Chapter Three

The Views from Here
(METHODS/Part 1.)
Preface to Chapter Three

Chapter Three follows from the previous chapters: Chapter One’s overview of research position and sources, and Chapter Two’s discussion of methodology. In this chapter, further analysis of theoretical source material confirms—and is confirmed by—applications within drawing. These examples constitute the practice methods that demonstrate the research findings. Here, specific points of methodology connect directly to a view upon methods and interests within drawing practice or project. I begin with closer readings of key theorists, including: Merleau-Ponty’s The Visible and the Invisible and Crowther’s notion of the transperceptual, and relate these to understandings and applications of imagination and perception— as encountered and extended through drawing practice. I then establish and define the key terms applicable to events of perception, and the features and techniques of drawing as understood within this research. I identify the methods and approaches of drawing practice, that constitute central proofs of my project findings. Drawing practice is interrogated to confirm assertions of alteration and anomalies in drawing; demonstrating the differing and expanded range and complexity of what is received and harvested from vision – and into the visible – through the process of drawing.

Additionally, I include analysis of artist Barbara Bolt’s practice-research, and her position on enactments of performativity within the art object. By reviewing Bolt, I am able to engage the practice-led research process of another artist and, in doing so, consider the crossovers, as well as the divergences, from and within my own practice and research understandings. My findings, like Bolt’s, regard the orientation and significance of adaptative deployments of perception, as enabled by the interior perceptual and imaginal response within human participants—both artist and viewer.

PART I: The View from Here (In Theory)

This section considers additional perceptual features, as discussed in the prior chapters, and addresses how these become demonstrable within examples of drawing practice, undertaken in this research. Specific examples of practice from this research is cited; then shown to corroborate the research proposition, and confirmed by the methodology. Here, I offer direct evidence of how drawing’s adaptation of perception opens onto an extended awareness of additional possibility within the visual field.1 Drawing examples are analysed to verify their findings, and to explore and elucidate revelations of more subtle perception; revealed through

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1 Crowther’s appraisal of Merleau-Ponty, in “Vision in Being: Merleau-Ponty and the Depths of Painting”, notes: “that... Being’s spatio-temporal masses and events exist independently of perception emphasizes the finitude of the body’s inherence in it...perception is always incomplete...There is always more to see... how much ‘more...is determined by how sustained our perceptual interest...mediated by constraints arising from...spatial and temporal properties. Our perceptual orientations can only negotiate what Being will allow.” The Phenomenology of Art and Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn. London & New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. p. 82.
the drawing, then traced and understood in both its process and artefact. Within this analysis, it becomes evident that the formal strategies of drawing instruction are a type of secondary invention; devised to translate and facilitate altered deployments of seeing that comprise the primary methods of drawing. Certain known categories of subtle or peripheral aspects of perception—which are the central tools to aptitude for drawing—are described in order to illustrate how inherent shifts in the projection and deployment of perception are essential to accessing the expansive perceptual disposition necessary to drawing. These aspects of the perceptual, in the practice evidence, are derived from drawing that embraces representation as its goal, but which witnesses and discloses additional individual and subtle revelations.

(1)In the very act of creating an image...one literally acts upon the world, and in doing so, changes one’s cognitive relationship to the represented object and to oneself...acting on reality in a way that changes the existing relation of subject and object at all levels.2

My research evaluates the perceptual implications of the shifting applications of sight—requisite to the activity of drawing—as adaptations fundamental to any and every successful transcription through and into drawing. Such altered deployments of perception diverts attention’s focus away from more habitually privileged patterns of seeing, so that the see-er (seer) within this process seeks reception of less apparent elements within vision, that normally remain hidden to everyday detection. Additional sensory data is always potential to perception, but is dependent on the intention of sensory applications; so this data may lack the necessary significance or substance to penetrate the surface of notice in ordinary operations of looking3. Normal waking perception is conditioned to anticipate a world that conforms to a collectively subscribed physical order, and is thus governed by expectation. When data does not contribute directly to what is sought in the daily projects or interests of perceptual existence, we likely fail to take it in. Such subtler elements hover on the periphery of attention, and may potentially reveal other or expanded understandings of how “the world recedes beyond and transcends our body’s immediate grasp of it,” to disclose the “embodied subject to be itself transcendent: to constantly change its perceptual positioning in relation to the world.”4

2 Crowther, Paul. The Phenomenology of Visual Art (even the frame). p 18
3 Colin McGinn’s Mindsight and David Lewis-Williams’s The Mind in the Cave make the case for comparisons and continuums in altering perceptual experiences, that move out from an understanding of ordinary sight—that which we engage autonomically within projects and needs of day-to-day waking existence—as being at one end of that continuum. Patrick Trevor-Roper’s The World Through Blunted Sight, analyses the impacts of ‘blunted’ vision, from faults within the physical sense, that also infers a standard measure of perceptual normalcy against which defects are ascertained and corrected.
1. The Visible and the Invisible

It is thus...not as the bearer of a knowing subject, that our body commands the visible for us, but it does not explain, does not clarify, it only concentrates the mystery of its scattered visibility...⁵

When setting sight to the task of fashioning pictorial figurations, an artist may invoke “impossibilities in ways that symbolically transcend what physical space allows.” ⁶ In such cases, the resultant artwork conveys visible articulations of observable qualities that appear to be at odds with familiar visual understanding, as we are programmed to interpret these.⁷

Within this project, I demonstrate that certain latent perceptual details are, in fact, existent, despite being normally undetected or unacknowledged by mental analyses (thought per se) of what it is we think we see. Such elements reveal as subtle yet authentic presences; integral ingredients of the visual field; knitted into our comprehension of perceptual life, as a kind of connective tissue. Crowther identifies this ephemeral sinew as the transperceptual – that is, latent qualities, subtle influences and subliminal facets through which more apparent sense perception and comprehension are able to play out. Those who draw or paint from observation; who have practiced adapting vision through the distinct perceptual goals of drawing’s rules, will know—for example—the merits of seeking negative space; thus looking to the shape of emptiness to decipher a unique configuration of form, as it inhabits its discrete environment. By appreciating negative space, what may seem to amount to literally nothing, is instead shown to be fundamental in how we orient and assemble pictures of the world—not only in drawing, but also in detecting potentials for space-occupancy from our surroundings.

Figure 3.1

Figure 3.2*  

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⁷ An example of effective adaptation in familiar drawing rules is in seeking shapes and space deemed negative; what Philip Rawson called “areas of the drawing surface... which have an existential value...either positive (defining the full) or negative (defining the void). That is to say, they may represent on the surface of the sheet either the presence of objective bodies or the empty space between bodies... Negative forms must be studied even more vigorously than the positive ones. It is normal for the physically present to demand definition, whereas the ‘absent’ needs far more effort to perceive and define...Thus if one begins by drawing the negative areas without first diagramming the positive shapes, artistic results rather than inartistic must automatically emerge.” (Rawson, Philip. Drawing: The Appreciation of the Arts/3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp.141-142)

⁸ Volume Two: Plates 13 & 14. (Work of the Author.)
This is illustrated in the example of the two drawings depicted here, Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Both are representational sketches, both were made in their entirety from observation while looking upon the same physical source: a museum display case containing a pair of pachyderms. The first drawing (Figure 3.1) aligns more closely and clearly to expectations of the view of the animals on display, framed within perspective indications of their placement within room and case, as inferred from the viewpoint of the artist. The second sketch provides more of the composite and confusion of the actual details potential to observation within that scene—by adding reflected and secondary impressions, espied on the glass’s surface. However, in showing more of what was truly there in this visual field, this drawing looks less like the expected account, as it adds back in what we normally edit out from interpretations of sight. Thus these drawings demonstrate the influence of intention and adaptation, even within the vision of percepts.9 (This project and its findings are discussed in detail in Chapter Four: Case Studies, Part I, Section 4.: Imagining Representation.)

Merleau-Ponty addressed “The Spatiality of One’s Own Body and Motility” (Phenomenology of Perception) writing of a body that “reckons with the possible”10 when accounting for potential movement and interaction within available or unoccupied spaces (i.e., negative); thus engaging in appraisals of the physical surrounding, where “every movement has a background...not a representation associated or linked externally...but is immanent in...[t]he plunge into action... the subject’s...original way of relating himself to the object, and is on the same footing as perception.”11 His unfinished opus, The Visible and the Invisible,12 serves as his final interrogation of perceptual faith,13 and is contained within investigations of the ‘relation between the visible and the invisible, where the invisible is not only non-visible.’14 Merleau-Ponty reflected on the interplays between the denser apparitions of ‘daylight truth’ and other layerings and possibilities of the perceptible; interactions through which we apprehend ‘much more than an object...not the naked thing...but rather the thing ready to be seen, pregnant—in

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9 Despite expectations rooted in our phenomenological experience of sight – the reality of vision brings some curious paradoxes to such assumption. Robert Solso, in Cognition and the Visual Arts, notes several facts about vision, which can surprise and confound those beliefs –one is that, however instantaneous sight seems, there is an imperceptible delay of the speed of light that enacts as a lapse in the timeliness of visual reception—and—the other, that image input is received on the retina are upside-down. Without our brain’s inversion of the latter impressions, our view of the world would replicate that of a camera obscura. (Solso, Robt. Cognition and the Visual Arts. Cambridge, MA & London: MIT Press, 1993.)


11 Ibid., p. 127.


13 Ibid., Chapter 1, “Reflection and Interrogation” was titled by Merleau-Ponty as “The Perceptual Faith and Its Obscurity”. The accompanying editor’s note reads: “Opposite the title of the section, the author notes: ‘Notion of faith to be specified. It is not faith in the sense of decision but in the sense of what is before any position, animal and [?] faith.’” p.3.

14 Ibid., p.227.
principle as well as fact—with all the visions one can have of it.”

This text, gathered and published posthumously from his writing fragments and working notes, provides a final view of his explorations into a phenomenology of the visual and visually latent. While compellingly configured, rendered and translated through Merleau-Ponty’s lyrical prose, it remains an incomplete text.

2. The Transperceptual

Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘invisible’...holds that whatever is visible is so only insofar as it emerges from the broader field of perceptual complexities. These are ‘invisible’ in that they are not usually noted or remarked upon in ordinary conditions.

Paul Crowther revisits Merleau-Ponty’s notions of visible and invisible, and rearticulates the central premise into a conceptual model more germane to the direction of this project. He frames a conversation inside terminology that is more directly applicable to processes and potentials of the perceptible within visual art. While crediting Merleau-Ponty’s identification of less-than-visible qualities, as the necessary accomplices to visual comprehension, Crowther questions the efficacy of the term invisible, whose familiar attribution might appear to contradict subtle-but-actual elements of perception—those very perceptions which phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty strove to clarify, rather than confuse. By definition, the word invisible (at least in English) tracks too closely, to a denotation of what remains undetectable to perception. Thus, as definition, the word is too constraining to incorporate the nuances in seeing, required to encompass what is ‘both immanent in what we perceive, yet extends beyond it, in unfathomable complexity.’

By applying invisible in its strictest sense, the idea of visual impossibility may lead to conceptual dead ends—rather than broadening understanding of what can be visible or sensible within the context of visual art. Still, Crowther acknowledges Merleau-Ponty’s quest “to make vision’s inherence in the visible, visible to itself.”

Crowther suggests the term transperceptual to designate perceptual functions and subtle aspects, that comprise “the space of those unnoticed or hidden details that subtend immediate appearance.” In his thinking, an individual experience of vision is only private in that it is held in comparative relationship with public context. Likewise, the textures of the transperceptual—while subtle and obscure—support the cohesion of a sensory field, from which more tangible visual detail is detected. As conceived, his transperceptual arena embraces: the microscopic, the molecular and the indecipherable pixels that compose digital

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15 Ibid., pp. 123-124.
16 Crowther, Paul. The Phenomenology of Art and Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn. p. 34.
17 Ibid., p. 35.
18 Ibid., p. 80.
platforms; as well as elements contained inside or below the composition of matter. These elements include: internal viscera of the body, and hidden forces and facets below the ground in landscapes; muted and mutable aspects unseen or unseeable, which are, nevertheless, an “actuality known mainly through possibility.” In addition to Crowther’s categorisations, I would additionally attribute this sense of a transperceptual as applicable to the peripheries and shades held within the visual field; whose potential and revelations are both accessible and fundamental to the process of drawing. As stated in the previous chapters, the perceptual modifications that are encoded as conventions for drawing, include: negative and positive space, recognition of tonal value, and the fluidity of visual relationship as inferred by proportion or perspective strategies. These qualities profess designations from the transperceptual environment, and provide a subtle substructure for composing the drawing, as derived from perception. Even in depictions of the patently unreal—as in Crowther’s nomological impossibilities—where the visual is imagined rather than detected in a percept, a transperceptual context or environment is requisite. For example, in dreams, the scenes invent and unfold inside the transperceptual scaffolding of sleep, and the specific transperceptual context of the dream allows us to encounter and believe our internal visions as authentic sensory data—until such time as awakening into daytime changes the transperceptual structure, where the essence of oneiric visualisation is then shown to be otherwise.

3. On Seeing (How) to Draw

To unveil the means, visible and not otherwise...these objects of his quest are not altogether real objects; like ghosts, they have only visual existence. In fact they exist only at the threshold of profane vision; they are not ordinarily seen.

To fashion sensory experience into pictorial expression, we adapt and adopt the disposition for looking. We intentionally loosen the restraints of perceptual routine; thus freeing our senses from the bonds of Merleau-Ponty’s declarations of perceptual faith. Analysis of the formal conventions of ‘how to see’—as developed into coded techniques for ‘how to draw’—suggests an origin from efforts to make more cognitively intelligible the altered experience of vision during drawing; translating these into explicable and repeatable instructions for seeing into

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19 Ibid., p. 35.
20 Crowther follows on from Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetic legacy, noting that his predecessor positions the artwork in “a unique halfway position between perception and reflection” one that “(u)like perception itself...preserves and articulates the most crucial ‘invisible’ scaffolding of the specific situation it is expressing.” Crowther, Paul. "Merleau-Ponty: Perception into Art." British Journal of Aesthetics. Volume 22, No. 2, 1982. pp. 146-147.
21 Merleau-Ponty describes the act of mimicry performed by the body as a preparation for achieving actual sleep: “to call up the visitation of sleep...when sleep ‘comes’ settling on this imitation of itself...with what he calls “anonymous alertness of the senses.” Phenomenology of Perception, trans. by Colin Smith. London & New York: Routledge Classics. 2002 pp 190-191. This commentary echoes that described by Bachelard in the essay “Oneiric Space.” (The Right to Dream. Trans. from French by J.A. Underwood, New York: Grossman Publishers, 1971)
that drawing process. Crowther’s physical laws and Merleau-Ponty’s *perceptual faith* imply a baseline for assessing altering modes of perception, which deviate from dominant habits of ‘normal’ sight, as embedded within our expectations and routines. In contrast to standards of perception that may prove “entirely deadened to...expressive power through familiarity,” formal artistic training is designed to pass on traditional skills for drawing, painting, sculpture, by imparting systems of seeing whose aim is to challenge perceptual habit and, by doing so, expose the limitations of such habits. Thus, even artworks, whose desired or achieved results are faithful replications of objective views, cannot succeed in that representation unless the posture of looking is purposefully moved away from routine strategies of perception. Drawing’s conventions—detecting proportion, perspective, tonal value and, in particular, concepts of negative and positive in shape and space—confirm this notion of subtle perceptions that, when apprehended, accomplish the visual composition of the drawing, as revealed from perceptual strategies that would confound or impede our more routine operations and expectations of vision. The irony of representation in drawing, then, comes from intentional applications of perceptual strategies, designed to detect what is ordinarily overruled within more functional goals of looking.

Framed within this consideration of perception, I argue that the basis of such schema arises out of what first came into view at the edges of perception, these coded transformations of the sense of sight would have evolved from experiential moments of sensation, which were initially encountered prior to any understanding or establishment of such rules. Traditional instructional interpretations in art—for example, Gombrich’s *schema and correction*—reinforce the suggestion that these rules were codified from what began as (now remote) realisations within (direct) vision, designed to emphasise pairings of sight and imagination within artistic enterprises—in a manner which highlights the critical role of such perceptual pairing as “*reciprocity between the visible and the invisible*.” Imagination filters each and every event of vision against reference to what is familiar or already-seen; so is part of the operational process that orients vision to regard the ‘rules’ of drawing.

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24 For example, in *Drawing: An Appreciation of the Arts*, Philip Rawson identifies drawing as comprised of “enclosures which have an existential value in that they can be either positive (defining the full) or negative (defining the void)” so that “they may represent on the surface of the sheet either the presence of objective bodies or the empty space between bodies... Negative forms must be studied even more vigorously than the positive ones. It is normal for the physically present to demand definition, whereas the ‘absent’ needs far more effort to perceive and define.” (Rawson, Philip. *Drawing: An Appreciation of the Arts*, London: Oxford University Press, 1969. p.141.)


4. Imaginative (in) Seeing

The capacity—even desire—to encounter altered or additional views is a shared characteristic, within our collective experience of possessing individual consciousness. As such, it is not restricted to those proficient in drawing and/or painting, and neither are such encounters particularly far-fetched from the everyday rhythms of perception and interpretation. We witness our dreams and hypnogogic states, interludes of reveries and daydreams, we view art and ‘watch’ film, and we entertain concepts of religious lore and other mythic fabrications. All of this is evidence of not only imagination’s integration into how we learn to see, but also of the centrality of imagination’s inventive engine driving all human pastimes of sight. Knowledge and identification of seeing and the seen—as a project of human perception—is largely self-taught. It is also important to acknowledge that not all perceptual events that first appear as marginal or atypical, when juxtaposed against the constraints of the real, or when rendered as images in pictorial form, necessarily cross beyond the threshold of factual impossibility. There are vague and subtle traces in overlooked but authentic phenomena; which become counted and accounted for through processes and productions of art.\(^{27}\) As the artist shifts the configurations as to why perception is engaged, this enables a translation of a unique and private event of seeing—accomplishing through grasping and fixing moments of vision from the fleeting parade of the visible. Once vision has been transcribed into publically accessible and enduring pictorial record, the drawing then relays how such application of sight distinguishes itself from the ordinary exercises and outcomes of sight.

5. Imagination in the Sensorium

Now, the very fact that imagination takes on a dispositional rather than stimulus-based character, is of the greatest importance to cognition in general.\(^{28}\)

Even drawings that strive to mimic ordinary perception into highly skilled renderings of external and objective source; simultaneously disclose perception that deviates or surpasses the nominal subject matter of the depiction. Drawing contains and conveys as a form of poetic transcription\(^{29}\) that reaches into—and beyond—the surface of what is clearly visible, thus deciphering and documenting the \textit{imaginably latent} as well. Because of the manner in which

\(^{27}\) The American psychologist and author, James Hillman (1926-2011) lobbied for recognition of the imagination as a reality of what is received and experienced by the imagination — rather than making it real because it is attributable to a physical reality. For example, in the essay \textit{On Paranoia} (Eranos Lectures 8, 1986), Hillman analyzes delusional belief as being the mistaken attribution of something as literal and fixed rather than a poetic utterance of the soul. In \textit{The Thought of the Heart}, he positions the image as being formed in the thinking organ of the heart, where “interior reverberation allows the heart to witness the images in its feelings rather than to be identified with...feeling in...subjectivism.”(p.73) Hillman, James. \textit{The Thought of the Heart and the Soul of the World}. Putnam, CT: Spring Publications, 1992.


perception’s deployment is modified towards this purpose, drawing reflects an expanded sensory.30 This research contends that drawing does, in fact, arise as response to actual experience within embodied life—just as does dreaming or other perceptual input, which we classify as imaginal. 31 Drawing’s particular route through perception straddles and detects both percept and image—so that ordinarily transient disclosures of perception become converted into enduring documentation, via the transcribed artefact. In the flows and overflows of ephemeral sensory data, the imagined is continually accessible, but will fade quickly without sustained attention to its perceptions—as professed by drawing. Ordinary anticipatory sight is constrained by the need to confirm certain ‘physical laws’, and necessity then relegates subtle, ambiguous or extraneous presences in the visible to the ranks of the overlooked. The alterations of visual disposition, as employed for ‘picturing,’ offer both maker and viewer opportunity to extend and expand apprehension—within more protracted projects of looking and within records that fix impressions from fleeting sensory experience.

Crowther defines imagination as non-derivative among mental functions, neither ‘luxury experiential add-on” nor ‘autonomous’ curiosity; instead a key constituent of perception and cognition. In this, he echoes Hillman’s notion of imagination as the “thought of the heart”.32 Hillman’s understanding of the imaginal premises imagination as its own mode of ‘thinking’, transpiring in a precise bodily zone, as a precinct derived from more metaphoric understandings of the heart. Crowther’s imagination is of “a dispositional, rather than stimulus-based character,”33 distinguished as “quasi-sensory” mode of cognition, distinct from the two other primary mental operations: “thought per-se” or “direct sensory experience”.34 From this, Crowther defines the approach to art as empathetic in disposition—empathy not to be construed as function of sentimental sympathy, but instead one affected from recognition of individual interiority as part of a shared collective condition. The objective of art is “a free celebratory transformation...from the realm of the involuntary and private, to the voluntary and public.”35 This opens up a view on depictions, held simultaneously within—and beyond—reflection of private reverie.

30 As noted in the Introduction to this text, what I identify here as an expanded sensory is not the same as speculations or definitions of extra-sensory, as this latter term privileges its attribution to sources beyond physical senses or known spatial habitations of the body.
31 The imaginal is defined in James Hillman’s The Thought of the Heart and The Dream and the Underworld, and by more recent concepts of Paul Crowther in “Imagination, Language, and the Perceptual World: A Post-Analytic Phenomenology” (2013)
33 Ibid., p. 15.
Crowther tracks cognitive development as the evolution in an individual imagination towards the capacity to relate and recognise the immediate, from reference to an elsewhere. Imagination, as visualising operation, reveals “an ‘elsewhere’ populated by things and states of affairs akin to those immediately present... established and negotiated...even though it is not yet understood, explicitly—as ‘elsewhere’.” This developing imagination is situated in our childhood progressions toward maturation, and is marked by conceptual milestones: movements from undifferentiated image-based beliefs to the later capacity to distinguish between imagination and perception. With an ability to differentiate in aspects of the seen, there also comes the capability to voluntarily produce and control our internalised imagery. Thus, while adult imagination generally manifests linguistically, the origins of visualisation and language arise from the child’s primary and initial mode of learning the world; that being, from image impressions that occur within an embodied, spatio-temporal existence. I believe that this early dominance of visual input and impression explains early anomalies within my perception of the visual field, which became resolved directly into imagery through drawing, in part, because I had then erroneously assumed this experience of vision to be universal, rather than idiosyncratic events within the individual sensorium. As we acquire greater sophistication in language, the vocal gestures of speech can denote associated visuals—yet this will not position the image or the work of visual art as interchangeable with the linguistic utterance. In my experience, there are modes of information and communication, from certain unseen or barely seen phenomena, which become discernible in the drawing—both in the activity and the resultant trace. The fact of this initial and continuing awareness of these extra-visual factors has driven my practice and my research, and is confirmed into knowledge that has only surfaced into (my) awareness through drawing.

![Figure 3.3. Tintoretto’s Alarm Clock](image)

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37 Volume Two: Plate 11.(Work of the Author.)
PART II: The View From Here
Applying Imagination and Observation to Drawing

In this section, other aspects of perceptual manifestation are sited in examples of the drawing practice research, thus demonstrating drawing’s access to an expanded scope of the visual sensory. Analysis of the practice operations of drawing verifies that shifts in the strategy of looking are implemented as part of a specific visual disposition assumed for drawing. Though drawing’s alteration of the posture and apprehension of sight may appear to surpass what comes to us in ‘normal’ looking, I contend that all that can be seen by drawing is found within an embodied capacity of vision. Thus, even the images that arise in impossible visions of dream or hypnogogic states are events of embodied sight\(^{38}\) and, therefore, are as much constituent of the seen,\(^{39}\) as our waking encounters with percept.

1. Drawing’s Rhythm

Drawing is a curious enterprise; a means for transcribing sensory impression, detected and imagined in mixtures of sight and touch. There have been occasions that, when immersed in observational drawing, I am certain that my hand has moved into making the marks which accurately document the target of my sight, even before my eyes have confirmed the details of these forms through vision. How is that even possible, if the learnt assumption is that the eyes alone appraise a visual field, out of which our sense of sight will merely record the passively available data?\(^{40}\) This experience would seem to confirm my assertion that perception for drawing—in its adaptations and interactions within the composite sensory experience—will reconfigure seeing inside a broader understanding of the visual—as the principal sensory zone through which drawing is actualised. Drawing initiates as attention to rhythm and patterns; its orientation is toward different goals than the utilitarian interests of the habitual projects of perception. However, I also assert that, to varying degrees, we learn to seek a schema of identifiable patterns or to facilitate our functional orientation and cognition from vision. There we look to find comprehension by comparing the newly received against the imagination’s stores of perceptual elsewheres\(^{41}\). These orientations of sight are reflective of visual

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\(^{38}\) Imaginal aspects encompass an additional sensory—not to be confused or attributed as extra-sensory—a term already discussed for its implication of input sources determined to be beyond the physical sensorium or spatial habitation of the body.

\(^{39}\) James Hillman, in “The Thought of the Heart,” presents a case for acknowledging a quality of the imagined as possessing its own reality of experience. What has been seen in imagination is the authentic manifestation of imagining—though its truth is not the same as what we measure by our material standards of the existent.

\(^{40}\) In Cognition and the Visual Arts, Robert Solso addressed physiological facts of vision which contest claims of an inherently passive sense of sight. These facts include, for example: inversions of images onto the retina—i.e., upside-down like a camera obscura, hemispheric cross-overs in control of the eye and vision, and (minute) reception delays, based on speed of light. What this implies is that notions of vision and drawing as being a flat perceptual exchange is challenged by the perplexing mechanics of even ‘ordinary sight’. (Solso, Robert L., Cognition and the Visual Arts. Cambridge, MA & London: Bradford Books/MIT press, 1994.

\(^{41}\) Ibid. Solso describes “Visual processing of information...is hierarchical, moving from the eye to the neurons of the primary visual cortex and...associative cortex...At each level processing becomes more entangled with higher-order
circumstances described by Gombrich’s *schema* model for “classifying the unfamiliar with the familiar”. Yet, within the play of eyes and hands when seeking after a drawing—removed from practical motivations and identifications—we can dance more freely among visual features collected or selected, not categorised in terms of physical purpose but instead forming the basis for weaving threads of visual sensation into the rhythms of a drawing. During the research, when revisiting observational practice, I noticed that I felt particularly unrestrained by a need to replicate items or events, which were already clearly present and enduring as physical facts. Thus, I could select and choreograph elements of vision, as revealed to the roving interests of my grasping eyes and hands. Relaxing the functional visual agenda allowed for subtle traces of perception to rise into reception through drawing.

Figure 3.4. *Bed Degradations, No. 1 – 6* (2010)

Figure 3.5. *Bristol View* (2012)

functions, so that in a very brief time we interpret visual signals into meaningful thoughts. (p.30) He also addresses the relatively simple physiology of the eye against “a fantastically complicated brain that permits us to ‘see’ far more than we sense,” (p. 14) from impressions received in a “a series of scans in which the eye momentarily stops on one feature...Since this scanning/stop maneuver takes place over very short time periods, the subjective experience is that we are seeing the picture all at once, when, in fact, our visual perception of it is built up from a series of discrete ‘snapshots’.” (p.26)

42 *Volume Two: Plate 15*. Graphite on paper, 9 in x 6 in each. (Work of the author.)
43 *Volume Two: Plate 16*. (Work of the author.)
2. TERMS of OBSERVATIONAL DRAWING
Before proceeding into detailed analysis of drawing practice examples and outcomes, this section clarifies specific terminology, as employed in PART III: (Prelude) Before and After (Images).

a. On Observation: Observational drawing, which leads to mimicry as representational copy, is typically thought to be drawing’s obvious goal. Evaluation for accuracy in surface portrayal is measured by comparing visual illusions of resemblance to the identifiable external referent. Richard Wollheim\(^{44}\) cited this as the test that brings the viewer (including the draughtsman) to engage with a drawing—yet he stressed that this alone will not determine an interesting drawing. I also submit that accomplished representation of objective forms will not encompass the all of what is observed or observable; such drawing is often an outcome edited through dominant rationalist conditioning and expectations.* Therefore, in my practice analysis, I survey and position an expanded scope of what drawing approaches or detects in observation of the visual field—and offer this section of terms for clarification in such discussions.

Observational Drawing*: Notwithstanding positions stated above, in the following research examinations, the term observational drawing indicates a representational drawing (i.e., figuratively identifiable) as one whose making/outcome is directed to accurate transcription of external views on objective data (percept). This definition of observational drawing thus establishes a research benchmark from which to consider additional possibilities, modalities, or variations of the observed or observable drawing.

“Other” observations: Included in practice examples are other manifestations of observation in drawing—yielding unexpected, under-recognised or anomalous qualities of vision—additional aspects of the observable that (for me) only became disclosed by drawing process. I reference certain visual phenomena—such as migraine aura—not because my research purpose addresses specifics of aura events, either within vision or drawing. These phenomena offer demonstrable instances of anomalous or subtle perception—rendered and made apparent within the visual strategies of drawing. Such manifestations of vision have only entered my full awareness in the viewer’s thoughtful reflection, after their appearance as traces on the drawing’s surface. As Wollheim argued, this altered strategy of looking is not only required for producing the drawing; it is also a key criteria for appraising whether the drawing achieves its resolution as visual record of an artist’s individual unique internally-experienced perceptual event. (Figures 3.7 through 3.12)

\(^{44}\) Wollheim, Richard. “What Makes Drawing Interesting?” Wollheim also saw ‘no overlap between representation and illusion’ (p.9) in that the viewer knows that they are appraising a drawing rather than the object itself.
b. On Auras\textsuperscript{45} and Occlusions:

These terms refer to specific events in vision; manifesting as part of the visual field yet not received into the visual cortex through retinal impression. As applied to my research and drawing practice, auras occur along the migraine spectrum, thus are neurologically induced and involuntary. As visual event, they classify (by McGinn’s criteria) as true hallucinations. Hence, these are percepts, in the sense that they are not creation of imagination, nor can they be eliminated from sight by altering will or attention. Hence, they appear as element or interference in the visual field. Practice documentation of these demonstrate subtle or vague aspects of observation, specified below, which are detected and recorded into drawing:

**Palinopsia:** This is an aura manifestation that appears as an after-image; similar to lingering haloes in vision produced by a camera flash – or by prolonged staring.

**Visual Snow:** A condition of aura also known as persistent aura without infarction (i.e., without headache) or persistent migraine aura (PMA). It presents within vision as an overall grainy static or noise in the visual field—resembling, while less opaque than television static. (It is most pronounced in darkened conditions; least noticeable in bright light.)

**PART III: (Prelude) Before and After (Images)**

1. Rendering Aura

“I will never know how you see red, and you will never know how I see it; but this separation of consciousnesses is recognized only after a failure of communication, and our first movement is to believe in an undivided being between us.”\textsuperscript{47}

I recall the circumstance of my earliest memory of drawing. Drawing, in this instance, refers to an intentional pursuit of representation from observed external appearances, rather than the scribbles and/or shape-seeking expressions that arise in cognitive developmental stages; activities in which I had, like any other child, also engaged. Sometime before age five, in addition to the aforementioned normal childhood motor expressive ventures, I found I possessed an ability to view the object before me, then cast a trace of my perception against blank paper, like a slide projection. In response to the image’s appearance, I would grab a

\textsuperscript{45} From: Sacks, Oliver. *Migraine: Revised and Expanded*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1992. “AURA This term is now used for many weird and wonderful symptoms which commonly precede the headache of migraine —and frequently replace it altogether. The word aura was first used by Pelops, the master of Galen, who was struck by the phenomenon with which many attacks begin. The sensation having bee described to him by patients as ‘a cold vapor,’ he suggested that it might really be such, passing up the vessels then believed to contain air. Hence he named it ‘spirituous vapor’ in Greek.” p. 312.

\textsuperscript{46} I have visual snow, and have always had this manifestation in my vision and, in fact, it is only through drawing practice that I have externalised into a format in which it became acknowledged into conscious awareness.

pencil to follow the contours of that apparition, even as it faded from the page. To continue drawing, I’d just repeat the process: look, project, draw. Thus drawing commenced in an innocent and un-reflective pastime; taken to be part of normal vision\textsuperscript{48}, as this constituted normal seeing for me. I now understand this atypical perceptual event as part of my individual journey toward learning the world through vision—one that evoked a direct visual response of drawing. Over time, I understood the methods of my curiously easy facility were not universal, nor would others necessarily follow the same strategy for pursuing the odder but natural emanations of their vision, through drawing. We all experience fleeting phenomena of perception, but unless or until these become attended or rendered into pictorial form, our vision remains transitory and unnoted.

From the beginning, your paper is limited, as all geometrical figures are limited. Within its confines is the complete creative message...The consciousness of limitation is paramount for an expression of the Infinite...The universe, as we know it through our visual experience, is limited.\textsuperscript{49}

Another aspect affecting my physical sense of sight, which contributed to this quirk in the apprehension and application of vision, was a significant degree of undetected myopia\textsuperscript{50}. Our primary learning of the world transpires as largely self-taught enterprise; through vision and its inputs, then processed in imagination. We have no way to test or know that early visual impressions reveal as personal, rather than universal, comprehension of the visual field. For Crowther, “human perception is itself creative and expressive...not only because the body organizes and gives structure to the phenomenal field through it’s positioning, but also because the world recedes beyond and transcends our body’s immediate grasp of it.”\textsuperscript{51}

Interpretation comes in comparative juxtapositions of the immediately available against the remote, of the personal versus the collective. However, we are not generally aware of the divergence of our personal perception from collective assumption—unless and until we interact with art. Revelation of the personal into the external—and thus made available to the collective—is what motivates the making and viewing of works of art, because this also discloses the common paradox in our perceptual habitation. We participate in a public sense of how the world is perceived while, at the same time, we are always translating out of our individual interiority of experience. Any acknowledgement of oddities in perception is


\textsuperscript{50} Trevor-Roper, Patrick. \textit{The World through Blunted Sight}: “(E)ven if spectacles are worn, it is never quite to same as having a normal eye. Often the child has already suffered from his inadequacy before the glasses were prescribed.” (p. 18) and “There have been several attempts to assess...the personality changes that accompany myopia...the myope is at any rate superior in pencil-an-paper types of intelligence...Mystics And religious leaders, as well as musicians and artists, are said to be frequently myopic, since a blurred view of the outer world is no impediment to their inner vision.” (p.23.)

understood by contrast to the public sphere of perception. Thus the myope is deemed to need eyeglasses for a specified correction in vision, in order to align with external readings from a chart of letters on the wall, as graphic indicator of collective norms of vision. Acknowledgement of the unique and individual sensorium, itself a universal condition both compared and comprised within the collective, is best conveyed through publically accessible expressions, like art, which make visible the externalisation of interior vision. The personal is appraised in its variation from collective understandings; into expressions that, in Crowther’s words, “explore another person’s selective interpretation of the visible...at a publically accessible level...liberated from the vicissitudes of time.”

There remain no drawings to illustrate the outcomes of my early mastery. Instead, what I have is a newly acquired deduction as to the extent of my (literal) gaze, its proof found in photographs from early childhood. In outdoor snapshots, I invariably appear to be squinting toward the camera, a posture that had led me to previously assume—if I’d given it any thought all—that I must have been facing into the sun. More recent examinations of these photos, part of another subject thread from the current cycle of drawing research, yielded fresh clues as to my vision in that time. In these photos, I now see that my companions—the other children or siblings—pose open-eyed, their faces relaxed as they regard the unseen photographer. The photos bear witness to the disposition of perception I had adopted in order to comply with the photographer’s likely request to look toward the camera; my attitude of squinting necessary to maximise visual acuity at any distance beyond a limited scope of immediate proximity. My deviations in vision were eventually noticed; then eyeglasses ‘corrected’ my sight. After this intervention on my vision, my trick of projecting with my eyes seemed to fade away as well.

2. Drawing Origins

The idea is transformed, adapted to, and carried by the inner quality of the medium, not by its external aspect...An idea to be expressed may be based upon naturalistic experience, fantasy or abstract concepts. All these sources generate impulses in the mind which may be transformed and given expression...

This early event, resolved by drawing, imbued in me the passion for feverishly mapping apparitions of vision, a passion for drawing. I now understand my anomaly to be palinopsia, or after-image, a manifestation of migraine aura. Occurrences along the migraine spectrum do

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54 See: Volume Two, Appendix: Sibling Reveries.
55 Hofmann, Hans. Search for the Real and Other Essays. p. 64.
56 Oliver Sacks, in his book Migraine, describes at length various manifestations of migraine aura – including “very vivid and protracted visual after-images.” (p. 25) considered ‘hallucination’ in a clinical sense, in that the “hallmarks
not always include headache, and I would not experience accompanying headaches until adulthood. As a child, the effect of aura, combined with the intensity of my short-sighted squint, created a receptive sensory disposition that amplified perceptual impacts of the after-image traces. As a result of my oddity of vision, I began to detect and record vague shapes, coming initially to my ability to draw—without identifying or characterising items in vision by name, and before being introduced into such transcriptional practices through the codified language and rules of drawing instruction. What I witnessed is comparable to Crowther’s *transperceptual*, where “hidden or unnoticed possible visual details…the atmosphere in which discrete visual items and…individual visual phenomena is emergent.”\(^{57}\) Thus, I came to drawing as extension or digression within vision; instilled as knowing rather than in learning. By following strands of practice and interest throughout this research project, I still circle back to an initial embodied intertwining of drawing and vision. Even while unaware, my drawing practice has been directed by a remote event of perceptual curiosity; one which prompted me to pick up a pencil, to converse with myself about the world, and how it appeared to me, through drawing. Such dialogue is a process through which I came to “learn the vectors of possible appearance in transperceptual space through largely unremarked-upon activities…when studying details and appearances of things for some…purpose” until “this experience accumulates and becomes a perceptual skill.”\(^{58}\)

**a. Reverie: Palinopsia Redux**

During this project, I attended a gathering of practitioner-researchers and while there experienced an event of visual alteration, of a quality that echoed the circumstances of perception, which I have described previously as the source of my early engagement in drawing. This recent event occurred when the group assembled in a dimly lit space, to watch a performance by one of the participating artists. The movements of the silent performer were slow, deliberate and attenuated, to the degree that the usual grips of time and physical space slackened, as other details became clearer within this *transperceptual* enclosure. In the quieting slowness, my vision altered as well, and my focus assumed a posture of sight not unlike that of seeing enacted for drawing. Sight became both diffused and transfixed; my gaze relaxing into the requisite looking for seeing-into-drawing. Ehrenzweig identified such of the hallucinatory experience are these; it is mistaken for reality, and it elicits perceptual reaction”. Within these, Sacks also notes phenomena of perception which are experienced as “enhancement or obfuscation of sensation…evidence of such diffuse visual excitation is provided by the intense, protracted, sometimes almost dazzling, visual after-images which may occur at such times…being followed by protracted echoing or reverberation for some seconds after.” (Oliver Sacks. *Migraine: Revised and Expanded*. Berkeley London: University of California Press, 1992. pp. 66-67)


receptive states as “essentially ‘polyphonic...several superimposed strands at once...creativity requires a diffuse, scattered kind of attention that contradicts our normal logical habits.”

I might have drawn what I saw then, but had neither tool nor paper to hand. Instead, this encounter entered visibility as a kind of ephemeral mode of drawing, as glowing outlines lingering in my field of vision where, once again, visual remnants as after-image hovered before my eyes. The performer’s shape disclosed into my vision as multiples; each of her body positions remaining visible as soft traces of light or halo against the darkened space. These views were not imagined internal impressions, but were beheld as extra layers or extensions of the visual, presented externally. This phenomenon verifies an understanding of such traces and/or hallucinatory inputs as externally witnessed sensory event in perception, rather than one internal or intended by an imaginative will. Once the performance concluded and we returned to an adjacent lecture theatre, I hastily sketched my recall of this ephemeral drawing. The sketch (Figure 3.6) depicts overlaps of vague figure-shaped haloes—aglow against the darkened environment. I had watched these unfold concurrently and sequentially, as I assumed an unfocussed trance of looking; the kind of diffuse application of seeing that occurs when drawing. The forms in my sketch do not recall or convey internal or imagined fancies, but were discerned into sight as illuminated silhouettes that had temporarily persisted in each pause or space of the performer’s bodily occupation.

Figure 3.6. Palinopsia Redux

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60 “[T]here are some occasions when perception encounters...meanings which cannot be grasped immediately -- the aura of ‘something still to be said’ lingers and becomes unbearable. We feel the need to preserve...or articulate further.” Crowther, Paul. ‘Merleau-Ponty: Perception into art’, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol 22, No 2, 1982, p. 141.
61 Volume Two: Plate 3. (Work of author.)
3. Drawing’s Disposition of Seeing: Looking towards and Looking Past

To further support my contention of a distinctive nature in the disposition of seeing activated when converting aspects of visual sensory into drawing, I return to key concepts and terminology, including: Wollheim’s interesting drawing and his concepts of seeing-as and seeing-in as referenced in Chapter Two, added to standards delineated by Hans Hofmann in his teaching notes. I cite additional points made by Crowther, which directly acknowledge and build on Wollheim’s findings – all of which situate measures for evaluating an artwork’s impact beyond conventional understandings of surface resemblance or art appreciation.

In Crowther’s model, the viewing posture—what I identify as an adapted or altered perceptual disposition—is driven by empathy. This empathy response is one that recognises a shared affective condition, based in collective individual interiority—one that heralds an attitude of engagement that can discern the interesting drawing championed by Wollheim. Accompanying this empathic posture, Crowther suggests an additional quality to inform viewing stance: that of ‘disinterestedness’. This disinterestedness is not an equivalent to uninteresting, anymore than his denotation of empathy implies a mawkish sentimentality. Empathy and disinterestedness combine as succinct attributes of an affective posture of perception, which underpins the alterations in seeing essential to a deployment perception that facilitates drawing. Disinterestedness is also an apt characterization for the perceptual motive (or non-motive) brought to viewing of the work of art. Such disinterestedness acknowledges the opening of perception onto other possibilities arising from the perceptual field, when the application of sight is not prompted or driven by demands of function, expectation, or attentional strategies and preconceptions—as applied to elicit utilitarian outcome from fleeting impression. What do we seek in each act of looking – and how does that change in the face of art, particularly when engaging sight (and touch) to direct expressions of drawing?

Another salient point, confirmed in the practice findings, is that the drawing process allows and offers an implicit departure from our more habitual expectations and applications of the visual sense. What distinguishes the artistic artefact lies with its peculiar perceptual capacity; the capacity to which Crowther assigns the term ‘picturing’, as already described and defined

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62 In his recent book, The Phenomenology of Art and Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn (London: Bloomsbury Academic/2013), Paul Crowther devotes his first two chapters to an analysis of aspects and features of Wollheim’s ideas around art.
64 Moreover, both these qualities are experienced at a quasi-conscious level, and only apply to the instant of direct, directed and individual engagement with the work of art itself. These affective concepts do not necessarily imply that all visits to galleries, museums, or other activities that surround attendance to art and art production are driven by such empathy and disinterest.
in Chapters One and Two\textsuperscript{66}. Normal vision scans—while ‘picturing’ fixes. In order to compose a visual transcription that \textit{draws} from materials of external reality, the orientation of perception requires sustained attention to selected aspects of its concrete occupation and positioning within space. In the usual application of perception, we anticipate and receive a world “governed by physical laws.”\textsuperscript{67} Expectations, as constrained by these physical laws, may relegate the subtle and ambiguous within the visible to the status of overlooked. In its extensions of looking—through altered dispositions of sight—‘picturing’ offers conditions where both maker and viewer contemplate recordings from fleeting perceptual data.

In \textit{Phenomenology of Visual Art (even the frame)}, Crowther continues to consider activities and artefacts of visual art, for the significance that these highlight and fix into the visible. Works of art of convey their messages into formats and placements that are physically distinct from the viewer’s immediate spatio-temporal environment. The artefact communicates what the individual artist’s imagination witnesses and designates as intrinsically meaningful; reflecting this back into the viewer’s private sense and the sensory, from within an impression expressed outwardly into the public sphere. That sphere is ‘public’ in its acknowledgment of a collectivity; comprised of interior imaginative individuals as its constituent parts. Shared interiority is integral to our understanding of being human, and the intrinsic significance in art offers more than “convention...whereby resemblance...is the basic referential function without being a significant condition of it.”\textsuperscript{68} The endeavour to record or enact such images as interventions upon the visible/visual “changes one’s cognitive relationship to both the represented object and to oneself, and to existence in more general terms”\textsuperscript{69} as we “reconfigure physical material so as to represent a state of affairs other then the material itself.”\textsuperscript{70} That possibility of reconfiguration propels dynamic depictions and deeper vitality of expression, beyond simple replication of obvious or presumed subjects, visible on the surface.


\textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 26.
**Part IV: Interrogating Practice**

1. Barbara Bolt and the Challenge of Representation

   The focus on artworks, rather than practice, has produced a gap in our understanding of the work of art as process.71

   In *Art Beyond Representation: The Performative Power of the Image*, the Australian artist/scholar Barbara Bolt rethinks the affective and expressive location of both process and outcome within the “work of art”. By doing so, she echoes the concerns and considerations of my other referenced theorists, including: Crowther, Wollheim, and Ehrenzweig. What Bolt adds to the discussion is that she brings a knowledge and discovery derived from contemporary practice, from her own process-based research and reflections as a painter. In citing cognition arrived at through practice, she offers a model for bridging methodology and method, which is useful to the interrogations and findings in my own practice-as-research. Bolt questions the biases of art history, as a tradition of interpretation that customarily confines itself to appraisals of surface analyses of works. A particular shortcoming of that tradition is its tendency to assign value based on accuracy of representation alone; while other affective or subtle substance and significance held within the work is relegated to secondary status. What can then become excluded are the very qualities that render the work genuinely interesting, as in Wollheim’s assertions regarding drawing.72 Like Wollheim and Crowther, Bolt identifies weaknesses in both the traditional art historical and modern semiotics-based discourses; ones which either privilege the result as representational copy, or largely ignore the art object—by strategies that flatten it into externally assigned signs or significations.

   Current conventions of critical discourse tend to minimise the impact and import of perceptual and material forces; that are central to both the making and preservation of the unique expression contained within the artwork as artefact. Bolt’s response seeks another modality of meaning; a third alternative, as accessed through the corrective endeavour of practice-based research. The knowledge of the maker adds another kind of authoritative voice to our understanding of art, and here the enquiries and findings of Bolt’s own practice serve as examples of such disclosure. Questions posed by Bolt’s query include: *What, in fact, is to be made of drives and impacts contained within such work? How do these come about and how to these continue?* For Bolt: “Art is an event of stopping; of making an open clearing in the noise of the everyday.”73 Unless expressive practices are engaged, ones that open onto

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“mutual reflection between imaging and reality”, 74 we may fail to notice, not only the true depth of the artistic encounter, but also whole portions of the wonder of embodied perceptual life: sleep or dream states, auras and other excess data existing within the visual—perceptual realities typically overshadowed or edited by dominant demands of expediency or function.

Addressing these concerns, Bolt proves herself a lucid interpreter of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger; enlisting his theories to articulate her practice-derived evaluations of representation and visual art. She offers an extensive examination of the limitations in typical assumptions regarding representational artwork, and suggests more expansive modes of evaluation, built upon Heideggerian concepts, for instance: handle-ability and techne 75 . She applies these concepts to locate and classify artistic endeavours within a broadened scope of revelatory materiality; taking understandings beyond mere esteem for either static surface outcomes of the work, or an even more static role as justification for scoring points of critical theory. Bolt affirms Heidegger’s rejection of any enshrined view of man-as-subject or artist-as-genius, and instead situates artistic practice in a process of co-responsibility. Here, the artist is but one agent interacting among equals, within an enterprise that also encompasses its materials and context. Her premise considers how we receive and conceive images; beyond habits ‘enframed’ in representation, and beyond models that elevate man as subject presiding over object. In her reading of Heidegger, Bolt identifies the artist as one of the various ingredients or actors in the creative undertaking. For the artist, Bolt’s refreshing interpretation “reverses the chain of causality,” 76 thus opening onto emergent revelation, rather than orchestrating or confining acts of control over perception. 77

Still, these factors and principles, as cited by Bolt, could also be examined through the conceit of altered or modified applications of perception, as established and defined in my own practice-project. Such re-framing would not negate Bolt’s understanding and application of Heidegger’s concepts of handle-ability and techne – as these are, in fact, devices of adapted perception enacted by the human agent. Also, care should be taken regarding discussions around co-responsibility, lest they imply a degree of sentience on the part of material

74 Ibid., p.10.
75 By handleability, Heidegger understands that we can only make theoretical sense of the world “only after we have come to understand it through handling.” (p.49.) In techne, Heidegger is trying to describe the practice of acting upon the world that allows man to participate –in the instance of Bolt’s writing – in an activity that reveals more as the process that the product, “a mode of revealing” that “comes to presence...in the realm where revealing and un concealment takes place.” (Ibid., p. 62.)
76 Ibid., p. 72.
77 Heidegger wrote of emergence rather than making of the art object, and Bolt quotes his notion that “In great art...the ‘artist remains inconsequential as compared to the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge.” (Ibid.,p. 105.)
participants; therefore risking unnecessary and unprovable anthropomorphism, that lies beyond the purpose of art practitioner-led research. While I do not suggest that Bolt advocates such fanciful leaps; the argument and proofs she expounds, in support of performativity, can appear unnecessarily and unwittingly convoluted.

Bolt’s evaluation of representational art is aided by her knowledgeable application of Heidegger; which she positions in discussion with other recent thinkers who seek to develop criteria for practice that challenge semiotics-based approaches frequently favoured in current discourse. What Bolt offers, as replacement and improvement over the aforementioned prevailing models, is a proposed alternative modality for considering art, based on performativity. She structures proof of this performativity model within an analysis taken from her reading of cultural appreciations of light. Of particular interest to Bolt is how physical light environments become translated into perceptual generalisations, and how these inform, but also restrict, cultural conventions within art as well as philosophy. Bolt cites the Eurocentric bias, with its philosophical foundations in the Enlightenment; as influencing subsequent western thinkers, including Heidegger, and shaping western art history’s understandings around how light is conveyed or portrayed in visual art. Bolt proposes, instead, her concept of performativity, which she positions as activity that transpires from within the artwork itself.\(^{78}\)

From there, according to Bolt, exemplars of localised light biases are repeatedly directed, transmitted or emitted from the work. In framing her evidence, Bolt’s narrative justification relies on a description of the glare of the Australian sun, with its impact on pre-colonial observational habits among “Indigenous Australians”. She then applies this story to present her case for an alternate disposition for looking; grounding her proof within a radically divergent example of tribal culture. Bolt claims that physical qualities of European light conditions illuminate prejudices of Enlightenment thinking and this, in turn, formed Heidegger’s understanding of “revealing;” reinforced by his limited, culturally specific apprehension of daylight. Though Bolt reasonably asserts that cultural preconception can overwhelm our views on the world, I contend that this does not ratify performativity as the best, or only, philosophical framework for revisiting or reshaping the limits of world view, as defined by culture or landscape.

I have no doubt that Bolt’s portrayal of light is valid, insofar as it goes. However, what I have found through my drawing research is that—even while vision may be situated within more general or habitual conditions of the larger perceptual context (the public sphere)—we must

\(^{78}\) Bolt differentiates the notion of the ‘work of art’ (i.e., process) from the ‘artwork’.
adapt and enact perception in momentary inclinations, as situated and comprised as an individual experience of perception. This is especially applicable and verifiable within expressive enterprises: like art. Drawing allows the artist and viewer to relax the grips of broader cultural biases; in order to provide a glimpse into what lies before and beyond the effects of those assumed prejudices. Additionally, I find that Bolt’s reliance on a practice proof, that is based largely on externally constructed light circumstances, would appear to be merely swapping one cultural generality for another—even if her aboriginal example is more seductive in its exotic tribal identity. Bolt seeks to verify her position by referencing another generalised outlook: one that continues to take its reading from, rather than against, externalised effects of a cultural landscape or lightscape. Though a different continent, this notion still seems to rest upon sweeping assumption.

To an extent, my reservations around Bolt’s position arise because my query into perception has me looking—quite literally—in a different direction. Bolt is a painter and, as such, her performative model is also informed by the bodily immersion necessitated by the messy, gritty substance of that medium. It is my experience that, in addition to the crafting of its imagery, painting demands rigorous attention to—and thus continual interruption by—the demands on perception made by its materials and handling. In contrast, the premise and passion of my project transpires within drawing; a medium I favour, at least in part, because it requires no more than minimal regard to materials while engaging its process. What I detect and assert from drawing practice is facilitated by drawing’s directness of reception and response to the fields of vision and perception. My research concentrates on the adaptations made in the individual’s application of seeing, in order to draw, that then enables unique, expansive and even revelatory participation in perception. Like Bolt’s performativity, my project does not elevate the artist to a position of master. Instead, my research changes or extends the locale of creative and perceptual enactment—to promote what is held, transmitted and exchanged within and between perceiving imaginations, rather than as enacted by a performative artefact. Drawing, regardless of initial inspiration or resultant trace, captures and continues a distinctly singular perception, and reflects an interior and individual perception. This verifies Crowther’s notion of art as expressing shared uniqueness of vision; as a universal condition revealed within—and from simultaneous contrast to—the public realm.

Bolt’s accomplished analysis of her selected philosophical sources remains impressive and informative; and this is far more substantive and convincing than the conclusions she derives from her practice data. My doubts about her practice interpretations are based, to a degree, on the fact that the perceptual alignments I have followed in my research veer away from
Bolt’s claims around the literal point of view. The perceptual arena I seek divulges as idiosyncratic view, with its more nuanced sensory contingencies of light and sight. This sharply contrasts to Bolt’s practice measure of culturally specific daylight glare, which seems to privilege an external and culturally determined disposition in perception. What I track and discern in my own practice project finds that drawing articulates from the individual implementation of sight. By observing what are normally considered overlooked, obscured or occluded in the conditions of seeing, my research affirms that the primary experience of perception in drawing reveals as interior experience and interpretation, and from external data that is first filtered by the imagination. Thus the sensory environment, made visible through the artistic endeavour, is entered by way of an interior imaginal portal. Certainly, cultural generality can make its stylistic influence known upon the surface of the work, but I challenge Bolt’s assertion of this as either central indicator or proof of performativity—rather than an informative detail of art history. Artistic perception addresses the imagination of both the maker and viewer and, from this, enhances and elucidates its orientation toward the interior experience of the visual realm. In pursuing my practice with a view to the shadows—by looking to dreams, auras or other traces of reverie and myopic vision, by shielding my eyes from the obvious offerings of daylight—I seek after oddities and subtleties in individual vision as springboard for practice explorations. Through drawing, I interrogate and illustrate elements of personal perceptions: ones that either guide, or elude us, within more public precincts of comprehension. In this, I offer an alternate arena to Bolt’s performativ setting, not with the purpose of negating her contribution but, instead, to extend examination of drawing’s application and province within individual perception. Here, imagery does not profess as text, but rather as the “presence” record of what one individual once visualised into image. Once there, the work of art remains to be seen, and thus reinvigourated, whenever (be)held again and continued along its perceptual existence—through each ensuing, unique and imagining viewer. As with Crowther’s analysis, my interests lay with how imagination precedes any later gestures in speech or text. Thus framed, what is ‘performed’ is not an activity that occurs within an artefact, but is accomplished by the dynamic application of looking on the part of an (always) imagining spectator.

79 Bolt, in her analysis of Heidegger, considers ancient Greek “presencing,” that sees “the undistorted presencing of things” holding richer perceptual possibility than the more everyday concepts, where “the thing disappears amidst the thing-concept” of “representational thinking.” (Bolt, Barbara. Art Beyond Representation. p. 95.) This is also affirmed in Ehrenzweig mention of how in art the “mysterious ‘presence’ reveals itself, which gives the work a living personality” (Ehrenzweig, Anton. The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing: An Introduction to a Theory of Unconscious Perception, p. 48). Crowther defines a presentness that “goes beyond the ordinary—highly mobile—conditions of perception, and...offers a cognitively enhanced visual presentation...which suspends...positioning in time.” (Crowther, Paul. Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame), p. 57) and offers a notion of art that “invests...itself with the character of visual presentness.” (Crowther, Paul. Phenomenologies of Art and Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn. p. 104)
2. Interrogating other evidence: Seeing Occlusion & Anomaly

(T)he artist’s vision picks out those deviations from perceptual norms (or the possibility thereof) which can find a fuller articulation in his work.\textsuperscript{80}

Included in my research are certain drawings that demonstrate, within their descriptive marks, evidence of the tangible manifestations of visual anomaly, the recognition of which has only emerged into awareness through drawing practice. These examples are not cited in order to examine anomalous events of vision as such, but because these visual deviations can illustrate subtleties and idiosyncrasies existent in vision, which are captured and visibly acknowledged by drawing. It is important to stress that these anomalous features first came to be marked into the drawing as intuitive response, rather than from some deliberate interpretive grasp of vision. Hence, these elements are disclosed from an appearance or sensation, which is received at an even further remove from the directed attention and vision, as it is generally adapted and applied into an intention of drawing. Hans Hofmann\textsuperscript{81}, in “On Experience and Appearances,”\textsuperscript{82} also identified the importance of a characteristic \textit{empathy} in art instruction, stating that “(i)f things are other than they appear, then the limited capacity of our senses must be united through an inner vision. Empathy results from inner vision.”\textsuperscript{83} Hofmann’s empathy is a convergence of affective response with “inner perception”, merging as a “faculty of empathy...by which we can comprehend the essence of things beyond mere, sensory experience.”\textsuperscript{84}

Drawings included corroborate my research claim that drawing-in-practice attends a broader province of the visible—as it is through drawing that I eventually identified another pervasive anomaly, inhabiting my visual field. This additional aura phenomenon entered awareness through drawing; only becoming consciously acknowledged in reflection, after the fact of its

\textsuperscript{81} Hans Hofmann had a profound and formative influence on mid 20th century art school pedagogy in the United States—the system under which I was trained and formed as an artist, studying from the 1970’s and through into the late 1990’s. As his biographic details describe: “Hans Hofmann (1880-1966) is one of the most important figures of postwar American art...renowned as an influential teacher for generations of artist—first in his native Germany, then in New York and Provincetown...As a teacher he brought to America direct knowledge of the work of a celebrated group of European modernists...and developed his own philosophy of art, which he expressed in essays which are among the most engaging discussions of painting in the twentieth century.” (Accessed: http://www.hanshofmann.org/biography, 2nd June 2014)
\textsuperscript{82} Hofmann defines his empathy within an instructional essay for his art students, and in the section “On Experience and Appearance”, finds that “(b)y using the faculty of empathy, our emotional experiences can be gathered together as inner perception by which we comprehend the essence of things beyond mere, bare sensory experience.” He differentiates the three dimensionality of the physically real from the two dimensionality of our capacity of sight – and believes the combination of seeing with the impacts and associations of experience, related to what has been perceived, allows us to also apprehend in “effects which are not three dimensionally real but supersensory and thereby transcendental.” (Hofmann, Hans. \textit{Search for the Real and Other Essays}. p. 62.)
\textsuperscript{83} Hofmann, Hans.”Excerpts from the teaching of Hans Hofmann”, \textit{Search for the Real and Other Essays}. p. 62.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., p. 62.
making, as a viewer.\textsuperscript{85} Hence, such disclosure, as part of the fabric of my \textit{transperceptual}, further illustrates this point. This tick in vision, called \textit{visual snow}, is another migraine aura condition and, therefore, is technically classified as hallucination.\textsuperscript{86} Visual snow presents as persistent television-like static that appears as a thickening in the very atmosphere of the perceived visual field. It is constituent in all my conscious vision, even behind closed eyes, and is most pronounced in darkened conditions. Curiously, the only visual situation where I do not experience this occlusion is while dreaming; as such imagery is not applied from the physical faculties, or neurology, of sight. In my recollection, this snow has always been part of my visual reality. I remember seeing the moving granular surface within darkened room when waking in the night as a child; its appearance is not unlike aquatint’s effect in etching; and as I had initially studied art at a time when drawing was not pursued as primary media, and I instead chose etching, for reasons that only now become fully obvious. On its face, my choice certainly acknowledged a close visual relationship in the graphic expressions of printmaking and drawing. Yet, I now see two additional and more affective reasons; neither of which I understood until the process of reflection on practice during this research. One further reason because the effects of aquatint mimicked the textures within my own experience of vision. Another factor came from an attraction to the deep richness of black in etching’s impressions, as pressed and fused into the paper. Such quality of blackness was a welcome contrast to how the noise of the snow effect muted my view on the night world. I can never see complete blackness in the dark of night, when viewing a starry sky, or even behind my closed eyes.

This anomaly of perception provides an example of the kind of deviation or variation that Crowther references; what Hofmann defined as ‘essence...beyond the mere sensory’. Such visual data is not initially recognised by thought awareness (thinking per se), but instead arrives as an intuitively recorded attribute; making itself known from inside the drawing process. There it arises as a visible manifestation of the unconscious urge to articulate the unique disclosures of vision, rather than merely simulating or repeating expectations of external perception. I contend that this drive to articulate the truly personal of vision, as present in expressive processes like drawing, informs the central concern of my research; that drawing discerns and documents subtleties of perception— hovering at the edges of the seen—between external data of vision and the interior life.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Returning to Colin McGinn’s discussion of \textit{hallucinations} as \textit{percepts}, in \textit{Mindsight} (2004), he categorises certain hallucination—as in my cited examples of migraine aura – as event of organic origin, rather than delusion, and notes that “the will implies a difference in \textit{causation} of images and percepts. Percepts typically have their causal origin in external stimuli; and even in the case of total hallucination, the causation does not involve the subject’s decision-making mechanisms.” (McGinn, Colin. \textit{Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning}. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 2004. p 15.)
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Figure 3.7. *I See You.* drawing in early stages

Figure 3.8. *Sleeping/Around* – drawing in early stages

87 *Volume Two: Plates 17 & 18.* (Work of the author.)
The knowledge of this aura effect came to consciousness only out of the development of a curious (and correspondent) habit within my methods for drawing; which first emerged into my practice nearly twenty years ago. It came as impulse, entering into the process without any awareness as to motive or sensory source. Thus, when drawing, I would first meticulously render the subject/object, and then feel compelled to disrupt and disturb my careful surfaces; by applying water to create an aquatint-like pixilation, or dripping/washing ink over the drawing. Within the current research, I finally was able to identify this habit as an instinctive externalisation of this peculiarity of my vision; bringing (my) drawing closer to accurate portrayal of the world as I actually apprehend it through sight. I also now understand that, in any attempt to draw from observation, I am required to project my gaze through and beyond this occlusive spectre that always inhabits my field of vision. This explains why purely representational drawing was never satisfactory, as it could not authentically reflect the visual—as I inhabit it. Drawing’s apprehension of a wider spectrum of visibility impels me to add the other emanations of perception back in and, in witnessing this quality of seeing as external record, I feel relieved. Figures 3.7 through 3.12 demonstrate how this intuitive response is applied to alter the outcome—and perceptual record—of two perfectly adequate graphite representations of beds, which I’d made during a prolonged period of insomnia, as an exploration of sleep’s spaces. In earlier stages of drawing process (figures 3.7 and 3.8), I felt a sense of still being outside these works; my unformed and unspoken artistic goals not yet reached. It was only in the subsequent disturbance—even near destruction—of the drawing that I achieve a connection to this articulation of my own sensory impression; one that allows me, as artist, to enter the piece and take possession of its expressive outcome, as describing a reality of my vision.
Figures 3.9 & 3.10. *I See You.* (2008)\(^{88}\) after & before drawing

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\(^{88}\) *Volume Two: Plate 17.* (Work of the author.)
Figures 3.11. & 3.12 Sleeping/Around (2007) after & before drawing

89 Volume Two: Plate 18. (Work of author.)
Part V: Seeing Doubled
1. Drawn across Time to What Remains Present in Art

The unconscious symbolism of the art form calls forth a reaction...on a far grander scale than the secondary dream elaboration, as though the masterpiece had been a dream of the artist which we, the public, perceive with our waking imagination.  

Another circumstance that shaped my encounter with works of art and my recognition of these as enduring expressive artefacts, is traceable to childhood proximity to New York City’s great art collections—particularly, the Metropolitan Museum of Art. In my childish imagination, paintings materialised as portals into the walls: opening onto territories of possibility, within and beyond the borders of their depiction. Such imaginative games arose within direct engagements with artwork; thus, as literal flights of fancy. In my reveries, I’d envisage what might happen if one could walk into and around the painting. What other worlds slipped out of view, just over the edges of gilded frames?

Crowther’s recent *Phenomenology of Visual Art (even the frame)*, addresses the development and impact of structural framing features, within a discussion that elucidates the imagined responses, when in the face the artefacts of art. Crowther proposes that framing strategies advanced out of, and along with, evolving human understandings as to the true extent of spatial distinction between the pictorial and actual worlds. Frames serve to define and separate the artistically constructed domain, from the realities of the audience’s lived environment. Hence, if our earliest art forms were revealed onto rock and cave wall, without regard to differentiated pictorial borders, this occurred, in part, because their makers had not yet apprehended their expression to be “ontologically different from real space;” while within cultures which believed these images to be “some privileged physical portal between the real and the spirit worlds.”

Crowther positions the progression of formats and framing devices as an evolutionary movement towards what he calls *circumscribed planarity*; the comprehension and acknowledgement that the constructed edges of the picture world exist to emphasise “its difference from ordinary perceptual space.” Thus the frame reinforces the pictorial world, by holding and defining the area of imagery both within and beyond its moment of creation; extending its influence beyond the limits of ordinary fleeting constraints of the time and space—as attributed to its origins and its maker.

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91 See: Chapter One, PART II: Philosophies of Seeing: 3. Origins of Images (Historical), for a discussion of Crowther’s model for the evolution of pictorial space in relation to David Lewis-Williams’ *The Mind in the Cave*.  
92 Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of Visual Art (even the frame)*. p. 53.  
93 Ibid., p. 52.
An additional pastime, formed by early art museum encounters, was my imaginative attempt to conjure the embodied companionship of the artist, and then to picture the master’s hand extending towards the marks or stokes, to form the imagined world, that now revealed its presence before me. Within the trance of engagement with extraordinary expressions in art, the sense of time—decades and even centuries—collapses inside the encounter between viewer and artist, and the reception of that differently conceived and configured visual space is then continuously fixed and imbued with “the character of presentness.”\(^{94}\) As viewer, I never pictured myself to be the maker, but rather strove to observe the proceedings from near at hand; seeking out the ephemeral space occupied by the artist, who had actualised form into these gestures—unfolding their revelation still.

During this same period, I attended parochial school\(^{95}\) for primary and secondary education—so my education was inflected with the traditions and beliefs of Roman Catholicism. Though I never found religious indoctrination persuasive, that liturgical pedagogy provided the useful epiphenomenon of familiarity with the specific details and narratives that informed my favourite genres of art—thus helpful to later study of art history. Though I lack a passion for theological conviction, I have frequently felt a grip of fervour when attending the timeless power of human creativity, as held within artistic expressions. Contemporary artist, Paula Rego\(^{96}\), acknowledges her upbringing in a Roman Catholic country as major source for her inclination towards visual storytelling. Though discouraged from belief or devotion by an atheist father, Rego states that “it would have been impossible in Portugal not to have been, in Paula’s words ‘some sort of Catholic’.”\(^{97}\) The terror and traditions of that mythology then set the stage for her practice explorations through various strands of magical fiction.\(^{98}\)

2. **Seeing Doubled: On Drawing as Act of (Further) Aesthetic Response**

A dream memory is easily forgotten, but in a work of art the unconscious symbolism stands permanently embodied. We cannot forget it or destroy it there, so our perception changes.\(^{99}\)

Anton Ehrenzweig described the essence of the aesthetic response as occurring in “shifting energy from depth mind to the surface mind”.\(^{100}\) The success of the work of art lies in its potential for conveying sensation of deeper meaning, what he had termed ‘depth mind’: a

\(^{94}\) Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of Visual Art (even the frame)*. p. 58.

\(^{95}\) These are known as ‘convent’ schools in the UK.

\(^{96}\) See: Chapter Four: Case Studies/Part Three: Re-Presenting Imagination: 1. Paula Rego.


\(^{98}\) “Paula Rego’s favourite painting is Max Ernst’s The Virgin Spanking the Infant Jesus in Front of Three Witnesses.”


designation of the more vital and affective mode of apprehension, that becomes available in proximity to significant expressions of art. Ehrenzweig contrasts this depth of understanding against the more superficial exercise of reason’s analysis; comparable to the diurnal cognition used to construct some recollected order from the blurs of sensation and image-trace residues brought back from our nocturnal dreams. When re-collecting a dream, the mind amends images into sensible narratives for the daytime consciousness; rather than expounding these within more fluid renditions of image into image. Such ordering and editing processes are the common method for dream recall because, once awake, the dream’s primary imagery ceases to be directly accessible to perception. As stated previously, dream content has informed my drawing practice for nearly twenty years; borne out into drawing as image-to-image or image-generative exploration, which thus de- emphasise reason’s biases for narrative reconstruction.

The initial proposal for this research had focused on images derived from dream encounters, and these remain as a significant source of research imagery. The following examples, figures 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15, recall what I have ‘seen’; as dream sketch notations made in the immediate aftermath of waking from a dream event. I later drew (literally) upon these notations, for developing a visual lexicon series: Hypno-Glossary (figures 3.16, 3.17, 3.18 and 3.19), as the collected pictorial documentation of various dream sightings. Other of these dream notations (figures 3.20 and 3.21) were also used within more developed compositions, as shown in figures 3.22, 3.23 and 3.24.

Figures 3.13, 3/14 & 3/15. Dream/night notations

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101 Volume Two: Plate 19. (Work of author.)
Figure 3.1. hypno-glossary

Figure 3.1. hypno-glossary

Figure 3.1. hypno-glossary

Figure 3.1. hypno-glossary

Figure 3.1. hypno-glossary

Figure 3.1. hypno-glossary

Volume Two: Plate 20, 21, 22 & 5. (Work of author.)
3. Drawing in primary and secondary imagery

Ehrenzweig stressed that the ‘aesthetic response’ to art is not confined to secondary translation. Therefore, the art image does not share the awakened dreamer’s restriction, which necessitates enacting of the perceptual switch from *imaginal* vision into diurnal recall and interpretation via reason’s narrative orderings. By contrast, the art object offers a vibrant enduring record of the *image*’s declaration, and thus can facilitate further possibility of disclosure, which transpire wholly within the primary province of *depth mind*—that is, from within the visual and affective imagination. Deeper engagements activate as the *image-to-image* dialogues, which are, for example, available whenever a new sketch is made in direct proximity and response from observation of the embodied (i.e., original) expression of another artist. To access this depth of contact and communion, “creativity requires a diffuse, scattered kind of attention that contradicts our normal logical habits of thinking.”

(In *Chapter Four: Case Studies*, example articulations of depth are reviewed in specific projects and drawings from the practice research; examined for their capacity to double and extend conversations between imaginations. These examples are selected from my own practice, as well as from the work of other artists, including Paula Rego.)

*Figures 3.13* through *3.19*, provide examples of drawing, which make note of something that was initially ‘seen’ within the territory of the dream; the place that Bachelard called *Oneric Space*, the other country of Cixous’ imagination. Here, in *Hypno-Glossary*, the drawings re-collect as a pictorial lexicon, assembled from vistas and visions brought back from the dream world. In this area of the research, I have also found that certain images—which were first presented into imagination in either dreams or as drifting peripheral glimpses of *hypnogogia*—can find spontaneous and/or recurrent iteration within the composition of more developed drawing exercises (*Figures 3.20* through *3.24*). Thus, a strange antlered dog, so vividly encountered in the toss between a moment of waking and the turn/return back to sleep, or the boat borne across a dreamer’s ocean with sails made of bed pillows, return as affective iconographic elements within further and deeper practice expressions, and into extended reveries of drawing that seem to hew to most closely to the rhythms of creative chaos and illogical freedom of the dream’s image-generation. I mention these examples to point out that—as in my realisation around the drawn appearance of my visual snow aura—when such ephemeral elements, previously only seen in dream or memory’s trace, become rendered and external as expression in drawing, their resolution into fixed imagery can bring an affective sense of relief.

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Figures 3.20 & 3.21. night notations

Figure 3.22 hypnodogia (2012)

Figure 3.23. Predella (detail) 2012

Figure 3.24. Imaginary Holidays (detail) 2011

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104 Volume Two: Plate 23 & 24. (Work of author.)
105 Volume Two: Plate 55, 56 & 57. (Work of author.)
4. Seeing Doubled: On Translation and Transcription

Ehrenzweig cautioned against reproductive practice that attends solely to surface appearances, as this only relays the “emotional sterility of the copy.”\(^\text{106}\) Describing the artistic masterwork, he indicates “a point is reached where...(t)he work assumes a life of its own...(a) mysterious ‘presence’ reveals itself, which gives the work a living personality.”\(^\text{107}\) This clarifies the challenge inherent in transcriptional practice; if undertaken without observing or attending the deeper meanings, the opportunity to converse with that “living personality”, beyond the replication of surface, is missed. There is a residual force, imbued from the original activity of its making, that endures in the affectively realised work of art, and which exists outside the temporal moment or surface rationality that the work might ostensibly represent. This residual force is the reason we visit museums, and is the impulse from which we’ve invented our art histories. Within this common artistic pastime of sketching at museums and exhibitions, when transcribing the face-to-face encounter with past (but still present) masterworks—those image-to-image engagements will voice and amplify expressive energies, that resound across the precincts of proximity and time. Within such exchanges through drawing, the artist engages Berger’s “ferocious and inarticulate dialogue...like something thrown and caught.”\(^\text{108}\)

There is a long tradition of transcription in artistic training—when studying earlier artists, drawing (from) their work can access increased depth of looking. Within this research, I have frequently drawn from reproduction and other documentary reference materials. In this section, I briefly survey certain examples of such sources and transcriptive drawings, which were derived from secondary source material (Figures 3.25 through 3.31). In each instance, the studied reproduction was selected in a response to some quality held by the secondary image itself—from an interest in how these professed as visual reference, as a quality appearance apart from the original artworks they seek to describe. For example, from a text that catalogued x-ray studies of the layered iterations and versions of devotional paintings,\(^\text{109}\) I was instinctively drawn to sketch those black and white x-ray images. Perhaps my response was to these as the documentary offering of altered views of the artworks. Additionally, other transcriptional drawing projects were engaged to track and explore affective responses to people and places lost to time—in drawing from and upon old photographs (figures 3.30 and 3.31); discussed and included in Volume Two: Appendix, Sibling Reveries.

\textbf{a. X-ray vision & Other Transcriptions}

Imagination is not...a faculty which fabricates images of reality, it is a power which forms images which surpass reality in order to change reality. It is the power of ‘sur-humanity’.\textsuperscript{110}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure325.png}
\caption{figure 3.25}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure326.png}
\caption{figure 3.26}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h!]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure327.png}
\caption{figure 3.27}\textsuperscript{111}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{111}\textit{Volume Two: Plate 25, 26 & 27.} (Work of author.)
b. Sibling Reveries

Figure 3.28

Figure 3.29

Figure 3.30. Cake/2012

Figure 3.31. Salt/2012

112 Volume Two: Plate 28 & 29. (Work of author.)
5. How the pictured world of drawing is different than a text.

If, as Crowther proposes, imagination constitutes its own genus of cognition, then drawing can be positioned as both exercise and record of this thinking. Drawing, as species of pictorial thinking, operates in a manner not dissimilar to the ways writing, reading and speech expand into understanding, as wrought from linguistic thought. Still, the path of a drawing will not trace the same route when gathering into expression; as do the systems and structures that implement verbal formats. Creative expression in writing records an order of thought, what Merleau-Ponty called “linguistic operations,” which converts from sensory impulse or context that precedes those words and sentences. The initiatory impulse is transposed into identifiable text or verbal symbols; then ordered into arrangements that adhere to conventions of the language’s particular syntax. Drawing, in its performance of cognition, follows its process toward revelation by watching out for the accumulation of marks, then responding to the way these simulate impressions of directed vision—regardless of whether they re-mark from an objective sight, or as revelation of a more subtle sensory or imaginal nature. The primary accomplishment and interest of drawing derives from how its image impressions disclose upon the external surface, as a visually evocative arrangement. Another essential difference—or advantage—of visual artistic expression is that subsequent viewings of imagery can embrace and extend a wider reach of communication than the constrictions of comprehension imposed by the limits of fluency, to deciphering verbal meaning.

The eye is an instrument that moves itself, a means which invents its own ends; it is that which has been moved by some impact of the world, which it then restores to the visible through the offices of an agile hand.114

Written works—produced by a distinct author in a particular language—can be identified, attributed, and disseminated through varied transactions of printing, publication and linguistic translation. The work of visual art, the drawing, retains the singular expression of its unique moment of transcription; its outcome remains embodied in that original visual utterance. It is in this way that—as a mode of communication—a drawing is more universally and directly accessible to its ‘reader’. Lacking adequate translation, the comprehension of “linguistic operations” is limited to those with fluent knowledge of a distinct grammar and vocabulary. The message of a drawing remains tied to its singular visual product, and thus it differs from oral and aural records, whose meanings will flow intact through necessary accommodation to translations and tongues over time. Certainly, mechanical reproduction of visual art will alter aspects of the original – in scale, tone, cropping—and, by doing so, will unintentionally dilute

or alter the impact of its initial resonance—but that resonance remains within the authentic artefact. Also, if one draws (again) from existing artwork, the resultant drawing constitutes and reconstitutes as something utterly new; recognised as the handiwork of the artist who authors the new expressive act from the original source material of another.\textsuperscript{115} Such drawings are not made to take credit for the original source, and are not perceived to replace or claim the other’s work (crimes of forgery aside). On the other hand, if we cite or recite the words of another, these are still attributed as the author’s original words, rather than as new composition. The authenticity of that creative utterance is not deemed remade or reclaimed; the consequences of plagiarism demonstrate the collective view of any such attempts. The linguistic translation of texts is, of course, an enormously creative and inventive task, but the end goal of that endeavour is the intact extension of what originated as a specific author’s text, without subjecting his/her intended meaning to revision or re-authoring.

The word draw, in English, embraces among its definitions, ones that mean “to elicit,” “to pull”, or “to attract\textsuperscript{116}. The implication of a pull or attraction, in drawing, is intimated by the accruing marks that bring forth, and into focus, vision called to by imagination. Drawing beckons disclosure from a softening of gaze and gesture, to divulge its surprising record of what is actually — rather than presumptively — available to individual perception. This can only occur from adaptations of perceptual disposition, which are requisite for translating sense experience into drawing. In the altered sensory mode that attends the drawing process, sight can reach further into the seen; where this view to drawing can edit and decipher into presentness, what would remain unaccounted within more normal and fleeting operations of vision. Thus, subtle traces are fixed into view—aided by intentional suspensions of linguistic identification or cognition, and privileging by a shifting application of the eyes. Putting aside verbal language’s talent for utilitarian recognition facilitates the drawing process—making space for more fluid apprehensions of movement, form, shape, light— to be abstracted and reconfigured away from our narrative or iconic preconceptions— and into a drawing.


Summary for Chapter Three

This chapter elaborated on specifics of methodology as it is applied directly to the methods and practice components, within this research. I outlined terms of drawing and perception, as understood and addressed in this project, then demonstrated aspects of adapted or altered perception and how their expression was/is revealed into the drawing practice. Discussion in this chapter also defined the processes through which drawing can be situated as both discovery and record of the imagination’s view, and is expanded upon by aligning the findings to readings and interpretation of the methodology. I have also reviewed the practice-based research example of Australian artist Barbara Bolt—in order to consider the similarities in our inquiries, while highlighting the differences in the direction of exploration and in our conclusions from practice findings.

The next chapter (Chapter Four: Case Studies) establishes the research positions and methodology, as demonstrable and in greater detail and depth within specific drawing examples, which are analysed here as research outcome. This chapter is comprised of a number of Case Studies, which contain and explore selected drawing examples within dedicated bodies of work, which form the practice component of the project that address and affirm my research discoveries.