesse, would create various test pieces from which she would formulate ideas for larger, complete works. In chapter three’s discussion of British sculptor, Henry Moore, this is established as a familiar and historical method of creating sculptures. What is distinctive about Hesse’s use of these test pieces is her re-framing of them as works of art, rather than reserving for them only a supplementary role. After Hesse’s friend and fellow artist, Sol LeWitt, placed a private collection of Hesse’s test pieces in a glass case, Hesse recognised the way in which this conventional form of displaying works of art constituted a challenge to the traditional theories and approaches to archiving. Supporting, preliminary or preparatory works produced by artists would either be discarded by the artist themselves, or if the artist was of a sufficient level of fame, stored away in museum archives or displayed in ways that emphasised their supplementary use. Instead, Hesse created a series of works in which her test pieces were presented and exhibited in glass cases, without any explicit supplementary function (see Figure 1). As Fer observes: “The act of encasing these little experimental things in glass seems both to make a claim for them and at the same time puts a question mark
over what they are.” The creative use made by Hesse of her own test pieces not only constitutes a response and questioning of dominant theories of archiving and definitions of works of art, but also served as the inspiration for the *Eva Hesse: Studioworks* exhibition itself, in which other test pieces and ‘studio sweepings’ were given centre stage. Fer’s own study into the complex nature of what she termed Hesse’s “sub-objects” instigated this exhibition, which she co-curated, recalling Bochner’s complication of the distinction between curator and artist, when re-presenting supporting material of other practitioners. This demonstrates the circular and reciprocal relationship between archive theory, artistic responses to archive theory, theoretical theories of such a response, and the conversion of this theoretical study into a new contribution to both art exhibitions and theories of the archive. Despite its theoretical and aesthetic value, the exhibition also calls into question the very act of using Hesse’s studio works in this way. With Hesse’s career lasting only five years, such a reframing of the significance of the exhibition’s contents can be interpreted as an act of commodification that turns the sparseness of available material into an opportunity to make new claims, and re-classify such material in ways that might make it of more interest to the public. Such re-classification also potentially increases the market value of archived works-for-art. This echoes the appropriation of Sant’Elia’s works on paper that are discussed in chapter four.

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118 Ibid, p. 38.
Fer’s notion of sub-objects constitutes a challenge to Wolff’s assertions that art is manufacture, and that the complexity of creative works must be capable of recognition. Fer describes the sub-object as “something that does not quite rise to the status of an
object but remains closer to a thing. They play somewhere in between these two terms". Commenting on the art critic Lucy Lippard’s use of words such as ‘test pieces’, ‘studies’, ‘models’, and ‘prototypes’ to describe Hesse’s studio works, Fer emphasises the ambiguous and problematic nature of what is being described: “All the words and the slippages between them seem to be symptomatic of the objects falling through their net.”

These same words reoccur throughout this thesis, both in my own use, and in referenced quotations. Fer’s highlighting of their indefinite positions, and the implications this has for the discussions of the creation, classification, display, and theoretical interpretation of preliminary and preparatory material, serves to emphasise the precarity of what is being discussed, and the space this opens up for further philosophical, art historical, and art practice investigation.

Such words also continue to perpetuate the ‘manufacturing’ role of the artist as producer, and works of art that are the products of these various stages of study, modelling, and prototype-making. The following quotation from Fer signifies her distance from Wolff’s view that art is “always” manufacture: “Although the term ‘creativity’ has tended to get tied up with exhausted notions of individual expression of emotion and feeling, the whole question of what it is that artists do can’t be so easily dismissed. To call it production

\[119\] Ibid, p. 42.

\[120\] Ibid, p. 16.
helps to shift the focus, but then misses the things that differentiate artistic work from other kinds of work.”\textsuperscript{121}

Marxist notions of the artist as producer, forever borne of their historical circumstance, and bound to the requirements of various consumers, may be applicable to the \textit{appearance} of displayed test works such as those made by Hesse, that call into question historical preconceptions, but they do not account for the uncertainty created by the questions themselves. The “point at which ‘non-work’ \textit{becomes} a way of working” introduces ambiguity into the causal process, hierarchical ordering, and the importance of both the creation and experience of supplementary material.\textsuperscript{122} Marxist terminology of manufacture is inappropriate for such material, as it elevates notions of order and the methodical movement towards a designated outcome, above the inquisitive, accidental, spontaneous, and unpredictable soil from which works of art grow and continue to resonate. In such a conception of the supplement, even biographical material such as an artist’s studio or a psychiatric report, emerge not as tools of decipherment, or distracting obstacles to ‘complete’ works, but as valuable spotlights on the unanswerable, enigmatic and evasive nature of the creative process.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid, p. 71 (original emphasis).
Technology, Equipment and the Supplement

The importance of this section to the thesis is in its address to the significance of the material nature of both classically defined works of art, and supplementary works. This extends to the importance of technology for both the causal emergence of the creative process, and the possibility of using supplementary material. Technological developments not only dictate the form and utilisation of equipment, but also influence the ways in which works created by artists are categorised and archived. The themes addressed in this section have implications for the relationship between the philosophy of technology and supplementarity, as precise considerations of the connection between technological developments and the status of supplementary material, as well as the process of distinguishing such material from works of art, are explored and evaluated.

The artist, Albrecht Dürer (1471 – 1528) made use of the technological developments of his era in a very particular way that complicates the distinction between what is support, and what is the work of art. The first stage of Dürer’s practice was to draw the image by hand. The drawing would either be made directly onto wood, or onto paper that was then attached to wood. The drawing would then be etched into the wood through traced carving, destroying the original drawing in the process, before being used to make any number of impressions, either by Dürer himself, or one of his team of workers.

The Metropolitan Museum of Art (MET) in New York, which possesses two woodblocks is eager to stress that, despite the uncertainty over Dürer’s direct involvement, the trace of the artist looms large (with an implied sense of authorship). They explain on their
website that: “the intricacies involved in shaping the patterns of curving and tapering lines in order to create pictorial effects never before achieved in woodcut must certainly have required Dürer’s close supervision, if not his hand on the knife”. The emphasis on physical techniques “never before achieved in woodcut” implies that they were too well executed to have been the work of a mere assistant, thereby promoting the apparent importance of these woodblocks through their association with Dürer himself.

Even works in which Dürer’s direct involvement is in no doubt can be problematic in relation to both supplementarity and categorisation, as in the case of his copper engravings. Dürer’s most famous works, a trio known as the meisterstiche (master engravings), are so revered that, in the words of Angela Campbell: “almost every institutional and many private print collections in the US and Europe have an impression of at least one of his three best-known prints”. Despite being derived from the same original engravings, efforts have been made by many of the owners of these impressions to assert claims of qualitative superiority in comparison to the others. As Campbell explains: “These surviving impressions, not surprisingly, have been the subject of endless comparison: every print custodian wants to know that his/her impression is among the very best and/or the earliest (this is sometimes thought to mean the same thing, though it often does not).” Campbell is undertaking an extensive study of the chronological ordering of the impressions, using modern digital technology in order to detect subtle

125 Ibid.
degradation of etched lines that occur during the printing process. The distinctions between these impressions, and the suggestion of jostling for hierarchical positions, bring to light some important issues in modes of classification and evaluation that arise even in copies derived from existing original pieces. It also illuminates the important issue of how historical and contemporary technology can be combined to produce new knowledge. ¹²⁶ Both the issues of hierarchical classification, and of the relationship between old and new technology, will be addressed in the case studies of Sant’Elia, Bacon, and Artaud.

In *The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice*, Deanna Petherbridge emphasises the significance of the ‘hand’ of the artist that such digital techniques can uncover and archive, whilst simultaneously questioning the implications of digital technology for preserving and archiving what she considers to be important information about the creative process. For Petherbridge, the information found in drawing does not merely provide an insight into an artist’s approach and genius, but constitutes the very essence of its value. Petherbridge describes the “spacial and textural journey” that is recorded by the process of sketching and drawing. ¹²⁷ The various journeys revealed through drawing are “strategies” of learned style, technique, and artistic expression that weave together to constitute the work of art, rather than simply arriving at it. ¹²⁸ Each of the four case studies discussed in this thesis, concerns in different ways the interrelation

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¹²⁸ Ibid, p. 152.
between mystification and demystification that supplementary material can embody, and
the importance this has for technology.

Petherbridge argues that the relationship between equipment and the creative act is
not just a means to an end, but intricately intertwined: “Tool, material, medium and
techniques are so closely interconnected as to be difficult to unscramble.” The
significance of this interconnection is underlined by Petherbridge when she states the
possibility of: “a deep social or psychological dynamic to complement drawing’s primary
role of invention by employing simple tools”. Technology does not simply assist the
creation of works of art, but both shapes and is shaped by it. A digitised or photographed
version of a drawing may capture its likeness, but the original drawing itself, as
Petherbridge would argue, contains traits that are seemingly beyond reproduction. In
contrast to the clamour to digitally analyse Dürer’s master engravings, such an
interpretation elevates the original above its copies, and calls for an overturning of any
hierarchical classification that would reduce the value of material made by artists (whilst
itself implying a new hierarchy). This issue is addressed in all four case studies, as
different approaches to supplementary material involving the hand of the artist and their
utilisation of equipment, are explored within specific theoretical frameworks.

Yet Petherbridge appears to turn against the very interconnectedness between invention
and tool that she had earlier asserted. Whilst “in the digital age, the newly generated
image has no more status than any other in a chain of simulacra” the “unique hand

129 Ibid, p. 118.

130 Ibid, p. 122.
drawing on paper remains redolent with meaning and promise, as well as history”. The choice of computer programmes, coding, the precise compiling of image databases, and the evidence of technical proficiency involved in the digital drawing seemingly become devalued in comparison with the textual depths offered by hand drawing. Such a perspective reveals what is at stake for the content of archives when technological developments change processes of creative practice. Not only does the nature of what is archived change, but technological developments also bring with them new considerations that force a re-consideration of entrenched and established theoretical areas of priority. The case study of Sant’Elia in chapter four explores further these issues of hierarchy, simulacra, and the role of the medium in evaluating the status of supplementarity and the work of art.

Conclusion

The historical overview at the beginning of this chapter provides a broad outline of the events in art theory and practice that have seen the meaning of the supplement continue to shift in use and value, establishing the context in which this present discussion takes place.

This chapter identifies issues of importance for the present analysis of supplementarity, and its relationship to the work of art, including: the emergence of the centrality of the artist, accompanying biographical accounts, the shift from ‘cult’ value to ‘exhibition’ value of works, the romanticised notion of both the ‘genius’ and melancholic character of

artists (and the mythologising of artists), the importance of the ‘hand’ of the artist, and novelty, for the interests and growth of the art market, and the emergence of public art museums. These historical events not only reflect developments and shifts in approaches that supplement works of art, but show how approaches to the work of art have historically influenced (and continue to influence) the importance or denigrated value of works-for-art.

The late Nineteenth Century, and the Twentieth Century, were shown to be periods of tremendous change in approaches to the creation, interpretation, and displaying of works of art (and by extension, supplementary material). The first reconstructions of residences with a connection to celebrated artists began to appear, art movements became increasingly aware of their processes of working, and museums such as MoMA introduced concentrated ‘spiritual’ environments, as well as emphasising the use of narrative-based and educational interpretations of works of art. The supplementing of works of art via educational devices appears as an important theoretical and sociological concern in Bourdieu and Darbel’s *The Love of Art*. Supplementarity was directly linked to the popularisation of Conceptual art, thus marking its most explicit and integrated influence within art practice and art history. The social role of the artist as ‘producer’ is shown to have been asserted within a Marxist ideology, with implications for the use of equipment and other supporting material that describe them as components of manufacture. Technological developments in internet-based art, and digital archiving, are shown to have implications for the archiving and consequent availability of different stages of the ‘working’ of works of art, whilst also maintaining and strengthening forms of
supplementarity such as support, preservation, and continuing concerns with originality and authorship.

The categories of ‘interpretation and display’, ‘the production of value’, and ‘technology, equipment and the supplement’ that conclude this chapter, not only provide more detailed analyses of specific historical events of importance for this re-consideration of the supplement, but identify key themes that will unfold over the course of the subsequent case studies. Although categorised and addressed in separate sections, there is of course slippage between these themes that reflect the fluctuating and unstable state of defining works of art, and those works that are employed in specific ways to support them. For this reason, these themes will be returned to throughout the remainder of this thesis with different considerations in mind, as I construct an evaluation of supplementarity that does not seek to fix these themes in place, but which identifies how such an evaluation is made possible.
Chapter Three: Art and Equipment

This chapter will use, as an example, the work and working methods of British sculptor Henry Moore (1898-1986) to advance this investigation into the complex status and interrelation between the ‘preliminary’, the ‘supplementary’, and ‘completed’ works of art.

I will consider the distinction between art and equipment, and the emerging classifications of supplementary material that relate to this distinction. Of particular relevance to this chapter is the variety of supplementary materials that can be produced and put to use during the lifetime of an artist (whether by themselves, or through the interventions of others who have had varying degrees of contact with the artist and/or their work). In particular, I will look at the vast amount of preliminary material comprising of maquettes, sketches and intermediary plasters, and the ways in which this material has been utilised in different ways, sometimes to supplement ‘completed’ works, sometimes to help recreate the imagined reality of an artist’s daily working life. To respond to the question ‘what is the supplement?’ it is necessary to discuss the variety of supplementary material used in the making and displaying of works of art, and the slippages that can appear when trying to define their status.

This chapter will be of use to promote studies into the undeveloped differences and crossovers between Heidegger’s theories of art and equipment, with Heidegger’s theory of causality forming a bridge from one to the other. It will also be of value to advance studies into Moore’s working process by carefully analysing the various stages in which
his creative process materialised, as well as showing how issues such as market forces, commodification, and the necessity of expanding his reputation came to directly influence the production and use of Moore’s output. Within the overall framework of the thesis, this chapter addresses the question of what supplementary material is, how it differs and compares to complete works and in what ways such classifications are significant for studies of art practice, archive theory, museum theory, the philosophy of technology, and cultural studies into the role of education.

This discussion will be developed by drawing upon Heidegger’s essential distinction between art and equipment. I address Heidegger’s notion of the ‘instrument’ in relation to causality, thus enabling an analysis of the relationship between idea and form. In turn, this will help to illuminate the uses and valuations associated with the variety of supplementary material produced in (or out of) Moore’s creative process.

The transition from preliminary status to supplementary status in Moore’s work will be directly related to the Heideggerian distinction between equipment and art. It is not so much the conclusions that Heidegger reaches that are of primary significance here, but of positioning this current discussion within the framework of Heidegger’s approaches to art, equipment, and causality in a way that can produce new findings that will advance the investigation into supplementary material.
Heidegger and Equipment

In chapter one I showed how Heidegger defined great art as that which allowed for a ‘presencing’ of truth as ἀλήθεια. Alternatively, equipment has the quality of ‘readiness-to-hand’ that is always put to use, as opposed to its appearance as ‘presence-at-hand’, in which the ‘thingliness’ of a thing removes it from its usefulness as part of a system of equipment. In this respect, art and equipment are, for Heidegger, quite distinct. Yet, at the same time, Heidegger states in Being and Time (1927) that: “The work to be produced, as the ‘towards-which’ of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. The shoe which is to be produced for wearing (footgear); the clock is manufactured for telling the time.” Such work therefore both entails a use of material, and a ‘usability’ of that towards which equipment is employed. There is an apparent discrepancy here between art as ἀλήθεια, distinct from any equipmental function, and the use of equipment for producing that which has this same “kind of Being that belongs to equipment”. This chapter focuses on this apparent discrepancy as the locus for a discussion of the problematic and complex nature of evaluating preliminary and preparatory material, showing how particular approaches to art practice can disrupt and act upon such theoretical distinctions.

Another importance of this distinction and apparent discrepancy for the present discussion is in its ability to bring the issue of art-equipment more clearly into view.

Heidegger counters any objections about the discrepancy between equipment and art in ‘The Origins of the Work of Art’:

132 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 99.
The readiness of equipment and the createdness of the work agree in this, that in each case something is produced. But in contrast to all other modes of production, the work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is part of the created work. But does not this hold true for everything brought forth, indeed for anything that has in some way come to be? Everything brought forth surely has this endowment of having been brought forth, if it has any endowment at all. Certainly. But in the work, createdness is expressly created into the created being, so that it stands out from it, from the being thus brought forth, in an expressly particular way.\textsuperscript{133}

The work of art, despite being something produced through the use of equipment, is thus distinguished from a shoe, or a clock, through the unconcealment of its createdness, whereas the latter conceal their createdness in order to function as the equipment they are.\textsuperscript{134} Heidegger therefore accounts for the use of hammers, nails, canvases, clay, kilns, paper, pencils, and any other thing that exists prior to the creative process, but which may be employed during the process itself in order for its createdness to appear (as opposed to being used to produce yet another form of equipment). That is not to say that the use of such things in the created process become apparent in themselves. Instead, Heidegger makes the same argument for art as he does for the produced equipment, where that for which equipment is used is able to be what it is (whether art or equipment) all the more when the equipment that produced it is concealed.

Heidegger explains this position: “Precisely where the artist and the process and the circumstances of the genesis of the work remain unknown, this thrust, this ‘that it is’ of createdness, emerges into view most purely from the work.”\textsuperscript{135} This foreshadows

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[133] Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In Basic Writings, pp. 181-182.
\item[134] It is precisely this relationship that is turned on its head in the ‘ready-mades’ of artists such as Marcel Duchamp, where the equipmental being of a thing (such as a urinal) is brought into the unconcealment of its createdness through situating it in contexts in which its equipmental function gives way to its presence as a created thing.
\item[135] Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. In Basic Writings, p. 182.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Adorno’s own concern with developments in art practice, culminating in Process art that had become increasingly popular towards the end of Adorno’s life in the late 1960s, where the ‘madeness’ (ϑεσει) of works obscured their potential enigmaticalness. The apparent demystification of the work of art that such evidence of production induces, is discussed further in chapter five.

But does Heidegger’s position apply to all aspects of the creative process? Can the production of art be compared to that of the production of a shoe or a clock? Whilst it could be said that the lack of attention given to a nail in the final form of a thing – whether a work of art, or a door – allows that which is produced to be more clearly as what it is (where I do not consider the nails securing a canvas to a frame when experiencing a work of art, or the nails that hold together the door when I open it), does this comparison hold true for all things used in the process of producing a work of art?

The current discussion of production in the creative process is in effect positioned between two poles: equipment, and that which the equipment is put to use to produce. If what is produced can be called an ‘end’ (and it will shortly be seen that this in itself is a problematic term), this end can be seen to change the ways in which certain elements used in the process of production are to be evaluated. For example, the production of a clock may involve the use of components (fashioned through the use of further equipment) such as dials, hands, gears, and glass that are gathered together in such a way as to produce an end – the clock itself. However, what if the clockmaker, in order to prepare better for the final production of the clock, first produces a prototype? The prototype stands in quite a distinct relationship to that of mere component parts, having
been produced through the gathering together of these parts in order to produce an end of sorts. Yet this end itself is also of a distinct relationship to that of the final clock. It may lack the finesse expected of a clock intended for commercial use, or it may contain errors borne of experimentation. Perhaps it is constructed as a point of reference for finalised versions, and as such incorporates a design that allows it to be disassembled and reassembled with ease. Such a prototype could be said to consist of both an equipmental function as part of a larger process orientated towards producing the finished clock, and at the same time a more distinguished and marked proximity to the finished clock itself (through appearance, composition, and function) that differs significantly to that of a cog, or a dial. It is not identical to the finished clock (due to such factors as intended purpose, or the level of execution), yet it embodies the key properties of the finished clock (it looks like a clock, it shows the time, etc.). It does this to such an extent that it may appear to an outsider as being indistinguishable from the latter, and may even be confused with the finished product itself. In such an example, the prototype receives its distinctive meaning from the existence (whether actual or intended) of the end towards which it is put to use; that of equipment that shows the time of day.

This analogy highlights the importance of how material is ‘framed’. A model produced by an artist as a reference and piece of equipment for a larger project, can become re-evaluated if the model is removed from its equipmental context and re-framed within a gallery setting.

What meaning, then, can be given to a maquette? Like the prototype clock, it is not some interchangeable piece of equipment such as a nail or a piece of clay (albeit of a particular
size and/or quantity). Instead, it is a particular composition that enters into a
distinguished relationship with that which is intended as the ‘end’ of the process of
production it forms a part of. Like the prototype, it might share in the appearance and
material composition of the product that follows it. Yet unlike the prototype it is not in a
relationship with another, better executed piece of equipment yet to come, but is instead
in an altogether different relationship – a relationship with a work of art. If the prototype
clock can be said to contain the properties of the finished clock as equipment (albeit
perhaps imperfectly), can the maquette be said to contain properties of a work of art?
Does the maquette not also exist and present itself in its createdness? Could not a
maquette (given a certain context) also be confused with a work of art in the same way
that a prototype clock may appear to an outsider as being the finished product? What
meaning and value can be given to a maquette where no ‘finished’ piece is derived from
it?

Although I will now focus on a specific analysis of Moore’s maquettes, that analysis will
also be of relevance to discussions of the nature of the creative process in general, as well
as the role of classification in museum and exhibition displays. What is central to the
thesis here is the importance of intention on the part of the artist (explored via
Heidegger’s notion of causality), and the reasoning that can lie behind curatorial decisions
to use and define certain works-for-art in specific ways. The implications of such
curatorial decisions are developed in more detail across the following case studies.
Moore’s Maquettes

In 2010, Tate Britain held a major retrospective on the life and work of Henry Moore. Included alongside many of his best known ‘completed’ sculptures were numerous works used by Moore during the artistic process, such as maquettes, sketches and intermediary plasters (larger and more precise versions of the maquettes, which could be cast in bronze, or used as the starting point to ‘scale up’ into significantly larger ‘complete’ sculptures). At the Henry Moore Foundation (hereafter referred to as the Foundation) in Hertfordshire, much of the Estate where Moore produced so many of his work has been conserved, including a studio brimming with maquettes, surrounded by the tools used to fashion them.

Almost every book dedicated to reproductions of Moore’s work will include a multitude of preliminary works, often positioned adjacent to the works into which they were later ‘worked up’. Some books are dedicated almost entirely to the detailed descriptions or documentation of his artistic process. What did this process entail? Did Moore consider the true creative act as taking place on paper, in the initial moment when three dimensional form is first rendered, or when the ‘complete’ worked up sculpture has been set in place?

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136 Tate Britain, 24 February – 8 August 2010.

In the 1930s, Moore began to move away from conventional sculpture, towards a more inventive style. This ‘turn’ manifested itself in sketches, or more precisely ‘transformation drawings’ that developed not from the human form, but from sketches of found objects such as shells, pieces of wood and animal bones that gradually evolved on the page into shapes that seemed to take on human characteristics.\textsuperscript{138}

During this period, Moore was still predominantly working through carving, and it would have been simply impractical for his ideas to evolve through such a time-consuming method of working. When Moore said that “art tends to arrive at a true result through instinct”, he was referring to the genesis of the original idea, where the instinctive act of creativity can work its way through so many false starts and unsatisfactory attempts in order to arrive at a resulting artistic idea.\textsuperscript{139} This “through instinct” constitutes the journey by means of which the art is said to arrive, and yet the arrival, as all arrivals are, is both an end and a beginning. Whether Moore deemed the results good or bad would determine whether this initial work would be developed and refined, left on the page, or the studio shelf. The material used at this stage of the creative process, small scale and more directly capable of manipulation, has strong parallels with Fer’s description of Hesse’s ‘sub-objects’, which are “ruled by pure contingency” that makes them suitable for new ideas and works.\textsuperscript{140}


\textsuperscript{140} Fer, \textit{Eva Hesse: Studioworks}, p. 76.
Such drawings provided an outlet for Moore’s creativity that his chosen material would not offer him:

When my sculpture was mainly carving I would be having many more ideas than I was able to carry out and I would get rid of ideas, if that is the right phrase, by drawing to prevent them from blocking each other up. Often I would make pages of drawings of ideas. On one sheet of paper there could be as many as thirty projects, such as Stringed Figures, all produced in a few hours. One of them would hold my attention and I would think it was the best one.\textsuperscript{141}

Immediacy began to become increasingly important to Moore’s practice. By the end of the 1930s he had shifted from mainly producing carvings, and had instead begun to work by modelling.\textsuperscript{142} In the early stages of his career, Moore created sculptures that were largely seen from limited angles, or ‘frontal’. As he started to create works to be seen in the round, the importance of the medium in which he arrived at the initial artistic ideas changed. Creating the early preliminary work for a three-dimensional piece would “require at least twenty or thirty drawings” whereas a maquette would allow far greater scope and faithfulness to the intended outcome.\textsuperscript{143} Moore explains that “The maquette is only three or four inches in size, and I can hold it in my hand, turning it over to look at it from above, underneath, and in fact from every angle. Thus from the beginning I am working and thinking in three dimensions.”\textsuperscript{144} Here Moore makes explicit the working

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid, p. 100.

\textsuperscript{142} Fath, ‘Henry Moore: The Path to Maturity’. In Henry Moore: From the Inside Out, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{143} Hedgecoe, Henry Moore, p. 269.

and thinking by means of the maquettes, saying “I do not think in words, I think in shapes.”

The property of maquettes was, for Moore, so close to the potential ‘final’ piece as to be almost indistinguishable: “When I make a small maquette, it is rather like an architect making a sketch for a small building on an envelope. In his mind it is a full-size building. In the same way, with my small plaster maquettes, I am thinking of something much larger.” This statement indicates a process of classification on the part of the artist. Its function is that of equipment, but the form of this equipment is dictated by its resemblance to potential works of art. They are equipment in the service of the artist’s process of working, but their utility is determined by how they appear. The viewer, therefore, may look upon the maquette in wholly different ways to the artist, but they both share a common ground; to judge, contemplate, and estimate the value of its appearance. Again, this correlates closely with Fer’s comment on Eva Hesse’s ‘studioworks’: “these small things seem to be halfway – the fraction may vary quite drastically of course – between things to make and objects to look at.” This highlights the confusion that can arise between the intentions of the artist, and the experiencing of works-for-art when assessed purely on their visual properties. It also underlines the importance that curators and artists frequently attach to the necessity of emphasising the equipmental function of displayed material.

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145 With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work, p. 121.
146 Hedgecoe, Henry Moore, p. 266.
147 Fer, Eva Hesse: Studioworks, p. 24.
The technique of working up maquettes into larger scale sculptures involved inflicting a lot of damage upon the models, with sections cut off and separated. Until the end of the 1950s, many of the maquettes from that decade were destroyed, often at the foundries during the enlargement process, but also through the lack of care with which they were handled.\footnote{David Mitchinson, ‘A Note on the Plasters’. In Henry Moore: From the Inside Out, Claude Allemand-Cosneau, Manfred Fath, David Mitchinson (eds), London: Prestel, 2009. p. 59.} This ‘disposable’ function of the maquettes began to change as Moore increasingly returned to previous sculptures to either modify or re-size them. By the end of the 1950s they had become valuable tools worthy of keeping due to their usefulness for potential future projects. The maquettes originally used could be easily manipulated to experiment with the possible ramifications such changes would have.\footnote{Ibid.}

Equally, the maquettes were invaluable in allowing multiple versions of the same sculpture to be executed. Moore began to realise through experience that his projects were never necessarily completed. Their function as equipment, however, remained the same, as this statement from Moore, reflecting on their role in his work during his career, makes clear:

> Sometimes I make ten or twenty maquettes for every one that I use in a large scale – the others may get rejected. If a maquette keeps its interest enough for me to want to realise it as a full-size final work, then I might make a working model in an intermediate size, in which changes will be made before going to the real, full-sized sculpture. Changes get made at all these stages.\footnote{With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work, p. 57 (my emphasis).}
Any one of Moore’s maquettes, when taken in isolation from the established consensus of what constituted Moore’s finished pieces, could be seen on some level to meet the criteria of art as laid out by Heidegger. Their createdness would appear distinct from any equipmental value or function. The most telling distinction between the prototype and the clock, or the maquette and the finished work of art, would be in its purpose and execution, yet as Heidegger explains, it is precisely these elements that are hidden in equipment in its equipmentality, and in art as art. The circumstances of creation, the details of the artist, and the process itself, would be quite unknown, allowing the “that it is” of the maquette to come to the fore. Conversely, their apparent equipmental value is emphasised when displayed alongside numerous other maquettes inside a preserved studio, or when placed next to refined pieces derived from them.

This shows the important role played by curators in providing a suitable context for works-for-art, placing them in studios, alongside clearly defined works-of-art, or surrounding them with explanatory material that helps tell a story about the creative process itself, rather than risk such works being misinterpreted as complete pieces. Such storytelling is what David Carrier is alluding to when he says that “narrative sentences are the hidden scaffolding holding together the public art museum”. The implications of centralising the creative process within a gallery or museum setting are explored further in chapter five.

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The Perry Green studios began to fill with maquettes sent back from the foundries, often in a damaged state. It is likely that the prolonged exposure to his surrounding body of work, representing hours of effort culminating in the production of corporeal manifestations of his creative impulses, led Moore to look upon them with a more appreciative eye. The shelves of his studio filled with maquettes began to resemble collections, retained for purposes that stretched beyond simple equipmental usage, and gradually the damaged models began to be restored. When the Henry Moore Sculpture Centre was established in 1974 at the Art Gallery of Ontario (AGO) in Canada, an outlet and setting for this body of work that had been largely hidden from the public up until this point became available.\footnote{www.ago.net/henry-moore-sculpture-centre (accessed 21 March 2011).} Moore’s assistants carried out a conservation project of rebuilding the maquettes to their original forms from out of the bits and pieces the fineries had sent back, before the recreated models were shipped to the AGO in Canada.\footnote{Mitchinson, ‘A Note on the Plasters’. In Henry Moore: From the Inside Out, p. 59.}

This marked a significant step in the value and use of the maquettes, as for the first time they became elevated to the heights of warranting a public display without immediate recourse to ‘completed’ pieces. Prior to this, it was far from uncommon for some of Moore’s maquettes and drawings to be exhibited as supplementary material (and in fact Moore had sold more drawings than sculptures by 1939).\footnote{Jeremy Lewison, Moore, London: Taschen, 2007. p. 26.} Now, however, through the endeavour to capitalise on Moore’s international renown, and Moore’s own desire to preserve and utilise the fruits of the early stages of his creative projects, a total of (to
date) 48 bronze and plaster maquettes have been given their own pride of place in a gallery setting at the AGO. The very act of shipping them to Canada and ‘enshrining’ them within such a setting meant that they became transformed. Whilst their subordinated role in relation to Moore’s complete works of art was still emphasised, the absence of such completed works served to highlight what Benjamin would call their *auratic* presence as actual works created by the artist. Furthermore, their particular artistic qualities (both as part of a process, and as works in their own right) was promoted. It is clear that the maquettes were not considered to be mere equipment of the level of nails, hammers, or chisels, but instead held (to borrow another term from Benjamin) an exhibition-value of their own.

It is also important to acknowledge here the relevance of commodification – the concept developed from the work of Marx concerning the transformation of things of little or no apparent value into commodities to be exploited. The preservation and use of Moore’s works-for-art described here, as well as similar preservations and uses of supplementary material in general, can be considered to occupy a prominent place within ongoing debates about commodification. Do museums (and in this case, the artist) produce commodities out of the detritus of the creative process (or indeed, via the continued displaying of works of art no longer connected to their original context) so as to exploit otherwise redundant or valueless material? Or is the use of such material or works a reflection of the values and interests of the time?\(^{155}\)

Over the course of this thesis I will argue (particularly with reference to Adorno’s theory of enigmaticness) that the value of supplementary material for museums and displays would be short-lived if there were not also significant public interest in the creative process itself. When David Carrier, in *Museum Skepticism: A History of the Display of Art in Public Galleries* (2006) states that “the profits produced by making of commodities makes collecting possible”, he indicates the influence that public interest has on the archiving and displaying of supplementary material. The nature of this interest will be developed in chapters five and six.

Three years after the formation of the ‘Henry Moore Sculpture Centre’ in Canada, the Henry Moore Foundation was established. After this, the process of restoring maquettes became more thorough, with “each individual plaster also being photographed and fully catalogued”. Presiding over these events, Moore was able to increase massively the totality of his artistic production by producing numerous bronzes and plasters directly derived from maquettes themselves, propagating the importance of his creative output so as to extend over every aspect of his tactile involvement. For some, this use of supplementary work was to have a negative effect on Moore’s reputation. Chris Stephens, the editor of the catalogue that accompanied Tate Britain’s Henry Moore exhibition, exclaimed that “Moore’s work seemed to become increasingly over-familiar, an idea not helped by his eagerness to exploit sculpture’s potential for multiplication.”

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156 Ibid, p. 119.


Fer highlights the problematic nature of evaluating the status of material derived directly from previously abandoned projects, stating that “casts and cast-offs come to be intimately related”. The issues of reputation and the proliferation of imagery will be explored in the next chapter, and these two observations reveal the levels to which supplementary material such as maquettes, and in particular here the numerous plasters and bronzes derived from them, were of a sufficient quality to increase familiarity (and even over-familiarity) with his work in general.

The smooth, seamless surfaces of so many of Moore’s sculptures was a vital aspect of the aesthetic force Moore sought to convey, echoing the flawless composition of the natural objects from which he drew his inspiration. Yet a consequence of such an end product was inevitably to sacrifice the physical evidence of involvement of the artist, which in any case was almost entirely absent in a real sense since 1964, when carvings were subsequently almost exclusively carried out by Henraux artisans at Moore’s behest. Schopenhauer’s championing of immediacy becomes eclipsed by Heidegger’s notion of great art that emerges more clearly in the “that it is” of its createdness precisely when the artist and process recede into the background.

Moore’s physical interaction with the surfaces and textures at his disposal was paramount to his vision of provoking experiences and feelings through form alone. As

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159 Fer, Eva Hesse: Studioworks, p. 33.
160 Lewison, Moore, p. 89.
Moore himself said, “tools are only an extension of your arms and hands”. Yet this involvement had become diluted to the point of being imperceptible in his more refined public output. The use of his maquettes within the public arena, their elevated status through dedicated, permanent displays such as the AGO, and the ongoing conservation project carried out by the Foundation, allowed this involvement to be shared on a global scale.

By bestowing a heightened value upon all stages of his creative output, Moore could seemingly have it both ways. The labour of the artist, along with the idealised, immaculate end products, could be made available to all. However, what this ‘heightened value’ consists of remains ambiguous as long as the seemingly obvious separation between Moore’s sculptures, maquettes, and drawings is left unexplored. What is needed for a clearer understanding of the status of the supplement, and its relationship to works of art, is a more thorough investigation of the unique properties and distinctions between the different stages of Moore’s output.

Causality

This section introduces Heidegger’s notion of causality. By comparing Heidegger’s approach to the work of art with his approach to the importance of causality for technology, I open up a new method of approach that is of value for re-interpreting and analysing different stages of the creative process. This section is important for establishing not only the slippages that exist between categories of supplementarity, but

162 With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work, p. 113.
also the ways in which material, form, desired outcome, and motivating inspiration become important factors in evaluating the different works produced by artists.

Almost 2,400 years ago Aristotle offered his views on the art of his time: “We often say of good works of art that it is not possible to either take away or add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art.”

The significance here is that of establishing an early historical understanding of art that exists as art prior to an apparent ‘achievement’ of that which is necessary to become ‘good’. Whilst excess may suggest for Aristotle that the work has been taken too far to be redeemed, its apparent defect implies, on the other hand, that the work of art, as art, remains capable of being improved - of being added to in order to meet this ancient criteria for attaining its ‘goodness’ as a work of art. In short, the designating of something as a work of art does not take place before it has been finalised, but instead applies to that which is still capable of improvement or decline.

Such a distinction is important in providing a historical context for the following interpretation and employment of Heidegger’s understanding of causality. Whilst Heidegger did not directly address the notion of preliminary and preparatory works that I am arguing fall between the ‘complete’ work of art and equipment, I consider his analysis of the instrumental to be crucial in elucidating its meaning and evaluation. For Heidegger: “Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever

At the heart of Heidegger’s discussion of causality is not only the issue of how something may come to be, but the particular ways in which this coming to be is formed and manifested.

The relevance of this distinction for the discussion of preliminary and preparatory work in this chapter, and for the thesis as a whole, is in understanding the degrees to which the work of art is or is not to be considered as art in the various stages of the creative process. This means evaluating whether the work of art is a culminating point of a process, or whether it pervades the process itself. Heidegger points towards a classical definition of four causes that underpin his own unfolding of causality: *causa materialis; causa formalis; causa finalis; and causa efficiens.*

As with the notion of truth, Heidegger returns to ancient Greek language for an indication of the original force and meaning behind certain words. For ‘cause’, Heidegger refers to *aition,* a word in which Heidegger attaches deeper connotations of “that to which something else is indebted”, as he emphasises other aspects such as interdependence, owing, and responsibility. It is this distinction that Heidegger seeks to clarify in his interpretation of causality as understood by the ancient Greeks. Here, cause (or a number of causes) is not simply that which is responsible for producing a thing in itself, but is instead intimately bound with a process of bringing this thing forth, where: “The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth


165 Ibid. Please refer to the notes on the translation of the original German text, which shows how Heidegger ‘awakens’ these further connotations of *aition.*
Understood in this way, the thing is not simply the end result of a cause (or causes) as mere effect, but is instead something that the causes allow to come about, to be brought forth. In this sense, the thing is brought out of its concealed state, into unconcealment through the interdependent relations of particular causes.

So how does Heidegger understand these four causes, and in what ways can they help to further this discussion of supplementarity? *Causa materialis* refers to the materiality of a thing, and *causa formalis* refers to its form (or aspect). The matter/form, *hylé*-morphé dichotomy is well known, and perhaps seemingly the least complicated elements of Heidegger’s reinterpretation of causality. To use Heidegger’s terminology, the particular thing that is brought forth is indebted to this or that material, or a combination of materials (wood, clay, bronze), and this or that form (a cup, a clock, an abstracted reclining figure). These causes are ‘co-responsible’ for allowing the thing to appear as what it is. Already, this helps to emphasise a certain matter of individuality in different versions of a single form in Moore’s work. The clay maquette may appear to be of the same form as a work cast in bronze, but it does not bring forth into unconcealment something identical to it. The bronze material and the form/aspect cooperate in a different way to that of the same form made of clay. The play of light and shadow of the bronze work occurs differently, and therefore emphasises or conceals different aspects of the work. Equally, the clay maquette is better placed to retain evidence of the artist’s tactile involvement, leaving traces of fingerprints on the surface. The matter influences the form/aspect itself in a way that shows the uniformity of form in the two works to be only nominal.

\[166\] Ibid, p. 9.
The third cause, *causa finalis*, is that of the end or *telos*, which is responsible for that which the combination of matter and form are co-responsible for. It is this cause that is fundamental for Heidegger’s interpretation of Greek causality, and the one which he considered to be the most overlooked in his own time. For Heidegger, this cause circumscribes in advance the ‘realm’ in which the thing will exist. It is a ‘confinement’ not just to a particular role or purpose (a word Heidegger states is often wrongly attributed to *telos*), but to circumscribing a deeper meaning whereby: “Circumscribing gives bounds to the thing. With the bounds the thing does not stop; rather from out of them it begins to be what, after production, it will be.”

Heidegger understands this third cause not merely as that of anticipated purpose, but of the thing in its envisioned *completeness*, a completeness that contains within it the place or placing of the thing within a world of meaning and values.

The fourth cause, *causa efficiens*, lies in the definitions going back to Aristotle, understood as that which brings about the effect that is the finished thing. This would commonly be attributed to human influence, such as the skilled craftsman, however Heidegger rejects this classification. Whilst he agrees that the fourth cause is that of the artist or artisan who gathers together the other three causes in order bring into appearance of the thing that the four are co-responsible for, he dismisses the notion of them being a *causa efficiens*. Heidegger goes on to state that there is no known corresponding Greek word or Aristotelian doctrine that names it. Instead, Heidegger argues that the artist or artisan is responsible for the “that” and the “how” of the other

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168 Ibid.
three causes, and where, pivotally, the bringing forth and resting-in-self take and retain their first departure.\textsuperscript{169} It is this \textit{bringing forth} (\textit{poiēsis}) itself that governs the four causes understood by Heidegger, and is closest to the sense of \textit{causa efficiens}, albeit in a way that differs considerably from the one commonly understood. Heidegger states that the four causes, as that which brings about the process of bringing forth (as inducing to go forward, or as an occasioning): “Let what is not yet present arrive into presencing. Accordingly they are unifiedly ruled over by a bringing that brings what presences into appearance.”\textsuperscript{170}

The importance of Heidegger’s notion of causality for this thesis is twofold; It allows for a re-consideration of technology as being more than supplemental, where the material and technical approach is integral to what is produced or worked, rather than merely an interchangeable medium; and it allows for the importance of the creative process in preliminary and preparatory works to be more clearly identified and defined.

As mentioned, Heidegger states that “wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality”. Having defined causality, Heidegger goes on to state that “instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology”.\textsuperscript{171} He then goes on to say of technology that “the possibility of all productive manufacture lies in revealing”.\textsuperscript{172} The notion of \textit{revealing} is itself related to causality when Heidegger states that: “Bringing-

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
forth comes to pass insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we call revealing."\(^{173}\) As discussed in chapter one, Heidegger’s understanding of great art is of that which allows for the happening of truth as \(\alpha\lambda\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\), as the presencing of truth in its unconcealment. The *revealing* that is the coming to rest of *bringing-forth* as something concealed coming into unconcealment, forms, as it were, a crossover or meeting point of both art and technology. *Revealing* is where the *possibility* of all (technological) productive manufacture lies. Indeed, Heidegger further clarifies this by saying that “technology is a way of revealing”.\(^{174}\) The artistic process, too, is a way of revealing, as a *bringing-forth* that comes to pass through the unconcealment of \(\alpha\lambda\iota\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha\). Heidegger indicates a common ground for the artistic and the technological (by way of the *occasioning* – the inducing towards the presencing of a thing through causality) when he says that: “*Bringing-forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning - causality – and rules them throughout. Within its domain belong end and means, belongs instrumentality.*”\(^{175}\) The domain of *bringing-forth*, and its coming to pass as *revealing* applies to both art and technology as that which determines their cause and culmination.

This ‘common ground’ of art and technology as *revealing* is an important claim of this thesis, as it not only provides a way of reconciling these distinct areas of Heidegger’s work, but also offers a new avenue for locating the significance of the creative process. Whether considered from an artistic or technological perspective, the creative process is

\(^{173}\) Ibid, p. 11.

\(^{174}\) Ibid, p. 12.

\(^{175}\) Ibid.
at one and the same time a *revealing*. This will be shown to be highly significant for the archiving/preserving, displaying, and reception of supplementary material, which in turn relates to contemporary debates on museum theory, art theory, and cultural studies in general.

The ambiguity between art and technology is further emphasised when Heidegger turns to the Greek origin of the word technology – *technē* – with its dual connotations of craftsmanship and the arts of the mind and the fine arts. It is neither possible nor necessary to undertake a discussion of Heidegger’s more detailed analysis of technology that would develop from this point. However, this concatenation of shared concepts allows for an orientation towards their significance for art. In the following description of the coming together of the four elements of causality in the revealing of bringing-forth (as *poiēsis*), I consider instrumentality, albeit described as the “fundamental characteristic” of technology, to also be a characteristic of the artistic process:

> Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth, according to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning. This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or house, with a view to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from this gathering determines the manner of its construction. Thus what is decisive in *technē* does not lie at all in making and manipulating or in the using of means, but rather in the aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that *technē* is a bringing-forth.176

Throughout ‘The Question Concerning Technology’, Heidegger often couples *artisan* and *artist* as if to emphasise the fact that they share in the bringing-forth of unconcealment through its revealing. It is therefore no great leap to draw the conclusion that, as heavily

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implied throughout Heidegger’s texts on art, that art is a bringing-forth as revealing. It can also be inferred that art too is for Heidegger not merely a matter of manufacturing, and that the “finished thing” (the completed work of art) derives its manner of construction through the gathering together in advance of the aspect (form) and matter of the work of art with a view to its envisioned completedness. In short, that which is to be brought forth by a work of art dictates the way in which that work comes to be, and as such necessarily resides over each stage of its creation. Instrumentality emerges as a shared element of the artistic and technical processes, with a common ‘end’ (albeit determined in advance) of a revealing through bringing-forth into unconcealment of the concealed. This notion of art, as determined in advance as that which governs its own construction, takes on a major significance in evaluating certain forms of supplementarity such as the maquettes, plasters, and bronzes produced as part of Henry Moore’s creative process.

The gathering in advance of the four causes determining the manner of construction would seem to negate the possibility of spontaneity or malleability, yet this can soon be dismissed. For example, whilst the material, form, and the envisioned finished ship as completed may determine the manner of its construction, it is common for adaptations to be made to a design as unconsidered problems are encountered, or when new requirements appear. Heidegger is not implying that the revealing gathered in advance provides a perfect virtual model, but that in order for it to emerge in appearance, the four causes that refer to its fundamental properties must come together to induce its coming to be. If certain approaches prove to be inadequate (e.g. a paper hull, a top heavy superstructure, or a poor shipbuilder) they will soon be revealed as such in relation to the
governing third cause of *causa finalis* (hence why it was prominent in Heidegger’s notion of causality). This governing third cause dictates whether what is encountered in the construction is adequate or inadequate for the task in hand. How can this then be related to the artistic process, and of supplementary material?

*Figure 2: Henry Moore, 'Ideas for Sculpture: Transformation Drawing, Lobster Chair, 1932. Henry Moore Family Collection. Image Redacted.*
To begin with, I will start with the example of one of Moore’s sketches of possible sculptures (see Figure 2). Already the *causa materialis* and *causa formalis* appear to be completely distinct from that of one of his sculptures, being drawn in pencil on toned wove. Yet a *causa finalis* is already governing the sketch by determining the manner of its possible construction, through a variety of possible works, each shaded to imply roundness to the depictions. The *causa finalis* (albeit in a general form of sculpture at this stage) dictates the *indication* of form as outlined by the pencil.177 This outline is already a form (the execution of lines that imply shape and shading), whereas the matter (pencil and toned wove) is dictated by their suitability for allowing a quick series of ideas to become rendered in order to capture potential ways of *realising* the *causa finalis* of a potential sculpture.

As discussed, Moore favoured the use of sketches as a way of *capturing* ideas (imperfect or undeveloped moments of *causa finalis*); what Christa Lichtenstern refers to as a “melting pot”.178 Yet as *imperfect* as this *causa finalis* may be, it nevertheless contains within itself the instigating force of art (as opposed to a ship or house). The sketch could thus be divided up into four components: *Causa finalis* – the work of art intended as sculpture; the *causa materialis* – the paper and pencil that allows the immediacy of ideas in a way that can inform later construction; *causa formalis* – the suggestion of these ideas rendered through lines and shading (and in other cases, the addition of colour); and the skill of Henry Moore himself in gathering together the other causes.

177 If, as Fer asserts, a test piece may be a site of productive contingency, this can now be considered to be ‘controlled contingency’ governed by the possibility (however indistinct) of creating a work.

The sketch is therefore to be understood not as an end in itself (as well may be the case for other sketches), but as a determined manner of construction that from a gathering in advance of causes receives its determination as such. Yet this analysis appears not to account for any primacy of creativity or originality in the sketches themselves. Surely the sketches contain within the fabric of their construction the original force of creative inventiveness in its most instinctive and unmediated form? On the surface this would appear so, however, interpreted through Heidegger’s understanding of causality, the content of the sketches are already bound and in-formed by the causa finalis. The causa finalis serves to bring-forth into revelation an unconcealment that is not that of a drawing or sketch, but that of a potential sculpture. This is of course not to say that this medium cannot otherwise be the locus of a great work of art, but that in this case its instrumentality is contained within its genesis.

Spontaneity may occur here only within and out of prior restrictions that bind the application of the artist’s ‘imagination’ to a governing set of requirements. These may be the sculptural form, existing methods of display, and the restraints of potential construction, that delimit and curtail the extents to which spontaneity can be made to serve. In this sense, the spontaneous is not immediate, but is instead already mediated by a bringing-forth that induces the particularity of apparent spontaneity. Here, the spontaneous can be understood as the concentrated efforts of such a bringing-forth in accordance with an appropriate available medium. This medium allows for particular combinations of multiple elements that are both suitable and relevant (relevant to the reigning bringing-forth itself), to be brought-together or gathered so as to be quickly
preserved or captured. Such suitable and relevant elements are various influences drawn from a multiplicity of sources that are concentrated in accordance with this reigning *bringing-forth*. They belong to the prior *experiences* of the artist. In this case, for example, certain approaches to forms established through the consideration of natural objects, an understanding of the requirements of sculpture, an awareness of existing approaches to art such as Surrealism, and Moore’s own skills as a draftsman and sculptor. It is the combination of these prior experiences in accordance with the reigning *bringing-forth* that gives rise to the *new*, and it is the availability of a suitable medium that allows for the capture of these combinations that bring forth the spontaneous. The spontaneous does not appear out of thin air, but out of a concentrated *thickness* of influences derived from experience, that both combines and preserves them. The unpreserved would in effect relate to the *fleeting* idea that remains as idea due to its lack of accordance with the reigning *bringing-forth* and/or the lack of a suitable medium for its preservation (of whatever duration). In this interpretation, Schopenhauer is right to allude to a certain “rapture of the moment” that he champions in sketches and the original formations of artistic creativity, which can be understood as the most *direct* point of contact between the creative process and the *bringing-forth* itself.

However, in this use of Heidegger’s notion of causality the lack of an “admixture of deliberation and reflection” that Schopenhauer associates with the “pure” work of art could be described as misgiven. Instead, it is through a thorough series of multiple deliberations and reflections, albeit combined and gathered together in a unique way under the reign of a particular *bringing-forth*, that a *concentration* of experience takes place as spontaneity. The spontaneous sketch could therefore be understood as the
birth, but not the conception of the work of art, and as such it represents only the earliest form of a work that already contains within itself the potential to grow and develop into maturity. The conception takes place in the combination of experiences under the reign of the particular bringing-forth. Its birth (as that which derives from this conception) relates to its sensual (aesthetic) appearance that represents the origins of its potential aesthetic development (albeit in ways that contain within themselves a pre-aesthetic conception governed by a particular bringing-forth). The aesthetic therefore has both a referential relationship to a pre-aesthetic notion of bringing-forth, as well as a dynamic significance (as that which brings-forth its own requirements and receptions) that will together be developed further in relation to Gilles Deleuze in the following chapter.

This application of Heidegger’s notion of causality reveals the particular intentions and considerations that can be at play throughout the creative process, and serves to show that works-for-art can be viewed as more subtle, complex, and valuable as cultural objects than a reduction to a supporting and functional status allows. Equally, this example reveals the extent to which theories applied to art both structure and transform the interpretation of artworks and works-for-art, where a theoretical method of analysis such as this places particular emphasis on a work’s qualities that seemingly produces (rather than necessarily reveals) their value and status. Yet the work itself is also pivotal to this transformation of value and status, with its mode of construction providing new areas of theoretical consideration.

The sketch, as described here, is an instrument in the service of a causa finalis; it is this evidence of instrumentality that reduces and hinders the ‘purity’ of the “that it is” of the
‘finished’ sketch, and thus results in only a partial bringing-forth. It is a ‘completed’ sketch, but its completion contains within itself a function that goes beyond it, and marks it a work-for-art. This bringing-forth is as adequate to the guiding notion of potential sculpture, as a rough outline of something resembling a ship is adequate in bringing-forth the appearance of a functioning sea-going vessel.179 Nevertheless, the sketch is governed by another order of causa finalis which is that of a specific mode of art (a potential sculpture), which is itself ruled by a bringing-forth (poiēsis) into unconcealedness of a truth (as ἀλήθεια) of the would-be sculpture. As such, it is brought into existence as a work-of-art (albeit ‘impurely’ in its ‘reduced’ and ‘hindered’ state) that is ‘impure’ precisely because of its evidently instrumental construction. In short, the sketch is an artistic creation in its own right (with its own particular causality), whilst at the same time owing its coming-to-be to its instrumental role in the creation of another, more refined work of art.

This is of significance for validating the use made by artists and curators of works that appear through the creative process, but which were not envisioned as complete works-of-art. Preliminary and preparatory works are distinguished from complete works by the degrees to which their construction has been dependent upon an instrumental purpose. However, the above analysis indicates how such a distinction in fact marks them as both works-for-art and works-of-art within a hierarchical system of classification that might

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179 This ordering can even be seen in Moore’s well known wartime sketches that apparently captured the unmediated circumstances of the time, but which were in reality carefully constructed in accordance with preconceived motivations: “They are not documents of an actual reality but highly conceived works of art; even the sketchbook drawings that preceded the finished works are removed from the situation that Moore would have observed” - Chris Stephens, Henry Moore, Chris Stephens (ed.), London: Tate Publishing, 2010, p. 165.
deem them to be of ‘lesser’ or ‘lower’ status in comparison to more clearly established works of art, rather than verisimilitudes of ‘actual’ artworks. The issue of hierarchical classification is developed in chapter four.

Context is highly significant in the evaluation and understanding of the vast majority of artworks. One of Moore’s maquettes, for example, may be viewed hypothetically by someone with no prior knowledge of sculpture or Moore’s work, and considering the maquette in itself, the viewer may be forgiven for taking it to be a finished, completed piece. In reality, there are a series of prior indicators that establish contexts and possible interpretation that play upon the maquette so as to emphasise its instrumental attributes. Many of Moore’s works have titles that include ‘maquette’ or ‘working model’, along with accompanying explanatory texts. In many cases they are displayed alongside completed pieces. Yet of the many indications that establish interpretations of such works, perhaps one of the most significant factors in distinguishing preliminary or preparatory pieces from completed works is that of size.

Another way of understanding Heidegger’s notion of causality in relation to Moore’s working process is in terms of a series of interconnecting causalities, wherein each series also interconnects with the others as part of a totality ruled by a primary bringing-forth. The sketch is of a different form (aspect), and involves different materials, so, as touched upon above, it could be seen to have its own causa finalis that gathers in advance these two causes with a view to constructing a finished sketch. This sketch would be part of a series that makes up the construction of a ‘grand’ causa finalis of the primary bringing-forth. One benefit of conceiving Moore’s creative process in this way is that it helps to
account for the degrees of alterations, improvisations, and revisions. The work, being brought-forth, is not fully formed and merely refined through the creative process, but instead guides and unites the different series of causalities in their combined efforts to bring the work forth. Moore himself alludes to a sense of this pre-existing guidance which the different stages of the creative process are brought towards through the act of creation itself, saying that: “One of the things I would like to think my sculpture has is a force, is a strength, is a life. It’s as though you have something trying to make itself come to a shape from inside itself.”

Elsewhere, Moore is clear in his view that the envisioned completed work, even if without a settled form or meaning, is at each stage understood as a large, ‘full-size’ sculpture, with the following quotation referred to earlier stating that “with my small plaster maquettes, I am thinking of something much larger”. The maquette is not a copy of the drawing (as if only a mere refinement rendered in three dimensions), but is created through its own particular causes. Even when referring directly to a sketch of potential sculpture, the four causes that bring forth the maquette converge in completely different ways to those in the corresponding series of causes relating to the sketch. However, in both series of causalities it is the primary bringing-forth that rules over them. Compared to the sketches, the initial maquettes enter into a closer proximity to the complete sculptures through their shape. However, whilst the bringing-forth of the work may begin to be revealed more clearly, its four interconnecting causes remain distinct. The causa finalis, in part receives its content from the primary bringing-forth of the complete work to be revealed. It is nevertheless oriented towards an equipmental practicality that

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allows for a more direct shaping, and as part of Moore’s own specific method of working that factors in (as has been seen) the longevity of a particular maquette’s appeal when deciding which maquettes will be ‘worked-up’ into complete works. This *causa finalis* is what dictates the matter and form, which in both respects differ in kind to that of the complete work. Matter must be suitable for ease of use and malleability (as opposed to the high-quality material Moore commonly used for complete works); form, whilst potentially indistinguishable in shape, must again be in accordance with an equipmental function, and is therefore of a small scale. The artist, Moore himself, gathers these three causes together in quite a different way to how he would when creating the finished work, and employs different skills and additional equipment in bringing the maquettes forth.


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181 Maquettes that are *not* ‘worked up’ into complete works must not be understood here as ‘incomplete’, but instead as containing within themselves a certain ‘inadequacy’ or ‘unfitness for purpose’ that implies a dead-end to a particular line of a creative process. This distinction will be developed more fully in the following chapter.
The initial maquettes emerge through four causes that whilst ultimately governed by the
*bringing-forth* of the artwork as unconcealment (and in their own ways works-of-art), are
predominantly marked by instrumentality. This can be seen in Figure 3, where this small
work in plaster, of 22cm in height, has visible thumb prints, traces of rough carving, and
unrefined edges that contrast sharply with the highly polished monumental works.
Moore’s method of using natural objects to develop his ideas is evident in the
incorporation of a shell at the base of the dress, cast in plaster and made to suggest the
contours of fabric. This use of found objects emphasises the instrumentality of Moore’s
maquettes, as the objects themselves are only suitable for direct use at a stage of working
in small-scale. This interpretation and application of Heidegger’s notion of causality
thus brings to the fore the fundamental distinctions between the maquettes and the
complete works. At the same time it provides a clue to any possible confusions or mixed
interpretations between the two.

In this section, I have provided a detailed analysis that offers a re-interpretation of what
preliminary and preparatory works are. This analysis suggests a new way for both artists
and curators to understand how such material is neither entirely art-work nor art-
equipment, but has a unique existence that combines both. The common ground of
*revealing* derived from Heidegger’s philosophy, and shared by art and equipment, calls
for a re-evaluation of the denigrated status applied to works-for-art within an artistic
context, especially when that equipment is not defined entirely upon its use-value (such
as a nail or paint brush), but also through its aesthetic value.

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182 Henry Moore: From the Inside Out, Claude Allemand-Cosneau, Manfred Fath, David Mitchinson (eds),
2009, p. 172.
The Centrality of the Artist

I will now address the ways in which Moore’s preliminary and preparatory works have been utilised as supplementary material. Although I specifically address Moore, this section also has implications for understanding the appropriation of supplementary material in general, and the centrality of the creative process that is both asserted and emphasised within museum and gallery settings. This section is therefore of relevance for studies into methods of display, the promotion of artists and their works, and the role of education in art.

Having clarified my interpretation and application of Heidegger’s distinction between art and equipment, as well as developing my own use of his understanding of causality to open up the space between these two poles, I will now turn to the actual uses made of such material. I show how the classical *causa efficiens* that Heidegger claims to be erroneously attributed to the artist or artisan, dominates the utilisation of such material. The primary focus will concern the ongoing efforts of the Foundation; in particular the work carried out at his former estate at Perry Green, which has continued to adapt his preliminary material in innovative ways since Moore’s death in 1986. However, to begin with, I will return to the place that first raised Moore’s maquettes upon a pedestal for public consumption in their own right.

The maquettes at the AGO remain among the biggest collection of Moore’s preliminary and preparatory works in the world to this day. The AGO website describes how visitors can listen to audio recordings of Moore discussing his working process, as well as
engaging “the visitor in a variety of interactive activities” designed to educate as well as entice the casual attendee. Alongside this, visitors can also watch on video screens the transportation of, and subsequent setting up of one of Moore’s sculptures in Toronto. It is significant that the emphasis here is on informing the visitor to the gallery. First of all there is a certain assumption about the cultural education of the visitor that recalls chapter two’s discussion of Bourdieu and Darbel. The employment of audio devices explaining the details of the artistic process, visual-historical documentaries showing the public of Toronto how a major public work of art came to be there, and other interactive elements of the gallery imply an active pursuit of what could be called the ‘less informed’ gallery goer.

Such inclusions do not assume that the anticipated audience is culturally knowledgeable through simply letting them experience the work in its displayed form alone. Instead, a number of additions are inserted so as to engage the visitor with the work within the gallery. The maquettes are elevated to the height of occupying their own privileged position within an art gallery. At the same time they are demoted to the level of educational material. On the one hand, they are promoted as the culturally significant material produced by a world renowned artist. On the other hand, their subordinated role as an element in the multifaceted stages of the artistic process is emphasised, as so indicated by the artist’s own voice-over.

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The acquisition of the maquettes and plasters by the AGO represented a marked development in the reputation and corresponding significance of such works through the very fact that they were considered important enough or worthwhile to acquire in the first place. As Howard S. Becker observes in *Art Worlds*: “What is not distributed is not known and thus cannot be well thought of or have historical importance. The process is circular: what does not have a good reputation will not be distributed.”¹⁸⁴ This quotation also illustrates the reciprocal nature of commodification, whereby the conversion of otherwise surplus material into commodities can create and further ongoing interest in such material. Nevertheless, I maintain that without substance of some sort, the longevity of commodity-value will be short-lived. This is discussed further in chapter six.

It is important to consider how such works, brought forth through four causes distinct to those of completed works (albeit ruled over and ‘borne out’ of the primary *bringing-forth*) might be utilised in ways that are equally distinct to those of completed works, or in some cases crossing over with them. I contacted David Wistow – Interpretative Planner in European Art at the AGO – to ask him how visitors to the gallery responded to the maquettes, and received this reply:

Museums attract a wide variety of visitors with diverse interests. Many visitors are fascinated by how art is made. Our collection of maquettes communicates quickly and efficiently Moore’s creative process. Their tiny scale is intensified by their juxtaposition with the full scale plasters which make up the bulk of our Moore holdings. By consulting complementary photographs on view nearby visitors can track the process from the intimate moment of creation – when Moore sculpts the maquettes by holding it in his hand and cutting and gouging – to the more public moment when the large scale works are finally cast in bronze.

Some visitors prefer the immediacy of the maquettes and their domestic scale. Others respond more positively to the large plasters.¹⁸⁵

Wistow’s comments support the notion that the maquettes are primarily experienced as part of a larger project, and that the AGO emphasises their educational value, providing a visual guide to the process of creating art. The maquettes and plasters, now given centre-stage, are themselves supplemented by photographs and videos, as well as written material that either accompanies a work, or is included in leaflets. The presentation is very much a case of highlighting the distance between the preliminary and preparatory works, and the completed works, whilst simultaneously capitalising on this very distance by offering the public a rare chance to go on a tour of the creative process of a famous sculptor. Whilst such a ‘tour’ is ostensibly educational, I argue in chapter five that creative processes themselves have their own ‘enigmaticalness’ that gives a renewed cultural value to supplementary material.

The issue of plasters and bronzes often derived directly from maquettes or working models brings to the fore a further complication of causality and ‘end’. Such plasters and bronzes are in a sense crystallisations or acts of enshrining the predominantly equipmental maquettes and working models. This process of drawing attention to ‘equipmental’ pieces by re-casting them using forms more palatable to traditional cultures of display, echoes the transformative effects, noted by Fer, of Hesse’s test pieces being exhibited in glass cases that was discussed in chapter two. It also shows a willingness by either Moore or the Foundation, to respond to theories of the archive (that would de-value maquettes by presenting them as support and equipment) by utilising the

¹⁸⁵ David Wistow, Email to the author, 4 April 2011.
properties of dominant methods of display to add value to otherwise supplementary material, literally casting them in a new light.

It would initially seem that such enshrining, being so tightly bound to the appearance of the maquettes they enshrine, cannot be so far removed from them. However, a careful examination of the four causes reveals another quite distinct series. In Figure 4, the form

(aspect) of this maquette cast in bronze may of course be almost indistinguishable from clay or plaster versions, but distinct surface differences occur through the interrelation of light and a new type of matter. Furthermore, the form may be drastically altered through scaling up. The matter itself is entirely different, with bronze used for both aesthetic qualities and practical purposes of endurance, with the bronze surface reflecting light more sharply than plaster, which allows the shape and details of carving to be rendered more visible. The causa finalis is altogether distinct, as it gathers together the form and material not in order to serve an equipmental function, but to be brought forth into an exhibition-value that includes multiplication and ease of distribution that distinguishes it from the large-scale complete works. The artist, Moore, gathers together these three causes in a way that is again distinct from any preceding series of causality. He employs a variety of different skills and techniques that at one and the same time reduce the maquette to its most equipmental function, whilst extracting from the maquette its most artistic qualities in order to bring them forth into a revealed state of appearance. In most cases, Moore himself is not physically involved in this cause, but resides over it as a director as various other people assist in its construction.

This adaptation of original material to produce new works, correlates with Rosalind Krauss’ comments on Rodin’s ‘The Gates of Hell’, constructed from fragments of sculpture left behind after Rodin’s death, and where: “It is, we could say, the product of a collaborative effort between the artist, artisan, and the physical properties of the material, but even that is too simple.”186 Whilst Rodin’s death caused Krauss to question

186 Krauss, ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde’. In The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, p. 182.
the validity of ‘The Gates of Hell’ as worthy of being attributed to him, Moore’s involvement in the re-casting of his maquettes makes the resulting works no less complicated.

The primary bringing-forth itself is essentially diverted away from its ruling influence that governed the bringing into being of the full-scale sculpture, and instead a properly intermediary work appears that is closer in kind to the completed work than the equipmental work, but which at the same time exists as an enshrining of the latter. As such, the plaster or bronze work is caught between these two poles of complete work and equipment – being neither equipmental in-itself (and existing as an end), whilst at the same time enshrining something predominantly equipmental (and thus bringing this equipmentality into appearance).

William Pucker illustrates the ambiguity that can arise in evaluating such work when he says of Figure 4, ‘Working Model for Stone Memorial’ (1971) that “this nominally working model clearly stands as an autonomous and authentic work of art in its own right”.¹⁸⁷ This work cast in bronze brings to the fore the cutting and engraving that is indicative of the construction of a maquette in its less refined, less proximal adherence to the typical appearance of Moore’s complete works. However, in bringing these qualities to the fore as an enshrining, the work transforms them by presenting them within a form that is considered an end in itself. This formal presentation as end could be said to allow the cutting and engraving to resonate with historical sculptural approaches such as realism,

and the works of sculptors such as Jacob Epstein. Yet at the same time, the reliance upon the predominantly equipmental work, as well as the title of ‘working model’ continues to emphasise its distance from a conventionally understood ‘completed’ work.

Moore’s increased use of bronze and plaster versions of his maquettes, no doubt encouraged by their appeal to places such as AGO, also serves to complicate the content of the *causa finalis* of future maquettes. Their potential development and distribution as bronzes and plasters could be said to exert an influence over Moore’s artistic process itself, whereby in some cases bronzes and plasters would become the primary envisioned object of *bringing-forth*.

This concept of ‘enshrining’ given here has implications for studies into the use of bronzes in sculptural practice, and the wider issue of the re-casting of supplementary material in visual forms that further emphasise the crossovers and ambiguities between art and equipment. To ‘enshrine’ is to convert and transform the overtly equipmental properties of a thing into a visual medium that more strongly accords with the prevailing standards of ‘complete’ works of art.

The creation and displaying of Moore’s bronzes, plasters, and maquettes, constitute different forms and degrees of connection between Moore ‘the working artist’ and the resulting complete works of his creative process. Such works are characterised by the ‘trace’ of the artist in the creative process, and exhibited in ways that draws attention to the *act* of creation as much as what is created, distorting what is central to the ‘art experience’ when these works are displayed. These smaller works are also valuable for
propagating the awareness of Moore’s work, as well as making it easier for galleries to claim ownership of parts of the sculptor’s output.

At the centre of this ‘propagating’ was and is the Henry Moore Foundation. The Foundation was established in 1977, primarily to impose some order over the chaotic and constant production of new works, as well as overseeing the lending of works to galleries and museums. A clause in the Foundation’s Memorandum of Association states that it had been “established to advance the education of the public by the promotion of their appreciation of the fine arts and in particular the works of Henry Moore”. 188

This promotion of the works of Henry Moore, and Henry Moore as a creative practitioner, would take a variety of forms. Alexander Davis was appointed to undertake comprehensive research looking into, and acquiring, all printed material on Moore. After fifteen years of research, Davis, along with The Henry Moore Foundation, published ‘The Henry Moore Bibliography’ as well as establishing the Foundation’s on-site library. 189

The mythologising of Henry Moore the working artist had begun during the sculptor’s own lifetime. The issue of ‘mythologising’ will be developed in each of the remaining chapters, and emphasises both the continuing influence of the ‘cult of the biographical’ addressed in chapter two, and also the extent to which this historical approach has developed, but at the same time repressed, the valuation and use that currently


dominates supplementary material. As well as the Foundation’s continued purchasing and loaning of Moore’s maquettes, plasters, bronzes, and sketchbooks, a number of books and exhibitions took place that emphasised the centrality of Moore’s creative process.

In 1968, the photographer John Hedgecoe provided the images that accompanied Moore’s autobiographical content in a book detailing most aspects of Moore’s professional life, showing photographs of the important places from Moore’s childhood and education, along with pictures of Moore working in the studio and overseeing the production of his larger works. Similarly, the book *With Henry Moore* was released in 1978, consisting of photographs of Moore at work during the various stages of his creative process taken by Gemma Levine, and accompanied by comments from Moore as he talks about his inspiration and method of working. The brief introduction asks the question “how does a great creative artist go about his work?” before positioning the book within a larger historical context so as to emphasise its importance by adding: “How much richer would art history prove if the same could have been done for Michelangelo, or Donatello?” This not only suggests that Moore is on a par with those figures, but that the significance of the artist’s working process is such that it was only the absence of the necessary means that prevented their working process being similarly recorded. This point is of importance for the thesis as it draws attention to the notion that technological advancements in the distribution of publications, and emerging sociological interests in

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190 Hedgecoe, *Henry Moore*.

191 *With Henry Moore: The Artist at Work*.

192 Ibid.
artists themselves (charted in chapter two) have opened a new space for centralising the creative process.

In 1984/85, the ‘Henry Moore Centre for the Study of Sculpture’ in Leeds organised an exhibition called ‘Henry Moore: Sculpture in the Making’ which was the first show to explore the relationship between his creative process and his inspiration. Plasters and bronze casts which concerned the same form being rendered in different ways were loaned from the Foundation, along with maquettes and working models (again being alternative versions of the same idea), objects found in Moore’s studio, and Moore’s signature punch.\(^{193}\)

The inclusion of Moore’s signature punch shows the extent the organisers went to in order to focus the purpose of the show upon shedding light on the process over the product. The show presupposed that there may be an interest in finding out what goes on ‘behind the scenes’ when an artist creates a work of art. The complicity of the Foundation, which, of course, being at the epicentre of Moore’s creative production, had access to an abundance of such material, meant that the ‘Henry Moore Centre for the Study of Sculpture’ was able to utilise the availability of material that in the case of the majority of well-known artists, was not generally accessible. This is an important consideration within this thesis, as it highlights the way in which Moore and the Foundation’s preservation and commodification of his supplementary works made new approaches to exhibiting and interpreting such material, possible.

The maquettes, plasters, and working models were all far more transportable than the cumbersome full-scale sculptures, and as such the Foundation’s large collection was regularly in demand. The practical properties of works devised as primarily equipmental would therefore become further utilised. David Mitchinson – Moore’s former assistant and a key member of the Foundation – describes one of the problems that can arise from the misuse of their material, saying how: “Often it seemed that anyone who could lay hands on a few prints and a couple of working models considered that he or she had sufficient material to announce an ‘exhibition’.”¹⁹⁴

This exemplifies one of the pivotal issues regarding the complex status of preliminary, preparatory, and supplementary material. There is always the possibility or risk that the distinction between work considered by the artist to be part of their creative process, and work they consider to be the culmination of this process, will be misunderstood and misappropriated either by the organisers of exhibitions, the viewing public, or both. This underlines the responsibility contemporary curators have for ensuring that the context in which particular works have been produced is carefully attended to. At the same time, it shows how such works can be ambiguous enough, and perceived to be of enough artistic value in themselves, to justify placing them on ‘centre stage’ in this way.

Whilst the AGO display and the ‘Henry Moore: Sculpture in the Making’ show both ensured that the original function of the material was clearly indicated (and in fact specifically highlighted), it is possible for an exhibition to go ahead, as Mitchinson says, with only a handful of work that bears the name and the touch of the artist. The artist

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 33.
themselves would not necessarily consider them to be fit for the purpose of being presented in an ambiguous light that potentially implies the works on display are the ‘finished products’. But how relevant is this concern if there is a genuine interest in the ‘products’ of their creative process?

In 1984 one of Moore’s working models, ‘Working Model for Reclining Figure: Angles’ (1975-77) was lent to the Government Art Collection, and consequently put on display in Number 10 Downing Street.¹⁹⁵ This shows the capacity for supplementary material to represent an artist even in one of the most prominent locations in the UK, which raises the question (explored in the remaining chapters) of how far sensitivities towards original intent extend when an apparently ‘lower’ form of work-for-art can be utilised in such a way.

**Preserving the Past and Educating the Present**

Henry Moore died at his home in Perry Green on 31 August 1986. Though The Foundation had already put in a tremendous effort to promote the artist and his work in a way that would meet The Foundation’s mandate of advancing the education of the public, Moore’s death would mark the beginning of a period of even greater promotional intensity. Whilst the production of new material had obviously reached an end, new tasks and challenges would become apparent. Mitchinson refers to the sculpture assistants (of which he was one) taking on a new role as “sculpture conservators” after

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 46.
Moore’s death. Even works on paper were provided with environmentally controlled conditions, underlining their archival importance.

The members of the Foundation would have recognised the public interest in shows such as the one held by the Henry Moore Centre for the Study of Sculpture, which focused on Moore’s working process and inspiration. It is therefore unsurprising that the Foundation would look to increase the publics’ exposure to such works by providing assistance in appropriate proposed shows. In 1991, forty-two small works and four medium-sized works were displayed in seven regional galleries in the UK. David Sylvester writes in the catalogue that accompanied the shows – ‘Henry Moore: Sketch-Models and Working-Models’ - that “the small pieces were often the initial embodiment of an idea in sculptural form and were entirely modelled by the artist without the aid of assistants”.

It is clear from this statement that Sylvester is referring to the initial manifestation of the creative idea and the lack of assistance when producing the work on show, as being positive attributes worth promoting so as to make a case for the material to be considered as having a significant value. Sylvester recognises in the preliminary and preparatory works a value that appears adjacent to the ‘complete’ works. He invites the public to consider this value, with special attention given to conception and materialisation, which is pointedly artist-centric instead of work-centric.

This can be contrasted with the focus of the exhibition put on in 1996 by the Henry Moore Foundation and curated by David Mitchinson; ‘Henry Moore: From the Inside

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196 Ibid, p. 45.
197 Ibid, p. 52.
Out’.\textsuperscript{198} There was also an accompanying book of the same title.\textsuperscript{199} Of all the exhibitions and shows that had focused on his preliminary and preparatory works, this was the largest - the focus being on the plasters, with Mitchinson explaining that: “Outside Toronto they remained far less known than the bronze casts that were made from them. They had seldom been exhibited or commented on in monographs or exhibition catalogues, indeed many that remained at the Foundation had never previously been exhibited.”\textsuperscript{200}

The theme for the show was ‘Ideas for sculptures’ which - like the ‘Henry Moore: Sketch-Models and Working-Models’ shows – saw the organisers and curators attempting to make explicit the formation of the idea, from its first physical appearances, up to its ultimate ‘realisation’. This is tantamount to saying that the drawings, plasters and carvings are all produced during the \textit{formalising} of the idea, and can legitimately be contemplated as manifestations of the idea stage as it literally takes shape on its way (crucially only potentially) to the ‘complete’ piece. To an extent this falls within the application of Heidegger’s notion of causality. The crucial difference here is the emphasis of the idea deriving from the artist, whereas for Heidegger the artist is essentially a vessel (albeit one with a particular talent) through which the concealed is brought out into unconcealment. Such a show emphasises the dominant, conventional view of the artistic process, and can be seen as a further example of the educational deployment of the vast

\textsuperscript{198} Ibid, pp. 61-62.

\textsuperscript{199} \textit{Henry Moore: From the Inside Out}, Claude Allemand-Cosneau, Manfred Fath, David Mitchinson (eds).

reserve of material at the Foundations’ disposal, as the ‘works-of-the-artist’ are given due attention.

Both the exhibition and the accompanying book present the works as stages in the production of the completed works they promise, to which they ultimately defer. Whilst they celebrate the value of the works as containing the ideas and their development on their way to the ‘complete’ sculptures, they nevertheless avoid losing sight of this hierarchy. Indeed the three essays within the book - by Manfred Fath, Claude Allemand-Cosneu and Catherine Ferbos-Nakov, and Ann Hindry – all focus on the centrality of the artist. Whether writing about his overall career (Fath), his relationship to, and impact in France (Allemand-Cosneu and Ferbos-Nakov), or the meaning behind his ideas (Hindry), the value of the plasters and working models is assumed as a given, their place firmly set, allowing the discussion to swiftly move beyond them to issues of ‘greater’ significance.

In addition to the essays, *Henry Moore: from the Inside Out* included plates of all the work of the exhibition, each accompanied by a short commentary from a variety of contributors. Almost invariably these comments would refer to the idea behind the form, with the model capable of easily being substituted for the ‘complete’ work without troubling the consistency of the text. When the maquettes, plasters and working models are addressed directly, it is for the most part in order to discuss the material used, or the technical procedure of working the model up to a more complete state. A clear distinction is therefore upheld that separates the work of art from its equipmental and/or supplementary derivatives, in which the unifying element that dominates is that of the artist as *causa efficiens* – as the individual that is responsible for the work.
In the same year, practical concerns were occupying the members of the Foundation as they continued to develop Perry Green.

The Bourne maquette studio (Figure 5), where Moore had worked until his health deteriorated in 1983, became one of the most significant areas of development. Mitchinson describes the restoration process:

The inside rooms were photographed and each plaster maquette was identified and labelled before Woodward and Cooper removed everything, cleaning and making condition reports as they went along. Once the studio was emptied, unnecessary external windows and doors were blocked, a new interior window was created to make viewing easier and prevent non-essential access, and the spaces were redecorated in their original colours. Then came the task of returning all the contents. Over three hundred little plasters were put back, with slightly more on view as the conservators had found some hidden in boxes and drawers. They were also able to restore a number of fragmented works and reassemble others whose elements had become separated. The found objects were also
cleaned, while others removed over the years for exhibition displays were returned.201

There is an interesting dichotomy at work here. The Foundation goes to great lengths to ‘restore’ the studio, by reverting the colours back to the ones used originally, repairing damaged items, and generally cleaning the material and space. At the same time, The Foundation quite transparently presents the studio as a more polished, public-friendly space, by adjusting or removing particular features, as well as displaying models that for whatever reason had been discarded by the artist in boxes or drawers. In Figure 5, equipment, maquettes, and the contents of the table, are all laid out so as to render them more visible to viewers, suggesting a sense of order that is in sharp contrast to the presentation of Bacon’s relocated studio (discussed in chapter five). The result seems to be caught between being an act of preservation, and being a display of Moore’s work, with the end product having more in common with an idealised museum exhibit. The issue of the preservation or idealisation of an artist’s studio, together with what ramifications this has for considerations of de-mystification and mystification, will be explored in detail in chapter five.

By re-presenting Moore’s studio in the way that they have, the Foundation were able to significantly heighten the availability of original works to the public. This re-presenting of Moore’s studio encourages, at the same time, an evaluation of the studio’s contents as having cultural value, whilst clearly contextualising them as separate or merely adjacent to Moore’s complete works. The proximity of such works-for-art to works-of-art, as produced and explored in the above re-interpretation and application of Heidegger’s

201 Ibid, p. 65.
theory of causality, is hinted at in their continued preservation, whilst concealed within a context that pointedly connects them to a utilitarian function. The maquettes and the studio itself are situated by the Foundation within a biographical and educational frame that dictates how they might be interpreted.

There are a number of potential cultural and critical obstacles that need to be navigated when using the works of artists for educational purposes, and the Foundation approaches these difficulties in a variety of ways. The status of the maquette - whilst promoted as being an important part of the overall project that carries with it the properties of nearness to the original idea, and the greater ‘imprint’ of the artist themselves, remains held at arm’s length when it comes to the authority of the esteemed artwork. Something of the “domestic” nature (and by this I understand a certain informality and approachability) that maquettes are so commonly held to have, is hinted at in an educational project organised by the Foundation, in conjunction with Little Hallingbury School in 2010.

Taking as its basis some of the working practices used by Moore, the project began by asking the pupils to choose an organic object. Each visit to Perry Green would focus on a different area of Moore’s working process; printmaking, textile printing, creating a maquette, observational drawing, and context. The ‘creating a maquette’ workshop involved pressing the found object into a clay mould, then pouring plaster into the mould. A maquette was then made which used the found object in some way.\footnote{www.henry-moore.org/pg/education/past-outreach-projects/hallingbury-school/creating-a-maquette (accessed 18 December 2010).} Whilst from
one point of view this could be said to trivialise the status of maquettes and preliminary works in general, from another viewpoint it also emphasises this often hidden yet dynamic involvement that constitutes several facets of the artistic process itself. It brings it to the fore in a lively manner that sheds light on the individual roles and properties of the supplementary material displayed at Perry Green whilst simultaneously highlighting the fascination with the act of creating that exists from a young age, and which I will argue holds the key to the significance of the displaying of preliminary and preparatory works that is addressed and built up in the remaining case studies.

Conclusion

This brings this chapter back to the earlier discussion of Heidegger’s distinctions between art and equipment on one hand, and on the other his notion of causality that I consider to bridge this gap and provide a framework to bring that which blurs the boundaries between art and equipment into a richer, more detailed consideration in its own right. What I aimed to show earlier in this chapter was the complexity of the different series of causality involved in each stage of the creative process. This included their interconnections, as well as their particular properties in relation to a (then) working artist, Henry Moore. Heidegger downplays the prominence of the artist in the causality of the work of art by distancing himself from the classical understanding of the artist or artisan as causa efficiens. He nevertheless situates the artist as one of the pivotal four causes that interrelate under the rule of a bringing-forth into a revealing of the concealed into the unconcealed, an unconcealment in which art is more purely able to presence itself in its createdness and as such allow the bringing-forth of truth as ἀλήθεια.
Heidegger’s specific concept of art as ἀλήθεια is not of itself pivotal to the present analysis of supplementarity, as this would imply aligning this discussion with a particular and contested philosophy of far-reaching implications. Instead, the methodological approach to analysing supplementary material made possible by this concept becomes an invaluable method of opening up the complex nature of the status of the supplement.

Technology is also defined by Heidegger as being a matter of revealing, and this shared attribute unites both art and equipment in a way that frees preliminary and preparatory works from being specifically considered in terms of either one or the other. This chapter establishes a means of classifying such material, in a way that will be of use to artists and curators alike. It is especially useful in carefully analysing the classification and use made of such material that can be made by the artist themselves, and whilst I do not claim that this analysis can be precisely applied to all practising artists, it provides a template for understanding what defines such supplementary material as ‘supplementary’. The notion of ‘enshrining’ is introduced as a new way of considering the ways in which certain works are derived from previous works, with a particular emphasis given to the transformative effects that bronze castings have on the value and use of maquettes.

The overarching question of this chapter – ‘what is the supplement?’ – remains largely (although not completely) dominated by what is in question, and how it is presented for interpretation. Different categories of supplementarity (preliminary works, preparatory works, biographical material, and educational devices), in effect, form spheres that eclipse one another, depending on where the spotlight shines. When the spotlight is cast on education, the other categories support this focus. When the spotlight is cast on
preliminary works, the other categories illuminate rather than overshadow this consideration. The direction of this spotlight is dictated by hierarchical classifications of works of art and supplementarity that, as addressed in chapter two, are in a state of perpetual historical fluctuation. The supplement is whatever happens to be appropriated or framed as a support for a particular area of focus, but this analysis and application of Heidegger’s concept of causality, as well as the consideration of influences surrounding the interpretation of Moore’s work, serves to highlight how the status of the supplement is one that invites slippage and re-evaluation between notions of supplementarity, rather than being fixed in place. For something to be used as equipment does not mean that it is only to be considered as equipment. This complicates Fer’s notion of the ‘sub-object’ that “remains closer to a thing” by indicating how this use of Heidegger’s notion of causality can determine different qualities of both equipment and work within the same item of consideration. Equally, for something to be considered a work of art does not mean that it cannot itself become supplementary (as explored in chapter five).

As one of the four governed causes, the artist has a share in the control of the work of art. It was shown how Moore’s maquettes functioned as potential complete works that Moore would enter into a reciprocal relationship with (that of a maquette holding a prolonged interest for Moore, and that of a maquette demanding Moore’s interest). In contrast, the next chapter will address the opposite to this relationship by exploring supplementarity in terms of incompleteness, the lack of control or influence over its use, and corresponding issues of legacy and appropriation. Connecting these issues, and furthering the discussion of causal series at different stages of the artistic process explored in this chapter, will be an investigation into the hierarchical classification of art.
Chapter Four: Hierarchy and Control

The key question driving this chapter is - ‘how is the supplement classified?’ – which differs from the previous inquiry into the status of the supplement by addressing historically formed hierarchical classifications of works produced by artists. It is not a question of what the supplement is that is discussed here, but of how it has been defined, and whether such definitions can themselves be questioned. In this chapter I will complement the previous discussion with an exploration of incompleteness and the lack of control, or rather an appropriation of control in which the artist’s influence is diminished. The issue of ‘incompletion’ will be unfolded in order to explore the ways this term can be understood in relation to different stages of the artistic process. This will be in order to understand its possible evaluation and meaning, as well as to shed light on methods of appropriation where a conventionally ‘complete’ work of art is absent.

In order to unpack these notions I will be looking at the work of the Italian architect Antonio Sant’Elia (1888 – 1916) who was associated with the Italian Futurist movement and who was killed in the First World War before any of his ambitious and distinctive architectural ideas could be constructed. Sant’Elia’s reputation is based on a series of highly Modernist architectural drawings and sketches that became associated with the ‘architectural wing’ of the Futurist movement. Sant’Elia did not live long enough to construct any of his designs, but left behind a series of drawings and sketches of varying degrees of execution and quality, many of which continue to feature in publications and exhibitions on Futurism and modernity. I chose to focus on Sant’Elia because of: the significant distinctions between drawn or sketched proposals and the monumental
structures they proposed; the distinctions and relations between the various preliminary and preparatory works themselves; and the particular context and circumstances relating to the artist and his work that illuminate the issue of appropriation.

As with the previous chapter, I address both the philosophical issues relating to the evaluation of the material in question, as well as discussing the ways in which this material has been used (in the past and the present) in order to develop further this exploration of supplementarity. This will be accompanied by an exploration of the possible evaluation of his work, as well as an analysis of hierarchy in supplementary material in general.

The elevated status of Sant’Elia’s works on paper that has resulted from the circumstances of his early death and association with the Futurists means that some key concepts can be derived from a discussion of his practice. In particular, the artistic aspects of the creative process that can be identified in works even when those works were envisioned as part of a (potentially speculative) project. This discussion of Sant’Elia also allows processes of appropriation to come to the fore through the absence of the controlling influence of the artist. This does not mean that the use of Deleuze in this chapter merely illustrates or supports these practice-based concepts; instead, practice and theory provide foils for one another, where the relevance of each for this discussion of supplementarity can be better elucidated. This chapter therefore provides an account of processes of classification and appropriation of use for studies into the formation of art history, and the history of Futurism itself.
Sant’Elia

Sant’Elia’s architectural education tells a story of a fairly unremarkable student in most areas except drawing, where he excelled. Certainly the scarcity of plans or sections in his works would suggest that the technical aspect of architectural design was far less appealing, and came to him less easily than the act of employing his imagination to create potential new structures. There appeared to be a friction between the constraints and pragmatism of structural engineering, and the freedom of creating fanciful and vague ideas for buildings. This is significant in understanding to what extent the drawings and preliminary sketches discussed here were intended to lead to plausible buildings; to what extent he would need to compromise the designs (and the bearing this had on his own ideas); and to what extent the material left behind can legitimately be classified as the preliminary work of an architect. The discussion of Sant’Elia extends the analysis of classification in the previous chapter by explaining the degree to which intention on the part of the artist matters to those displaying and experiencing works. Whilst the discussion on Moore focused primarily on the artist’s involvement in the classification of their works, this chapter makes use of an account of the artist’s background and working process to see to what extent works can be appropriated and ‘re-framed’ in different ways to their intended purpose, and how much this transformative approach might be justified. As such, this aspect of the chapter will be of particular relevance for studies into curating and museum theory.

The associative powers of an artist’s reputation in relation to the totality of their output, is magnified all the more when there is a shortage of existing material. As Foucault
argued: “Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work. The problem is both theoretical and technical. When undertaking the publication of Nietzsche’s works, for example, where should one stop?”

Foucault refers to the most extreme example, whereby a shopping list drawn up by Nietzsche would still ‘technically’ be the product of Nietzsche’s writing, but is clearly of a different type to his philosophical works. What Foucault is alluding to here is a hierarchy of classifying authors and their products. Such a hierarchy can be identified in the ways in which preliminary and preparatory works-for-art have been utilised, or in some cases ignored or poorly defined, giving rise to an ambiguous and confused lack of ordering that figuratively elevates Nietzsche’s shopping list to the same level as Thus Spake Zarathustra. With the work of Sant’Elia, this hierarchy of classification is problematised by the way in which his career came to an end. Foucault’s question does not refer to the importance of authorship on the part of the author themselves, but of the importance given to it by those in a position to put certain material to use. Such appropriation will be discussed at the end of this chapter, and more fully explored in chapter five. For now, it has relevance in revealing what could be called an external aspect of hierarchical ordering that is brought to a thing produced by someone to which the term ‘author’ is applied on some level. When the thing in question shares traits with that which the author is

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203 Foucault, ‘What is an Author?’. In Aesthetics: Volume 2, p. 207.

204 An unanticipated offshoot of the ‘birth of the author’ that took place in the Eighteenth Century, which as discussed in chapter two, arose largely due to market concerns. Foucault’s question of how far the significance of the author should spread to the totality of his output highlights the extent to which the balance had shifted from the particular quality of the product, to an assumed mark of quality of the producer.
reknowned for as an author (a written list and the writer, the rough sketch and the artist), the attribution of significance may become confused. As such, care must be taken in understanding how value and meaning is to be applied or discerned in a particular thing.

Sant’Elia’s early works, such as Temple of Fame’ for the Monza cemetery, from 1912, are not particularly striking or distinguished from similar academic works of this era, however they can provide evidence of learned traits that assist with the interpretation of more celebrated works. The influence of Sant’Elia’s education at the Academy of Brera, where the worms’-eye-view perspective was taught as a form of “romantic evasion”, can be traced in the pictorial rendering of the ambitious projects that would later cement his reputation.205 In this sense, Sant’Elia’s early works have an educational use that outweighs their value as works of art. With his later drawings and sketches forming the cornerstone of his reputation and significance, these earlier works take on a retrospective value. This occurs through their formal resemblance and relationship to the more revered works, and through the reputation of the author (and not of value in and of themselves). This can be demonstrated by referring to the extensive collection of Sant’Elia’s work held at the Musei Civici di Como, consisting of 184 works on paper.206 Of these, the 26 dated (or estimated to date) from before 1912 (the point where Sant’Elia’s innovative style began to appear prominently) have rarely been loaned out for exhibition purposes. Instead, it is the works most recognisably associated with Futurism that are


most in demand.\footnote{207} This indicates a hierarchical ordering of value that has been established between museums and galleries looking to include samples of Sant’Elia’s works. The works that are widely reproduced and circulated in books on Futurism are loaned out the most, followed by works from his dinamismi (which will be discussed shortly). Despite all of the work in the Musei Civici di Como collection sharing the general traits of being original depictions, plans, or details of non-existent buildings produced by the same author, there is a clear divide in the levels of interest shown in loaning them. This is a division centred on period, style, and familiarity that through repetition only serves to reinforce it. The implications of this for the thesis is that it shows how such material, ostensibly capable of being categorised as works-for-art, can themselves be further divided into material that provides an educational support (or supplement) for works that receive greater attention. In order to clarify this issue of hierarchical ordering of Sant’Elia’s creative output, I will now turn to a former colleague and contemporary of Foucault’s – Gilles Deleuze.

As discussed in chapter one, Deleuze, along with Guattari, stated that they did not believe in a system of the fine arts. However, that is not to say that they did not have clear ideas of what would and would not constitute ‘art’. During a lecture in 1987, Deleuze said that: “A work of art has nothing to do with communication. A work of art does not contain the least bit of information.”\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, ‘What is the Creative Act?’, \textit{Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995}, New York: Semiotext(e), 2006, p. 322.} By this, Deleuze did not mean that a work of art might not be appropriated by others who may find ways of rendering it informative in accordance with

\footnote{http://museicivici.comune.como.it/index.php?page=prestiti#2000 (accessed 12/02/2012).}
their own interests or intentions. Instead the work itself as work can never contain information or communication as a function or intended property. Deleuze and Guattari see the work of art as “a being of sensation and nothing else”. As soon as it is said to be informative, or capable of communicating something, it is not the work that is working, but something from outside being brought to it and appropriating it.

It is in this sense that Sant’Elia’s earliest works can be understood. The works themselves, being derivative, are in effect eclipsed by their capacity to provide information about the biographical development of Sant’Elia. A commodity value is produced (in this case, historical and educational value) to make up for the relatively mundane quality of the works as art. As such, and as opposed to Heidegger’s notion of causality, it is the classical causa efficiens that is elevated to a pedestal, whereby the prominence of the artist/author leads to value being attached to the material.

Within the current analysis of a possible hierarchy of Sant’Elia’s work, it is thus designated as properly supplementary material, and therefore apparently of a ‘lower order’ subordinated to the works of art they serve to inform. That is not to say that Deleuze himself would agree to such hierarchical classification. Instead this shows that from a Deleuzian perspective the work of art itself is no longer being encountered, but that only an externally bestowed value (under the primacy of causa efficiens) is being attached to it.

Yet how does this hierarchy of Sant’Elia’s work apply to his finished architectural projects? After all, would it not be appropriate for the measure of an architect’s abilities
to be the quality of the structures he actually made? Of the two surviving structures erected according to Sant’Elia’s designs during his lifetime, the only building is the ‘Villa Elisi’ in Como (1912), which whilst having some mildly distinctive features, is for the most part rather conventional. The other structure, the Caprotti tomb in Monza (1913), whilst hinting at a more inventive approach that would mark Sant’Elia’s revered works on paper, is primarily distinguishable as the only example of a complete piece, where the plans, sections and measurements still exist. This makes the tomb of interest to scholars of Sant’Elia’s work due to the indication of his working method. The ‘Villa Elisi’ is almost an anachronism in the body of work Sant’Elia left behind. Whilst Sant’Elia’s academic drawings and sketches can provide indications of the development of the ideas that would lead to his more revered works, the ‘Villa Elisi’ represents the culmination and realisation of such formalist training.

A reversal of what could be called a traditional hierarchical relationship between preliminary and preparatory works, and the completed or finished works, takes place here. The completed works are of insufficient quantity to constitute the main point of reference in the assessment and evaluation of Sant’Elia’s output. They are also of insufficient quality in relation to his most revered drawings and sketches to stake a claim as being the culmination of the ideas being developed in such ‘unfinished’ works. In contrast to the work of Moore, the references to both of these completed structures represent the lack of control Sant’Elia had over his legacy, whereby early and largely compromised works would be given more attention than he would have ever anticipated. This was due to the significance they would come to have (albeit negatively) as indications of his architectural accomplishments. Classification not only takes place
during or shortly after the creative process, but can also happen retrospectively, transforming otherwise complete works into supporting material; informative footnotes to accounts of an artist’s career.

Figure 6: Antonio Sant’Elia, 'Untitled (Dinamismi series)', 1913. Musei Civici di Como. Image redacted.
The Dinamismi

This section addresses the issue of hierarchical classification through works by Sant’Elia that functioned as lexicographic sketches for potential projects, whilst also becoming the objects of detailed analysis in their own right. The discussion shows how the circumstances surrounding these works influence the level of attention given to them, and consequently affects their interpretation and use.

In the same year that Sant’Elia was commissioned to design the Caprotti tomb, he executed what are now considered to be some of his most startlingly original and inspired works. The collection of drawings known as ‘dinamismi’ are small, minimal and in most cases clearly produced in a short space of time, with the quickness of the pen strokes evident throughout. In Figure 6 it can be seen that instead of elaborate details, and dramatically coloured landscapes, this image consists of large empty spaces of white, enclosed by a few ruler-guided pen strokes that often carry on past the points where they intersect with one another. The swift lines that exceed the edges create the illusion of speed, as if Sant’Elia was rushed and had no time to render the image more precisely. The lines encourage the eye to move quickly, as one glances rather than gazes at the drawings, leading to a sense of dynamism and movement unusual in architectural imagery. Da Costa Meyer notes the influence of Boccioni, and it is fair to consider the dinamismi as Sant’Elia’s first significant steps towards a style in line with the leanings of

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Futurist contemporaries and associated practitioners.\textsuperscript{210} For such a simple and minimal drawing, it manages to contain a wealth of information. This includes evidence of the influence of his peers, the beginning of his exploration of an inventive new cityscape, and the application of a technique that contrasts starkly with the conventional works that preceded them.

Sanford Kwinter, in \textit{Architectures of Time}, dedicates a chapter to evaluating Sant’Elia’s later works in terms of how they represented a changed attitude towards the relationship between art, time, and space. Kwinter’s following observations on the dinamismi highlight how the influence of Futurism, the character of the author, and the expressing of an ethos, can be discerned within a few lines on paper: “One is inevitably struck, when examining Sant’Elia’s sketches, by the extraordinary momentum of the draftsmanship, the obsessively precise freehand style with its swift, simplified yet deliberate lines, at once restrained and expressive, volatile and refined.”\textsuperscript{211} Their “obsessively precise” execution underlines the seriousness of the drawings, and consequently of the artist at the time of making them. Their simplicity belies their importance to Sant’Elia, as instead of half-heartedly indicating a generalised form of an idea, the dinamismi represent a microcosmic stage of ‘completion’ – albeit one situated (at least in theory) at the beginning of a larger project. The strokes in Figure 6 are not just suggestions or outlines for potential works, but capture a style, mindset, and moment of self-expression in a very specific way, utilising this minimal approach to expand the drawing’s capacity to invite speculation, and rendering the drawing an end in its own right. As Kwinter notes, each


drawing consists of a dichotomy of techniques, whereby the level of control deployed allows the bold, overlapping, and generally more expressive lines to become more distinct, whilst avoiding slipping too far into the appearance of a ‘rough’ sketch. It is this conscious blending of accuracy and haste that allows the dynamic qualities in Figure 6 to stand out as intentional, rather than as a result of an ill-disciplined or impatient draughtsman quickly scrawling ideas down on whatever happened to be at hand. The qualitative content of the dinamismi is therefore rendered with a certain level of refinement which, coupled with their historical importance as his first major steps towards the style for which he would be remembered, causes them to occupy a high place in any hierarchical ordering of his works. However, as I will show, it remains in a supporting, supplementary role.

These were not drawings produced with the intention of building them, but were instead exercises in envisioning a new, modern world that fitted in with the ideology of the Futurist movement, and the developments of Modernism in Europe in general. Luciano Caramel and Alberto Longatti emphasise this point, arguing: “Sant’Elia was perfectly aware of the fact that his ideas could not be put into effect. And this implies that these ideas were charged with innovative potential, and were meant to provide all-encompassing answers, in the form of suggestive images, with great emphasis given to psychological and fantastical values.”212 If these drawings were never intended to be developed into finished structures, Petherbridge’s observation on architectural sketches emerging “partly out of an internalised and therefore unconscious identification with

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The discussion of Heidegger’s notion of causality encourages a more subtle approach to the origins of the dinamismi, where they can be interpreted as entirely conscious efforts to create works that are ends in themselves, albeit works that contain within them the potential for further projects.

For the most part, the buildings have no discernible function, though some are clearly intended to depict power stations. The heights of the walls and the large plain areas suggest monumental structures, but minimal and simple ones as well. Though there are several traits that have been carried over from his drawings from the previous year, the style of the dinamismi is altogether more vibrant and energetic. Da Costa Meyer describes the drawings from 1912 as “invertebrate, and one has difficulty imagining the gloomy interiors as other than unlit, shaftlike caves”. Clearly they were not intended as the initial stages of an actual design that would require detailed interiors and an organised inventory of materials. The dinamismi represent the crystallisation of his initial private ideas, where his imagination was able to operate freely without the restrictions of a brief, or with a view to meeting the expectations of an educational institute. There is an apparently clear equipmental function; a polished, worked up series that formed a catalogue of architectural patterns, forms, and gestures that could be incorporated into later projects. Llorenç Bonet acknowledges this purpose of the dinamismi when he observes that there is no attempt or “inclination to define clearly a specific use. What we see instead are fragments, parts, volumes: the aim is to create a formal repertory that

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serves as a basis for a language to build in concrete and steel”. This is emphasised in Figure 6 by the inclusion of a second, smaller depiction in the bottom right of this picture, which causes the smaller and larger depictions to resonate with one another as two captured ideas within the same creative act. The same issue of distinction found in Moore’s *transformation* drawings seems to occur here.

As with Moore’s drawings, the dinamismi are not entirely equipmental, but are produced under the governance of a *causa finalis* that dictates the matter and form, as well as the approach of the artist. However, the *causa formalis*, and the *causa finalis* itself, are both brought forth in the dinamismi in ways that diverge significantly from a purely architectural function, and instead become more pictorially gestural as works in their own right. Whilst Moore’s drawings invariably addressed issues such as shape, material, and lighting that all related specifically to their intended use as preparatory steps towards potential sculptures, the dinamismi consist of techniques that convey monumentality, minimalism, and speed all at once. This occurs through the form of the lines, and an awareness on the part of Sant’Elia that these drawings were not merely functional. They immediately place themselves within the borders of the emerging styles associated with Futurism.

Furthermore, the perspectives used throughout the dinamismi situate the structures within a wider world. They emphasise their implied existence as part of a larger city, rather than being isolated drawings focused entirely upon the outline of the structure, which would reduce them to merely abstract designs. Placing them within a landscape,

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no matter how minimally or simplistically rendered, assists in drawing in the viewer by allowing their imagination to project the works onto a speculative reality. Kwinter situates the use of this technique historically when he observes that Sant’Elia deployed: “the borrowing of a device common to Nineteenth-Century painting, but just beginning to discover new modes of application in the nascent art of cinema: that of allowing the contents of a frame, no matter how spare or ‘innocent,’ to become fraught with whatever occurs or exists beyond it”. 216

Such a simple addition transforms the drawings from realisable design, to the fantastical, as a narrative is implied within which a particular building or structure is but one element. The lack of an indication of use, as highlighted by Bonet, only emphasises further their qualities as images that seemingly allow the imagination to speculate, rather than imposing intended functions and meaning onto the viewer. At stake here is the blurring of the boundaries between art and equipment, and the problems this leads to in relation to classifying the works of artists into one of these categories. This is a matter of concern for both artists and those who utilise the works of artists, because it has implications for how the creative process itself can involve the production of artistically valuable material throughout its different stages, and of how this artistic value is determined and consumed. This leads to a development of my interpretation of Heidegger’s causality by way of Deleuze’s notion of the actualisation of ideas, and the significance this has for understanding completion, incompletion, and apparent hierarchical orderings in the creative process in relation to supplementarity.

216 Kwinter, Architectures of Time, p. 75.
Deleuze, Art, and Sensation

In Deleuze’s philosophy, art, in a way that echoes Heidegger, is that which could be described as bringing forth or expressing that which can only be sensed. However, for Deleuze this occurs by way of what he calls signs (discussed in chapter one). Not all signs are art, but all works of art, or rather art that works, create a sign. For Deleuze, the sign is akin to that which Kant discovers at the limit of the faculty of sensibility (the receptive capacity of the mind), in what Kant calls the sublime (“the sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense”).\(^{217}\) At this limit of the faculty of sensibility, Deleuze locates signs, which as discussed in chapter one, he correlates with Plato’s second form of sensation (the thought-provoking).

The significance of this is that the sign, the experience of which is grounded in sensation, becomes the basis of thought, established as an encounter with Difference itself (which Deleuze also calls (non)-being, or ?-being).\(^{218}\) In Deleuze’s thought, pure Difference underlies the unfolding and actualisation of the world, in opposition to classical thought going back to Plato that grounded all existence in the identical. This was a pre-given unifying identical Being from which difference would only appear as the sub-dividing of the identical (the oneness of Being) into various classifications or categories. In the classical model of thought going back to Plato, Difference would be subordinated to the

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\(^{217}\) Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, p. 98.

\(^{218}\) See Deleuze, *Difference & Repetition*, p. 64. The capitalised ‘Difference’ is a fundamental concept in Deleuze’s thought, but cannot be adequately explained within the limits of this thesis.
identical, resemblance, contradiction (or opposition), and analogy. Instead, Deleuze formulates a philosophy in which Difference is that from which thinking is instigated, rather than merely being a formal division of a pre-given unity. The sign is the encounter with difference (or with a differential relation of differences), and has two characteristics, which Smith describes thus: "The first is that the sign riots the soul, renders it perplexed, as if the encountered sign were the bearer of a problem. The second is something that can only be felt or sensed."\(^{219}\)

The sign as “bearer of a problem” alludes to both Plato’s second form of sensation, and Kant’s encounter with the sublime as a problematic experience (which Kant describes in terms of the mind’s inadequacy and incompetence when trying to understand the experiencing of the sublime). The prominence of the problematic in interpretations of art has correlations with Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness (which will be expanded upon in chapter five), in that it is the puzzlement itself (rather than any attempts at solving the puzzle) that gives it its force. At first, these distinct but similarly ‘problematic’ encounters would seem to be at odds with Heidegger’s notion of ἀλήθεια, however as a temporal unconcealment of truth, ἀλήθεια (the driving force behind Heidegger’s notion of causality) also calls into question the fixity of meaning and reality, only momentarily providing the possibility of encountering a truth that remains closer to a feeling or sense than a clear revelation. In all these concepts there is an encounter that lifts the one encountering ‘out of the everyday’. As such, this discussion of the sign (and of these concepts as they are used throughout this thesis) can be situated within historical

\(^{219}\) Smith, ‘Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality’. In Deleuze: A Critical Reader, p. 32.
concerns with sense-based encounters that have been frequently associated with the experiencing of art. The present discussion is therefore of significance for studies of aesthetics and the relationship between the philosophy of art, art history, and the experience of art.

As something that can only be sensed, the sign is an intensity of sensation that is experienced in a complex relationship between what Deleuze calls the virtual and the actual. The virtual is understood as real but not actual, wherein it is the possible (as a multiplicity of intensities of difference), but is not potentiality (which would already be governed by actual limitations). The virtual is ‘non-thought’, but non-thought in the process of becoming actualised. He describes this movement thus: “We call the determination of the virtual content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into species and distinguished parts differentiation.”

Differentiation could be described as the gathering together and distinguishing of differences or singularities (for example three different pitches of sound) from a virtual plane of multiplicities (for example, white noise in general) that forms a pre-actualised, imminent Idea. The sign is produced through this differentiation as an intensity emerging from the differential relations (for example, a chord). Differentiation on the other hand, is the distinguishing of these differentiated singularities (as intensities) into distinct elements that actualise the idea, where intensities become ordered, organised, and interpreted in consciousness as qualities (for example, musical harmony). Deleuze (in reference to Leibniz) uses the example of the sound of crashing waves to show how

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220 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 207.
sensation can instigate thoughts and experience through a combination of the virtual and actual, by describing such a sound as being both clear and confused. It is clear inasmuch as the sound is perceived all at once, yet it is confused insofar as the singularities of the sounds of each individual droplet of water are not themselves differenciated – that is, grasped and perceived clearly and distinctly in our mind. As Deleuze argues further:

These singularities then condense to determine a threshold of consciousness in relation to our bodies, a threshold of differenciation on the basis of which the little perceptions are actualised, but actualised in an apperception which in turn is only clear and confused; clear because it is distinguished or differenciated, and confused because it is clear.  

Sensation is here not just something experienced, but the condition of experience itself. In opposition to Kant’s view of the encounter with the sublime as that which transcends “every standard of sense”, Deleuze formulates a transcendental differenciation of differences into intensities that as sensations become actualised and constitute the conditions of experience. It is the movement of different/citation that, for Deleuze, actualises the virtual, and precedes identification, opposition, resemblance, and the entire sphere of thought that since Plato had been held to precede difference.

The relevance of this for the present discussion of supplementarity is in Deleuze’s determining of art as that which creates signs, which as the ‘being of the sensible’ is also the condition of experience itself. In this interpretation, each work of art is at one and

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221 Deleuze, *Difference & Repetition*, p. 213.

222 It is not (for Deleuze) a pre-given standard of sense that comes up against something that sense is beyond a capacity to experience, but instead it is in effect out of the unsensible field of the virtual multiplicity of differences that sense forms (becomes actualised) and makes experience possible.
the same time the condition and the being of a form of experience that can only be sensed, whilst what is sensed is necessarily received from the unsensible (the intensity in its pre-actualised condition as a differentiation of difference). The work of art produces a sign that is encountered at the limit of sensibility, a sensation which occurs prior to any possible classification or identification. This echoes Fer’s comments on Hesse’s studio works: “If they are prototypes, it is because they are not archetypes. In other words, they are not universal and timeless, but leave us with a sense of a first encounter with things, the kind of encounter we had before we knew how to make sense of them.”\textsuperscript{223} This observation hints at the extent to which Deleuze’s notion of the sign can provide a renewed significance for works-for-art, where the encounter with the sign can be clearer and less compromised when faced with material that has not been immediately consumed within the historical values and apparatuses of the art system that determine a work as work. Instead, works-for-art can (if the context allows) be more problematic and conducive of the type of pre-classified experiences Deleuze refers to.

The sign is an intensity \textit{before} it has been comprehended and organised in consciousness as a quality. The sign always points to an “imminent Idea or differential field beyond the norms of common sense or recognition.”\textsuperscript{224} Whilst there are many ways of encountering a sign, it is the work of art that creates and maintains the sign as an intensity. This is why, for Deleuze, no work of art can contain information, even if the work may be appropriated and put to use in a system of thought that is governed by identification and

\textsuperscript{223} Fer, \textit{Eva Hesse: Studioworks}, p.188 (my emphasis).

\textsuperscript{224} Smith, ‘Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality’. In \textit{Deleuze: A Critical Reader}, p. 34.
classification. The work of art and its appropriation (as something understood and/or as something that provides information of some kind) are in effect asymmetrical, and must not be confused with being two complementary sides of the same thing. The capacity for a work of art to be ‘measured’ in terms of its ‘effectiveness’ becomes a matter of degrees of *encountering* intensity, of the force of the encountered sign. If the composition of a work is too caught up in efforts to communicate (or indeed presented in a certain way that communicates) elements such as historical information, an adherence to academic standards, a narrative or a representation, the work is diminished and eclipsed by non-artistic considerations.\(^\text{225}\) It may become concealed, or in the case of the most ineffectual attempts at creating works of art, may be unable to bring forth a sign at all.

In this discussion, my aim is to reconcile any apparent discrepancies between art and equipment that were identified in chapter three, whereby the distinction becomes a false one when attempts are made to unite the asymmetrical. Judgements of completion and incompletion fall on the side of identity, wherein identification dominates the perception/recognition of a work (and which gives rise to hierarchical classifications). The work of art, however, is neither complete nor incomplete; its completion contains within itself an incompletion that is precisely the encountered problematic sign. Deleuze aligns the work of art with the ontological question of Being (reawakened by Heidegger), that occupied continental philosophy in the Twentieth Century, in a question that I consider to lie at the heart of Heidegger’s notion of *ἀλήθεια* as the bringing-forth of a truth of Being, manifested and resonating in what Heidegger considers to be great works of art:

\(^\text{225}\) It is important to note that this part of the discussion relates to Deleuze’s writing from the late 1960s, during a period where modern art was widely considered to be increasingly preoccupied with a rejection of traditional concerns with producing representational works.
It must be remembered to what extent modern thought and the renaissance of ontology is based upon the question-problem complex. This complex has ceased to be considered the expression of a provisional and subjective state in the representation of knowledge in order to become the intentionality of Being *par excellence*, the only instance to which, properly speaking, Being answers without the question thereby becoming lost or overtaken. On the contrary, it alone has an opening coextensive with that which must respond to it and can respond to it only by retaining, repeating and continually going over it. This conception of the ontological scope of the question animates works of art as much as philosophical thought. Works are developed around or on the basis of a fracture that they never succeed in filling.\(^{226}\)

This unfilled fracture does not imply a failure of the work, but on the contrary, is the capacity of the work to *be* a work; to bring forth a sign. Alternatively, the work is lost, obscured, eclipsed, or diminished when attempts are made to fill this work (such as its utilisation as information), or indeed when the work is insufficiently composed, and is unable to sustain the fracture/question. Deleuze considers inadequacy to be a definite possibility in the attempt to create or compose a work of art. Deleuze and Guattari state that: “The only law of creation is that the compound must stand up on its own. The artist’s greatest difficulty is to make it *stand up on its own.*”\(^{227}\) If the work must rely on informative properties, or an association with a revered author (through the priority given to the author as a *causa efficiens*), it is no longer purely a matter of sensation. It is a mixed composite of sensation and concepts of what it *represents* instead of what it *presents*. So how would this apply to the dinamismi? Are they capable of standing up on their own?

\(^{226}\) Deleuze, *Difference & Repetition*, p. 195.

\(^{227}\) Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, p. 164 (original emphasis).
It is important to emphasise here the degree to which works of art are influenced by, and are an influence upon, the means of interpretation. Philosophical and historical analysis not only shapes the way in which works of art are evaluated in a particular way, but is also guided by the qualities of works that are less or more appropriate for fitting into a philosophical or historical system of interpretation. The use made here, of philosophical and historically emerging concepts, is therefore one of outlining the problematic nature of supplementarity, rather than rigidly defining it.

The dinamismi seem to balance precariously between the asymmetrical positions of art (as a composite being of sensation) and preliminary material governed by a _causa finalis_ of possible architectural structures. The situation is made more complex due to the absence of completed structures that would in effect provide a conventional hierarchical ordering that would position the dinamismi more clearly as preliminary material.

To approach the dinamismi from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari is to ask whether they are composed as ‘beings of sensation’, “and nothing else” or whether they are mixed compositions in themselves that are incapable of ‘standing up on their own’?228 Again the answer seems unclear. As individual drawings, they appear to lack nothing. The gestures of the lines, the technique highlighted by Kwinter that places them within a fictional setting, and the simplicity of the compositions can all be said to be gathered together in a way that, though it has a resemblance to architecture, is nevertheless quite distinct. These are not blueprints or refined architectural drawings, but appear closer to Sant’Elia’s tendency to utilise the visual language of architecture to create minute,

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228 Ibid.
fictitious landscapes. As such, they are not wholly comparable to the transformation drawings (see Figure 1) produced by Moore in the early stages of his working process. Despite sharing a lexicographic relationship with those drawings, the dinamismi are far more removed from the mechanics of architectural production than Moore’s drawings were from the sculptural process, as indicated by Da Costa Meyer’s description of the dinamismi as “highly romanticised”.229

The form and matter in Moore’s drawings lent themselves more readily to development into three-dimensional pieces due to a minimal number of formal differences (shape, primacy of exteriority), and a greater degree of analogy. With Sant’Elia’s drawings, however, the concerns dominating an architectural work’s causa finalis (and thus permeating the gathering together of the other three causes) would consist of factors such as the variety of material, the function, the scale, the location, and of course its entire interior construction. The transformation drawings would therefore have more in common with an architectural blueprint, as preparatory works – as works preparing for something, and as it were already on the threshold of a project (no matter how vaguely defined). In contrast, the dinamismi are before the threshold (in Latin – limen), and are properly speaking preliminary. The preliminal is designated retrospectively when associated with a project that comes after it. Whilst both preparatory and preliminary works are regularly gathered together and utilised as supplementary material, their distinction should be made clear. The preliminary could be said to take place prior to the conscious preparation of a work of art. The preliminary may well be perfected, refined, and developed into preparatory or ‘complete’ works, but of themselves they are not yet

governed by a *causa finalis* that consists of the practical concerns of a grand project. Instead, they have a *causa finalis* concerned primarily with their own construction (even if this contains within itself the possibility of future development towards another *causa finalis*). It is not yet part of a series as a *causa finalis* among several, but is simply open to becoming part of one. The dinamismi are lexicographic as potential ideas for development (and as such, *externally* utilised – even if used by the same artist), but of themselves they are compositions of sensation that can be called works of art. All that would remain would be to evaluate the degrees to which such works are capable of working as signs. This is an important observation of the thesis, where preliminary works are specifically distinguished from preparatory works through the extent to which each of these modes of working constitute different concerns for the artist. The preliminary work *explores* new ideas, whereas the preparatory work *prepares* new ideas for specific projects intended to lead to completed works of art.

It is precisely here that the absence of completed architectural structures (produced by Sant’Elia in accordance with the style evident in his most recognised drawings and sketches) has a bearing on the evaluation of the dinamismi. The dinamismi do not fill a gap left by the absent structures, but are able to bring forth their sign. Works such as the dinamismi do not lack a composition that allows them to stand up on their own, but the artist is powerless to prevent the dominating effects of established hierarchical conventions that would reduce such works to a supporting role. The absence of the structures does not *reveal* qualities akin to works of art in the dinamismi, but prevents them from being concealed. However, the evaluation of the dinamismi, and their
exposure to hierarchical ordering, would still become complicated by the work that followed.

**The Città Nuova**

This section addresses the stages of ‘completion’ that can apply to supplementary material, where levels of refinement and ‘painterly’ qualities are applied so as to make certain works more ‘exhibition-worthy’. This discussion will show how works that are still ostensibly supporting material move close to the criteria that would apply to completed works of art, whilst showing how the distinction is maintained.

It was around the time of the dinamismi that Sant’Elia began to associate with a social circle of artists and architects who would hold discussions at various cafés, debating the direction of the arts and the current political climate. This circle included, among others, Umberto Boccioni, Luigi Russolo, and Carlo Carrà, who were either part of, or soon to join, the Futurists. Together they began to attend nights at the Famiglia Artistica, which Da Costa Meyer describes as an “anti-establishment association dedicated to the arts, music and literature”.\(^\text{230}\) This association was a major catalyst for the formation of the Futurists, providing the movement with its first opportunities for publicity, as well as some of its most important members.

At this stage Sant’Elia was not part of the Futurist movement, but instead was one of the members of the Famiglia Artistica to found the Nuove Tendenze group. It was as a

member of this group, and not the Futurists, that Sant’Elia would produce and exhibit what remains today his best known works. On 20 May 1914, the first Nuove Tendenze exhibition began. Featuring approximately sixty works by nine contributors (offering a mix of painting, sculpture, embroidery and architectural drawings), it was Sant’Elia’s work that was most prominent, consisting of a quarter of the exhibition’s total content.

The power station drawings were more developed and pictorial versions of his sketches in the dinamismi (see Figure 9). Though the function of the structure is clearer, they nevertheless continue to consist of only partial glimpses of buildings that disappear into ambiguous backgrounds of vanishing horizons and swirling skies. The colours used also hark back to his work from a few years earlier, with fiery reds and oranges casting the structures in a dramatic light (what Caramel and Longatti describe as “an almost fairy tale touch”), emphasised all the more by the scenographic use of the worms’-eye-view perspective.\footnote{Caramel and Longatti, \textit{Antonio Sant’Elia: The Complete Works}, p. 103.}

The power plant drawings represent Sant’Elia at his most pictorial, developing the use of perspective as a dramatic devise. In addition to the use of colour, the employment of perspective as a means of influencing the experience of Sant’Elia’s work also calls into question the extent and definition of ‘charm’ suggested by Kant. Can perspective also be a form of charm used to embellish or support a work? Can the design of a work, emphasised by Kant as its most important quality, also incorporate visual techniques specifically intended to win approval? By creating fictitious worlds in which to place his ideas, his vision could be expressed \textit{almost} unfettered by practical constraints.

In an evaluation of his work that admirably looks to avoid buying into the myth that built around Sant’Elia following his death, Da Costa Meyer asserts that “his vision remained
two-dimensional: when he tried to translate it into a third, it became conventional, if not
down-right banal. In Sant’Elia the painter took over where the architect faltered”. 232

It is perhaps unduly harsh to lambast Sant’Elia’s attempts at producing three-dimensional,
fully realised versions of his work, given his relatively young age. That being said, perhaps
one of the most potentially damning pieces of evidence of his architectural shortcomings
recorded by Da Costa Meyer comes in the shape of the number of internal designs he
produced, with Da Costa Meyer noting that “of the three hundred or so drawings
currently attributed to Sant’Elia, only about ten show plans, and only three show
interiors”. 233 This certainly supports Da Costa Meyer’s assertion that Sant’Elia was more
concerned with the general impression given by facades of undefined function, rather
than spending time applying himself to what could be called the more practical side of an
architect’s profession. However, this also suggests that Sant’Elia (and consequently, his
works of this period), had more in common with the creative practice of artists, than with
the practical concerns of architecture. The significance of this is in understanding how
the status, classification, and interpretation of works can be heavily influenced by the
position adopted by the interpreter.


Figure 7: Antonio Sant’Elia, ‘Airplane and railroad station, with cable cars and elevators on three street levels’, 1914. Musei Civici di Como. This work is in the public domain.

Figure 8: Antonio Sant’Elia, ‘Station for trains and airplanes’, 1914. Musei Civici di Como. Image redacted.
The centrepiece of Sant’Elia’s contribution to the exhibition was a collection of works gathered together under the collective title of *Città Nuova*. Executed precisely using ruler and compass, the series of pictures represented the peak of Sant’Elia’s efforts to arrive at a new style of architecture that freed itself from the constraints of historicism, and suggested a new type of city that would befit a modern Italy. Figure 7 shows how the accuracy of the perspective had improved, as had the overall quality of the draftsmanship. The scale of sketches such as Figure 7 also increased, as Sant’Elia grew in confidence and was keen to highlight the monumentality of his vision of the future. The standard size of the vast majority of his works were A5 or smaller, whereas his most developed works for the *Città Nuova* were closer to A1 – underlying the conscious hierarchical ordering of prominence and importance.

Far less stylised than the power station drawings (see Figure 9), the work constituting the *Città Nuova* such as Figure 7, did away with colour altogether. The perspectives were also far more varied; including angles from above and to the side, which resulted in a more comprehensive and plausible suggestion of reality. The trace of the visual language mapped out in his dinamismi is apparent in the works, however whilst the power station drawings saw Sant’Elia developing the pictorial qualities of that series of sketches, in the *Città Nuova* he focused on developing an apparently accurate rendering of his architectural ideas. These works were full of innovative solutions to issues of space, transport circulation, public access and light. The use of monumentality, emphasised by placing them within an imaginary setting, was again included. These works (which would go on to form the mainstay of his posthumous reputation) were ultimately a more refined and formal depiction of what were still, in essence, fanciful works of the imagination. The
neatness of lines in Figure 7, and the attention to detail in showing the interweaving elements that would make up a vibrant new imagining of a future urban landscape, belied the problems of realisation as dictated by the accessibility of resources, the scale of the workforce required, or indeed in the majority of cases, any indication of utility. Furthermore, the structures were depicted within general, non-specific locations, rather than alongside existing natural or man-made features. This further characterised them as idealistic imaginings, rather than as proposed solutions or alternatives to existing architectural concerns.

That Sant’Elia spent more time on the work in the Città Nuova than on any previous project, is evident from the number of preparatory drawings that accompanied most of the displayed sketches, as in Figure 8. The inclusion of preparatory drawings in this context helped to support the notion that Sant’Elia was proposing a serious project that could potentially be realised. The results were considered a great success. As Da Costa Meyer says, whilst “the public had been used to futurist art for some time – and would therefore not be shocked by the tamer variety produced by Nuove Tendenze – futurist architecture was new and unprecedented”. Though there were other architects around at the same time working on similar ideas (including Mario Chiattone, who exhibited alongside Sant’Elia in the Nuove Tendenze exhibition), none of them were able to produce the combination of originality and dramatic monumental imagery that captured the imagination in the way Sant’Elia’s did. His stylistic preference for rendering his designs in settings that highlighted such implied grandness of scale meant

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235 Ibid.
that works that could be as small as 75mm x 112mm would be able to imbibe the viewers with a sense of epic ambition. The triumph of this impressive plan for a new urban landscape inevitably invited the attentions of Marinetti, who was happy to bring Sant’Elia into the fold of his Futurists as he looked to add a visionary architect to his armoury.

The Nuove Tendenze exhibition highlights in a particular way, the slippages that can appear between hierarchical definitions of support-work and complete-work. With preparatory works of varying degrees of execution displayed alongside highly stylised and romanticised depictions of ambitious potential architectural projects, the different stages of completion, support, preparation, and artistic merit become blurred and confused. The ‘complete’ large-scale Città Nuova drawings are executed with precision and in great detail, marking a culminating point of Sant’Elia’s works on paper. Figure 7 has the appearance of a professional piece of architectural drawing, with great care taken to depict the perspective and intricacies of the depicted structure. However, Figure 8, in addition to being far smaller, is hand-drawn, heavily worked, and expressive in its use of curved and bold lines that come together to produce a more artistic and stylistic vision. Yet at the same time their comparison with the dinamismi is not a straightforward distinction between undeveloped and more refined works. Instead, the Città Nuova drawings diverge from the dinamismi in two ways that confuse the relationship between them.
Figure 9: Antonio Sant'Elia, 'Power Station', 1914. Musei Civici di Como. This work is in the public domain.
On one hand, the *Città Nuova* works, along with the coloured power station works such as Figure 9, advance the pictorial qualities through more detailed settings, and various techniques to create more imaginary scenes of fictitious structures. In this respect they go further than the dinamismi in seeing the artist “taking over” from the architect. Figure 9 uses a fiery combination of red, yellow, and orange to create a dramatic ‘scene’, illuminated by its contrast to the white and lilac background. The use of green to depict the smoke and clouds gives this work a striking visual effect which, instead of being merely ornamental (as Kant might claim), constitutes a significant part of its aesthetic impact. Figure 9 represents Sant’Elia at his most artistic, producing an imaginative and unusual image, rather than purely using drawing as a method of conveying information about potential structural design.

On the other hand, these works go further in the direction of functional depictions of realistic compositions. In effect, the *causa finalis* is here more restraining than that of the dinamismi, governing the works by drawing them towards a more rigorous architectural end product. The more architecturally consistent the works, the less capable they are of standing up on their own (insofar as they might be considered to be works of art), and the more compromised their composition of sensations become. Instead of the work of art as a ‘being of sensation’ (as Deleuze understood), the *Città Nuova* works are heavily balanced towards an informational function as formal proposals for potential building projects. Unlike the dinamismi, and the coloured power station works (which themselves are divided up into degrees of architectural accuracy and fantastical pictorial works), the *Città Nuova* works more readily affirm or bring forth their equipmental function. This refers back to Deleuze’s claim that art contains no information whatsoever, where
whenever information becomes a consideration, the sensation of experiencing art becomes nullified. The importance of this discussion is in the way in which it draws attention to the slippages and problems that are encountered when applying conventional hierarchical classifications to different stages of work that involve a wide range of specific concerns and forms of expression.

There are clear visual distinctions between Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9, which are accompanied by distinct visual impressions or effects. In Figure 6, the importance of drawing as a direct means of expression and reflection of the artist’s thoughts (as asserted by Petherbridge) is paramount. Whilst Figure 6 can be interpreted as a source of information about Sant’Elia’s technical approach, it is also a creative work that has a distinct quality that combines a minimalist approach, and expressive use of lines to convey speed, and the suggestion of monumentality. Figure 7 is predominantly equipmental, utilising Sant’Elia’s architectural education to produce a refined and accurate depiction of what is nevertheless still a highly original and ambitious project. Architectural techniques are used to lead the viewer towards an interpretation of the work as being a functional and considered project, rather than fanciful speculation (the implications of Sant’Elia’s death, which curtailed any possible developments of such projects, is discussed in the last section of this chapter). Figure 8 produces a very different visual effect to Figure 7, due to the heightened sense of expression. At the same time, the level of detail in this preliminary work, and its use in the Città Nuova exhibition, emphasises its potential interpretation as a bridge between inventive expression, and architectural accuracy. Such architectural accuracy is largely abandoned in Figure 9, with Sant’Elia’s artistic and
imaginative skills being employed to create a dream-like ‘vision’ or suggestion of the future, rather than a methodical plan to shape it.

At all these stages, different aspects of Sant’Elia’s creative approach are identifiable and capable of being considered as individual works with their own unique qualities, as much as being various forms of supporting material. Reducing such disparate works to conventional model/copy interpretations in which some are regarded as ‘higher’ or of more importance than others, is to gloss over their subtle and distinctive properties. I now develop this challenge to the restrictive nature of the model/copy dynamic that has dominated Western classifications of works-for-art, through a discussion of Deleuze’s re-interpretation of Plato’s concept of the simulacrum.

Hierarchy and the Simulacrum

As seen in chapter two, the classical view of creativity and those who create, as found in the writings of Plato, was largely disparaging. Yet despite art’s eventual emergence and distancing from Plato’s damning verdict, another of Plato’s notions – the distinction between models, copies, and simulacra - continues to dominate Western thinking in ways that significantly affect approaches to, and interpretations of, works of art. Generally speaking, the Platonic understanding of models, copies, and simulacra, is one of identity, resemblance, and falsity, and applies to all aspects of thought (such as morality, politics, and art). There is an original (the Idea) that serves as a model or ground, and which is ideal and universal. Ideal adherence to the model shares its identity (e.g. justice is just; virtue is virtuous), and as such they are the same. In relation to the model or ground is
that which claims a resemblance to its identity. Though it will never be identical to the
model (being only particular, and not universal), the claimant (or an image) may be
considered to be similar (in varying degrees of accord), and as such it is a copy. The copy
is a representation of the identity of the Idea, a secondary or imperfect copy of the
perfect primacy of the model. For Plato, another type of claimant exists that may attain a
semblance of resemblance to the model, but which does so only falsely. Such a claimant
is the simulacrum, which despite having the appearance of a copy, is in fact lacking in any
internal resemblance to it. Deleuze summarises this by saying that: “Each well-grounded
image or claim is still second in itself in relation to the foundation. It is in this sense that
Ideas inaugurate or ground the world of representation. As for the rebellious images
which lack resemblance, these are eliminated, rejected, and denounced as ungrounded,
false claimants.”

It is this grounding of representation in relation to identity that permeates many
approaches to art (by artists themselves, and by those who make use of it in some way).
It has a particular significance for supplementarity when considering the hierarchical
ordering of certain material produced in the creative process. A completed work may
become, from the perspective of museums and galleries, a model of sorts against which
preliminary and preparatory works are compared and ordered in degrees of apparent
similarity. In this sense, the value of preliminary and preparatory works emerges out of
their capacity to resemble the completed works, with galleries and museums often going
to great lengths to find ways of connecting preliminary or preparatory material to
‘masterpieces’.

Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 272.
The model-copy distinction can be illustrated in reference to Heidegger and Schopenhauer's analyses of painting. Such a process applied to Heidegger's theory of causality still *appears* to be consistent, wherein that which is brought-forth into unconcealment serves as the model towards which the stages of preparation in the artistic process are derived from (as copies), and which make their claim for resemblance through gradual refinement.\(^{237}\) Each stage is then considered to be an imperfect image (or claimant) assessed in accordance with its resemblance to the overarching and instigating model. Such an assessment would necessarily happen *retrospectively* when the model is already given in such a way as to make the assessments of claims possible.

Conversely, the Schopenhauerian approach occurs at the other extreme, whereby the Idea (in a more apparent accordance with Plato) is essentially unreachable, and can only be represented/copied. In both the Heideggerian and Schopenhauerian approaches, the Idea instigates the creative process. However, whilst in the Heideggerian formula it is a force that assists in pulling the creative process towards the emergence of Άληθεία, in the Schopenhauerian approach, as in the Platonic approach, the Idea is represented in an increasingly removed process where “the inspiration cannot last until the painting is complete”.\(^{238}\) This is why Schopenhauer considers the initial stages of a painting to have primacy over the subsequent stages of refinement. For him, refinement is not a matter of edging closer to the Idea, but of moving away from it in ways that make it more palatable

\(^{237}\) Though properly speaking, the Heideggerian notion of great art in the ‘final’ stage (if considered in terms of refined stages) would necessarily *escape* representation in order to become the bringing-forth of presence. The similarities of this break with representation to Deleuze’s understanding of art will be shown shortly.

\(^{238}\) Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, p. 408.
to the representational expectations of the time. In the Schopenhauerian approach, the creative process moves from a close resemblance to the Idea, towards simulacra that in some way retain the image of the Idea, but none of its content (or at best become vaguely similar copies of the Idea).

Deleuze, however, looks to elevate simulacra to a level that exposes what he considers to be the false primacy of identity from which difference (and therefore resemblances, similarities, or false semblances) occur, in favour of an originary difference from which identity, resemblance, similitude, and semblance are falsely derived. Such an interpretation would transform the hierarchical relationship between preliminary, preparatory, and completed works. The differences in each stage would be elevated to levels wherein the singular differences of every form of work produced at each stage would no longer be considered in terms of its accordance with an overarching model or Idea, but would instead be apprehended in its own right. Deleuze argues the case for the two positions of simulacra:

Let us consider the two formulas: ‘Only that which resembles differs’, and ‘only differences can resemble each other’. These are two distinct readings of the world: One invites us to think difference from the standpoint of a previous similitude or identity; whereas the other invites us to think similitude and even identity as the product of a deep disparity. The first reading precisely defines the world of copies or representations; it posits the world as icon. The second,

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239 Simulacra in the sense meant by Deleuze should be clearly distinguished from the more negative formulation of simulacra described by another French contemporary of his, Jean Baudrillard. In Baudrillard’s philosophy, simulacra are the products of the increase in representation and reproduction that prevents the experiencing of the ‘real’, and which leads to a simulation of reality devoid of real meaning. For Deleuze, simulacra, understood in themselves, are confrontations with a persisting illusory image of reality based on identity and resemblance, rather than that which forms and perpetuates the illusion. See Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994 [1981].
contrary to the first, defines the world of simulacra; it posits the world itself as phantasm.\textsuperscript{240}

Differences of resemblance here fall under the accordance of a candidate or image to an unobtainable Idea or model. The Platonic formula asserts that the only differences to be found in the world are those that distinguish degrees of resemblance in relation to the primacy of the Idea or model, where identity is determined by an approximation to a model. In this mode of thought the preliminary or preparatory work, whether understood as \textit{working towards} an instigating bringing-forth, or conversely, \textit{as deriving from} an inspirational idea, is still understood in terms of an accordance of resemblance. Sant’Elia’s creative output (as well as Moore’s sketched ideas for sculpture, and maquettes) would therefore be understood as supplementarity, supplementing his efforts to reach the model that (whether progressively or regressively) situates them as hierarchically defined copies. The significance of this is in providing a framework within which the dominant historical perspectives concerning models and copies can be shown to influence the hierarchical classification and distinction between ‘complete’ works and their supporting material.

Alternatively, where the only resemblance is between differences themselves (where differences resemble each other through being related as differences), it is disparity itself from which analogy and resemblance are falsely derived. This occurs via efforts to attribute shared \textit{qualities} that accord with an assumed model of identity that establishes resemblances and proximal similarities. As has been seen, such qualities only appear in actualised experience as part of an ordering of consciousness that effectively \textit{makes sense}

\textsuperscript{240} Deleuze, \textit{The Logic of Sense}, pp. 261-262.
out of unsensible intensities existing in a pre-actualised (or un-differenciated) state in a virtual plane of multiplicities. In short, simulacra in Deleuze’s interpretation would no longer be bound to a resemblance falsely attributed to differences as understood in terms of various qualities that resemble or differ from one another only by degrees of similarity or dissimilarity in relation to given identities or models. Instead, they would be encountered in terms of difference itself.

The preparatory sketch exhibited alongside a refined and well executed drawing as part of Sant’Elia’s *Città Nuova* ‘project’ (such as Figures 7 and 8), would no longer be considered as merely an initial stage in a hierarchical order of adherence to a model against which it would be measured and compared. Instead, it could be interpreted as an event in itself, where its *Causa finalis* is unshackled from any subservient connection to an order of similitude to that which it may be brought towards, or derived from. It would be apprehended in itself as that which is brought forth through its own necessity, under its own particular conditions and actualised virtualities. This is what Deleuze is referring to when he says that “the non-hierarchised work is a condensation of coexistences and a simultaneity of events”.241 Each stage in the artistic process would be no longer governed by an end or an originary inspiration, but would itself become something potentially capable of producing signs to be encountered. Each stage would be able to be experienced as a new difference that appears through its own combination of differences, where an *effect* is produced that is quite distinct from other works that appear under their own conditions.

241 Ibid.
Smith describes the Deleuzian understanding of art by saying that “rather than functioning as their totalising or unifying principle, the work of art can only be understood as the effect of the multiplicity of the disconnected parts”. The so-called preliminary or preparatory sketch produces a sign that is from a certain perspective less intense or effective than an established ‘complete’ piece – or in the case of Sant’Elia – a more refined and presented drawing or sketch (that utilises traits such as size, precision, colourisation, and/or pictorial composition). However, this does not mean that it should immediately be considered as subordinated to it through orders of resemblance. Instead, the effect of the produced sign should be encountered in itself, by raising the preliminary or preparatory work beyond its assigned status as a supporting piece or a mere copy that precedes or derives from that which it is said to represent. It then becomes a simulacrum that affirms its internal lack of resemblance to any such model in order to come forth and be experienced in itself. Its particular mode of existence within an apparent hierarchical ordering of works becomes a dynamic (rather than subservient) force that affirms a singularity that is unconcealed (instead of subsumed or obscured) through its very relation to such a hierarchy, where: “By simulacrum we should not understand a simple imitation but rather the act by which the very idea of a model or privileged position is challenged and overturned.”


243 This issue of difference and similarity between model and copy is applicable in the use of highly accurate renderings of Paul Klee’s puppets, that have been used to protect the originals whilst becoming available for display. See Christine Hopfengart, ‘Hybrid Creatures – Klee’s Hand Puppets Between Art and Kasperl Theatre’, Paul Klee Hand Puppets, Hatje Cantz, Ostfildern, 2006, pp. 8-32.

244 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 69.
The internal dissimilarity in the conditions of that which might be taken, under the governance of representation, (whether applied by the artist themselves, or externally) to be a claimant looking to claim a resemblance to an Idea or model that comes before or after its production, becomes instead a difference in kind that allows it to break free from its grounding in a hierarchical order. When a plate was discovered hidden beneath the ink version of one of Sant’Elia’s *Città Nuova* pieces, its own particular qualities could be emphasised, despite having originally had a supporting function that resulted in it being concealed from the public.²⁴⁵ Similarly, a drawing of Sant’Elia’s, found to have been executed on the back of a shopping list is not deemed, in this notion of simulacra, to be of lesser value in relation to works produced on traditional supporting material. Instead it can be considered to have its own unique qualities, ones which, I might add, poetically and literally bring together the two sides of the problem of the oeuvre described by Foucault earlier.²⁴₆

By employing Deleuze’s concept of the simulacrum as a difference to be encountered in itself, the hierarchical ordering of preliminary and preparatory works breaks down in favour of a series of differences, each produced through the composition of distinct components under individual conditions. The problem of completion or incompletion in relation to theoretically unrealised architectural projects becomes a matter of externally annexed consideration in relation to the appropriation of the various works under a hierarchical model that remains governed by identification and similitude (the Platonic model-copy relationship). Here, on the other hand, each ‘stage’ of the series becomes a

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²⁴₆ Ibid, p. 264.
series of interconnecting signs, albeit of varying intensities that are ‘sensed’ by viewers or spectators that are themselves more or less receptive to receiving and/or interpreting these signs. These signs are able to resonate with one another through differences of differences, rather than through comparisons of adherence to an apparent overarching model or Idea.

Heidegger’s understanding of *Causa finalis* is effectively raised to the level of that which brings forth an unconcealed truth (as ἀλήθεια) in each so-called stage of the artistic process, whilst breaking away from a dominant bringing-forth that would limit and bind them to a subordinated unified progression towards itself. Even the clockmaker’s prototype, though not a being of sensation due to its practical function, would come forth as a unique simulacrum that differs internally from the finished clock. The Schopenhauerian hierarchy would also be dissolved, whereby each apparent deviation from the inspiring Idea would appear as a difference in itself. It would no longer be understood in terms of a determined order, but instead would see the inspiring Idea incorporated as a part of various compositions, each appearing under uniquely determined conditions. This illustrates how Deleuze’s notion of the simulacrum ‘repositions’ works-of-art and works-for-art in a way that calls into question historical debates concerning hierarchies of form. In contrast, where the stages of hierarchical ordering are instead elevated to that of Deleuzian simulacra:

No series enjoys a privilege over others; none possess the identity of a model, none the resemblance of a copy. None is either opposed or analogous to another. Each is constituted by differences, and communicates with the others through
differences of differences. Crowned anarchies are substituted for hierarchies of representation.\textsuperscript{247}

Supplementarity becomes only a nominal and artificial term in relation to what are called preliminary and preparatory works, yet such works have been (and continue to be) appropriated in accordance with a hierarchical series since Sant’Elia’s death in 1916. The final section of this chapter will address the uses made of such works.

**The Appropriation of the Supplementary**

This section addresses the issues of appropriation and commodification that, in contrast to the highly controlled uses of Moore’s output, capitalised on Sant’Elia’s work in ways that re-framed its significance through a systematic process of myth-building. This section is importance for the thesis because it highlights a variety of forms of supplementarity in which the artist has no control. This serves to distinguish forms of supplementarity such as works-for-art (that as discussed above, may be re-assessed in relation to works-for-art), from other forms of supplementarity that enforce or challenge historical classifications of works for specific purposes.

In June 1914, Sant’Elia joined the Italian Army. Just over two years later, in October 1916, he was shot and killed whilst taking part in the Battles of the Isonzo; he was twenty eight. What followed in the years after Sant’Elia’s death was a systematic process of glorification and distortion of his character, his intentions and his achievements. During his lifetime, Sant’Elia had already begun to slow his production of works - especially ones

\textsuperscript{247} Deleuze, *Difference & Repetition*, p. 278.
that conformed to the Futurist ethos – and was potentially moving further away from the Futurist movement, both politically and socially. In death, he could be celebrated as a great martyr of their cause, a puppet figure above which Marinetti pulled the strings.\(^\text{248}\)

Marinetti was well known for his skill and willingness to use a wide range of techniques to promote both himself and the Futurist movement he led. As Cinzia Sartini Blum explains:

In order to ‘sell’ the futurist program of aesthetic renovation and national reawakening, he assimilated the persuasive systems of political propaganda and industrial advertisements: inflammatory and hyperbolic rhetoric, signposting, the distribution of leaflets, and a massive use of the media for promotional purposes.\(^\text{249}\)

Even in Sant’Elia’s lifetime, the Manifesto of Futurist architecture, widely considered to be written by Sant’Elia (and certainly there were large sections where he was unquestionably the author), was re-worded (most likely by Marinetti himself) so as to utilise rhetoric more in keeping with the aggressive, confrontational style of other Futurist literature.\(^\text{250}\) With Sant’Elia dead, the path was clear to exaggerate the significance of his work, his death and his political views. The fact that he was with the Socialist Party mattered little to Marinetti and his associates, nor did it concern them that none of his work had been made during Sant’Elia’s time with the Futurist movement. His last words, “men, tonight we shall sleep either in Trieste or in paradise with the heroes” became famous as a speech of patriotic bravery, despite none of the witnesses to his final

\(^{248}\) Sant’Elia’s later works, perhaps idiosyncratically, saw him return to more conventional themes such as churches, whilst employing more traditional architectural styles within his drawings.


moments recalling any such utterance.\textsuperscript{251} In October 1921, following the request of the local authorities, his body was returned to his home city of Como, only for the ceremony to be hijacked by the Fascists as an opportunity to reinforce the idea of his martyrdom in the name of the nation, with a militia squadron even being named after him. The Futurists were also present, with Russolo delivering an impassioned speech, no doubt extolling Sant’Elia’s dedication to his country, and to the right-wing leanings of the Fascists.\textsuperscript{252}

It was the start of an increased drive to see Sant’Elia inexorably associated with the Fascist Party, with streets and squares being named after him in the region of Lombardy, as if to highlight the reward of posterity for those who serve their country. The painter, Mario Bazzi, made a picture called ‘The Death of Sant’Elia’ which cast the architect in a romanticised setting, surrounded by the mournful and adoring troops that he had commanded. Marinetti and his fellow Futurists were desperately trying to impress upon Mussolini that their movement could take the responsibility of a new state-approved art, and Sant’Elia became their unwitting posthumous standard-bearer. The Futurists wrote article after article extolling him as the inventor of modern architecture, a claim that wildly exaggerated the extent of his influence. Some even went as far as to speak of ‘Santelian’ architecture, as if the handful of drawings and sketches amounted to the foundation of an epoch that cast its shadow over all that followed.\textsuperscript{253}

\textsuperscript{251} Ibid, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{252} Ibid, p. 191.

\textsuperscript{253} Caramel and Longatti, \textit{Antonio Sant’Elia: The Complete Works}, p. 60.
In 1933, Sant’Elia’s work featured prominently in the Fifth Triennale in Milan.\textsuperscript{254} The Triennale had become established as an important showcase of contemporary modern design, and had previously included works from the Dessau Bauhaus, and furniture made by Van Der Rohe. The Triennale was considered to be a major show of international significance, with the emphasis primarily on new works in the field of design. Yet not only was Sant’Elia’s work selected a full twenty-three years after his death, it would also receive its own dedicated exhibition within the show, with the drawings and sketches provided their own room. This year saw an increase in activity by the Futurists devoted to sustaining and extending the ‘legend’ of Sant’Elia. Marinetti and Mario Del Bello produced a booklet entitled \textit{Breviaries of Martyrs and Heroes}, which spoke in pious terms about the sacredness of Sant’Elia’s work, primarily as a beacon that lit the way for architects such as Le Corbusier.\textsuperscript{255} This year also saw the authors praising the significance of Sant’Elia’s manifesto, which, almost certainly having been heavily edited by Marinetti, amounted to him promoting much of his own views from behind the mask of his fallen associate.

Marinetti and the Futurists were masters of self-promotion, and from 1930 they had produced several magazines that included articles glorifying their work, their ideology and their suitability for being the official state art. Their primary architectural magazine, \textit{Futurismo}, changed its name in 1933 to \textit{Sant’Elia}, possibly to capitalise on the recent exposure that his work had received within the respected setting of the Triennale.\textsuperscript{256} In


\textsuperscript{255} Ibid, p. 197.

\textsuperscript{256} Ibid, p. 198.
the publications, they attempted to start the ‘Movimento Italiano Sant’Elia’ claiming Sant’Elia to be the originator of Fascist architecture, and called upon people to continue his projects, or at least to carry out their own under this umbrella title.

That the name ‘Sant’Elia’ had become little more than a byword for modern Fascist architecture can be clearly seen by the Sant’Elia magazine’s efforts to permeate the very means of production used in construction. The magazine advertised, among others, ‘Sant’Elia stones and marbles’, ‘Sant’Elia ceramics’ and the more general ‘Sant’Elia Materials’.257 This allowed companies to associate their product with a name that stood for nationalistic modernity, whilst at the same time allowing the Futurists to reinforce their presence, even if only loosely in name, with contemporary building projects. ‘Brand Sant’Elia’ represented the culmination point that had been driving the Futurist efforts of preserving and embellishing the myth. Caramel and Longatti acknowledge Marinetti’s manipulation of Sant’Elia’s work and reputation, stating that: “Marinetti’s interpretation of Sant’Elia’s work was neither confused nor over-ambitious, rather it obeyed the logic of an appropriation strategy, all to the advantage of the reproposal and redefinition of all the futurist theories.”258

Three years earlier, the Futurists had organised the largest show ever held of Sant’Elia’s work. The ‘Onoranze a Sant’Elia’ took place in Sant’Elia’s hometown of Como, and was held under the patronage of no less a figure than Mussolini himself. By that stage, the fabricated link between Sant’Elia and fascism had been set in stone, with typical patriotic
and hyperbolic speeches from Marinetti taking place in front of a gathering of many of the most prominent Fascist Party members of the day. It was at this event that Marinetti suggested that one of Sant’Elia’s designs be chosen to be constructed as a First World War memorial. At that time, Como did not have one to commemorate the dead, so the suggestion was greeted with enthusiasm by the local authorities, and was soon commissioned.  

Marinetti and fellow Futurist Enrico Prampolini selected a sketch from 1914 as the basis for the project. The building depicted has much in common with some of the architectural traits that emerged when executing the dinamismi, as the main, monumental structure emerges from the steps and angled walls that flank its sides. It is impossible to know what function Sant’Elia envisioned for this building, as he rarely gave titles to his work, or supplied any interior plans. If anything, the drawing’s ambiguity lent itself more easily to the task of being made into a monument, as taking the sketch on form alone, the one characteristic that stands out is its implied monumentality. Marinetti was insistent that this would be a Futurist project from start to finish, and had Prampolini design the plans for the monument. Prampolini, a painter and scenographer, had little difficulty in rendering Sant’Elia’s rather flat sketch into a sharper, more rounded drawing; however he was inexperienced when it came to the more formal requirements of interior plans and dimensions. Marinetti reluctantly handed the project over to the architect Giuseppe Terragni. Commenting on the finished result (see Figure 10), Da Costa Meyer remarks that “needless to say, it bears hardly any resemblance to Sant’Elia’s work of any period, or even to Terragni’s, and is more expressive of the elegant taste of Milan’s

Whilst the finished monument inevitably involved a compromise between the original sketch and the realised structure, I would disagree that it hardly bears any resemblance to Sant’Elia’s work. Seeing the monument, it immediately brings to mind Sant’Elia’s idiosyncrasies and unique style. That Prampolini and Terragni removed the side windows and other additional details only goes to make the monument more reminiscent of the simple forms of the dinamismi, and is unquestionably the best indication of what Sant’Elia’s more experimental and ambitious work, transferred from idea into corporeality, might have looked like. This discussion of the Como War memorial recalls the problematic nature of Rodin’s ‘The Gates of Hell’ as argued by Krauss, where multiple authors can be discerned. Unlike that example, the Como War memorial is not claimed to be a work by Sant’Elia, which changes how it can be interpreted, whilst remaining a work that complicates the identification of authorship that at the same time calls into question the degrees to which a work might be classified as a supplement or an extension of an artist's ideas.

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260 Ibid, p. 201.
Figure 10: Giuseppi Terragni, 'Monument to the Fallen', 1933. Como, Italy.

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The Como war memorial represents an important and curious quasi-annex to Sant’Elia’s work. By this I mean that in a body of work as sparse as his, and with no significant structures of his own completed, the war memorial has by default become the solitary standing structure that comes closest to embodying Sant’Elia’s more progressive visions. As such, it warrants inclusion in any analysis of Sant’Elia’s drawings and sketches (having been developed from one such sketch), but must at the same time be distinguished from his body of work. Here the curious nature of the Como war memorial should be apparent, whereby the one ‘completed’ work that could potentially serve as the representative that provides shape and potential reality to his preliminary and preparatory works, is not his. Neither is it entirely Prampolini’s or Terragni’s. Instead it is a chimerical work of architecture in which their primary influence, and the instigator of the overall form, was no longer alive in order to contribute to the final outcome. The memorial both preserves and distorts the memory of Sant’Elia by offering an imperfect, compromised, and idealised version of one of his sketches; one that allowed one of his ideas to at least in part come to fruition, but at the price of receiving many stylistic additions that prevent the monument from even only outwardly providing a relatively faithful rendering of his intentions (if indeed he ever intended to build it). The Como war memorial can be understood within a traditional hierarchical ordering in terms of a Platonic simulacrum that bears a resemblance to Sant’Elia’s work, but inevitably lacks any internal correlation to it. On the other hand, if it were to be understood as a Deleuzian simulacrum it becomes something unique in itself, where Marinetti, Prampolini, Terragni, and Sant’Elia all have some share in the produced construction, with none (including Sant’Elia) taking precedence over the other.
In all these cases of appropriation it should be remembered that the work exhibited, reproduced, or referred to as the ground of Sant’Elia’s reputation (however much exaggerated) was, and remains, understood as preliminary or preparatory (in the conventional sense of the words). The works were made to serve the notion of Sant’Elia as a ‘visionary’ cut-down whilst defending his country, and thus unable to see his grand ideas reach fruition in erected structures. The suggested or proposed structures depicted in the drawings and sketches become ‘virtually’ complete works to which the preliminary and preparatory works serve as supplementary material – albeit as supporting works that become ‘elevated’ in status (in reference to a conventional hierarchical ordering) precisely due to the ‘unrealised’ status of the completed works. In short, the ‘un realised’ works became the ‘object’ (albeit an imaginary one) of appropriation that in turn raised the status of the preliminary and preparatory works to that of clues or indicators in a way that they never would have, had the structures been successfully built (or indeed, if their practical limitations had been exposed as unrealistic for whatever reasons). Through the mechanisms of their appropriation, these works stand in for the unrealised structures (and thus reach a greater significance), whilst at the same time that which they stand in for ensures that they remain categorised as supplementary material of a lower hierarchical order. As such, they do not obtain the elevated level of simulacra that can be appreciated in themselves, in accordance with Deleuze’s view. They therefore become unconventional works within a conventional hierarchical ordering, where a perceived overarching causa finalis (the completed structures) dictates their apparent functional role. At the same time, the causa efficiens claimed by Heidegger to be falsely attributed

to the artist, is employed in its classical sense as a way of nevertheless attaching significance to these works as bearing the trace of the hand of the artist (and therefore standing in as *evidence* of his genius).

The use that Marinetti and his colleagues made of these works therefore elevates them to a higher status than would usually be afforded to what would be conventionally recognised as preliminary and preparatory works. However, it is not an elevation that (as with Deleuze) would allow these works to break free from any supposed subordinated relationship to a model. This appropriation is politically motivated (the focusing upon a potentially progressive and modernised Italy as alluded to in the works).

By including Sant’Elia’s works in prominent exhibitions several years after Sant’Elia’s death, the value of the works changes considerably from that of material indicating ambitious potential projects, to that of *historically* valuable works. These works would have a marked increase in their auratic quality (the term coined by Benjamin to refer to the importance of the hand or trace of the artist, as discussed in chapter one), where they are no longer purely speculative, but become presented as artefacts and signposts of a lost visionary.

On the other hand, the auratic importance of the actual drawings and sketches was countered by a variety of techniques that in effect *supplemented* and developed the *myth* of Sant’Elia as a visionary. The ‘Movimento Italiano Sant’Elia’, the booklet ‘Breviaries of Martyrs and Heroes’, and the renaming of the Futurist architecture magazine to *Sant’Elia*, all became forms of supporting and perpetuating the supposed importance of Sant’Elia’s
later works (of which the only physical evidence was the collection of drawings and sketches he left behind). This in turn served to heighten the significance of these drawings and sketches, as that around which such glorification could take place (via the attributed significance of that which they alluded to). Furthermore, the use of technological reproduction made it possible to widely distribute images of selected drawings and sketches by Sant’Elia under the banner of Futurism. This served to utilise these works in a way that was simultaneously both supplementary, and by elevating them to a higher hierarchical level of significance as visual promotions of Sant’Elia’s work.262 These reproductions in books, newspapers, and articles, influenced their public reception by presenting them on the same scale and medium as reproductions of historically considered ‘complete’ works. This highlights the important role of technology in shaping the way works are perceived, engaged with, and consumed.

To this extent, it can be seen that Adorno’s concerns regarding the appropriation of technological reproducibility were justified when considered from the point of view of Fascist manipulation. Sant’Elia’s name, his vision (as depicted by his drawings and sketches), and even his fabricated last words were made to serve a political cause that Sant’Elia, in death, had no control over. In this respect the use made of Sant’Elia’s work is at the opposite end of the scale to the highly controlled use of Henry Moore’s own preliminary and preparatory works.

262 Reproductions of some of Sant’Elia’s works accompanied each version of the manifesto, being “always the same ones, time and again”. Caramel and Longatti, Antonio Sant’Elia: The Complete Works, p. 62.
At the same time the technological reproduction of Sant’Elia’s work can also be seen to have transcended (at least to a large extent) its political appropriation over the course of time. The fanfare surrounding Sant’Elia’s life and work propagated by the Futurists inevitably died down following World War Two and the end of Mussolini’s reign. However, Da Costa Meyer points to the influential architectural critic Reyner Banham as having played a key role in continuing, at least in part, the perpetuation of the myth of Sant’Elia’s contribution to modern architecture. Da Costa Meyer shows how Banham, writing in 1955, traces the lineage of modern architectural design back to Sant’Elia, praising the originality of his ideas and dismissing the absence of plans or sections by saying how “the evidence of Sant’Elia’s abilities has, I suspect, simply been lost in the inevitable attrition of time.”²⁶³

Thus the over emphasised importance of his contribution to modern design, as purposefully carried out by the Futurists, found its rhetoric picked up by Banham at face-value, and broadcast on an international level. As discussed in chapter two, MoMA played a pivotal role in establishing a new notion of modern art, and exaggerating the importance of historical artistic movements around or recently before its creation. As such, the historical significance of Futurism became crystallised. The results of this crystallisation were to be (and continue to be) numerous studies and books dedicated to the movement, and included in the reproduced imagery remain to this day reproductions of those of Sant’Elia’s works that relate most evidently to Futurism. Such is the shadow cast by Futurism over Sant’Elia that a small number of his drawings and sketches (usually taken from the dinamismi or Città Nuova works) are regularly included in publications on

Futurism (despite these works being produced before he became a member), whereas the number of English language books dedicated to Sant’Elia himself can be counted on one hand. Though not a household name, Sant’Elia retains a mythical status composed of echoes of Futurist propaganda, and the romanticised notion of a genius killed in battle before being able to bring his visions to fruition. As Paul Goldberger wrote in a 1986 review of the ‘New York Times’ of the show ‘Antonio Sant’Elia: Drawings’ his: “name has the power of legend among architectural students” and goes on to describe him as “a prophet...an artist-architect who issued a clarion call to the glories of modernism, who wanted to proclaim the potential of Twentieth-Century technology to remake the world”. The show in question was the first retrospective to be seen in America, going to six museums in total (including the Yale Art Gallery), and such a review highlights how the myth of Sant’Elia had been well and truly set, and as such tended to lead the way in place of the technical or creative properties of the work.

The use of digital archiving should also be acknowledged here. Rather than being utilised to promote the availability and engagement with Sant’Elia’s works, digital technology has been used by the Musei Civici di Como as a reference point for constructing a database of Sant’Elia’s works for the purpose of organising future displays. This suggests that digital technology as a form of supplementarity often remains in an entirely supportive role that is geared towards the promotion of original works.

This section draws attention to the importance of forms of supplementarity that appropriate an artist’s life and work in a particular way, in order to establish or

perpetuate the ways in which such work might be interpreted. It is therefore of importance for considerations of the implications that embellishments and distortions of an artist’s output can have for how their work is classified, and therefore received.

Conclusion

This chapter addresses the question – ‘how is the supplement classified?’ – through a careful study of two aspects of Sant’Elia’s works on paper: the classification of works-for-art, where the possibility of a more complex interpretation of the artist’s output is argued; and the classification of such works that is shaped and influenced by specific forms of supplementarity that are applied by ‘outside’ forces.

This chapter further highlights the problematic status of the supplement explored in chapter three, whilst extending this study into the different forces at play in classifying what is conventionally defined as supplementary material. The question of the classification of the supplement is shown to be framed by philosophical, historical, and (in this case) political approaches that come to bear on the work. Hierarchy emerges as both a problematic and dominant influence upon the classification of the supplement. Historically established modes of situating preliminary and preparatory material in a lesser relation to complete works of art, is identified as a significant factor in interpreting the ways in which such material is both interpreted and utilised. This historical position is also challenged by Deleuze’s theories of the ‘sign’ and his re-interpretation of Plato’s concept of simulacra, which brings into question an approach to the prominence of identity that has dominated Western attitudes towards the hierarchical distinction.
between model and copy. Deleuze’s conception of art as ‘sign’ suggests the possibility of works produced by an artist to be engaged with in terms of the sensual experiences they induce, rather than attributing value to their status in comparison to other forms of art. Deleuze’s interpretation of the simulacrum, which emphasising differences over ordered similarities, provides theoretical support to the claim of this thesis that works-for-art are more complex and deserving of greater consideration than is predominantly the case today. This provides a new framework within which supplementary material that falls into the category of ‘work-for-art’ can be re-considered, where the historically hierarchical distinction between model and copy is called into question. This is explored through a careful consideration of examples representing different types of Sant’Elia’s works on paper (dinamismi, preparatory sketches, architectural drawings, and fantastical depictions) that are each shown to have distinctive qualities that do not correlate with conventional hierarchical classification. Causality (identified in chapter two as an important focus of this thesis) is expanded upon to emphasise the significant role that the creative process itself has for an understanding of why the supplement can and should be re-considered.

This chapter also makes use of the distinctive conditions influencing the use made of Sant’Elia’s creative output, to highlight the forms of supplementarity that can be applied to (rather than identified in) an artist’s work. This is important for emphasising the implications of the different categories and applications of supplementarity. Myth-building, carried out under a wide range of approaches explored in detail in the final section of this chapter, are shown to be exercised under specific conditions, whilst having significant implications for how an artist’s output is categorised and received. In
particular, the ways in which specific works are elevated in importance above others, the extent to which contingent factors influence how works may be displayed, archived, or lost, and the way in which aspects of works may be eclipsed by other qualities due to how they have been historically promoted or discussed. In this respect the chapter is of value for both revealing and understanding the ramifications of appropriation and commodification of available material in a way that is only apparent when viewed from a position where the retrospective analysis (such as the re-consideration of a Modernist artist’s work) becomes possible at a later date. The implications for the philosophy of technology are considerable, as stages in the creative process are shown to go beyond a simple equipmental use, and become capable or being interpreted as concentrated results of creative invention.

The unique circumstances surrounding Sant’Elia’s work makes him invaluable as the subject of a case study within this present discussion, as both the conditions of his working process, and the exploitation of his output after his death, bring to the fore considerations that are pivotal for an analysis of how the supplement is classified.
Chapter Five: Biographical Material, Aura and Enigmaticalness

This chapter is concerned with the importance of the supplement. Why, in what way, and to whom is the supplement important? In the previous chapters, the status and classification of the supplement have been explored by addressing the different forms of supplementarity – preliminary works, preparatory works, biographical material, and educational devices – revealing their specific differences, and the slippages of meaning between them. I have also shown how these slippages are dictated by different ways in which such forms of supplementarity are brought together, emphasised, or pushed into the background. The uses of supplementary material not only change the ways in which such material is interpreted, but also influences the works of art they may be made to support.

The question of why the supplement can be argued to be important could therefore be claimed to be dependent upon context. For example, preliminary works become important for scholars of artists’ techniques, whereas historians of artists may place greater significance upon biographical material. Equally, curators may see the importance of both preliminary works and biographical material in providing an opportunity to present works of art in a new way that might appeal to the public. However, whilst all these claims may be held to have validity, in this chapter I argue that supplementary material can itself emerge as culturally important, due to the emphasis it gives to the creative process, and the effects of this shift in emphasis on the experience, study, and practice of art.
The main focus of this chapter will be the former studio of the painter Francis Bacon (1909-1992), which was removed from its original location in Kensington in 1998, and reconstructed in the Hugh Lane Municipal Gallery of Modern Art in Dublin. Through a careful consideration of Benjamin’s notion of aura, and Adorno’s concept of enigmativeness, I argue that Bacon’s relocated studio illuminates the cultural importance of supplementary material.

7 Reece Mews

Bacon had lived and worked at 7 Reece Mews in Kensington for thirty-one years. Due to Bacon’s apparently chaotic working process, the studio space became filled with various books, photographs, newspaper clippings, and abandoned canvases, as well as an accumulation of materials such as brushes and paint. Following Bacon’s death, the studio was left largely untouched. The heir to Bacon’s possessions, John Edwards, made the decision that the studio and its contents should be preserved for posterity. It soon became apparent that the location of the studio did not lend itself to receiving a steady stream of visitors, with little room for more than a couple of people to enter at any one time. With its steep and narrow staircase, and cluttered studio space, 7 Reece Mews could not have been more unsuitable for public access. Furthermore, these restrictions would inevitably put the preservation of the contents at risk. From a pragmatic point of view, the studio needed to be relocated if it was to reach a wider audience. Having tried unsuccessfully to win the support of London’s Tate Gallery, Edwards eventually reached an agreement with The Hugh Lane Gallery in Dublin (in the country where Bacon was
born). The first items arrived in September 1998, and on the 23 May 2001 the reconstructed South Kensington art studio was finally opened to the public.

The reconstructed studio itself is made up of much (though as will be discussed, not all) of the studio content (consisting of over 7,000 individual items), as well as the walls. The studio is effectively boxed in, with a window providing a single viewing or observation point. Located outside this room, the original stairs from Reece Mews have been placed beneath a Perspex cover. Three other spaces are dedicated to Bacon; a micro-gallery, an exhibition room, and an audio-visual room. During the reconstruction process, each individual item in the studio was photographed, documented, and digitally added to a database considered to be the most comprehensive of its kind. Importantly, this digital database is not made publicly available online. Despite its thorough documentation of the studio’s contents, the database’s primary function is that of facilitating the potential use of the contents in future exhibitions. Instead of providing virtual access to the contents of Bacon’s studio that could ‘take the place’ of the experience of the original works, digital technology is used to share information about objects that may be deemed worthy of display. This shows the extent to which ‘the original’ is still being prioritised over the copy.

Studios and former places of residence have been preserved in different ways, and to varying degrees, such as the attempts to recreate a faithful version of Delacroix’s last


266 Ibid, p. 19.
home and studio. Another example is Edvard Munch’s studio in Oslo that has been utilised not as a fixed museum, but as a place for contemporary artists to produce projects inspired by Munch’s work. There are numerous factors behind such preservations. The work may be left to the State (as in the case of Brancusi’s atelier), or saved by the efforts of others who recognise or imagine a need to protect a site they consider to be of cultural relevance (as with the former homes of Delacroix and Rembrandt). Bacon himself attached little sentimental value to the fate of his studio, having encouraged Edwards to renovate the home they shared together instead of keeping it as a shrine.

Whether bequeathed or ‘rescued’, the act of preserving the spaces of celebrated figures (something that is not limited to the art world, as can be seen in places such as the Freud Museum in London, and the Franz Kafka Museum in Prague) is an important modern phenomenon. Pierre Bourdieu, writing in 1993, highlights the relative peculiarity of the practice of celebrating the lives of artists, where: “There are in fact very few other areas in which the glorification of ‘great individuals’, unique creators irreducible to any condition or conditioning, is more common or uncontroversial.” Both Bourdieu, and Howard S. Becker in Art Worlds, developed sociological interpretations of the creative industries in which a multitude of factors are found to be at play in establishing and

maintaining the reputations of individual artists. Bourdieu shows how the reputation of artists is never truly fixed, but must constantly be re-established in order to withstand new developments that threaten to usurp established tastes and styles, saying that: “The literary or artistic field is a field of forces, but it is also a field of struggles tending to transform or conserve this field of forces.”

The project to reconstruct and preserve Bacon’s Kensington studio must, at least in part, be understood in this context. Painting as a serious art form was by the 1990s in decline, with the most successful artists working in media such as video art, or installations. Multi-media had become established as a norm of contemporary practice, whereas painting was increasingly considered to be an exhausted and dated medium. The possibility of preserving the studio within a museum setting would provide some form of protection for Bacon’s legacy by placing it within a context that, as Benjamin would say of the work of art, ‘arrests’ time. By housing and emphasising the auratic quality of a work, or in this case, a studio, the museum effectively insulates and preserves Bacon’s legacy. The intended permanence of the display provides longevity to the preservation of his reputation. This act of preservation implies a cultural significance for that which is being preserved. This implication in turn underlines the value of his paintings, as the products of an artist whose studio is capable of warranting preservation.

271 Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production, p. 30 (original emphasis).
Figure 11: Francis Bacon's reconstructed studio, Dublin City Gallery The Hugh Lane, Dublin, Ireland. This photo of Dublin City Gallery The Hugh Lane is courtesy of TripAdvisor.

www.tripadvisor.ie/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g186605-d187624-i124021230-Dublin_City_Gallery_The_Hugh_Lane-Dublin_County_Dublin.html#119670866
The relocation of Bacon’s studio (Figure 11) is a matter of *display as displacement*. ‘Display’ is derived from the French word ‘despleier’, which in turn is derived from the Latin ‘plicare’, which means to fold (more literally, to fold inwards), with the assigned prefix, ‘dis’, making ‘displicare’ – to unfold – or to fold apart. It lends itself to this current discussion through the connotations of a display bringing forth through a process of unconcealing and demystification, rather than statically existing in mere objectivity. To display is to place something within a context where what is displayed is encouraged to appear, and to be seen. The studio or residence, when conserved in its original location, is not so much a matter of display, but of *inviting*, of providing an opportunity to come and see what already came to exist without any concern for future audiences. By agreeing to assist in the relocation of Bacon’s studio, the museum or gallery would be actively choosing to display the studio, to make the claim that what was to be displayed would be *worthy* of display. This is an important point as it highlights the way in which the relocation of Bacon’s studio re-presents it in a very specific way that can be distinguished from the conservation of studios or houses in their original location. What remains, what is lost, and what is transformed in this re-location, opens up Bacon’s studio to a detailed analysis of the cultural importance of supplementarity.

To display the contents of an artist’s studio is inevitably to become involved in the issue of aura. In 1992, Bourriaud stated that: “Sacredness is making a comeback, here, there and everywhere. In a muddled way we are hoping for the return of the tradition of aura.” Yet whilst he may have been referring to the new ways in which the ‘sacredness’ of works of art were manifesting themselves through a greater emphasis on

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the importance of audience participation as the event of art, it at the same time implies that aura had never disappeared. Instead it was continuing as a force to be contended with, and ready to reappear in (then) new developments in art.

To display the contents of an artist’s studio asserts that the contents already have a value that makes them worthy of display. This value is derived from their association with a particular artist. An act of commodification takes place, where the studio as display produces value that extends to, and supports the artist’s work, which itself gave value to the studio. The displayed studio is the extreme form of the emphasis of biographical content in assessing the cultural value of an artist and their work. At the same time it represents a crossover of apparently distinct fields, wherein human history and art history meet. Christopher Whitehead explains this conventional distinction: “In general, art museums tend not to collect and display historical artistic material, or the personal effects of human remains of artists and others, such as patrons, who operated within the artistic field at a given time.”

In an email conversation with Whitehead, I asked him whether cases such as Bacon’s displayed studio might suggest that over time traditional distinctions between art, archaeology, and art history could become problematic. Whitehead replied:

273. The prevailing ideals of major galleries and museums (as discussed in chapter two) before, during, and after the 1990s show how the notion of aura remained a consideration, even if a negative one at times.

‘Elevating’ biographical objects ‘to the level of display’ complicates the prescribed focus of the art museum (i.e. the ‘artwork’), but it could be seen to work within well-worn art historical/aesthetic discourses of the artist as a special, often visionary, individual. It is notable that when artists’ possessions are displayed the artists in question tend to be consecrated, to use Bourdieu, and perhaps there is some kind of fascination (which such displays encourage) with their possessions as relics, or objects that have been touched by and used for greatness. This is also surely the hinted possibility of connection between contemporary visitors and long-dead individuals, whose overwhelming cultural and historical significance (as people whose creations transcend historical and cultural specificity and reflect an a temporal human condition) can be humanised through a display of tools they used, the letters they wrote or the spaces they inhabited.275

This possibility of ‘humanising’ historical figures who have been presented as culturally significant or somehow ‘special’, highlights a contradictory double movement that appears in the act of displaying Bacon’s studio. It is one that formed the object of much consideration and concern for both Adorno and Benjamin, in which the viewer is both drawn closer to the human behind a work, whilst at the same time distanced all the more by this ‘drawing near’. Occupying the division between the two is aura.

Aura

On one hand, the displayed studio seems dominated by aura, of its deep association not only with that of the absent figure of the artist, but of the quasi-mystical sense of creativity itself. On the other hand, it seemingly demystifies the studio by drawing attention to the everydayness of much of its contents, and providing information about techniques and inspiration relating to Bacon’s work. The displayed studio and its contents could be described as both a mystifying and demystifying scene of creativity itself. In my interview with Barbara Dawson, the Director of the Hugh Lane Gallery who

275 Christopher Whitehead, Email to the author, 14 June 2013.
oversaw the project of relocating Bacon’s studio, she spoke of the studio as Bacon’s “engine room”, emphasising its pivotal role in fostering the production of his works.²⁷⁶

Brian O’Doherty further emphasises the auratic quality of the studio in its intertwined relationship with Bacon and his works:

Now preserved in Dublin’s Hugh Lane Gallery, Bacon’s studio carries such a whiff of presence that you can hallucinate the large, restless, reputedly dangerous animal inside as you peer through the door and window. What happens to this room when it is frozen in museum time? How does it illuminate Bacon’s art? It becomes emblematic, circulating a low-grade energy among artist, persona, studio, and work, enough to sustain the myth it begot.²⁷⁷

In this respect the studio brings forth its auratic quality, and further mythologises the artist as *causa efficiens* by extending the creative process beyond matter, form, and intention. It does this by incorporating the array of additional material gathered together by the artist in his efforts to create works. It is a matter of distances. Bacon’s displayed studio brings to light the intricately interwoven issues of the maintenance and loss of aura that concerned Adorno and Benjamin in different ways. In the five or six decades since their main texts on this subject, it is apparent that the auratic, and conversely the loss of aura, continues to be problematic. When Caygill, in reference to this debate, says that “it was the development of the technology of reproduction which enabled the category of the authentic to emerge and lend authority to the original work” it could also be added that a certain ‘clamour’ for aura appeared within the field of cultural production.²⁷⁸ With the decline of aura in the ever-increasing flow of reproducible imagery (which in the

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²⁷⁶ Barbara Dawson, *Interview with the author*. Dublin, Republic of Ireland, 27 April 2011.


digital age of instantly uploadable video and still imagery has been pushed to an extreme), the idea of the original takes on a new significance as a rare and valuable quality, contrasting vividly against a backdrop of disposable, and therefore ephemeral, material. The inessentiality of reproducible imagery gives a renewed meaning to the essential – to essence. Benjamin appears to suggest a supplementary role for aura itself, in relation to the essence of a thing, when he says that “the ornament is much more the distinguishing characteristic of authentic aura, an ornamental envelopment in which the thing or essence lies secure as if sunken in a case”.²⁷⁹ Benjamin’s use of the word ‘ornament’ brings to mind its use by Kant (which Benjamin was no doubt aware of), concerning that which affects the experience of a work of art, whilst not being intrinsic to it. In a hypothetical hierarchy of the auratic, a preserved studio endowed with the trace of the artist, and wrapped up in a biographical value that extends to the totality of the studio’s contents, becomes the rarest, and (from a certain perspective) the most profoundly auratic artistic material. On the surface, such material appears to resist reproduction. As Benjamin says: “Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be.”²⁸⁰ Whilst the displayed studio is not a work of art in any conventional sense, it both embodies and emits presence through its biographical content. At the same time, it makes a claim for the authority of the author, whose creative essence lies ‘enveloped’ in an aura as ornament.

The prominence of the artist is asserted over any reproductions of Bacon’s work that might threaten to dissolve this authority in the temporal usefulness of imagery. Here aura and reproduced imagery enter into a reciprocal relationship. In the digital age, Bacon’s works are accessible at the press of a few keys – available as screensavers on phones, or to be printed out at home. The multiplicity of imagery expands the reach of Bacon’s reputation, reducing the distance to the surface content (if not the size, texture, weight, and place) of his works. At the same time, the more this non-auratic use of Bacon’s work expands, the more the peculiar characteristic of aura increases in the original works. Bacon’s displayed studio intricately supplements both the original works and the reproductions by becoming, as it were, the hub of the auratic. In this sense, it continues to be an “engine room” that anchors the authority of the artist in a time and place both despite and because of a displacement that allows it to be displayed.281

The studio itself is not entirely impervious to reproducibility either. In 1985, Bacon was the subject of a South Bank Show documentary that featured interviews with Bacon inside the studio at 7 Reece Mews, and is now freely accessible in its entirety on YouTube. In 1993, the biography The Gilded Gutter Life of Francis Bacon was released and included a colourful reference to Bacon’s studio as being a “magical cave of old paintbrushes, easels and canvases, newspapers, and copies of Paris Match, all be-spattered with paint” as well as a photo of Bacon in (as the accompanying caption describes) his “famous, chaotic studio”.282 In 1998, John Maybury directed Love is the Devil: Study for a Portrait

281 Heidegger’s hut in Todtnauberg endures as a structure still used by his descendents, however it is clear that displacing it and reconstructing it in a museum setting would be to make a statement, to assign value and offer an invitation to view it.

of Francis Bacon, in which a superficially faithful representation of the studio features prominently, characterising the real studio and projecting a semi-fictitious narrative upon/within it. Also in 1998, the photographer Perry Ogden was invited to take a series of photographs of the interior of 7 Reece Mews, including areas that were not eventually relocated, such as the bedroom and kitchen. These photographs were released in 2001 in the book 7 Reece Mews: Francis Bacon’s Studio. In each case, imagery of the studio (whether literary, documentary, fictitious, or photographic) is reproduced. By the time the displayed studio opened in 2001 it had already been reproduced in various forms in ways that both familiarised and mythologised it. As David J. Getsy remarks: “the studio itself has become Bacon’s most recognisable image”. Far from dissolving or usurping the auratic content of the displayed studio, these cases of reproduction emphasise the distance between the studio and its various forms of reproductions. At the same time they assert the call for reproducibility by revealing it to be of a value worthy of reproducibility in various forms. Benjamin, speaking of the cult image, explains that: “True to its nature, it remains distant, however close it may be.”

By being displaced, and displayed, Bacon’s studio is placed at a distance. The properly equipmental value (in the sense Heidegger understood) of paint brushes, newspapers, a dirty sink, and jars of paint thinner are, by being displaced, removed from their

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'readiness-to-hand' and unconcealed in their 'presence-at-hand'. Their ‘use-value’ is reduced and closed off within a distancing carried out by the act of displaying, which at the same time cloaks the studio contents in the aura of the artist, where a radiator is no longer a mere piece of equipment for heating a room, but becomes incorporated into the world of the artist. What is present is the very presence of the past that preserves the past only in order to say that “that world is no longer”. The content, as that which brings forth the ‘pastness’ of this past world, constitutes an irretrievable and unapproachable distance, which heightens its auratic presence the further that world appears to be. Understood only in consideration of the artist and ‘pastness’ of the creative act, supplementarity would always represent death. Yet at the same time such evocations of past worlds fold the past and the present together. Barbara Dawson alludes to this sense of the past made present when recounting her first glimpse of the studio in Kensington, saying that: “When I put my head round the door I felt as if I had stepped into a time-tunnel.”

This notion of aura depends upon the classical understanding of the artist as the causa efficiens. Buren perpetuates this interpretation of the artist as all-important, and romanticises the significance of the place of creativity when criticising the reconstruction of Bacon’s studio: “it was the reality of the work, it’s ‘truth’, its relationship to its creator

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287 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 99.
290 Cappock, Francis Bacon’s Studio, p. 15.
and place of creation, that was irretrievably lost in this transfer.” 291 Without the prominence of the artist in a causal consideration of the work of art, the studio and its contents appear to lose their auratic value from the point of view of its relevance as that which supplements works of art. Dawson underlines this issue when she says of the studio contents that “essentially it’s just rubbish” and that its cultural significance is something applied to it, in accordance with certain prevailing attitudes operating within the field of cultural production. 292 Becker would call it a world populated by a series of ‘art worlds’ consisting of “people doing things”. 293 Heidegger, Adorno, and Deleuze would not apply the same level of significance to the studio and its contents. Heidegger’s anti-humanist approach meant that he was not at all concerned with individual artists, but with the unconcealment of Being that happens to appear through art. Adorno “wanted to know what the cultural objects were saying despite their creators’ intent”. 294 Deleuze’s philosophy of Difference meant that he was concerned with pre-individual ‘assemblages’ of multiple forms and forces that shape creators as much as creative acts, rather than finding value in materials based on a hierarchical ordering dominated by the identity of the artist. These different positions, both curatorial and philosophical, highlight how interpretations of the studio can be framed by both the priorities of their respective projects, and properties of the studio that emerge as areas of consideration.


292 Dawson, Interview with the author.

293 Becker, Art Worlds, p. 379.

294 Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectics, p. 78.
The perceived auratic quality of the studio encourages a use for it within a gallery setting. It is the possibility of a window onto the (past) ‘mysterious’ world of the artist, described by Getsy as “ultimately voyeuristic and somewhat exploitative entertainment”. The notion of a window onto another world is literally enforced by making the small window attached to the reconstructed studio the single means of viewing its contents. The window underlines the distance between the viewer and the studio, heightening the sense of voyeuristically looking in to a secret, private realm (not unlike Duchamp’s Étant donnés). It is the value given to the biographical connotations of the studio and its contents that first produces its auratic quality and provides it with an apparent cultural significance. This section therefore highlights how aura is produced through the assertion of value given to particular objects, by institutions or individuals, whereby the historical connotations of such objects both bridges a gap, and emphasises a distance. This is important for the thesis due to how it shows that the presentation of material can foreground their qualities in ways that insist upon interpreting their associative (and therefore supplementary) value, at the expense of other qualities. I now discuss how such a presentation can in fact inadvertently lead to another interpretation of supplementary material that transforms its cultural value.

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Enigmaticalness

Theodor Adorno, in a very different way to Benjamin, is sensitive to the effects of aura as it appeared in relation to works of art, ‘fixed’ within the artificial context of museum settings. He echoes the general sentiments of Heidegger (who speaks of the work’s transformation into ‘object-value’) in his criticism of the losses inflicted upon works of art once they are incorporated within museum settings, saying that: “Museums and mausoleums are connected by more than phonetic association. Museums are like the family sepulchres of works of art.”\(^{296}\) However, he also recognised that such a setting produced a new way of evaluating works, whereby museums have “transformed works of art into the hieroglyphs of history and brought them a new content while the old one shrivelled up”.\(^{297}\) This ‘hieroglyphic’ quality of works of art signified for Adorno their essential ‘enigmaticalness’, as enigmas that work as works through their ‘enigmatic’ nature. Despite this, the works change within the museum setting into hieroglyphs of history, where they become the enigmas of the past. For Adorno, this is not meant in a wholly negative sense, but reveals how even within a context of the historical, they can still retain their essential enigmaticalness.

It is the efforts to unravel this enigmaticalness that for Adorno constitutes the greatest difficulty and obstacle to art (efforts such as those discussed in the ‘interpretation and display’ section of chapter two). In a manner that correlates in part with Deleuze’s notion of art as that which produces ‘problematic’ signs, and which remains art only to the


\(^{297}\) Ibid, p. 185.
extent that it produces a sign, the perceived understanding of a work (as guided by the mechanisms of the culture industry) deprives it of the essential enigmaticalness that makes it a work. Adorno argues:

“The better an artwork is understood, the more it is unpuzzled on one level and the more obscure its constitutive enigmaticalness becomes. It only emerges demonstratively in the profoundest experience of art. If a work opens itself completely, it reveals itself as a question and demands reflection; then the work vanishes into the distance, only to return to those who thought they understood it, overwhelming them for a second time with the question ‘What is it?’ Art’s enigmaticalness can, however, be recognised as constitutive where it is absent: Artworks that unfold to contemplation and thought without any remainder are not artworks.

The work of art, for Adorno, must therefore retain its enigmaticalness, not in the sense of a problem too difficult to resolve, but in the sense of a work that remains enigmatic precisely in its resistance to becoming a problem. As an enigma, the work of art may invite understanding, but this is not the same as posing a problem. The more a work is apparently understood, the further its essential enigmaticalness becomes concealed. As such, it is the drive to understand the work of art that Adorno recognises as that which places its essential enigmaticalness in danger. This recalls the historical accounts ranging from Vasari, The Goncourt Brothers, MoMA’s ‘evolutionary’ layout, to the present day, where various methods of supplementarity have been employed to guide interpretations of artworks.

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298 It should be noted that in Adorno’s terminology, he is careful to distinguish enigmaticalness from ‘the problem’, which he understands as a mere posing of a task.

It is precisely this *drive towards understanding* that Adorno sees as one of the mechanisms of what he and Horkheimer call the ‘culture industry’. In opposition to the aesthetic experience of a work that engages with its essential enigmaticalness, the culture industry reduces works of art to commodities there to be understood. Works of art become incorporated into a popular notion of ‘culture’ that can be consumed by a visit to a museum as much as a coffee can be consumed in a café. Instead of enigmas, works of art become entertaining riddles, where various efforts are made to provide helpful hints and clues in the form of leaflets, guides, and wall-mounted information about context, such as those that were the subject of analysis for Bourdieu and Darbel. For Benjamin, the age of technological reproducibility was welcomed as a potential way of breaking with the cult-value and auratic presence of institutionally ‘protected’ museum works in order to encourage a dynamic and temporal use-value in art. For Adorno, technological reproducibility had instead made art accessible to a largely indifferent mass audience, and therefore a matter of potential political and market exploitation. Benjamin optimistically looked towards a potential *mobilising* of the masses by exposing them to high art that would encourage critical thinking. Adorno, however, feared the appropriation of art as a method of encouraging the opposite by reducing art to a commodity value, and depriving it of its essentially complex enigmaticalness. The reduction of art to the status of commodities to be understood was to be what Adorno and Horkheimer would term the *deaesthetisation* of art, where, as Kaufman puts it, the culture industry would be “designed to inculcate conformism rather than critical agency”.  

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the connotations of a lost or fading historical significance tied up in its enigmaticalness, instead encouraging “culture’s straightforward, affirmational repetition of a consequently unchallenged reification”. In this sense, aura in historical works is understood by Adorno to be an indication or echo of engagements with existence that encourage a critical relationship with the present. As such: “The intentional abandonment of aura leads to a failure even to register negatively – through vexed attempts to create or access aura – the crucial modern phenomenon of aura’s loss (or at least its apparent loss).”

For Adorno and Horkheimer, aura in art was not to be considered as necessarily negative, but instead retained a sense of enigmaticalness (as alluded to when speaking of the works of art in museums as hieroglyphs of history). This encouraged critical engagement over the placation of riddles presented as understood, and supported by the means of (apparently) understanding them. Here I arrive at a key point in this thesis. From Adorno’s perspective, supplementary material would be essentially demystifying inasmuch as it would support works of art by shedding light on such things as the technical construction of work, the formation and development of ideas leading towards works of art, their ‘madeness’ (ϑεσει), and the biographical circumstances of the artists creating works of art. Supplementarity would, in all its forms, fall on the side of deaestheticisation, where “its unmistakable symptom is the passion to touch everything, to allow no work to be what it is, to dress it up, to narrow its distance from the viewer”. By its very nature, supplementarity would appear to interfere with the ‘being

301 Ibid.
302 Ibid (original emphasis).
303 Adorno, ‘Situation’. In Aesthetic Theory, p. 22.
what it is’ of the work of art. The displaying of maquettes in Moore’s former studio might narrow the distance between the viewer and the creative process of the large-scale sculptures that developed from them; the explanatory text might be seen to ‘dress up’ the work in a historical context that offers a background to the artist’s motivation and intentions; the biographical material might establish a field of influences or an insight into the artist’s personality. Yet in all these examples it is important to state that it is the use made of such material, and not the material itself, that Adorno criticised.

I consider Adorno himself to offer a way of salvaging supplementary material from its apparent consignment to mere apparatus in the service of the culture industry (a term that perhaps more than ever remains applicable in contemporary society). Adorno considered that museums withered original properties of the works they house (through their efforts to compile collections of historical works of art for contemporary enjoyment) whilst at the same time providing those works with a “new content”. At the same time, I consider what is here collectively called supplementary material to carry with it a dual function that on one hand provides methods of supporting established works of art by assisting in the furthering of knowledge that elucidates the creative process (as opposed to just extending knowledge of established works of art), whilst on the other hand allowing the opportunity for such materials to be brought forth as cultural objects in their own right as a result of the centrality of the creative process that their employment instigates. They would then be capable of being evaluated, not in a deferential relationship to an artist or completed works, but as cultural objects which themselves call for a more thorough analysis.
Carol Duncan, describes the notion of ‘the liminal’ experience created by the sanctified setting of museums and galleries, where: “zones of time and space in which visitors, removed from the concerns of their daily, practical lives, open themselves up to a different quality of experience”. It is my view that supplementary material experienced in such a concentrated setting, rather than being fixed in an educational or demystifying role in relation to works of art, themselves become opened up to new levels of significance. Supporting works, biographical material, and educational devices are typically intended to un-puzzle the works they ostensibly support. However, the very act of displaying such supplementary material elevates the apparent importance of the creative process itself, emphasised by the ‘liminal’ state of experience in the viewers that the environment of museums and galleries encourages. The apparatus of demystification itself becomes mystified and enigmatic, re-framing works of art as themselves supplementary to the experience of the creative process.

The inclusion of supplementary material alongside established works of art can therefore, in my view, completely transform what is being experienced. Every explanatory text, framed preparatory drawing, encased sketchbook, or displayed paintbrushes, only serves to centralise the creative process, displacing the centrality of the works of art, and making certain forms of supplementary material of more significance as a result. The gallery or museum setting, so often encouraging a reverential approach to its contents, illuminates the mystified and enigmatic nature of the creative process that is brought to attention through the use of supplementary material. I therefore disagree with Daniel Buren’s interpretation of Bacon’s relocated studio, where he argues that: “Such a studio gives us

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an idea of the personality of the artist and surprises us with the state of his studio, but that is all."\(^{305}\) The implications of displaying Bacon's studio, and other forms of supplementary material, are far greater and disruptive to conventional modes of experiencing art than Buren’s interpretation suggests. That Tate Britain’s *Francis Bacon* exhibition (2009-10) dedicated one of eight rooms to Bacon’s ‘Archive’ (consisting of an abundance of material loaned from The Hugh Lane) supports the view that supplementary material is increasingly regarded as being of great interest to the public, and the complex ramifications of introducing such material into a major retrospective cannot be easily dismissed.

That is not to say that such an interpretation of supplementarity would easily coalesce Adorno’s views on art. In fact he is quite clear in saying that what gives a work of art its enigmaticalness is its radical break with the ordered world of things. This break at one and the same time reveals the enigmaticalness of this ordered world, just as it apparently offers a solution, where: “Art becomes an enigma because it appears to have solved what is enigmatical in existence while the enigma in the merely existing is forgotten as a result of its overwhelming ossification.”\(^{306}\) However, this ‘ossification’ lies at the heart of the incorporation of this current interpretation of supplementarity into schemata that would involve both aura and enigmaticalness. ‘Truth content’ for Adorno appears in an artwork as a challenge to the ossified organisation of the world, whilst at the same time presenting the possibility of confronting and improving this established order. It is not


the revelation of an absolute truth, but always a particular revelation of the enigmaticalness of the world that at the same time contains within itself the possibility of a way out (which is why it is an enigma, and not an inevitably insoluble mystery). It reveals a puzzle whilst simultaneously inviting (challenging) the viewer or listener to solve it, thus revealing a mystery to be demystified. As Adorno says of the artwork: “The zone of indeterminacy between the unreachable and what has been realised constitutes their enigma. They have truth content and they do not have it.” Adorno seems to leave no room for supplementarity (or indeed Schopenhauer’s primacy of the creative idea) in this working of art when he says: “Of all the paradoxes of art, no doubt the innermost one is that only through making, through the production of particular works specifically and completely formed in themselves, and never through any immediate vision, does art achieve what is not made, the truth.”

This ‘truth’ in its enigmatic revelation that at the same time invites a resolution, only becomes more enigmatic when the passing of time makes any notion of possible resolution more obscure and indecipherable (its *becoming hieroglyphic*). This produces an auratic quality that is fundamental in engaging critically with the otherwise ossified world of ‘mere’ existence. For Adorno, the “truth content is not external to history but rather its crystallisation in the works”. Yet this opens up a possibility for

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309 David Carrier describes the notion of ‘imaginative time travel’ as an important function of art museums and galleries, however, this view neglects the extent to which time distances the viewer from the ‘world’ in which those works appeared. See Carrier, *Museum Skepticism: A History of the Display of Art in Public Galleries*, p. 217.
310 Ibid, p. 175.
supplementarity that allows it to step out from beyond its incorporation within the culture industry. Whether an entire studio, an architectural sketch, or a maquette, the supplementary material is already in an open-ended relation to enigmatic works of art. It can therefore never be completely ossified in the forgetfulness of the everyday. Only the reduction to mere cogs in the machination of the culture industry would threaten to turn such material into everyday items. However, their use as supplementary devices actually maintains their preservation as objects (or collections of objects) that retain a relation to enigmaticalness (with varying degrees of intensity), not just to the works of art they are said to supplement, but to the process itself. This is an important observation of the thesis as it emphasises the extent to which the archiving of material can allow new areas of consideration and cultural importance to appear, in what Steedman refers to as the “mad fragmentations that no one intended to preserve”. Supplementary material may have been preserved as a support for complete works, but I assert that unintentional implications of the archiving of these works can be identified. When the use of supplementary material is no longer considered as potentially detrimental to the works of art they are intended to support, or as purely educational devices, their value as the means to consider the enigmatic act of the creative process begins to emerge.

These works reveal the stepping out of possible ossification in order to construct a puzzle. As such, the displaying of such works may take its initial inspiration from the culture industry’s efforts to reduce the art experience to a simplified matter of problem solving. At the same time, the displaying of such works preserves a variety of influences, choices, material constraints, and prevailing ideologies of the time that may not have even been

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Steedman, *Dust*, p. 68.
perceived by the artists themselves, yet endure as enigmatic works in their own right.

The emphasis such works give to the creative process only serves to highlight further their enigmaticalness, as embodiments of the act of creation. These works are neither completely ossified, nor conventionally recognised as complete works. As the examples and motivations of supplementarity themselves become historicised, their evaluation becomes exposed to new interpretations that are no longer sutured to their original intended uses. Instead they allow other qualities embedded within them to come forth. As Benjamin says: “Every image of the past that is not recognised by the present as one of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.” Images of the past may be recognised as a concern of the present (such as in its use within the culture industry), however that is not to say that their preservation does not preserve other attributes or potential revelations contained within those images.

Figure 12: Francis Bacon, 'untitled', circa 1960s - early 1970s. Dublin City Gallery The Hugh Lane, Dublin, Ireland. Image redacted.
My assertion that the educational use of supplementary material can lead to a subversion of its intentions by reflecting focus away from works of art, and onto the creative process itself, might appear to devalue the importance of the, specifically educational, function that such material can provide. However, it instead re-casts this use of educational approaches, by paradoxically turning demystification into a process of strengthening the enigmatic qualities of supplementary material that ‘embodies’ the act of creativity. The display of Bacon’s studio allows a focusing upon the enigmatic creative process (via the association of aura), and the educational or supplementary content. As Barbara Dawson discussed with me, there are “a number of facts that can be gathered from the studio contents” – where the fingerprints on photographs can reveal their use as reference material, where found newspaper clippings of figures can be related to depicted postures, and where a careful analysis of the layers of paint splatters can indicate “his increased confidence in working in different ways”.  

Such facts can be utilised with justification in the development of an awareness of Bacon’s working process, and of his influences and techniques. The displayed studio during its relocation and reconstruction, as it were, offers up or unconceals formerly concealed information that may well be put to use in ‘understanding’ Bacon’s art. Indeed, the discovery of preliminary and preparatory drawings reveals that Bacon was being economical with the truth when he said that he always worked directly onto the canvas. Figure 12 is a preparatory drawing made by Bacon using blue ballpoint pen on

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313 Dawson, *Interview with the author.*

314 The small number of preliminary and preparatory drawings in fact reveals a lack of draftsmanship that justified their minimal use, and Bacon’s reluctance to reveal them.
the front end paper of one of the many books found in his studio – and is one of many examples of Bacon using this approach. In contrast to Sant’Elia’s dinamismi drawings (see Figure 6) there is no evidence of precision or a controlled gestural draftsmanship. Instead, the looseness of the pen strokes, coupled with the ready-to-hand nature of the material drawn upon, suggests that this was produced as a quick guideline for composition. The drawing in Figure 12 lacks the visual impact of the paintings that saw Bacon become established as one of the great colourists of his time, however it has importance for art historians, and historians of Francis Bacon, as it provides evidence that Bacon’s paintings were not always produced on canvas in a direct act of expression and creative inspiration, but could sometimes be mediated.

Far from dismissing its value, I would argue that the enigmaticalness of the process itself is brought into view more enigmatically as a result of such discoveries. Such information only appears to obscure enigmaticalness if it is assumed that it leads to a concrete understanding of the work, or is put forward as providing such an understanding under the influence of the culture industry. The presence of aura in the displayed studio emerges out of the developments in technological reproducibility that led to a new significance of the authentic, where, like the work of art in the museum, aura appears with a new content. This content can at the same time provide knowledge and understanding of Bacon’s creative process whilst further illuminating (and not obscuring) the enigmaticalness of his works. As Paul Ricoeur says, “the most valuable traces are the ones that were not intended for our information”.  

the auratic quality of the displayed studio appears, and at the same time aura in its new content supplements Bacon’s art through new information. Together aura and information emerge side by side in order to encourage, and not obscure, the enigma of his art. This section is of great importance for the objectives of the thesis as it not only addresses the inductive (rather than purely reflective) value that the use of biographical material in art museums and galleries can provide, but also has implications for the evaluation of works-for-art. In the previous case studies, works-for-art were shown to be highly problematic in terms of their status and classification in distinction to recognised works-of-art. This section provides a way of re-considering such problematic issues within a framework that allows works-for-art to be separated from a deferential connection to works-of-art - not in a theoretical context (such as the ones derived from Heidegger and Deleuze) - but in an actual and palpable experience of these works. In this way, such forms of supplementarity become culturally significant as products of creative processes that encourage a consideration of (rather than a resolution to) the enigmatic act of creativity itself.

Mystification and Demystification

Instead of aura being an integral element of a work’s enigmaticalness that comes forward ‘of its own accord’ in the aesthetic experience, the culture industry turns it into a commodity or a characteristic to be pointed out or artificially constructed within contexts that emphasise the history and age of a work of art. Adorno refers to this as the
phenomenon of aura becoming ‘bad’ when it is “instituted and simulated”.\textsuperscript{316} Adorno goes on to say that “aura is gulped down along with the sensual stimuli; it is the uniform sauce that the culture industry pours over the whole of its manufacture”.\textsuperscript{317} But is Bacon’s displayed studio also to be understood as part of this phenomenon of ‘bad’ aura in the service of a modern form of the culture industry?

There is no question that Bacon’s studio has been ‘instituted’, and that the sense of presence associated with the artist is emphasised at The Hugh Lane studio. The educational use of the studio and its contents is openly promoted through the supporting literature, and the digital database. The three rooms that focus on different aspects of the studio explain their relationship to Bacon’s work. The Hugh Lane’s website provides details ranging from the relocation process, the biography of the artist, videos, the various art material, the books found, and even the furniture. There is also an entire section of the website dedicated to explaining Bacon’s life and works for children. This provides information about the artist’s life, his technique, his former home, and the relocation process, but does not discuss any of Bacon’s works.\textsuperscript{318} Regarding the latter, this is a logical omission given the content, but it is important to note how the studio space and the project of relocation itself becomes an object of value and interest in its own right.

\textsuperscript{316} Adorno, ‘Situation’. In \textit{Aesthetic Theory}, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{317} Adorno, ‘Paralipomena’. In \textit{Aesthetic Theory}, p. 393.

\textsuperscript{318} \url{www.hughlane.ie/the-studio} (accessed 14 October 2012).
Yet does this ‘instituting’ necessarily need to be considered negatively? At once both mystifying and demystifying, the displayed studio should be understood not as constituting two opposed and contrary poles, but as the locus of a complex synthesis in which the distinctions between the ontic and ontological become blurred. Whilst a work of art may be displayed in a certain way that encourages nothing but distancing, the displayed studio operates in a way that pushes both closeness and distance to a point approaching indiscernibility. The negative possibility of this ‘instituted’ aura only appears if understanding is taken as an end; where what is demystified is held to apply for the totality of the creative process and the works that appear.\textsuperscript{319} Yet in all the explanations surrounding the displayed studio at The Hugh Lane, there is an underlying mystique. The displayed studio, and supplementary material in general, bring forth and reinforce aura. This occurs even if initiated or appropriated in the service of the culture industry, under artificial or simulated conditions that would attempt to engender a deaestheticisation of the experience of art. For Adorno, in opposition to Benjamin, aura is an essential element in art that is intrinsically connected to art’s enigmaticalness, where: “Aura is not only – as Benjamin claimed – the here and now of the artwork, it is whatever goes beyond its factual givenness, its content; one cannot abolish it and still want art. Even demystified artworks are more than what is literally the case.”\textsuperscript{320}

\textsuperscript{319} During my interview with Barbara Dawson, I asked her if she felt the demystification of Bacon through the revelations of the excavation impinged upon his work in any way. Dawson rejected this possibility, asserting that the impact of the works remained untouched (Dawson, \textit{Interview with the author}).

\textsuperscript{320} Adorno, ‘Situation’. In \textit{Aesthetic Theory}, p. 56.
Figure 13: The inside door of Francis Bacon’s studio, Dublin City gallery The Hugh Lane, Dublin, Ireland. Image redacted.
Such mystification and demystification is intricately involved in a movement of (to use Heidegger’s very specific meanings) concealment and unconcealment, where the factual givenness (the ontic) and the ontological quality of aura are effectively co-present within the experience of art. Figure 13 shows Bacon’s paint-covered studio door, wryly described by Bacon as the only abstract painting he ever made, and by Dawson as “itself a work of art”. This image encapsulates the enigmaticalness of the creative process, existing between a state of biographical/informative value, and a physical embodiment of the romanticised notion of the chaotic act of creation itself. The door (as all doors are) is between the outside and inside, letting in, and keeping out. The studio door is both unusual and familiar, art and non-art, both evidence and mystery. This movement of mystification and demystification in relation to Bacon’s studio will now be explored by addressing the main stages of its existence from its original use as a studio, through to the re-constructed and preserved studio that exists today.

The site of the working studio had, first of all, an appeal to Bacon himself. A quotation from Bacon on one of the walls of the Hugh Lane Gallery as you approach the studio emphasises this: “For some reason the moment I saw this place I knew that I could work here. I am very influenced by places – by the atmosphere of a room.” Already there is a form of aura at work here in Bacon’s own understanding of its suitability, where the intangible quality of ‘atmosphere’ is a governing influence. Yet at the same time a series of ontic considerations would have played a necessary part, such as the location, the size, the available facilities, and the light source.

321 Dawson, Interview with the author.
The **working studio** itself is, as evidenced by Figure 13, intimately involved in the creative process. In this consideration of Bacon, two forms of mystification/demystification operate on either side of the canvas, which serves as the point of contact between the two. Bacon fills the studio with various materials that themselves oscillate between equipment and presence. An example of this is that of a fragment of a photograph that was copied and made into one panel of a triptych. Unusually for Bacon, this panel did not feature any figures (it was also the only painting to feature the studio contents). During the extensive analysis of the studio content in the reconstruction, it was discovered that this photograph was itself a section taken from another photograph shot thirteen years earlier that included Bacon’s deceased former lover George Dyer. The fragment takes on a poignancy through its auratic quality of bringing forth or evoking the dead via their representation (here Benjamin’s own admittance of the auratic quality of photographs of the deceased is apparent), itself absent in the fragmented section. The fragment would be used as part of Bacon’s equipment as a visual reference to be represented, whilst at the same time carrying a trace of presence and aura (that of the missing figure of Dyer) which becomes concealed from a viewer - through these degrees of separation - in the final painting.\(^\text{322}\) Instead of concealing or obscuring the enigmaticalness of what is otherwise a non-descript painting, the analysis of the studio contents actually demystifies this formerly mystified auratic significance that had previously been evident only to Bacon himself, whilst opening it up to a new possibility of public interest that is wrapped up in the mystification of romance, loss, and melancholy. This illustrates the degree to which enigmaticalness can be induced in supplementary works that are ostensibly used to draw attention to demystifying information.

\(^{322}\) Cappock, *Francis Bacon’s Studio*, p. 39.
In combination with the artist’s memories (themselves intimately caught up in the things he surround himself with in a mutual process of forgetting and remembering), the studio contents become equipment, and in effect already fill the ‘blank’ canvas (itself an object within the studio) as the available forms of inspiration that may potentially be used. In Deleuze’s study of Francis Bacon’s creative process, he explains that:

The painter has many things in his head, or around him, or in his studio. Now everything he has in his head or around him is already in the canvas, more or less virtually, more or less actually, before he begins his work. They are all present in the canvas as so many images, actual or virtual, so that the painter does not have to cover a blank surface, but rather would have to empty it out, clear it, clean it.  

This is supported by Bacon himself who said that: “I like to live among the memories and the damage.” The contents of the studio themselves are constantly evaluated in terms of the possibilities they offer, in what Petherbridge refers to as the “premeditated disorder” of the studio that provides creative inspiration. Their value as equipment or as presence dictates their preservation, or their abandonment during the occasional cleaning of the space. Furthermore, the material of most value to Bacon would often be the least capable of being preserved, due to the manner in which Bacon worked, where “as a rule Bacon treated with the least respect those sources he found most useful”. This highlight an important issue of concern for supplementarity, whereby, as with Dürer’s initial sketches made directly onto wood, the destructive act of the creative

324 Quoted in Farson, The Gilded Gutter Life of Francis Bacon, p. 149.
325 Petherbridge, The Primacy of Drawing: Histories and Theories of Practice, p. 156.
326 Cappock, Francis Bacon’s Studio, p. 33.
process is often overlooked, potentially causing the prominence of certain forms of preserved material to be overstated. Preserved material that might be interpreted as demystifying the creative process, might themselves be responsible for further mystifying the reality of how an artist works, with the most valuable works-for-art becoming most at risk. This has implications for the philosophy of technology as it emphasises the distorted importance that can be attributed to the remainder, with the value of material not necessarily reflected in their capacity to be preserved.

The excavation brought moments of revelation that would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain were the studio maintained and preserved in its original location. It is in this respect that the process of relocation takes on its own particular significance. At this stage, the studio becomes an excavation site that revealed its own challenges and requirements from the team of conservators and archaeologists that was brought in. The archaeologists were “briefed on the vision for the studio” by Dawson and her team, and careful plans were drawn up to carefully remove and catalogue each item (which itself brought forth the possibility of compiling the digital database).\textsuperscript{327} Practical decisions needed to be made about what could and could not be preserved, whilst additions were made to prevent damage to other areas, such as the paint-spattered walls that were covered in three layers of protective facing.\textsuperscript{328} In total, the excavation took two weeks to completely remove the studio contents, walls, ceiling, and floor.

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{328} Ibid, p. 17.
The reconstruction was a *creation* of a copy rendered more complex by being constructed from the material that constituted the model. Like the Temple of Isis at Philae in Egypt, which due to the threat of being submerged was removed and ‘rebuilt’ brick by brick on Agilka Island (even to the extent that trees and plants were relocated), the constructed ‘studio’ at the Hugh Lane Gallery is in no way the *same* as the original. Just as the Temple of Isis had a particular relationship with the stars above it, and the play of shadows resulting from its position in relation to the sun, the *place* of the studio/shrine had an aura that could not possibly be replicated, wherein its removal irrevocably transformed it. It is difficult to imagine more contrasting settings for Bacon’s studio than the unassuming, slightly dingy-looking London flat located above a garage and accessed via a back alley, and the grandiose, pristine appearance of the Hugh Lane Gallery. The displayed studio becomes a simulacrum – not in the derogatory sense understood since Plato – but in the Deleuzian manner of something distinct, in which its internal difference can instead be affirmed. In this respect, it becomes a distinct simulacrum that has its own relationship to Bacon, his working process, his paintings, and the original studio. It is, to borrow a term from Heidegger, a de-struction that simultaneously destroys and constructs, and through this de-struction, information is unconcealed, and new notions of aura are brought forth. For example, seven empty bottle of the solvent carbon tetrachloride were found during the excavation. Since Bacon’s death the dangers of this highly toxic solvent were brought to light, and resulted in it becoming banned.\(^\text{329}\) When understood within the context of Bacon’s respiratory problems that in part contributed to his death, these empty bottles take on an ominous aura of their own that would not have existed during their use within

\(^{329}\) Ibid, p. 211.
Bacon’s working studio. However, this singular significance is nevertheless mystified by the auratic presence of the totality of the displayed studio.

The displaying of the studio also becomes a creation that emerges in its own right only through acts of mystification that in certain cases can themselves reveal content. As Dawson conveyed to me during our interview, “a certain idealisation is inevitable” such as the removal and archiving of the otherwise unseen material beneath the surface of the items covering the floor (replaced by polystyrene), which makes this material accessible, whilst concealing an alteration to the content of the original studio.\(^{330}\) Perhaps more dramatically, a large number of empty champagne bottles were removed from the studio and not included in the display, which significantly alters the way in which the artist and his creative process is presented.

It becomes apparent that there are two prominent forms of value to be discerned in the studio content: information, and the auratic. The two converge in the displayed studio. Newspaper clippings provide information about global events that indicate the context of his studio around the time of his death, but might be considered to be of a lower hierarchical value (in terms of cultural significance) in comparison to the newspaper clippings that feature underlined sentences comparing Damien Hirst’s work to Bacon’s.\(^ {331}\) At the same time, the presentation of both within a context that seemingly insulates them from their ‘everydayness’ as familiar items, and displays them instead as objects removed from their conventional use-value, allows them to take on an aura that

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\(^{330}\) Dawson, *Interview with the author*.

\(^{331}\) Cappock, *Francis Bacon’s Studio*, p. 153.
demystifies formerly mystified intangible qualities. The displaying of these objects, and
the sense of aura emitted by them (via their relation to Bacon) *illuminates* them in a way
that designates them as objects of a world that is *past*. This allows them to emerge *in
themselves* out of an ontical use-value that would otherwise conceal them. As Heidegger
argues:

> To experience the closest is the most difficult. In the course of our dealings and
occupation it is passed over precisely as the easiest. Because the closest is the
most familiar, it needs no special appropriation. We do not think about it. So it
remains what is least worthy of thought. The closest appears therefore as if it
were nothing. We see first, strictly speaking, never the closest but always what is
next closest. The obtrusiveness and imperativeness of the next closest drives the
closest and its closeness out of the domain of experience.³³²

It is precisely the removal of these objects not only from their everyday context and use,
but also, crucially, from their place within what was once an artist’s studio in Kensington,
that allows this closeness to become demystified through their presentation and
accessibility, but mystified by, isolating and drawing attention to, that which has gone
unnoticed. This closeness, perceived negatively, is akin to the ossification of existence
that Adorno sees as the backdrop against which the enigmaticalness of works of art are
illuminated (whilst also illuminating this backdrop). The *disruption* of the aura of the
studio and its contents through its relocation maintains a trace of its original aura in
relation to the now past world of the artist. At the same time, the transformative effects
of the studio’s removal from its original context (both geographically and in its use-value)
allows a demystification of what would otherwise remain obscure and distanced. This
occurs by shattering the ossifying effects of that which is merely maintained or enduring

in a particular place. The displayed studio, is freed from a sense of equipmentality by separating it from its original function, and thus becomes more enigmatic and puzzling.

The importance of this discussion for the thesis is that it addresses, in detail, the significance and ramifications of displaying material that goes beyond a casual consumption of what is placed on view. To display is to displace something from its original context, whilst simultaneously inviting a sustained and concentrated consideration of its value. Displaying and detailing at one and the same time demystifies the displayed content by allowing a closer scrutiny and engagement, whilst mystifying it by drawing attention to its particular peculiarity, and inviting a questioning of otherwise unconsidered aspects of everyday life. To relocate and display a sculptor’s maquette, an architect’s sketch, or a painter’s studio, is to illuminate it by isolating it from its original, concealing function (to refer back to Heidegger). Only this illumination does not provide clarity, but instead mystifies the displayed content all the more by allowing such a complex and mysterious aspect of the human condition (the act of creativity) to be frozen in place. The ‘everydayness’ of Bacon’s studio contents only serves to exaggerate the distance between the familiar objects and their proximity to an enigmatic process of creativity.

However, as long as the role of the artist is upheld as the causa efficiens of the work of art, the displayed studio remains utilised and consumed in terms of its biographical significance as supplementary material in a way that dominates any alternative evaluation (even if it maintains the possibility of such an alternative). The classical hierarchical ordering of the stages in the creative process that dominates the
contemporary field of cultural production in a way that permeates discourse, ensures the way in which the studio and its contents is predominantly understood, at least initially. When O’Doherty says of studios that “as residues, they are what we might call para-creations, footnotes to the departed painting”, he immediately reduces them to a lesser value within the creative process, as ‘footnotes’ to the main text of the works of art. Yet O’Doherty also reveals an increased interest in the unique role of the studio itself, and an appreciation of them as ‘para-creations’. This interpretation begins to bring them out of a classical hierarchical ordering that would have them signify only a supporting and entirely subservient role as sources of ontic data. Such data would merely be incorporated in an understanding of works of art that, for Adorno, represented the corrosive influence of the culture industry in obscuring enigmaticalness.

Conclusion

The key considerations of this chapter have been to show the ways in which aura can manifest itself, the problematic nature of biographical material when used to supplement the work of an artist, the subtle interrelation of mystification and demystification, and the emerging importance of Adorno’s concept of enigmaticalness as a way of re-considering supplementary material.

Just as Adorno asserts that the mechanisms of galleries and museums can re-position works of art into hieroglyphs of history that maintain in some respect their

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333 O’Doherty, Studio and Cube: On the Relationship Between Where Art is Made and Where Art is Displayed, p. 13.
enigmaticalness, so too can the drive towards understanding works of art further emphasise that which is essentially unknowable in them. Instead of being opposed, the ontic and the ontological may be drawn towards each other to the point where they converge, where biographical content can in effect bring distance closer as distance.334 This chapter emphasises the importance of the act of display itself, which, by way of displacement, allows the content to be considered in a new way. The importance of the context and environment of art displays, shown in chapter two to have been historically shaped so as to encourage a reverential approach to the cultural significance of artists and their works, itself becomes a key consideration. Within such an environment, the inclusion and educational function of supplementary material, was shown to be capable of shifting the emphasis away from considerations of works of art, towards a greater emphasis on the creative process itself.

This shift in emphasis induced by supplementary material has implications for the philosophy of technology, whereby forms of equipment and supporting material, displaced from their utilitarian role, become artefacts of cultural importance worthy of archiving and display due to their importance as enigmatic traces of the creative process. The creative process itself is revealed as becoming centralised as an inadvertent outcome emerging from the hierarchical classification of historically determined supplementary material, which ensured its preservation and availability through its auratic and educational valuations.

334 This is not to say that Adorno understood art in terms of an ontology that could serve as an underlying or instigating factor (as in Heidegger). For more on Adorno’s rejection of such a notion of ontology, and his own criticism of Heidegger’s ontological philosophy, see Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, London: Routledge, 2000 [1963].
Over the course of this chapter I show that Bacon’s relocated studio brings important issues of display, displacement, aura, education, the creative process, commodification, and mystification into view, allowing for a detailed analysis of their implications for supplementarity.
Chapter Six: Boundaries, Limits and Ambiguity

This chapter develops the discussion of supplementarity in terms of the difficulties that arise when the material being used for display and public consumption traverses multiple ‘categories’ that are at once potentially of the plastic arts, literature, historical artefacts, or all/none simultaneously. The concerns of the previous chapters – the slippage that appears between the status of works-of-art and works-for-art, hierarchical classification, appropriation, and the emphasis that biographical and other supplementary material gives to the creative process - will be brought together by addressing the ‘work’ on paper of Antonin Artaud (‘work’ being a problematic term that will be developed throughout this chapter). In this chapter, supplementarity emerges as both a form of institutionalisation, and a means of challenging entrenched and established approaches to the creation, interpretation, and displaying of art.

Artaud’s works on paper provide an opportunity to explore cultural objects and materials that were produced through a conscious effort to confront conventional distinctions between work and support, between process and completion. The use made of these works on paper has involved a concern for the biographical context in which they were produced. Of paramount importance is the mental health of Artaud and the resonances this might have for the ‘legitimacy’ of his work.

Artaud’s creative ‘method’, meant that the biographical details of his life, his literary works, and his drawings and sketches are often interwoven. As such, Artaud’s own written commentary on his work will be used throughout this chapter in order to explore
his confrontation with representation, and of the dominant conventions of creative practice of his day. This chapter has implications for studies of the relationship between mental health and the classification of artworks, theories of the archive (and responses to archive theory by artists), and the philosophy of technology (both for the creation and displaying of works).

This chapter is divided into three sections. It will begin by addressing the issue of mental illness, and the extent to which this can be discerned as a relevant factor of consideration when assessing Artaud’s work. The second section will address Artaud’s work itself – the process of creation, its problematic status, and its reception. Derrida’s concept of the parergon and his interpretation of Artaud’s ‘subjectile’ will be explored in relation to the key ideas discussed in the preceding chapters, as well as Artaud’s own writing. The final section will address the ways in which Artaud’s ‘works’ have been critically received and used since his death.

‘Artaud’ and Negative Supplementarity

Throughout his life, Antonin Artaud (1896 – 1948) adopted several different creative roles: actor, poet, playwright, film maker, theatrical director, and artist. Today he is perhaps best known for his book *The Theatre and its Double*, which contained his proposal for a ‘Theatre of Cruelty’. As a figure in art history, he is more generally known as a former member of the Surrealists, before being expelled by André Breton in
December 1926. He is also known for a brief career as an actor, and as a prolific writer and poet. He was a well known (if marginal) figure in Paris during the last years of his life, with many key cultural figures of the city offering sympathy and support following Artaud’s internment in various mental institutions. This, along with his erratic public appearances and the aggressive nature of his written or spoken works, established his reputation in France as an eccentric or ‘mad’ figure. Since his death in 1948, aspects of his works have received serious and prolonged critical discussion by major philosophical commentators including Deleuze, Derrida, and Maurice Blanchot. There have been two major exhibitions of his work: ‘Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper’ (1996-97), and ‘Exposition Antonin Artaud’ (2006-07), whilst Artaud’s works on paper have featured in numerous exhibitions across the world.

From his earliest writing, his acting, his concepts for theatre, and then finally his ‘works on paper’, Artaud constantly battled against the ‘insincere’. In his now well known correspondence from 1923-24 with the editor of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, Jacques Rivière, Artaud sought to respond to the rejection of his poems by addressing the problem of the creative act itself. This included the ways in which the creative act is to be evaluated, asking the question “Do you think a poem which is faulty but which has fine and powerful things in it can be considered to have less literary authenticity and power of action than a poem which is perfect but without great inner resonance?”

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As the correspondence unfolded, Artaud exhibited an extraordinary and passionate investigation and questioning of his own creative impulse. A telling remark hints at the lack of distinction between himself and his ‘works’: “Although I can very well judge my mind, I can judge the products of my mind only insofar as they merge with it in a kind of blissful unconsciousness.”337 Such was the level of this reflexive analysis that Rivière chose to publish their correspondence in the Nouvelle Revue Française – including one of Artaud’s poems. This in itself is a curious example of an ambiguous status appearing through the use of supplementary material. Having failed to have his poems published in Nouvelle Revue Française, Artaud eventually succeeds in having a poem – ‘A Cry’ – published, though within a context of self-criticism and debates with Rivière over the nature of writing a poem of sufficient standard to be published in the first place. This poem, ‘A Cry’ becomes a supplementary devise within the context of letters that themselves originally appeared as supplements to the unpublished poems. Blanchot highlights this very curiosity and paradox by asking: ”Was Jacques Rivière aware of the anomaly here? Poems which he considered inadequate and unworthy of publication cease to be so when supplemented by the account of the experience of their inadequacy.”338

Writing in 1968, Gilles Deleuze interprets Artaud’s comments in this correspondence as a confrontation with the same ‘dogmatic image of thought’ that he himself opposed:


Artaud did not simply talk about his own ‘case’, but already in his youthful letters, shows an awareness that his case brings him into contact with a generalised thought process which can no longer be covered by the reassuring dogmatic image but which, on the contrary, amounts to the complete destruction of that image.339

Deleuze’s comment supports the view that long before Artaud’s incarceration in the asylums, he was considered already to be entering into a critical relationship with the process of creativity. This gives weight to any discourse on his later works that might look to downplay the significance of Artaud’s mental state. It also underlines an academic acknowledgement of Artaud’s confrontation with conventional approaches to representation and creativity beginning to appear in France in the 1960s (Derrida’s essay on Artaud, ‘La Parole Soufflée’ was published in 1965). As such (and especially in the work of Deleuze), Artaud is not just an example of someone who challenged conventional attitudes to thinking and creativity, but is also an influence on such philosophical and historical developments. This point is important in emphasising the levels of Artaud’s relation to - or at the very least, a strong accord with - the development of some of the key ideas of Deleuze and Derrida that have been or will be discussed here. This also highlights the interaction between theory and practice which is of particular importance here, as it shows how the concepts and implications of supplementarity discussed in this chapter emerge out of a combination of art practice and philosophy.

In 1937, following a period of increasingly erratic behaviour, fuelled in part by his drug addiction, Artaud was committed to a mental institute, where he remained for nine years. The first part of Artaud’s internment was at the asylum of Sainte-Anne, before being

339 Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 147.
diagnosed as incurable and sent to the asylum at Ville-Evrard. It was here that Artaud returned to his ‘spells’ which will be discussed more fully in the second section of this chapter. Of relevance here is how the messages in these spells indicated both Artaud’s awareness of his situation, and his internalisation of his diagnosis, where: “I am in an Insane Asylum but this dream of a Madman will become true and will be implemented by Me.”

In 1943, Artaud was moved to the asylum at Rodez, directed by Gaston Ferdière. Ferdière, a former Surrealist poet, granted Artaud more comfortable conditions. However, this would prove to be the dawn of perhaps the most disturbing chapter of Artaud’s life, as Ferdière instigated a series of fifty-one electroshock therapy sessions.

The stigma of mental illness, unsurprisingly, firmly attached itself to Artaud following his release from Rodez. On 13 January 1947, Artaud ‘performed’ at his first appearance since 1937 at a benefit evening in his honour (to celebrate his return to the capital after Rodez) at the Vieux-Colombier in Paris. His old adversary/friend, André Breton, in a reluctant reply to a request to pay homage, delivered a speech that was full of barbed compliments that drew attention to his own misgivings about Artaud’s mental wellbeing: “The real tragedy is that society to which we are less and less honoured to belong persists in

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making it an inexpiable crime to have gone over to the other side of the looking glass.”

This supposed position of Artaud’s on the ‘other side of the looking glass’ would only have been reinforced by the subsequent performance Artaud put on, which deteriorated into a “wild improvisation, constantly shattered by cries, screams, and savage gestures”.

The validity of his creative output, in the light of the judgement of his mental capacities by the doctors that had overseen his stay in the asylums, was already in question. The doctor who had administered the electroshock sessions, was unequivocal when pressed on his own views on the continued interest in Artaud, saying that: “The studies of Artaud seem to be multiplying, which is something I find regrettable. Artaud had no message to communicate, never had. He was a distinguished paranoiac with absolutely extraordinary delusions of grandeur and persecution.”

Was he ‘sane’ when he was allowed to leave Rodez? Was he ever anything more than an unconventional personality who had the misfortune to be caught up in an unsympathetic institution? Dr Latrémolière’s comments, though undoubtedly biased, do little to encourage a positive interpretation: “All my life I’ll remember my friend Ferdière admitting to me ‘If I’d known what was to come, I’d never have let him leave Rodez. I regret it infinitely’...”

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343 Barber, Antonin Artaud: Blows and Bombs, p. 137.


345 Ibid, p. 24 (original emphasis).
Figure 14: Jakob Mohr, „Beweiße“ (proofs), Inv, No. 627/1, © Sammlung Prinzhorn, Universitätsklinikum Hiedelberg.

How is it possible to distinguish, for example, between Artaud’s combination of writing and drawing during and after his incarceration, and ‘works’ to be found in Hans Prinzhorn’s collection gathered together from patients from psychiatric hospitals between 1890 and 1920? Jakob Mohr was represented in the collection with a drawing/text that bears striking resemblances to the electronic effects of machines - together with a gestural usage of text that seemingly represents electronic currents being transmitted from a body via a machine (see Figure 14) - that are found in some of Artaud’s last large drawings, such as Figure 15.346 In both examples, the pages are filled up with words and imagery that wrap around depictions of human figures (Artaud in Figure 15, and possibly Mohr in Figure 14). Neither are conventionally beautiful works, with both consisting of unorthodox depictions of activity and force being transmitted from one figure to another. Yet the information available about Artaud, and the lack of information about Mohr, transforms their places in art history. Is it simply the case that Artaud, having already established a significant reputation within the creative circles of Paris, was deemed worthy of having his own work received in a favourable light due to the existence of an audience? Would the graphorrhea and fantastical imagery produced in art therapy sessions that can be found in the Prinzhorn collection suddenly be considered to be of a ‘higher’ status were it to transpire that the authors were in fact established and respected artists? This comparison highlights the importance of classification and biographical information for not only supplementing works of art, but also for distinguishing them. The ‘negative’ supplement emerges as a supporting framework that heavily emphasises an aspect of a work (for example, being produced as therapy within a psychiatric hospital), over its aesthetic or pictorial qualities, whilst also

346 Ibid, p. 146.
stigmatising a work of an established artist by centralising the conditions (both historically and mentally) from which the work appeared.

Artaud’s ‘comeback’ appearance to commemorate his return to Paris following his release from Rodez, is a testament to the interest that still existed in him, with nine-hundred people filling the Vieux-Colombier (and many more turned away due to lack of room) for the event. If his ‘works on paper’ are to be held in higher esteem than, for example, a drawing from the Prinzhorn collection that seems to share similar formal, creative, and technical properties, it is precisely because Artaud’s ‘works’ form part of the existing totality of his ‘oeuvre’. This had allowed Artaud to establish a reputation in the first place; a reputation immersed in an awareness and reaction to the creative and political climate of his day. His biographical past, and the reputation gained in it, meant that it was impossible for these ‘works’ to be received by his contemporaries in an anonymous manner, detached from any preconceptions or familiarity with Artaud’s previous creative efforts. This was despite the conditions or motives behind Artaud’s ‘works on paper’, and any apparent similarities with recognised works of the insane. Yet as Breton’s “looking glass” comment implied, the shadow of madness, regardless of any justification, made it harder for Artaud’s words and works on paper to be considered ‘untainted’.

Derrida, in one of his three essays on Artaud – ‘La Parole Soufflée’ – senses a problem in attempts to reject or counter clinical diagnosis, saying that:

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347 Barber, Antonin Artaud: Blows and Bombs, p. 136.
At the moment when criticism (be it aesthetic, literary, philosophical, etc.) allegedly protects the meaning of a thought or the value of a work against psychomedical reductions, it comes to the same results through the opposite path: It *creates an example*. That is to say, a *case*. A work or an adventure of thought is made to bear witness, as example or martyr, to a structure whose essential permanence becomes the prime preoccupation of the commentary.\(^{348}\)

Any defence (or indeed a psychiatric diagnosis) necessarily exploits, reshapes, and distorts a work (or the mental state of its author) in order to bolster its own internal logic and methodological approach. It becomes a case of *negative supplementarity*, where the contest only determines where the place of the supplement will lie. Madness (or its suggestion) floods and saturates biographical material. As long as madness must be contested at all, its outcome will only ever result in one of two scenarios; either the work supplements, attaches to, supports madness; or madness supplements the work as that from which the work should be experienced *in spite of*. On one side there are comments like Dr Latrémolière’s. On the other there are comments such as the following from Margit Rowell, in the catalogue that accompanied Artaud’s first major international show *Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper*, at MoMA in New York in 1996, where: “His illness, although it helps to explain his exacerbated sensitivity, his visionary insights, the patterns and functions of his expression, and the prodigious abundance of his œuvre, is not the key to his genius.”\(^{349}\) As Derrida elaborates throughout ‘La Parole Soufflée’, and ‘Cogito and the History of Madness’, the very notion of madness makes certain presuppositions about what would constitute reasonable thought.\(^{350}\) Instead of allowing a work to ‘be a

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work’, any clinical reduction or critical defence inevitably causes the work to become embroiled in certain ideologies, certain dominant and ensnaring notions of thought that are projected onto it, and which fix it in place as a ‘case’. At the same time as Rowell distinguishes madness from the “key to his genius” she implies that the reverse is even a possibility that must be refuted. Furthermore, she lists five reasons why his (unquestioned) illness supplements Artaud’s work in the way that it “helps to explain” it. The key itself is not elaborated upon, leaving only a negative series of supplementary ‘causes’, all of which revolve around the artist as classical causa efficiens (receptivity, imagination, method, intention, and work rate). Even when its essentiality is refuted, madness (through the critical conflict with the clinical) becomes woven into the fabric of the apparent cause above all causes.

Such is the extent of this conflict that Rowell is compelled to confront, head on, any potential confusion with an apparently lesser and more conventionally ‘mad’ variety of art – art brut. The artist, Jean Dubuffet, was a friend of Artaud’s who visited him several times at Rodez during a period where he gathered together works by patients in asylums in order to celebrate their qualities, saying that: “Those works created from solitude and from pure and authentic creative impulses – where the worries of competition, acclaim and social promotion do not interfere – are, because of these very facts, more precious than the productions of professionals.” However, as Rowell clarifies, Jean Dubuffet was nevertheless “careful to distinguish between Artaud’s drawings and those of the

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clinically insane”.\textsuperscript{352} This implies a hierarchy of madness. The ‘pointing out’ itself makes the distinction a matter of negative supplementarity – a support of the work through an acknowledged and promoted distancing from that which is nevertheless a distraction. It is a matter of deploying supplementarity in order to anticipate and disable expected criticisms, even if, as Derrida asserts of Artaud’s work, “the critic and the doctor are without resource when confronted by an existence that refuses to signify, or by an art without works, a language without trace”.\textsuperscript{353} Artaud’s approach to his work is such that it challenges the very conditions in which it might be clinically or critically assessed. As a result, it directs a searchlight towards any efforts to do so – illuminating the inadequacies of such endeavours to assess it in terms of the very ‘image of thought’ discussed in chapter four (made up of identity and representation) that Artaud rejects. Deleuze and Guattari support this view in Anti-Oedipus. They attack the conflict between those who would dismiss Artaud’s written work as being beyond literature because of his madness, and those who would argue that his work, as literature, is beyond madness, saying that “both groups hold at least one thing in common; they subscribe to the same puerile and reactionary conception of schizophrenia, and the same marketable neurotic conception of literature”.\textsuperscript{354}

This section began with Artaud raising doubts about his own thought process, and has ended with the concerns of others about the same.


\textsuperscript{353} Derrida, ‘La Parole Soufflée’. In Writing and Difference, p. 219.

\textsuperscript{354} Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pp. 134-135.
In relation to Adorno and Benjamin, the ‘immateriual aura’ of madness can be conceived only negatively. This occurs here in three ways. Either as that which undermines the validity of the work itself by enveloping it within a context of mental illness as its governing and instigating factor; by its becoming an underlying principle that ‘supports’ the work by way of a deliberate distancing from established forms of madness; or finally by contrasting the work by way of an ‘in spite of’ (as if to say that the artist produced works of art in spite of the ‘handicap’ of mental illness). This section therefore draws attention to the negative connotations of mythologising (and therefore supplementing) an artist’s life and work (in this case, the mythologised ‘Artaud’), which dominates critical, clinical, or apologist discussions of their output. This discussion is therefore of importance for studies into the relationship between mental health and art, and curatorial approaches to, and uses of, sensitive biographical information that can influence the ways in which displayed works are received.

Ébauches, Notebooks, and the Subjectile

This section addresses the ambiguities and confrontations between work and artist, artist and supplementarity, supplementarity and work, showing how philosophical concepts and art criticism arising from the history of supplementarity can influence the creation and reception of works.

Artaud’s works on paper can be loosely divided up into four types; spells, portraits, pictograms, and notebooks. The traits of each are often to be found in the others, with no set organisation or method applied. The spells were letters covered in symbols, and
often burnt and/or stabbed in some ways (the ‘spell’ aspect being Artaud’s implication that good, or bad thoughts, could be transferred through them, and to the recipient). The portraits are characterised by an apparent technical deficiency, roughly rendered in charcoal. The pictograms (the term used by Derrida) could in fact apply to the other three types of works – being any works on paper that combined drawings, sketches, marks, and writing. However, they also refer to Artaud’s drawings that were more figurative (along with written content), without necessarily being portraits. The notebooks, which go further than any of Artaud’s other works in breaking with representation and conventional approaches to the ‘production’ of art, were made up of a large number of school notebooks that amounted to over 20,000 filled pages of imagery and text.

It is important to point out that the notebooks remained in the possession of Artaud’s friend Paule Thévenin until her death in 1993, at which point they were donated to the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris. Though Derrida collaborated with Thévenin on the book The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud in 1986, in which the book is split into two essays, there are no references to the notebooks themselves, but only to portraits, spells, and pictograms. It should also be noted, as suggested by the title of their book, that at that time no major exhibitions of Artaud’s works on paper had been held. As such, when Derrida writes about these works, they must be understood as, at that point, ‘outside’ art history – an effect that in turn emphasises the confrontational and problematic forms in which Artaud’s creative works appeared.
Eight years prior to his contribution to *The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud* (his text, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’), Derrida wrote his major work on art – *The Truth in Painting* (1978). Included in the diverse discussions about art was Derrida’s development of the concept of the *parergon*. As discussed in chapter one, parerga are referred to by Kant in *The Critique of Judgement* as being the ornamental elements that are added to a work of art in order to win approval (such as a frame, or clothing added to a sculpture). Derrida takes this further by using the concept of the parergon as a method of problematising not only the distinctions, borders, and limits between a work-of-art, and work-for-art, but of the complex interrelation between work and non-work. For Derrida “there is a trembling of the limit between the ‘there is’ and the ‘there is not’ ‘work of art’, between a ‘thing’ and a ‘work’, a ‘work’ in general and a ‘work of art’”. This “trembling of the limit” refers to the points of indiscernibility where the distinctions between work and support, work and supplement, are no longer clearly defined and distinguishable. The parergon becomes a *shared* territory made up of both the work and the non-work. Maquettes, architectural preliminary drawings, and displayed studios can be understood within this specific framework as being *in part* parergonal through the respective ways in which they are utilised as supplementary materials that *support* or frame works of art. However, as shown through the discussions on Heidegger’s causality, Deleuze’s non-hierarchical simulacra, and Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness, they can also be understood as singular creations in themselves.

Some of the ambiguities surrounding this will be developed shortly via Derrida’s discussion of the *subjectile*; however, for now his concept of the parergon should be

clarified further. For Derrida: “A parergon comes against, beside, and in addition to the ergon, the work done, the fact, the work, but it does not fall to one side, it touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside. Neither simply outside nor simply inside.” The examples of supplementarity I have discussed are not entirely reducible to parerga (as objects or displays that can be elevated from a purely supplementary function or value). However, all supplementarity, by framing a work can be interpreted as parerga. The maquette frames the sculpture within a context of process; the architectural preliminary sketch frames the imaginary structure with an outline of its possibility; the displayed studio frames the paintings with the creative environment. For Kant, the parergon is a mere distraction or decoration that obscures the real work of art. However, Derrida sees the parergon as a zone in which the work and non-work merge. The significance of this is in dissolving the apparent separation of the work by bringing it into an intimate relation to a space that is itself equally connected to the outside. The outside is the setting or milieu, which serves as one of two grounds of the parergon, the other being the work of art. As such the “parergonal frame stands out against two grounds, but with respect to each of those two grounds, it merges into the other”.

This merging is usually imperceptible – disappearing into both grounds. The supplement or parergon (whether a frame, a maquette, etc.) distinguishes the separation of work and milieu by allowing them to merge within it, without merging into each other directly. However, for Derrida, Artaud’s ‘work’, causes the parergon to emerge in and as a part of

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356 Ibid, p. 54.

357 Ibid, p. 61.
the work. It is no longer distinguishing and disappearing, but indistinguishable and appearing within the work, as an integral element of the work, and no longer outside of it. Addressing Artaud’s works on paper, Derrida observes: “Violently mishandled, the parergon will be from now on incorporated in the work, it will make part of it. Its exteriority, its transcendent neutrality, its mute authority will no longer be intact.”

Derrida’s interpretation emphasises the extent to which supplementarity can become a way of working, rather than a mere support for work.

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Figure 16: Antonin Artaud, ‘Spell for Roger Blin’ (recto-verso), May 1939. Bibliothèque nationale de France. Image redacted.

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Artaud’s ‘spells’, such as the example in Figure 16, contain numerous elements that confront and shatter the anonymity of conventional framing. They are neither letters nor works of art, yet contain writing and imagery. Both writing and imagery work together in tandem, reinforcing the ‘casting of the spell’ through mystical symbolism and written incantations. Here, the medium itself is incorporated into the ‘spell’, with cigarette burns not only damaging the paper, but bringing each side into contact through the created hole that binds them. The blood-like red echoes the aggressive nature of the written content, with threats of having people pierced alive and having their “marrows perforated and burned”.  

The piercing, perforating and burning is both inscribed in writing, and inscribed into the material itself. It is no longer an indifferent or passive surface, a mere piece of paper framing its contents, but becomes (for Artaud) a conduit for psychic energy, bearing his thoughts and emotions through stabbing marks or stubbing. They do not appear as ‘works of art’ as part of a tradition of art objects, but as weapons, curses, or occasionally blessings, designed for specific targets. Here the auratic quality of the ‘spells’ is the essential element for Artaud, whereby the trace of the artist is imperative to their ability to work. As Sylvère Lotringer explains: “Although strictly speaking, Artaud’s spells are not artworks, being aimed at one person only, they were the essence of his art which, like magic, instantly does what it says.”

Whilst it is true that Artaud’s spells were aimed at one person, many of them, such as the one in Figure 16, carry broad and wide-reaching

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threats that encourage the recipient to spread. In this sense, for Artaud, the recipient becomes the messenger, with an effect that is both instant and continuous. The survival of the ‘spells’ owes nothing to Artaud - who conceived of them as vital but dispensable extensions of his existence – but to unintended acts of preservation. Stephen Barber, underlining the temporal nature of these spells, describes one such incident of preservation:

Artaud’s spells are experimental works of destruction, assaulted in conflagratory immediacy and with a momentary, corporeally focused purpose, whose form accidentally possessed an afterlife of survival, since, in several cases, he dispatched the resulting objects back to France by mail, to associates such as André Breton, who preserved them and later gave them to archives or art museums. 361

Neither art nor non-art, but existing on the border between the two, the ‘spells’, precisely through the absence of conventional methods of execution and presentation that would establish them as ‘works of art’, are able to bring to light the instability of classification (on both the side of the supplement and that of the work of art). Agnès de la Beaumelle, emphasises their innovative contrast with the established forms of work at that time when she describes them as being “a totally new means of graphic expression”. 362 At the same time, it resists reduction to that of a purely graphic object. By making the parergon a part of the work (and therefore exposing it and forcing it to emerge from its merged duality), the ‘spells’ simultaneously destroy the established limits between the work-elements and non-work elements. Derrida argues:


The traces of burning and perforation belong to a work in which it is impossible to distinguish between the subject of the representation and the support of this subject, in the *layers* of the material, between the upper and the lower, thus between the subject and its outside, the representation and its other. It is really a question of a *destruction*.

Derrida identifies a correlation between his concept of parerga, and a term found three times in Artaud’s writing – the *subjectile*. In each case, Artaud refers to the subjectile as something encountered or confronted in the act or process of drawing. The most detailed reference is the second one, made in 1946:

> This drawing is a grave attempt to give life and existence to what until today had never been accepted in art, the botching of the subjectile, the piteous awkwardness of forms crumbling around an idea after having for so many eternities laboured to join it. The page is soiled and spoiled, the paper crumpled, the people drawn with the consciousness of a child.

Derrida develops the idea of the subjectile into a form of complex support for (but not limited to) the work of art. There is one reference in ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’ to the subjectile as a “parergonal support” which underlines the correspondence between the two. However, the subjectile is a particular type of parergon – indeed the founding (and at the same time *founded*) parergon. It is *founded* as a pre-established set of values, relations, significances, and conditions. It is founding as constituting the foundation or support for the work, which Derrida describes as being *projected* onto it. As such, the subjectile is at one and the same time the engagement with a support that becomes a particular type of support only in the moment of engagement; the already grounded

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363 Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In *The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud*, p. 89 (original emphasis).


projectile. It is never simply a particular surface, nor does it relate particularly to this or that representation that might be constructed upon it. Derrida notes: “The subjectile, that is to say the support, the surface or the material, the unique body of the work in its first event, at its moment of birth, which cannot be repeated, which is as distinct from the form as from the meaning and the representation.”\(^\text{366}\)

Artaud’s approach is to attack the subjectile, to wrestle with the pre-established and pre-empting limits not just of a particular material, but of an entire history of art and representation. This attack manifests itself through his wilful combination of traditionally disparate elements such as image and text, in the manner of manipulating the medium itself, and in the technical (or consciously non-technical) approach to the drawings (“people drawn with the consciousness of a child”). This incorporation and subversion of the history of representation therefore echoes Fer’s critique of Hesse’s displayed test pieces, and reinforces the extent to which the supplement, practice, and discourse interweave and react to one another. Also, when Naomi Schor, in Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine, argues that: “for the archaeology of the detail, the sexism of rhetoric is of crucial significance”;\(^\text{367}\) Schor highlights how historical literature has characterised the interest in the detail of works as ornamental and feminine, in a prejudicial inference of inferiority and triviality. This important study of the detail, and the influence of gendered politics on how the detail has been historically perceived negatively, provides both context and support to this discussion of institutional approaches to hierarchical classifications of the supplement. This study also correlates

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\(^{366}\) Ibid, p. 65 (original emphasis).

\(^{367}\) Schor, Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine, p. 49.
with the present discussion by emphasising the deep and layered subtext of forms of art practice and art reception, against which Artaud (and later, Hesse’s) works can be interpreted as forcefully rejecting or complicating.\textsuperscript{368}

Edward Scheer, perhaps over-emphasising the centrality of Artaud’s encounter with aesthetics that take place in/through/upon the subjectile, indicates how “Artaud’s \textit{modus operandi} will be to make visible how the subjectile has been made to act falsely or not at all, under the \textit{system of fine arts}, and then restore it to its impossible truth.”\textsuperscript{369} I would not call it Artaud’s \textit{“modus operandi”} as this implies a hierarchical ordering of objectives that place the subjectile itself on an elevated level in need of being made visible. However, Scheer is right to suggest that the subjectile is a serious concern for Artaud. Even before the first mark has been made, Artaud conceives of his work in terms of a deeply connected relation to the properties of the medium that go beyond the tangible qualities, saying that “fine paper encourages you to make masterpieces, coarse and repulsive paper encourages you to make useful and needed works that will no longer be able to pass as beautiful”.\textsuperscript{370} Referring back to Heidegger’s four causes, this implies an acute awareness of the interrelation between the respective aspects of the creative process, with the \textit{causa materialis} and \textit{causa formalis} no longer considered as subservient to the \textit{causa finalis}.


In Artaud’s work there is no distinction between preliminary and completed works as the support is never just a first stage, but is intimately and irrevocably intertwined with the work that is wrestled from it. Deleuze’s affinity with Artaud’s approach to the ‘image of thought’ mentioned earlier can be seen to be justified in the non-hierarchical works on paper that actively reject “fine paper” that might encourage thinking in terms of masterpieces. Instead, they are created on/within “coarse and repulsive paper” that already resists pre-established expectations of “the beautiful” and raises conventionally considered ‘lowly’ material (at the time historically associated with a lower order of ‘secondary’ preparatory works, beneath ‘higher’ arts such as painting) to a level that demands to be engaged with on its own terms.

The clearest example of this demand can be seen in Artaud’s only exhibition following his release from Rodez, which took place on 4 July 1947 at the Galerie Pierre, at the invitation of Pierre Loeb, its owner and Artaud’s friend. The show was made up of portraits such as Figure 17, that included texts within them. This image, ‘Portrait of Jacques Prevel’ (1947), breaks with several conventional approaches. The distorted features of the subject are emphasised by the bold outlines and absence of other details, such as shoulders or backgrounds. The head and neck appear to be floating or severed, surrounded by the surface of the paper that is itself framed by text. The text, which is a poetic warning to the subject, describes the “sin that his entire face mediates”. Text and imagery are made to respond to one another, with the text describing what is being depicted, and the image dictating the text. Such portraits fall under what Derrida would call pictograms. For Derrida these pictograms “do not tolerate the wall of any division, neither that of different arts nor that of genres, nor that of supports or substances”.

A description of Artaud’s approach to creating these portraits illustrates his indifference to conventional rules or expectations of representation, as well as his incorporation of the surface/subjectile into the creative process itself. Artaud would regularly use both sides of a sheet (irrespective of any evidence showing through), and had a similar disregard for the faded but evident trace of effaced imagery remaining. Thévenin, having seen Artaud work (and having sat for portraits) describes Artaud’s general indifference to these potential obstacles:


372 Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, p. 78.
He takes no notice; perhaps indeed he will incorporate these phantoms in his work like so many marks of his progress and, in his war against the support, he will induce some violence to surge forth from these wounds he has inflicted upon it, the violence doubling that of the drawing. He takes his pencil or his stick (he uses pencil lead, coloured pencils, the soft Crayola-type chalks) as he would a true weapon, in order to constrain the subjectile.373

In the Galerie Pierre show, Artaud was by all accounts committed to putting on a successful and professional event. Perhaps buoyed by the Surrealism exhibition taking place at the same time (which he had turned down), he arranged two evenings of performances involving invited speakers reading selections of his work. However, for the most part, Artaud was evidently uninterested in any ‘traditional’ interpretation of his works on paper. In the text for the catalogue of this single exhibition, Artaud provides a detailed and powerful explanation of the portraits (divided up here and in subsequent references to reflect the layout on the page):

I have moreover definitely / done away with art / style or talent in / all the drawings / you will see here. I mean to say / that woe unto who / would consider them as / works of art, / works of aesthetic / simulation of reality. / None of them strictly / speaking are / works. / All of them are drafts, / I mean / probings or / burrowings / in all directions / of chance, possibi- / lity, luck or / destiny. / I have not sought / to refine my strokes / or my effects, / but to manifest / some sort of / linear patent truths / whose value would reside / as well in words, / written sentences, / as in graphic expression / and linear perspective. / So it is that several drawings / are mixtures of poems and / portraits / of written interjections / and plastic evocations / of elements taken from / the materials / of human or animal forms. / So it is that / these drawings must be accepted / in the barbarity and disorder / of their / graphic expression “which never / concerned itself with / art” but with the sincerity / and spontaneity / of the stroke.374


When Artaud says that “none of them strictly speaking are works. All of them are drafts” (ébauches), it is clear that Artaud is looking to distinguish the contents of the exhibition from any classical understanding of a completed work. By describing his portraits as ébauches in the exhibition catalogue he immediately pulls the rug from underneath anyone seeking to interpret or assess them in accordance with the standard criteria of completed works. Instead, he emphasises their ‘active’ and investigative nature, as the sites of experiments in probing, and burrowing, “in all the directions of chance, possibility, luck, or destiny”. Ébauches – being sketches, outlines, drafts – would seem to designate their place as the very definition of preliminary or preparatory material to supplement something that is to come after. However, there was no sense at the Galerie Pierre of this being akin to the Città Nuova show, where Sant’Elia’s sketches and drafts represented the potential genesis of a larger and grander project of the future. There is no suggestion of the ébauches being ‘unfinished’ or to be developed and ‘worked up’ at a later date. Instead, Artaud qualifies the use of this term, of which there is a sense that it was still inadequate for Artaud, by describing the works in terms of their use for testing the waters, pushing the boundaries.

The use of these words, “probing” and “burrowing” describe an ongoing exploration of the world, through which the ébauches allow this to take place. There is here no question of ‘complete’ or ‘incomplete’ works, because that would be to already approach them from an art-historical perspective and vocabulary, whereas the execution of these portraits was part of a process that “never concerned itself with art” in the first place. Artaud explains that his only concern was with “the sincerity and spontaneity of the stroke”. Here there is a sense of looking to express an unrefined, unpolished or
ornamented ‘truth’ – both in the act of expression, and in that which is being expressed. This “sincerity and spontaneity” coupled with his endeavour to “manifest some sort of linear patent truths” brings together (in a certain way) both Schopenhauer and Heidegger. Here the “linear patent truths” Artaud refers to are both something to be manifested through the creative act, as well as being a spontaneity that carries with it the quality of sincerity untainted by the refinements that Schopenhauer claims ruins the works. The subjectile becomes a site from which truth must be wrestled, and which has the capacity to conceal or un conceal it depending upon how it is confronted. The subjectile emerges here as a conceptual method of understanding very specific and idiosyncratic forms of expression that confront that which already (or might) come to disrupt the creative act. The importance of this for the thesis is in showing how historical, theoretical, and curatorial methods of supplementing works (often influenced by one another) are woven into the creative process, and can become identified as obstacles to be overcome, illustrated in a heightened sense in Artaud’s works on paper. The struggle against such obstacles is not always successful.

Derrida alludes to this (in a text where he acknowledges a strong correlation between Heidegger and Artaud) when he says of the subjectile that it “can always betray the truth, either by revealing it, or, by hiding it”. Artaud refers to some of the drawings as being “mixtures of poems and portraits”, and demands that they be “accepted in the barbarity and disorder of their graphic expression”.

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375 Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, p. 101 (original emphasis).
Artaud’s explanation of his drawings is marked by an almost apologetic (yet defiant) tone, which anticipates a negative reception to his struggles with the subjectile, and with historically established methods of working. Derrida picks up Artaud’s defence of the “disorder of their graphic expression”, in what he calls Artaud’s ‘maladroitness’. Indeed, during the early stages of the period where Artaud first started to produce large drawings during his incarceration in Rodez, he qualified his works thus when he writes in 1946:

> My drawings are not drawings but documents. You must look at them and understand what’s inside. Judge them only from the standpoint of art or truthfulness as you would a telling and consummate object and you’ll say:

> This is all very well, but there is a lack of manual and technical training and as a draftsman Mr. Artaud is only a beginner, he needs ten years of personal apprenticeship or at the polytechnic of fine arts.

> Which is false, for I have worked at drawing for ten years in the course of my entire existence, but I despair of pure drawing.\(^{376}\)

Derrida sees Artaud’s maladroitness as an effort to “reappropriate this hand and body” from the “strict organisation of that kind of know-how which regulates itself by foreign forces and compromises with them. The compromise itself is ‘the system of beaux arts’, its technique, its norms and departments, its devices. The subjectile is one of them, but at the same time it represents and adjusts them to each other within the framework of the canvas”.\(^{377}\) These two defences of his works (defined as ébauches or as documents as opposed to works of art or drawings) appear to yield to the weight of the “system of the beaux arts.” This happens by using the language of supplementarity to fend off accusations of technical deficiency, by aligning them with the sort of exhibitions of

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\(^{377}\) Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In *The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud*, p. 104.
preliminary and preparatory drawings and sketches that were familiar in Paris at that time. Yet at the same time they are asserted as ends in themselves that “must be accepted in the barbarity and disorder of their graphic expression”. Again it is expression that is essential to Artaud, and not the systems of hierarchical ordering and judgement within which they might be received.

If, as ébauches, they are in any way supplementary, that which they supplement can only be Artaud himself. Yet at the same time he is himself supplemental to these ébauches, as he probes and burrows in all directions, with them and through them in order to seek out ephemeral moments of truth. And these moments, manifest on paper, echoing (but distinct from) the circle Heidegger describes of the artist who is only an artist when he creates artworks, find Artaud and his ébauches supplementing one another. Barber describes how, at the final event at the Galerie Pierre where he was to read a text to the audience, “Artaud would appear surrounded by his own drawings, as though by an army”. This romanticised description captures the interrelation between Artaud and his ébauches well, where both the portraits and Artaud himself are reinforced by the presence of one another. Each portrait is just one form among many that allows Artaud to continue in his own personal exploration, an exploration where any technical or stylistic proficiency would constitute a compromise that pandered to outside forces. Rowell observes that: “From portrait to portrait, Artaud does not attempt to improve his technique, to progress, or to perfect his style. On the contrary, his objective was to burrow even deeper under the skin, behind the facade, and to reveal psychological or

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378 Barber, Antonin Artaud: Blows and Bombs, p. 145.
mystical truths which were only his to see.”379 The ébauches are “documents” that are left over or produced in Artaud’s ongoing efforts to bring expression into being, in what Deleuze and Guattari call “the Artaud experiment”.380

Of importance here is the extent to which an artist (in this case, Artaud) can centralise the act of expression or the creative process, placing it above concerns for marketable products that would become the objects of consumption within galleries and museums. The argument of the previous chapter, that supplementary material emphasises (and creates an audience for) the enigmaticalness of the creative process itself, is given further justification here through a discussion of works in which their significance for the artist is in their creation, rather than in what is created.

Scheer describes Artaud’s works on paper: “One is not meant to accept it as an art object but as a document of the failed forms which it represents and which collapsed around the idea which they could only betray as they entered the atmosphere of the subjectile.”381 In such interpretations (including Artaud’s own), the ébauches document rather than constitute the work; the ‘actual’ work being Artaud’s continuing journey. As Derrida says, Artaud’s works on paper (at least the spells, portraits and large pictograms) are made as a result of “the arrest of the journey”.382 The arrest takes place when Artaud’s struggle with the subjectile succeeds or fails, only for a new struggle to follow. After the arrest, 

380 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 370.
381 Scheer, ‘Sketches of the Jet: Artaud’s Abreaction of the System of Fine Arts’. In 100 Years of Cruelty: Essays on Artaud, p. 64.
382 Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, p. 147 (original emphasis).
the gallery setting is akin to a jail, in which the forces of established codes and values of representation (in the ‘dogmatic image of thought’ that Deleuze considers Artaud, like himself, to be opposed to) impress upon them. In this sense, the defensive and confrontational content of Artaud’s catalogue text can be better understood. In such an interpretation, works of art on display could be described as by-products rather than end-products, where working is considered of more importance to the artist than what is worked. Chapter five discussed the extent to which museums and galleries can (usually inadvertently) draw attention to this as the primary enigma to be encountered.

The catalogue text itself, accompanying an exhibition made up of both drawings and text, constitutes supplementary material of a complex and ambiguous nature. An exhibition that involves texts by Artaud is introduced and framed by a text by Artaud that itself is not in the exhibition, but which nevertheless becomes integral and even central to the exhibition. Furthermore, this supplementary text that is situated alongside the exhibition’s contents determines the status of the drawings and portraits as ébauches or drafts. This causes the catalogue text, as that which defines and defends the status of the exhibition contents, to become the very element of the exhibition (that it is merely alongside) that embodies Artaud’s message most clearly. The catalogue becomes a parergon. The entirety of the exhibition is transformed through a reading of this text, which seemingly, instead of just introducing those in attendance to the works, serves to also introduce them to the audience by setting up the meaning of the drawings and portraits; altering their status and position in relation to conventional ‘concerns for art’. This illustrates the blurring of boundaries and slippages that can appear between the supplement and that which it supplements. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
supplement is not fixed in a supporting role, but disrupts and distorts by its very presence.

It is a form of supplementarity that is embedded in Artaud’s pictograms, or more accurately, it is a problematic sense of supplementary relations that Artaud incorporates into his works. Does the written content supplement the imagery? Does the imagery support the text? For Derrida, Artaud’s pictograms – through their confrontation and disruption of the subject, the object, and the subjectile (as a ‘thrown’ foundation) – constitute a “destabilisation made into work”.383 It is this juxtaposition of text and imagery that are so carefully interwoven that disrupts classical or conventional limits and borders between support and work, between the inside and outside. Artaud’s pictograms are at once both and neither. Yet as Artaud was making these pictograms he was also producing other works that would go even further to challenge and destabilise these limits – a series of four hundred and six notebooks. Barber provides a description: “A school-child’s notebook of the period habitually held forty-eight pages, each 22.5cm x 17.5cm, so the total number of pages in Artaud’s notebooks amount to around 20,000 pages.”384 Their importance consists in the understanding that: “If Artaud’s presence may be materialised and conjured in its most authentic state, resilient and uncompromised, it is in the form of those notebooks.”385

383 Derrida, ‘To Unsense the Subjectile’. In The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, p. 80.
384 Barber, Antonin Artaud: Terminal Curses, pp. 28-29.
The first notebook appeared towards the end of Artaud’s time at Rodez, but their number rapidly increased following his release. Pencil and pen are used to fill the pages with poetry, rants, lists, and spells, all haranguing and jostling for position against, beneath, in front of ‘drawings’. They would often indicate body parts, coffins, machines, spikes, as well as more abstract suggestions of forms. Figure 18 shows the extent to which the pages were often stabbed at, in this case where the pen or pencil has passed from one side to the other, cutting through existing pictograms, and creating holes to be traversed in future efforts. Barber indicates their ‘function’ as a vital extension of Artaud himself – as an ever present method of immediate expression that serves multiple purposes, saying that: “Artaud’s notebooks must fulfil their immense duty of servitude towards him – annulling his enemies, resisting representational processes, generating elements for his new anatomy, and literally accompanying him, folded in his jacket pocket, on his transits through Paris.”386 Their portable form, already unsuitable for future display, were treated with a certain distain (in order to carry several books with him, Artaud would often have to fold them in half so as to fit them in his pocket) that indicates their practical, personal use.

It is uncertain whether Derrida was even aware of the notebooks. Nevertheless, they can be understood as the section of Artaud’s work that confronts the subjectile and incorporates the parergon more so than any other. The school notebooks, by way of their practicality as cheap, convenient, and portable mediums, constitute an archetypal subjectile for Artaud’s purposes. In fact, as schoolboy notebooks they represent the very form and forming of institutionalised learning and representational thinking that Artaud

386 Ibid, pp. 28-29.
wished to attack. Figure 18 suggests such a battle against institutionalised learning (conscious or otherwise). The text in the top half of the picture still conforms to the guiding lines provided by the textbook’s grid; a learned and ingrained approach. However, the sentences in the bottom half abandon this rigidity, increasing in size, overlapping the lines, and wrapping around the punctured holes (itself implying that the holes preceded the text). The notebooks also appear to go against Derrida’s assertion that “the arrest of the journey makes the work”, due to the extent to which Artaud incorporated the notebooks into the journey itself. However, it is this very incorporation that supports Derrida’s comments on the pictograms, where the ‘work’ only appears when the journey is forced into an arrest via the conventions of the system of the beaux arts that demands ‘products’ to be shown and consumed.

\[\text{For more on the relationship between art and the grid, see Krauss, ‘The Originality of the Avant-Garde’. In } \text{The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, pp. 158-162.}\]
The notebooks break from the constraints of hierarchical representation, with no ordering of beginning, middle, or end. In a manner that aligns itself with Deleuze’s writing on the simulacra that enter into non-hierarchical relationships of equal series, the notebook contents constitute an open-ended ‘totality’. Barber alludes to this when he says that: “Each fragment of image or text, like each frame of a film, comprises an autonomous element that can be combined or separated at will, in order to find its place in the confrontations and transformations which he aims to materialise on his notebooks’ surfaces.”

Évelyne Grossman says in her introduction to *50 Drawings to Murder Magic*:

> The action was played out on a different stage, that of his small exercise books; Artaud was alone on that stage – yet at the same time he was multiform, taking all the parts himself, and acting simultaneously as author, actor, and spectator within the confines of the page, as he constructed a work, an object, that was both his and not his.

The contents of the notebooks are in this instance no longer sutured to a privately ‘schizophrenic’ conversation between the ‘artist’ and his own ‘creations’. Instead they become in equal part internal and external to Artaud, where in this *merging* between Artaud and that which is produced, that is, outside of him, he merges *with/into* the outside as much as the outside merges with him.

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The conventional model of supplementarity would be to consider the notebooks as preparations out of which the portraits were to be born, crystallised, and ‘perfected’. As such, the notebooks would provide an unrefined, draft form of Artaud’s ‘work’ that can be used by curators and art historians to ‘decode’ the ‘proper’ works to which they are deferred. But instead this model is turned on its head. Though a relationship between the notebooks and portraits is clearly evident, it is not one of preparation followed by refined execution made available to the public. The exhibition of his portraits and drawings at the Galerie Pierre was a result of encouragement and prompting from Artaud’s friends, rather than an active decision on his part to make his work available to the public – as if this was a consideration and intention when producing them.

Margit Rowell underlines this notion of Artaud’s notebooks as existing outside of artistic categorisation when she says that: “Although he did not call it such, his writings are a kind of extended journal or diary, the expression of his true being – not art, just being.” In this relationship between portraits, drawings, and notebooks, it is portraits and drawings that are subservient to the notebooks. It is only the private nature, and formal properties of the notebooks that suggest a function of preparation and an equipmental purpose within a working process – sharing these traits with the traditional artist’s sketchbooks, in which the initial, instant ideas were jotted down and saved for a later development. The public presentation of this ‘project’ of spontaneous, instantaneous sincerity came only as an after-thought, as something that might serve to further Artaud’s own private ‘working’ – to supplement it.

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Though it was known by some friends and associates that this had become Artaud’s preferred method of ‘working’, they were for the most part concealed from the public. Just before his death, Artaud was in the process of preparing a book, *50 Drawings to Murder Magic* at Loeb’s prompting. Loeb was interested in the “curious drawings” he had seen in some of Artaud’s notebooks, and he suggested publishing a selection. That Artaud agreed to the suggestion, and was actively selecting pages at the time of his death, indicates that there was no particular importance placed in maintaining their private existence, even if their existence came about through no prior considerations of potential publication.

Artaud prepared a supplementary text for this book, which included the following section:

We are not concerned here with / drawings / properly speaking, / or with any kind of incorporation / of reality by drawings. / These are not an attempt / to renew / the art / of drawing / in which I have never believed / no / but to understand them / they must first be placed in context. / They are 50 drawings / taken from exercise books / containing notes / literary / poetic / psychological / physiological / magical / especially magical / magical first / and foremost.

Once again, Artaud’s need to justify his creative process re-surfaces in an accompanying text, emphasising the text’s importance for placing his work (which he distances from a concern for drawings, or a renewal of the art of drawing) in context. At one and the same time, Artaud draws attention to their outwardly preparatory or preliminary nature by explaining their origins in exercise books, whilst elevating their importance as works of a

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psychological and ‘magical’ value. This highlights the transformative properties of the supplement, which is here employed by the artist themselves in order to account for works never intended to be displayed, where the supplementary text forms a bridge between the creative act, and the public reception of what is produced in this act. In Artaud’s approach to his works on paper, and his approach to their public viewing, supplementarity is incorporated, challenged, reversed, and emphasised. Through this discussion of Artaud’s working process, the importance of the supplement (as both an obstacle and as a means of transformation), is shown to permeate through discourse, the creative act, and the displaying of works of art. Whilst Artaud’s works on paper highlight these aspects of supplementarity in a very specific and direct way, the analysis of these works, and Derrida’s concept of the subjectile, opens up questions of the relationship between art practice, and institutionalised conventions surrounding art practice, that will be useful for artists, art historians, scholar’s of Derrida’s philosophy of art, and both museum and archive theory.

**Representing the Non-Representational**

In this section I discuss the use made of Artaud’s work after his death. Of particular concern are the ways in which the techniques and material used by Artaud have affected the preservation and public display of his work, and the degrees to which biographical considerations (especially that of mental illness) have shaped the ways in which exhibitions of his works are marketed.
Indifferent to the notion of making the notebooks available to the public whilst he was alive, Artaud was nevertheless sufficiently concerned with their continued existence in order to entrust the vast majority of them to his friend Paule Thévenin. Artaud packed them up in Thévenin’s large metal travelling trunk, and requested that they were not to be destroyed in the event of his death.  

After some time had elapsed following Artaud’s death, Thévenin would discover upon opening her travelling trunk that it contained a dead rat that prior to its death had damaged some of the notebooks. This illustrates well the degree to which this substantial visual material of Artaud’s productive creative life was not subject to the protective conservational acts demanded of the material/works left behind by artists deemed of cultural significance. As Barber writes, “his public status on 4 March 1948 was not that of a great writer or artist whose work demanded immediate preservation for the future enrichment of national culture”. Thévenin, a close friend of Artaud’s that would have had both an emotional investment in preserving and nurturing Artaud’s legacy, as well as a more informed awareness of the intensity and dedication of his own working process, was keen to make use of the notebooks left to her. No doubt with an awareness of the dominant role Artaud’s literary reputation had over his other creative outlets, her efforts to render the contents of the notebooks publicly available would neglect the drawings, marks, and stabbings. Barber describes how “separated from their

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393 Barber, Antonin Artaud: Terminal Curses, p. 30.
394 Ibid.
396 Paule Thévenin provides a vivid account of Artaud’s working process during a sitting for a portrait (see Thévenin, ‘The Search for a Lost World’. In The Secret Art of Antonin Artaud, pp. 30-31).
vital confrontation with Artaud’s images and from the combat-surface of the notebook page itself, those texts’ extraordinary form stayed concealed”. The full content of Artaud’s notebooks, as well as the majority of his large drawings that were also within Thévenin’s collection, were to remain concealed for forty-five years after Artaud’s death. In September 1993 Thévenin passed away, with the notebooks and drawings being donated to the Bibliothèque Nationale de France in Paris. The importance of this account is that it illustrates the contingency surrounding the survival of these works, the extent to which Artaud’s works were ‘forgotten’, and how, even when eventually utilised, the content made available was selective.

Just over three years after these drawings and notebooks were donated to the Bibliothèque Nationale de France after Thévenin’s death, MoMA held an exhibition comprising of material from this donation, along with ‘works’ from private collections and various French museums and galleries (primarily the Centre Georges Pompidou). In the foreword to the accompanying catalogue the Director of MoMA, Glenn D. Lowry, introduced the exhibition by saying that:

> Although these drawings ultimately must be seen in the broad context of Artaud’s complicated and disturbed life, and in relation to his extraordinary literary output, they also can be appreciated for what they are: discrete works of art, often of great power and beauty. And while Artaud’s literary genius was recognised – if not fully appreciated – during his lifetime, it is only recently that his legacy as a visual artist has become clear.

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This comment at once emphasises the biographical influence upon the suggested and anticipated reception of the show, with reference to his “disturbed life” juxtaposed with acknowledgement and praise for his literary reputation. Here an unusual reversal of ‘visual art’ takes place. The historical knowledge of the ‘artist’, usually established upon the grounds of their visual output, *precedes* that of the ‘work’ itself, which for the most part had remained largely unknown since shortly after their creation. In this respect, the ‘work’ is subordinated to, and made to supplement, the “broad context” of Artaud’s biographical information. It is the establishing of a dominant historical *notion* of ‘Artaud’ grounded upon a constructed image of Artaud’s life and work that was carried out over a forty-five year period, where much of this material was unable, due to its concealed state, to have any bearing. As with Sant’Elia’s works on paper, scarcity coupled with a mythologised reputation, equals commodity value.

When Lowry says that Artaud’s legacy has “become clear”, it is rather in the sense of a *fuller* and more detailed picture of Artaud’s total visual output becoming available. The historical role Artaud’s output occupies in the development of visual art, on the contrary, becomes more ambiguous and indistinct. It is this ambiguity that pushes Artaud’s ‘unearthed’ material toward a supplementary position in relation to both other works of that era, and indeed to the historical picture of Artaud already established at that point. Elsewhere in the preface to the catalogue, Lowry emphasises the biographical relevance of the work. He highlights its personal and internal value, as opposed to that which may be engaged with or productively encountered, stating that “as intense as they are personal, these strange incantations and spells, fragmented images, and penetrating
portraits offer a glimpse of Artaud’s world”. Like discovered diary entries or preparatory sketches, the material is put forward as having an auxiliary function – subordinated to the task of embellishing a pre-existing image of Artaud the individual.

The work of this exhibition presents a problem that exposes crossovers between conventional applications/uses of supplementary material usually in relation to a respected or revered body of work to which the supplementary material is subordinated. Here the material concerned resists the established structures and codes employed to present and critique a show of visual works. Even the title of the exhibition presents a problem of a certain familiar usage that is ill-fitted to the exhibition’s contents – a point that Denis Hollier identifies when asking us to:

Think for a moment about the title of the show: *Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper*. In an artist’s *catalogue raisonné*, the expression ‘works on paper’ refers to that part of his or her oeuvre that the artist hasn’t put on a major, canonical support, canvas if a painter is in question, bronze or marble if a sculptor. Internal to the plastic arts, this taxonomy doesn’t apply to literature, however. Artaud, to my knowledge, has never painted on canvas. The slight, if poetic, *détournement* that applies this rubric to Artaud’s drawings, to the plastic production of a writer, this entails interesting semantic effects: The expression ‘works on paper’ no longer referring primarily to the support of the work, but to the types of signs traced on it.

Further to Hollier’s observations, I would add that the exhibition title is an acknowledgement of the supplementary status the organisers gave to the material being displayed. Hollier is correct in highlighting the absence of “major, canonical” pieces by

399 Ibid.

Artaud, along with the anomalous nature of naming the show after a term that is traditionally used to delineate supporting, preliminary, or preparatory material. However, the title at the same time emphasises such connotations – ensuring that the work (despite absent “canonical” pieces to which they might refer/defer) can be understood as being of a ‘lesser’ nature than prevailing notions of art works proper. In short, the exhibition title is a method of presenting the contents of the exhibition as being supplementary material through the use of a phrase that, though literally accurate, is one that usually implies the existence of a more established and revered body of work to which such ‘works on paper’ provide insights.

Recalling Derrida’s notion of the subjectile as the locus of a battle between the artist and internal or external institutionalisation, the gallery setting, in a sense, is already a defeat or a renewed onslaught against the work. New forms of representation, in all its structured organisation, is brought together in force, where in the case of the MoMA show, even the artist’s own reputation is used ‘against’ the works. In Figure 18, the ‘victory’ of institutionalisation is literally stamped onto Artaud’s work, with the red stamp simultaneously cataloguing and ordering the page, whilst indicating that the contents of the page are considered to be of such a ‘lowly’ status and value as to be susceptible to alteration and disfigurement.

Margit Rowell, in an accompanying essay within the exhibition catalogue, astutely addresses both the uncompromising and indiscernible quality of the works, and also the obscuring nature of the shadow cast by the life of Artaud and his literary reputation, saying of the works that:
It must be said that the context within which they might be examined is problematic. Whereas it is clear that they cannot be totally dissociated from his biography or from his written oeuvre, their extraordinary expressive impact forces us to acknowledge them on their own terms. This being said, it is difficult to compare them to the work of other artists of any given period, including Artaud’s own.  

This quotation highlights the dualistic state of the material displayed, whereby the work “forces us to acknowledge them on their own terms”. This is in part due to the qualities of the pictures and ‘drawings’ that still retain their originary sense of being isolated adventures, probings, and burrowings that were never intended to be understood or evaluated within a wider context. At the same time, they are subsumed by an historical awareness that meant that at the time of the MoMA exhibition, Artaud’s biography and written oeuvre had dictated the formation of his reputation whilst these works remained concealed for forty-five years.

Of the sixty-eight works that were displayed in the MoMA exhibition, none were taken from the notebooks. Such was/is their format that the issue of display itself is rendered problematic before anything else. In recent years, the French publisher Gallimard has provided two potential solutions to make public at least part of the content of this considerable body of material. In 2004, they released a hardback edition (later translated and released in England) of what was constructed to be as faithful an interpretation of the proposed book being worked on by Pierre Loeb and Artaud at the time of Artaud’s death – 50 Drawings to Murder Magic. The book contains a preface from Évelyne Grossman in which she emphasises the “careful and technical rendering of the seemingly crude and chaotic imagery (consider the cast-shadow work (hatching, stump drawing),

the use of light (‘the as-it-were flickering light of these drawings’) and of chiaroscuro”. 402
Such a description recalls the discussion of the importance of technique explored in chapter two. In 2006, Gallimard released a series of precisely rendered facsimiles of one of Artaud’s notebooks from January 1948, from the period just before his death. Barber describes their precision: “the paper, pencil-marks and ink-marks reproduced to the last detail, with only the corporeal elements of the original notebooks, and the gestural rips in its paper, missing”. 403 This recalls the discussion of aura in chapters one and five.

Gallimard’s endeavour to reveal aspects of at least one notebook in an imperfect but rigorous manner shows an intriguing level of care and dedication in looking to navigate around the ‘problem’ presented by the format/medium in which the vast majority of Artaud’s visual material would appear. The facsimile is devoid of the trace or impression of the ‘artist’ - precisely the crucial auratic quality that forms a significant dimension of Artaud’s engagement with/upon/through the subjectile - in opposition to Benjamin (though perhaps given the necessity of a facsimile at all, Benjamin’s position in regards the reproduction is pertinent). However, it is able to place in close proximity an example of Artaud’s most intimate works in the hands of interested participants. The facsimile is here a supplementary object that, rather than being positioned adjacent or beneath that which it supplements, is instead in-place of it (or at least one of over four-hundred versions). The one facsimile stands in for the entirety of the notebooks – dependent upon their existence and receiving almost all of its own qualities directly from that to which it is deferred. However, the facsimile exceeds the notebooks in as far their

402 Grossman, Antonin Artaud: 50 Drawings to Murder Magic, p. XI.
403 Barber, Antonin Artaud: Terminal Curses, p. 124.
potential to be shared and consequently experienced. The facsimile renders the (imperfect) form of the notebook accessible, whilst nevertheless emphasising the uniqueness of the original.

The problematic format of his material, along with the issue of the biographical servitude towards which the works in the MoMA exhibition were in part positioned, was made even more apparent at the largest show to date dedicated to Artaud. Called simply ‘Exposition Antonin Artaud’, the exhibition took place at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, in 2006-2007, and consisted of over 300 items, including 60 of the notebooks (their largest public showing). The show, despite consisting of the largest ever collection of his ‘works on paper’, was heavily orientated towards a biographical account of Antonin Artaud. The works become subsumed within this overriding intention to, perhaps contrarily, piece together the multiple and fractured identities Artaud passed through.

Divided into four outer sections dedicated, in turn, to his self-portraits, theatre work, his writing, and his involvement in film, these rooms surround a centre space of a primarily biographical nature, as if to emphasise the centrality of the biographical/personal focus of the show in relation to the various projects or endeavours that orbit around it. Key figures from his life (including his doctors) are introduced, alongside medical information indicating the diagnoses and proposed treatments that would lead to his sessions of electroshock therapy. Personal belongings such as his passport are presented alongside ‘spells’ held in Plexiglas and up against lights so as to allow the imagery and text on the

other side to become discernible. The exhibition ensures a totalising submersing into the varied forms of expression employed by Artaud during his life, with the walls, floors and ceiling filled with passages from his texts, whilst audio recordings fill the space with his voice. 405

Such an exhibition as that at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, was no doubt exemplary in both celebrating the multi-faceted forms of creative endeavours, as well as painting a vivid picture of his extraordinary and tumultuously tragic life. However, in a significantly more precise, exacting, and intrusive manner than in the MoMA exhibition, the biographical image (one that cannot help but be incomplete and fabricated) takes centre stage. It renders any available material (letters, descriptions of friends, doctors, acquaintances, photographs, stage costumes, ‘spells’, notebooks, portraits, audio recordings, personal artefacts) as supplementary material. The use of such material causes the mythologised ‘Artaud’ to eclipse an engagement with Artaud’s work, and whilst the enigma of the creative process discussed in chapter five is in part supported, it remains subordinate to an historical account of the mythologised individual. 406

Turning back to the notebooks themselves, and the problematic nature of their accessibility, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France is currently undertaking the laborious


task of documenting and digitising each of the 2,000 pages of all 406 notebooks in order to digitise them. On one hand, a vital quality of the notebooks - their tactile, assaulted, worked at presence – will resist all attempts at replication on an online digital archive. On the other hand, this process offers the best solution yet to the ‘problem’ of opening them up to a new form of direct experience. As Barber argues: “The digital world, in its infinite replication and transmuting representation of Artaud’s notebook pages, may negate the vital presence of gesture within them, and make it a consumable, assimilable artefact, like any other; or it may serve to re-activate presence.”\textsuperscript{407} I suspect the reality will fall somewhere in between, where the shortcomings of the digital representations will be countered by their superior ability to reach a wider audience that is increasingly used to navigate the web in order to experience and consume all aspects of culture.

What then would become of the original notebooks themselves? Barber raises his concern that the notebooks will be irreversibly affected by the process of digitisation as “the digital fundamentally shifts the status of whatever it engulfs”.\textsuperscript{408} To this end, there is again an echo of the debate between Benjamin and Adorno, in which the privileged position of the original work may be made to give way in the face of a technology that jettisons the significance of the auratic in favour of a radicalised form of expression, communication, and function. The opposing argument is of course that no matter how perfectly scanned and captured, the digital versions will never be able to replicate the

\textsuperscript{407} Barber, Antonin Artaud: Terminal Curses, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{408} Ibid, p. 122.
madness (or ἡσεί) of the notebooks themselves.\(^{409}\) The digital rendering of the notebooks will have the added effect of preserving the contents in a more or less permanent, endlessly reproducible manner. In turn, it would allow the original notebooks to be better conserved (though most likely condemned to the subsidiary status of artefacts wheeled out for occasional shows; impractical and cumbersome in comparison to their digitised versions). A digitised collection of Artaud’s notebooks will allow them to become more accessible than the original versions would ever be able to, beyond a solitary encounter.

This section establishes the extent to which the mythologising of artists, identified in chapter two as originating as early as the Renaissance, continues to dominate contemporary art exhibitions. The prominence of mental illness characterises (and therefore distorts) the uses of Artaud’s works on paper since his death, which shows the extent to which uses of supplementarity dictate the ways in which an artist’s reputation can be shaped and perpetuated. The problematic nature of Artaud’s incorporation of supplementarity is invariably acknowledged, but reduced in importance within the very institutional mechanisms of definition that his work opposed. This discussion also has implications for the philosophy of technology, wherein creative techniques (such as the use of notebooks) limits the capacity to which original works can be displayed, whilst encouraging new uses of digital technology to overcome these shortfalls in ways that call for a reconsideration of the value of technological developments in preserving and making available, historical works.

\(^{409}\) It nevertheless remains possible that developments in 3D printing will be able to replicate, to a large extent, the texture, degradation, indentation and (in the case of Artaud) burning and tearing of original works on paper, reducing the distance between facsimile and original (at least at a superficial level).
Conclusion

Through an exploration of Artaud’s approach to his works on paper, Derrida’s notion of
the subjectile that relates directly to Artaud, and the ways in which Artaud’s works has
been used since his death, this chapter highlights the importance of this discussion for
understanding three significant issues concerning the role of the supplement.

The first section of this chapter introduces the notion of ‘negative supplementarity’,
which is defined as a use of supplementary material in a way that overtly distorts or taints
the interpretation of an oeuvre, at the expense of other qualities. The implications this
has for other areas of study into artistic practice extend to appropriation, mythologising,
the influence of medical information, and other forms of information such as criminal
history, drug addiction, and political activity. Supplementarity is therefore identified as
an intervention that can dominate public and historical perceptions of works of art and
creative activity.

The second section addresses problems of a supplementary nature that can be identified
by, contested, and incorporated into creative practice. This section is important for
highlighting the ambiguities that exist between classically or conventionally defined
borders between support and work, revealing the extent to which these ambiguities can
encourage or restrict approaches to creative practice. This section also draws attention
to the ubiquitous nature of institutionalised modes of producing, displaying, and
critiquing works of art that formulate a matrix of supplementary values, methods of
working, or expectations that permeate (and therefore knowingly or unknowingly shape) the creative process itself.

The last section contrasts the concerns of the second section with a discussion of how influential negative supplementarity and institutionalised or conventional approaches to the interpretation and public display of works of art can be. This section is important for both revealing and emphasising the capacity for supplementarity to establish a mythologised characterisation of the artist that frames discourse and the presentation of their works in a specific way. The third section also addresses the importance of technology in both art practice and art display, whereby supporting material used by an artist can lead to new approaches (particularly digital) that simultaneously archive and make available, works considered to be of public interest.

Overall, this chapter, in distinction to the three previous case studies, places supplementarity at the centre of art practice, art discourse, art archiving, and art display.
Conclusion

In the introduction to this thesis I outlined its three core objectives: to address the ways in which supplementary material affects and alters the meaning of ‘the work of art’; to analyse the ways in which supplementary material has been archived, preserved, and displayed; and to understand supplementary material as ‘cultural objects’ that have their own importance, whilst directly impacting on how works are produced, received, and interpreted.

These objectives have been addressed through two chapters that establish the key concepts relating to the supplement that have emerged in philosophy and art history, and by four case studies that each respond to a particular question: what is the supplement?; how is supplementary material classified?; why is the supplement important?; and in what way is supplementarity problematic for the status of works of art? Through my discussion of these questions I have addressed my three objectives in detail, and have shown that supplementarity is an important, yet under-developed area of study with particular implications for art practice, art theory, archive theory, museum theory, cultural studies, the philosophy of technology, and the philosophy of art. This thesis therefore establishes a theory of supplementarity that calls for a re-interpretation of supplementary material and its relationship to how works of art are understood, with supplementarity encompassing a rich and complex series of objects that are of cultural importance.
In chapter one, ‘The Supplement and Philosophy’, the key philosophical concepts of importance to supplementarity are identified in the works of Kant, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, Deleuze, and Derrida. These are discussed in detail, establishing how supplementarity, often indirectly or obliquely, has influenced or been disregarded in philosophical interpretations of the meaning of art and art works. Chapter one is significant for the thesis as it identifies the philosophical concepts applied to works of art that become problematic or have their implications extended into new areas, when re-considered in direct relation to supplementary material. This chapter introduced these key philosophical concepts explored in the four case study chapters, and also outlined the importance of supplementarity as a relevant philosophical consideration.

In chapter two, ‘The Supplement in Art History’, the same approach to chapter one is employed, whereby the key events and concepts emerging from art history are identified and discussed. This chapter shows how the history of art is at one and the same time a history of supplementarity, where the discourses that constitute the recorded history of art have continuously shaped the interpretation and creation of works of art. As different approaches to supporting works of art became prioritised or discarded, the use of supplementary material is shown to fluctuate, whilst remaining of continued importance for establishing the context in which artworks were, and are, produced, received, and displayed. Yet despite this pivotal role, supplementarity itself has remained largely unexplored. Chapter two identifies three valuable categories for emphasising the importance of the supplement: ‘Interpretation and Display’ – where the supplement is influential for interpreting art in terms of classification, education, and display; ‘The Production of Value’ – wherein the role of supplementarity is explored in relation to the
production, creation, or re-presentation of works of art; and ‘Technology and the
Supplement’ – where the importance of equipment (whether the material used, or the
means by which works can be circulated and interpreted) for shaping creative practice is
underlined.

The question addressed in chapter three – ‘what is the supplement?’ – extends the
discussion of technology by re-evaluating the status of particular forms of art equipment
(in particular, works-for-art). Through my interpretation and application of Heidegger’s
notion of causality I show that the distinctions between art and equipment that
Heidegger himself had argued, are opened up to a more complex and detailed analysis
when applied to works-for-art such as Moore’s sketches, maquettes, plasters, and
bronzes. All of these forms of work are shown to not only fall between Heidegger’s
distinction between art and equipment, but are revealed to combine creativity and
equipmental use in very specific ways. The notion of ‘enshrining’ is asserted as a new
way of considering the act of utilising preliminary or preparatory works in the creation of
further works, and is an original claim of this thesis that has implications for the
evaluation of the creative act. My interpretation of Heidegger’s notion of causality
provides a way of analysing the construction of both works-of-art and works-for-art, by
combining Heidegger’s approaches to both equipment and art in a way that shows how
the act of creation itself, rather than the classical causa efficiens that centralises the
importance of the artist (and which is rejected by Heidegger) is identifiable in works-for-
art in a way that is incompatible with a purely equipmental function. The status of
conventionally defined preliminary and preparatory material is shown to not only be
complex, rich, and capable of analysis in itself, but is shown to complicate its use by the
artist themselves, or by their estate. Commodification is shown to take place, not just as a means of making use of material left over from the creative process, but due to the qualities that such preliminary and preparatory works contain that allows them to become commodities.

In chapter four I respond to the question – ‘how is the supplement classified?’ – by showing that differences between ‘support’ and ‘complete’ works have been conventionally and historically classified through the application of particular methods of interpretation that can be traced back to Plato’s philosophy of identity, and which have continued to dominate Western attitudes towards the distinction between model and copy. Further to this discussion, the classification of the supplement is also shown to be vulnerable to historical and political events (such as the early death of the artist, or the political motivations of groups or individuals associated with an artist). Through a combination of Deleuze’s concept of the ‘sign’, and his re-interpretation of Plato’s concept of the simulacrum, I applied these methods of interpreting art to Sant’Elia’s works on paper in order to demonstrate the extent to which such works can be experienced as having their own unique aesthetic qualities. These qualities are shown to become illuminated once the classical and hierarchical division of model and copy has been called into question. This chapter is important for showing that nominally material ‘support’ (together with its implications for the philosophy of technology) is not irrevocably reduced to a supporting role in relation to complete works of art, but is capable of being experienced aesthetically in its own right, or elevated to a position of cultural importance under specific conditions of appropriation.
Chapter five responds to the question – ‘why is the supplement important?’ – by establishing the ways in which concepts and approaches emerging from philosophy, the history of art, and art theory, have combined to (for the most part) inadvertently centralise the importance of the creative process. The distinctive nature of Bacon’s relocated and reconstructed art studio allowed for a detailed analysis of the cultural importance of supplementarity, and its significant implications for interpretations of works of art. Benjamin’s notion of aura was shown to have a continued resonance in the experience of art, whereby the very reproductions (in this case, photographs, films, documentaries, and books) served to mythologise and strengthen the importance of the ‘original’, and the auratic qualities associated with biographical association.

This is coupled with my interpretation of Adorno’s notion of enigmaticalness – the puzzling and mystifying nature of art that for Adorno constitutes its cultural value – which I use to turn against the apparently negative effects of the demystifying processes of supplementarity that Adorno and Horkheimer called ‘deaestheticisation’. For Adorno, educational devices, works-for-art used to show methods of working, and biographical material, would all go against the enigmaticalness of works of art, because they became efforts to ‘solve’ their mystery. Instead, I argue that within the concentrated and sanctified environment of the art gallery or museum that encourages profound or richer experiences, the inclusion of supplementary material centralises the enigmaticalness of the creative process itself. Supplementary material such as works-for-art and biographical material, exhibited as solutions to works of art reduced to riddles to be solved, instead invite new questions and mysteries. As Derrida states: “The supplement
transforms and detaches. Both at once.”

This is a pivotal chapter of the thesis that establishes the extent to which supplementary material can transform the experience of art by making the creative process of central importance (emphatically represented by Bacon’s relocated and reconstructed studio), whilst detaching the outcome (or work) of the creative process from its position as a focal point. The supplement is important because, by being displayed in an environment historically designed to emphasise a concentrated consideration of what is on view, it becomes important.

Chapter six, in its response to the question – ‘how is the supplement problematic for works of art?’ – distinguishes itself from the previous case studies by focusing on an artist who not only incorporated the problematic nature of supplementarity into his creative process, but who directly influenced the philosophical and art-historical discourse concerning the subject of this thesis. The supplement is problematic for works of art because it disrupts conventional approaches to the creation, reception, and displaying of works of art. Supplementarity is not passive, but is instead always disrupting boundaries, borders, margins, and distinctions between the supplement and what is supplemented. This chapter analyses a series of complex interactions between different forms of supplementarity that become projected, incorporated, rejected, and re-classified. In this chapter I establish the notion of ‘negative supplementarity’ whereby a specific consideration outside the work itself (in this case, the stigma of insanity), become attached to an artist’s work in such a way that it dominates its reception. In the case study of Artaud, this stigmatism is shown to be incorporated into Artaud’s own approach to his work, along with a conscious effort to struggle against the numerous supporting or

410 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 243 (original emphasis).
outside/adjacent factors that pre-empt, influence, or frustrate the creative process.

Through a detailed discussion of Derrida’s concepts of the parergon and the subjectile (the latter being directly taken from, and applied to Artaud), supplementarity is shown to be deeply interwoven into the creative process, whilst capable of emerging as an important artistic consideration in its own right. This chapter also shows how such an open engagement with this problematic and disruptive area of the creative process has been accommodated and navigated by the very institutions that Artaud struggled against.

Madness permeates the accompanying literature to exhibitions of Artaud’s works, and in the case of ‘Exposition Antonin Artaud’, is brought to the fore through the inclusion of psychiatric reports and historical accounts of the doctors that treated him. The implications that the incorporation of supplementarity into the creative process has for technology, archiving, and display are also shown, where facsimiles and digital scans are employed to resolve the problems of displaying material never intended to account for such concerns. This chapter therefore establishes the extent to which supplementarity can disrupt approaches, interpretations, classifications, and the accommodation of works of art.

The discussion of supplementarity is not only identified as a major concern existing within the philosophy, history, criticism, and creation of art, but is shown to have important implications for both historical and contemporary studies into the production, status, distinction, classification, appropriation, displaying, archiving, and experiencing of works-of-art, works-for-art, and supporting material in general. Through the four case studies these implications are introduced, supported, and established in ways that open up and
emphasise the importance of the supplement for understanding and re-considering approaches to, and evaluations of, works of art and the creative process.

This thesis encourages new research into the role of supplementarity in: creative practice, the archiving of artists’ works and biographical material, the philosophy of technology (in particular the re-evaluation of the different materials used in the creative process, as well as interpretations of equipment), archive theory (both classical and digital), museum theory, and the history of art. It will also be of value for studies into the history of drawing (in particular, its classification and use in displays), the ‘cult of personality’, curating (in particular, the transformative effects of the uses of supplementary material), the museum experience as ritual (and its effects on how different forms of work are interpreted), post-processual archaeology, studies of ornamentation, and the relationship between mental illness and art (in particular, the extent to which discussions of mental illness ‘frame’ the ways in which certain works are presented and understood).

This thesis also has implications for more specific studies of Henry Moore, Antonio Sant’Elia, Francis Bacon, and Antonin Artaud, as it calls for a reconsideration of the classification and displaying of their works and associated biographical material. The use of philosophical concepts in this thesis encourages new research projects into interpretations of art in the works of Kant, Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, Deleuze, and Derrida, as it extends these interpretations to different forms of the creative process, such as conventionally defined supporting material.
Having begun this project with an interest in the curious nature and appeal of displayed works-for-art that seemed to escape conventional classification, the journey of my research has led me into unanticipated depths of art history, creative practice, and philosophy that stretched far beyond my expectations. I intend to extend this journey by conducting further research that explores in more detail the centrality of the creative process, the notion of the ‘incomplete’ in art, digital approaches to archiving (including the potential of 3D printing to transform the process and theories of technological reproduction), a more detailed study of the symbolic value of Bacon’s studio door, and the deconstruction of reconstruction (in particular, the act of myth-building) that uses of supplementary material instigate.

What began as a study of the use of preliminary and preparatory works in exhibition displays has ended in a call for the re-evaluation of the significance of what have been historically neglected and unjustly subservient works of great cultural importance. The status of the work of art itself becomes problematic in an approach that emphasises different stages in the creative process, and the value of biographical material that is no longer strictly informative. Over the course of this thesis, supplementarity emerges as a hidden or largely overlooked issue that permeates the history, criticism, practice, and philosophy of art, whilst acting directly upon it in ways that have shaped its course, defined its margins, and served to act as a vital, yet unsung, support. Through this discussion and analysis of the complexities, subtleties, disruptions, and illuminations of this important, yet perennially deferential area of art history, I hope to bring this culturally significant topic of study out of the shadows, and into full view.
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**Figure 7**: *Antonio Sant’Elia: The Complete Works*, New York: Rizzoli, 1988, p. 250.

**Figure 8**: *Antonio Sant’Elia: The Complete Works*, New York: Rizzoli, 1988, p. 250.
Figure 9: Antonio Sant’Elia: The Complete Works, New York: Rizzoli, 1988, p. 81.

Figure 10: http://flickrhivemind.net/Tags/monumentoacadut,warmemorial/Interesting

Figure 11: www.tripadvisor.co.uk/Attraction_Review-g186605-d187624-Reviews-
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Figure 12: Cappock, Margarita, Francis Bacon’s Studio, London: Merrell, 2005, p. 174.

Figure 13: Cappock, Margarita, Francis Bacon’s Studio, London: Merrell, 2005, p. 207.

Figure 14: Beyond Reason: Art and Psychosis, Works from the Prinzhorn Collection,

Figure 15: Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper, Margit Rowell, ed. New York: The Museum of
Modern Art, 1996, p. 129.

Figure 16: http://tumblr.lareviewofbooks.org/post/7375314396/theaters-of-cruelty

Figure 17: Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper, Margit Rowell, ed. New York: The Museum

Figure 18: Grossman, Évelyne, Antonin Artaud: 50 Drawings to Murder Magic, Oxford:
Appendix One

The following paper was presented at ‘Philosophy &.....’, The Society for European Philosophy and Forum for European Philosophy Annual Conference, 31 August – 3 September 2011, York St John University.

Francis Bacon and the Unconcealment of Truth

For thirty years the artist Francis Bacon worked amongst the chaos of his Kensington apartment at 7 Reece Mews, until his death in 1992. Six years later archaeologists and conservationists, under the direction of the Hugh lane Gallery, began to systematically remove the studio contents, including the floor, the walls, and the door; bringing the material back to Dublin. Finally on the 23 May 2001 The Hugh Lane Gallery opened up their new display to the public – the meticulously reconstructed studio. But can it still be called a studio? Can it yet be called a display?

Using Heidegger’s interpretation of truth as ἀλήθεια, or unconcealment, as a methodological tool, I will look to explore the ways in which the material I refer to here as a display, currently gathered together in the Hugh Lane, has passed through a series of truths. Where each emergence of such a truth signals the submerging and obfuscating of others, and where prominence is in the hands of those who preserve perceived significance.

To begin with alétheia and the display; what is it that emerges, what is it that stays veiled, and what is it that is particular to this display? Indeed this very word, ‘display’, lends itself well to the conceptual language employed by Heidegger. Derived from the French ‘despleier’, this in turn is derived from the Latin ‘plicare’, meaning to fold (or more literally, to fold inwards), with the assigned prefix, ‘dis’, making ‘displicare’ – to unfold – or to fold apart. This idea of the display as an unfolding or folding apart easily evokes the Heideggerian imagery of ἀλήθεια as an unveiling of something that was formerly concealed. For something to be unfolded implies that it had previously been folded inwards. Unfolding is a revealing, an unconcealing that allows something to be brought into view, and in this way the term ‘display’ seems all the more apt for describing Bacon’s relocated/reassembled studio. From out of its ‘veiled’ existence in the impractical-to-access building of Kensington, this display allows something of the studio that was previously hidden to be revealed. However, with every unconcealment there is an accompanying concealment; ἀλήθεια, is for Heidegger never revealed to us as a totality, but only as partial revelations that come to us at the expense of others. With the display in the Hugh Lane, accessibility emerges as the authenticity of its original location slips away from us. An insight into the private life of the artist is illuminated, but only through
the fading into obscurity of the mystery and intrigue that could only exist in the foreground as long as so much remained veiled.

The private sanctuary, an essential part of the ‘atmosphere’ Bacon identified when he first experienced the place, was a specific truth that could only ever appear lit up and vivid to Bacon himself. By recreating the studio in a public gallery, the echoes of this sanctuary are obliterated, replaced by something altogether different, where instead of an escape from the world that Bacon had control over, we now have a space accessible to all, albeit from behind glass; instead of a select group of familiar faces congregating within the studio, we have an endless stream of strangers passing around a display. Furthermore, so many objects that constitute the display, were for Bacon a mixture of the merely ‘ready-to-hand’, holding little or no value for him, and able to be utilised as part of his artistic projects precisely because of this ‘lack’ of significance. For the viewer however, the most inconspicuous of objects (for Bacon) might reveal so much more to them. A copy of Viz magazine, which for Bacon may have warranted no further thought following its purchase, can for the viewer seeing this in the display represent a certain proclivity for a form of humour that one had never expected. The reverse is equally applicable, where a photograph that may have held a deep, personal value to Bacon, in a sense finds this value concealed from us. Unshackled from sentimentality, other truths about the photograph may rise up, which perhaps only the dissociated stranger is in a position to grasp (for instance the judgement of formal properties, unhindered by an emotional attachment to the subject).

Already we can see how considering such things in terms of ἀλήθεια’ causes them to shift and reform depending upon the beholder and the context in which the beholding takes place. The ‘truth’ contained within this display is something wholly dependent on the specific context of its current existence, where whatever truths existed for this assemblage of objects in the past is only relevant in as far as they are able to persist through to the current situation, whether through the qualities inherent in the objects in-themselves, or by knowledge passed on in whatever forms to those experiencing the display.

The ability of a truth to persist could be called a chain of preservation, whereby the concerns, priorities and requirements of whoever made use of the material in question, allow such truths to endure for a certain amount of time, and within a certain context. There are at least three main contexts that apply to the material in question. Bacon’s functioning studio; the shrine maintained by Bacon’s close friend and beneficiary John Edwards; and the Hugh Lane display.

Bacon’s studio was constantly morphing into a gathering together/ordering of material, as the artist dictated what did or did not persist in his studio at any one time. Paintings were destroyed, books and photographs were lost, newspaper clippings materialised and became assimilated into the mesh of visual influences. In this context, Bacon was the primary preserver of significance, bestowing meaning and truth upon the objects around him. In April 1992 this kinetic, ever-changing territory became still.
Following Bacon’s death, factors such as sentimentality and practicality caused the studio to be partially preserved, as other aspects were discarded (the sweeping away of dust, the possibility of ‘interfering’ with the studio’s contents...). For those years it fluctuated between an existence as a private shrine to a companion, to being the treasure trove revealed to a select few, as Edwards allowed a small number of friends and interested parties to have private viewings.

But what changed in this Kensington studio at the moment of Bacon’s death? After all, it was just a room, filled with various things. It had a function as an art studio, and suddenly, due to the death of the artist that had occupied it, this space was in effect cast adrift. Where did the significance come from that would later justify the painstaking transporting, piece by piece, to another country?

Two key factors would instigate the new chain of preservation; the emotions of John Edwards, and the success/fame/reputation that Bacon had achieved through his paintings. The former can of course only be understood in a vague way, with little but the few words Edwards said on this period, and our own ability to empathise through recourse to similar experiences from our own lives. The maintenance of the space would undoubtedly have been dictated by Edwards’ personal ability/inability to cope with grief. As the heir to Bacon’s estate, it would have been his decision entirely if he decided to sweep away the contents of the room altogether. Considering Bacon’s own comment about wishing to be put in a plastic bag and thrown in the gutter, as well as his habit of discarding or destroying many of his own works, it is not too outlandish an assumption that Bacon would have harboured little sentimental concerns about the future of his belongings. Edwards may well have wished to adhere to what he considered to be Bacon’s own preferred treatment of the studio. Edwards himself admitted that after bequeathing the studio to him, Bacon had encouraged him to modify the building and add another floor, which goes to strengthen the assertion that the initial steps of preservation were taken by Edwards alone, and were not instigated by Bacon before he died.

It is common for someone grieving to wish to leave in place the belongings and traces of the one they have lost. As Heidegger alludes to in Being and Time, the memory of the deceased can ensure that to some degree their being perseveres. Leaving the studio in place was a way of keeping Bacon ‘alive’, while at the same time respecting his memory. This respect is all the greater, the more important the material left behind was to that person when they were alive.

The notions of success, fame and reputation carry with them certain connotations, but also imply certain prerequisites, not least in that they all refer to assertions carried out by others, and consequently indicate an artist’s cultural imprint. Francis Bacon was a successful artist, recognised as such by people in positions of power and influence. For Edwards, this aspect of Bacon’s ‘cultural imprint’, the deceptively simple fact that Bacon’s life and work were orientated around his painting, serves to contribute a significant emotional value to the studio and its contents. The studio contents could in many ways be said to be Bacon’s essence. This invested the contents of the studio with an importance that suddenly became a matter of potential public interest, while
simultaneously serving a private purpose. The instigating factors for preserving the contents in a more open context were now in place. Through Bacon, his beneficiary, gallery owners, curators, archaeologists, conservationists, and eventually viewers, the studio undergoes a series of changes to its role, its value, its reality. Each stage of existence is accompanied by a dynamic form of preserving that relies upon the one that precedes it, whilst transforming the preceding one by bringing something new into the sphere of its constituent parts. In the case of this studio/display a ‘multiplicity of values’ create a patchwork of its historical development. Some of these values fade in and out of prominence; others appear momentarily and help to carry it over to its next manifestation before disappearing from perception or concern. With the studio/display there is also a vivid thread running through each stage of the patchwork, radiating a valuation that demands to cast its shadow over each and every stage. The presence of Bacon in the material remains in the foreground.

Having arrived at the decision to donate the contents of the studio to a gallery, the next stage was to find a gallery willing to take on the task of ordering the chaos. Edwards initially approached the Tate Gallery in London, and whilst they chose to decline the offer, those at the Hugh Lane in Dublin were delighted to accept this gift. However, in order for the display to be constructed in Dublin, it would inevitably have to be dissected piece by piece. Archaeologists and conservationists were brought in for their skills in dealing with analogous circumstances. The positions would be recorded, the individual pieces would be packaged and labelled, the packages would be carefully moved by a professional shipping and transportation company, before the display was constructed in the Hugh Lane. It is clear that various forms of estimating and attributing value had become involved in the process in ways that digress further and further from the value of Bacon’s work. Specific archaeologists, conservationists and transporters were brought in, which all involved the Director of the Hugh Lane, Barbara Dawson, casting value judgements on their ability to carry out the requested tasks. This is of course still dictated by the interests of the gallery, however not only do they relinquish a large element of control over to these external departments, they are also signalling the first point where the studio material itself takes on (however momentarily) a value that is no longer (or at best rudimentarily) derived from the force of Bacon’s reputation. Suddenly the material is seen with eyes unclouded by value through association. Instead this material is handled and preserved by professionals coming to it with their own sense of values. On one hand, Bacon’s reputation and significance is the reason these people were charged with this task, but on the other this particular truth of the material being handled could be said to have slipped beneath the surface of the river Lethe.

Archaeological values come into play upon the studio contents, values that include the careful removal of material, the recording of locations; the cautious and considered approach to uncovering hidden information; the informed and knowledgeable insistence upon what may or may not be unsalvageable when encountering material that the onlookers from the gallery wish to save. Not only will they concern themselves with the values of applying these acquired skills, but also with the professional self-valuation of performing their task well. In short, ἀλήθεια emerges in the material in a way quite distinct to those interested in preserving the sentimental or cultural value it may have. Similarly, those tasked with shipping and transportation will apply their own set of
professional values when handling the packaged material. Little more is needed than a ‘fragile’ notice on a package for those charged with ensuring their safe journey to remain indifferent to the importance others hold for the contents. The same processes, the same considerations and priorities would be applied in order to guarantee that the task ahead can be achieved successfully. The interventions of these external (and to all intents and purposes, indifferent) assistants in the preservation process between studio and display, illustrate some aspects of the complex series of ἀλήθεια and λήθη that are at play upon and around the material as it is passes through the stages described above. We can see that the studio’s contents take on different values that are ultimately dictated by those making use of the material, but in many stages of this process of preservation, are significantly driven by the ‘preservers’ maintaining the presence of Bacon for the material, in a state of unconcealment.

The pilot flying the plane containing the crates and packages becomes an active participant in the preservation process; however their knowledge of the significance this material has to Francis Bacon (and the importance this has for many others) may well be completely concealed from them. Conversely, the considerations that cargo, whether this cargo or cargo in general, has for the pilot (such as the various safety responsibilities, fuel adjustments etc.), will most likely remain completely concealed from those that later experience the studio material in its displayed form. This truth of the work is a value of the material that will find itself rapidly sliding down the scale of importance once the material’s function is being established by people with different considerations in mind when estimating its importance. For them, this is not worthy of preserving as an unconcealed truth, and instead it is deemed acceptable for this aspect of the material’s journey to become concealed and forgotten, and it is consequently consigned to oblivion. Upon arrival the studio contents, now in the hands of the curators of the Hugh Lane, are, so to speak, ‘sieved’ in such a way as to allow only certain ‘truths’ to pass through into public view. Other objects and artefacts are collected and gathered together in the gallery’s archive. Others, being estimated as having little or no value, are finally discarded, save perhaps for a description in the exhaustive record documenting the contents in their entirety. A process of ‘sieving’ can be clearly seen to be taking place at each of the aforementioned stages, but it is at this stage that the sieving subjects the material (and what of it is to be unconcealed) to a creative act of selecting and editing; sculpting with values clinging to the material at hand so as to construct something new and intended to endure. No longer transitory, no longer passing from one momentary use to another, the contents of Bacon’s studio are for the first time elevated to a position that brings them into the light of unconcealment in ‘their own right.’ The tangled, sprawling corporal residue left behind by Bacon’s creative process has now been unfolded, dis-placed, and re-placed; until the studio has finally been replaced by the display.

Although the display is certainly something new, its cultural significance, its general interest to the public, and the value of the material that form the display, remain, as we have seen, bound to the figure of Bacon the working artist. After all, it is this very relation that has allowed the material to persevere in the way that it has, remaining superficially in the same state as Bacon left it, though of course in actuality it has been adjusted, refined and manipulated to create the desired effect; the illusion of authenticity.
I said above that the studio was replaced by the display. To elaborate on this further, it is in a very literal sense that the contents were re-positioned, placed elsewhere, moved to a new location. This act of displacement destroyed the studio, seeing it meticulously ripped apart and scattered, before chosen aspects of the original were brought back together; however, now in a different location, within a different context and for a different reason. The display is not identical to the studio; instead many aspects of the original are lost, whilst at the same time new aspects appear in the pseudo-simulacrum.

Under consideration here is the phenomenon whereby the value of a thing (say a paint-spattered stack of newspapers) is subordinated to the value of another thing (say the reputation of an artist in Western culture) in such a way that were this relationship to be somehow severed, the former would undergo a ‘darkening’ of its significance, slipping out of its illuminated state, and into anonymity. As long as the subordinating/subordinated relationship is maintained, the subordinated thing continues to receive and contain a ‘truth’ that gives it a richer cultural significance (as a thing of use to us). This truth does not simply stay at rest in the subordinated thing, but acquires the potential to affect the way in which the subordinating thing is valued and estimated in its own unconcealment. The former relies entirely upon the latter, where the latter can continue to exist in its valued state quite happily without the former, however the latter can in turn become, as it were, ‘distorted’ by the former. A thing that is unconcealed in its being in such a way as to take on a value that makes it important in the eyes and hands of certain quarters of our society, but is only capable of being unconcealed in this way through its binding subordination to the existence of another thing (which nevertheless need not physically exist, as in the case of a dead artist), is still able to wield a power over this other thing to such a degree that it can in certain circumstances rise to a height unreachable by the very object that determined its value to begin with. This height can be measured in terms of the ability of this thing to shed light on that which it is associated with. Its truth can, if the conditions are right, bring further truths into unconcealment, with the possible ramification of creating a light that engulfs the thing or things to which it is subordinated, causing them to constitute a truth that is in turn subordinated to the very thing that is itself already subordinated to its existence. This circular process is at play in a very particular way in the example of the Hugh Lane display.

In the first instance, the studio and its contents are entirely subordinated to the dual aspects of Bacon the artist, and Bacon’s artworks. It serves as a bridge between the two. We can see how the value of the studio and its contents is derived from the significance of Bacon and Bacon’s art. Without the cultural importance of Bacon and his artworks, his studio would be devoid of its value to offer an ‘insight’ into the workings of a highly regarded artist; it would see its ‘usefulness’ for ‘us’ fade. Instead, because it does have this important relationship to Bacon and his artwork, it is seen by some to have the power to illuminate the former, bringing new knowledge and information into view for consideration in such a way that art historians, critics and interested members of the public feel they may be able to understand Bacon’s creative process, influences and working environment, and consequently be better positioned to interpret his paintings by stepping into an approximation of the light of the unconcealed...ἀλήθεια...of Bacon’s own position when these paintings were first created. Yet instead of being an imperfect or
inferior version of its apparent model, the ‘copy’ is instead invested with a new function, a new meaning and its own truth, a truth entirely distinct from any truth possessed by the studio. The whole process of preservation yields information that bathes the contents of the studio in brighter lights than it has ever previously received. The codex, a comprehensive account of every item found in the studio, records the studio’s totality in a never-before seen level of precision that is not only unique amongst the documenting of an artist’s studio, but is among the most thorough analyses of an individual’s belongings ever undertaken. The display allows one to virtually step into the shoes of Bacon and form a more vivid approximation of how he used his studio than any to be gained from photographs or descriptions. Each individual item could be analysed, allowing the possibility of identifying traces of paint on certain photos, pages torn from books that are found to have been the reference for a completed painting, and many other pieces of information that make themselves available to our own particular insights and interpretations. Armed with this newly gathered knowledge, and returning to a consideration of the studio as it was left behind by Bacon, we are able to project a more revealing gaze upon it.

The Hugh Lane display is one of the most curious of simulacra, as it appears on the surface to be a copy constructed out of the dismantled remnants of that to which it pays homage. It could be argued that through this act of copying, the supposedly copied subject is brought into its own specific unconcealment, where the studio in itself is finally elevated into the limelight, without deference to an absent artist. The studio as a totality is first isolated from its immediate association with the artist, allowing the particularities of the place to come to the fore. For a brief moment the studio is received in its naked state, unconcealed by motives, idealised functions and emotional ramifications. Then through the multiple stages of preservation it gradually undergoes a series of changes, losing material here, gaining required additions there, until the display is created – produced out of a combination of adherence to the studio, and the requirements of creating something that can be accessible for an interested public, as well as utilising the available material in such a way that it can be studied in detail. The display is not a copy, but arrives at its own unique ‘being’, and acquires its own specific value, only through this act of copying. Of crucial importance here is that through this isolating, preserving, copying and finally a calling for the created display to be overcome, the character of the studio, its value and cultural significance, its identity as a totality, are repeatedly and increasingly emphasised. To pull it apart, record it, and send fragments around the world is one thing, but through putting it back together again a proclamation about the meaningful role the studio should be recognised as having in future considerations of Bacon’s life and work is being loudly made. This proclamation is made all the more loudly through the fact that the display is only partially faithful, achieving a surface accuracy that suffices to represent the studio in a new way, highlighting the importance of the experience of the display, over a fidelity to the reality of the studio itself. The studio, through the isolating, preserving and copying process, has become idealised. This idealisation solidifies the reputation of the destroyed studio, and raises the created display to the level of a stele or monument, a marker bearing testimony to the studio and the artist, as well as serving as a vivid echo of the spiritual home of many of Bacon’s paintings.
The status of ‘monument’ placed upon the display does not detract from its own significance, as if this were to bind it ever more tightly to the memory of the studio. Instead it emphasises the display’s difference to the studio, allowing it to stand in place of the fallen studio, and simultaneously taking on the role of a locus around which discussions about the artist, his creative process, his working studio and his paintings can take place. But this monument casts a huge shadow...a shadow that is all the further reaching and tenebrous, all the more capable of consuming that which lies behind it, the more brilliant its face is illuminated by the light. The treasure trove of destroyed paintings, reference books, photographs and supposedly completed paintings, find themselves becoming supplementary material in relation to the idealised studio-as-display, rather than being brought into their own states of un concealment. The process of isolating, preserving and copying the studio effectively sweeps up and carries along the material contained within it, designating the contents as parts forming the whole. The creative construction of the display cements the connection the contents had with the studio, and now have with the display. The recording and archiving of material not currently on display that was carried out by those at the Hugh Lane, along with the loaning rather than selling of individual items to other galleries, keeps the ‘being’, ‘truth’... ἀλήθεια.... and value of these objects firmly sutured to the being of the idealised studio-as-display. This totality, in the way that it maintains its presence as a totality, dominates and permeates the value of the content. The truth of the material, its ἀλήθεια, is tainted, or rather altered, by its utilisation as useful components of an overarching schema. The individual materials that forms the totality have their value and cultural significance tied to the mast of the main display; so much so that even the attempts to utilise specific material as a means of retrospectively gaining insight into a now submerged truth, arrive at results warped by the conditions of the present and the presentation.

A place has been created for the ἀλήθεια of the display to be accessible, but this place pervades any potential territory that singular elements of the content might hope to occupy. The un concealing truth constructed in the Hugh Lane dominates the horizon, drawing the component parts back into its realm in order to receive a valuation based on the combined effect, rather than for the individual components to be appreciated in-themselves. The spectacle of the display neutralises the value of the composite parts in a way that directly opposes the truth of this material as it would have revealed or unconcealed itself to Bacon. In the spectacle, everything is utilised for serving one purpose. However, when Bacon was working as an artist, everything within his studio would have served its own unique purpose, and would have been treated as such. In the display we see only the direction of Edwards, Dawson, the archaeologists, and the conservationists – pushing the material towards one outcome – that of a display replicating Bacon’s studio. However, for Bacon each component served its own purpose. The tin of beans that was converted into a paintbrush holder; the piece of cloth that could smear paint; the David Gower photograph that could be manipulated.

When I spoke to Barbara Dawson she mentioned how people had sought to have postcards verified as authentic cards posted by Bacon. For me, these were fragments that had broken free of the boundaries of Bacon’s personal life, and had gone on to acquire their own chain of preservation, consisting of their own significations, playing
their role in another story which was concealed from Bacon. Yet we could both recognise the madness in attributing so much significance into simple objects. Dawson herself was able to recognise that the display at her Hugh Lane gallery mostly consisted of ‘rubbish’, but it is a collection of rubbish that forms part of the tapestry of a figure so culturally significant that it provides a bridge between the mundane and the profound. The illusion of authenticity as a guiding objective means that the walls, books, paintings and paint-splattered newspapers are given equal billing as characters that assist in creating the overall effect, which rises up over the sum of its parts and positions itself vividly in its unconcealed truth.

Yet in what way does this cache of informative and wide-ranging material broaden our understanding of the formation of value for that which falls between artist and art, and between equipment and artwork? All and more is available here to be analysed, but this very abundance blinds us as we strive to access this very space. To be sure, the display includes material that was clearly capable of matching the description of something that exists between artwork and equipment, but little or no trace remains present for us, having passed into λήθη just as the display revels in its own ἀλήθεια. We have seen how enigmatically elusive such answers can be, as the fragile accessibility of their being can so easily become subsumed in the being of another that illuminates our present through its ‘presence’. We have seen the complex and entity-specific processes of preservation that the truth of a thing may pass through in order to reach us, arriving filtered and distorted, but arriving all the same.

The painting allows the truth of peasant boots to disclose itself to us, without the painted boots being exposed to the concealing forces that hide us from the real ones. This is not to say that the painting itself, as an object, cannot be utilised for other purposes, and therefore drawn into and subsumed by the ontic world that shields us from accessing the truth of its being. Around the space opened up by a work, and held open by preservers, a swirl of outside forces gather, looking to capitalise on the truth thus opened up, to bring it back under the domain of the concealed ‘state of affairs’ of the usual and the everyday. Turning our attention back to the Dublin display with this in mind, we can understand that the work of art as ἀλήθεια, illuminates the ontic world that surrounds it, whilst it itself emerges from that world. In effect, the work clears a path for the contents of the immediately surrounding world that the space it opens up appears within, to be utilised and ‘used up’ in a new way altogether from that of a piece of equipment, as what is illuminated is bathed in the reflective glory of this truth. Where a work of art is said to work, the unconcealed truth of its being appears to the beholder as so unlike anything else, as so beyond the usual experiences encountered, that a desire arises to understand (that which is by its very nature ungraspable) by way of the ontic, everyday material at our disposal. This drive to understand the unknowable truth that comes forth in a work can only ever lead to a distortion and ‘re-concealing’ of the truth. The more we attempt to understand the truth as ἀλήθεια through the means of processes and methods taken from the ontic, the further away we move from what has been unconcealed. Yet many are drawn into the search for elucidating their experience of a work, discerning the indiscernible undisclosed truth.