Chapter Two

*It would appear (to me)*…

(Methodology)
**Preface to Chapter Two**

This chapter provides closer readings of the key theoretical sources in support of the thesis proposition of drawing as an adaptation and expansion of perception. Central to advancing these positions are recent aesthetic texts by Paul Crowther: notably in his concept and discussion of *picturing*, and his reasoning for the primacy of visual imagination in all activities of cognition. *Picturing*, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is a cognitive modality, which Crowther defines in contrast to linguistic thought per se. He situates this alternative thinking modality within the artistic endeavour, and as its own distinct mode of image-based cognition—that expresses and identifies out of the internal experience of perception. In terms of my own practice concerns within this research—*picturing* serves to extend an understanding of how the acts and artefacts of drawing are registered within human awareness. I then correlate this concept to other contributing voices and ideas addressing perceptual operations; particularly *picturing*’s correspondence to Richard Wollheim’s definition of the “interesting drawing” as an evaluation that privileges qualities of affective articulation, over and above readings of surface representation alone.

I then review practice history and interests that underlie the original research proposal. Initially, I had designated the perceptual inputs of sleep and dreams as central content area for the practice research. I explain how the areas of interest came to become extended and expanded, by way of realisations within the drawing practice, and evolved into an expanded definition of subtle traces within perception—as accessed and expressed through drawing. I then set out this revised criteria for the practice inquiry: one that encompasses a broadened definition and range of subject, as applicable to the research goals. While sleep and dream imagery remain thematically significant to the project, these moments of perception are now located and examined as only one domain of adaptation in perceptual habitation, while maintaining particular interest as to how dreaming demonstrates similarities in image-generation to the image-making operations occurring in drawing. My initial proposition—and subsequent related discoveries—are examined through further theoretical reference and consideration, including: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind”, Gaston Bachelard’s essay “Oneric Space”, analytic psychologist James Hillman’s *The Dream and the Underworld* and *The Thought of the Heart*, and Anton Ehrenzweig’s depth analyses of artistic expression. These texts are validated in readings of Crowther’s terminology and theories of visual art, which offer methodological bases for understanding and evaluating this research project and its findings.
Part I: Sense and Sensibility of Drawing

1. On Looking to Draw

My research addresses drawing’s capacity to diagram perception, by plotting out for external contemplation the fleeting events of vision—irrespective of whether the initial sensory reference is exterior, interior, solid or shadowy. In pursuing the practice component of this project, I have found that, regardless of whether the transcription commences in deliberate observation from an intended objective source or from curiosity borne along by a roving gaze, or is revealed as imaginative inner visualization; the drawing itself is a wholly invented depiction and manifestation of thought—made and contained within the visible. Thus, as method of cognition, drawing’s disclosures enact a different species of knowledge than what is acquired or articulated in vocal gesture or through other disseminations of verbal language.

The project focuses on moments of adapted perception that subvert expectations of sight. This subversion of perception allows for apprehension and understanding from a greater range of the available and possible data within the visual field; than what can be found in the traces comprising the more obvious representations disclosed within the surface account of the drawing. It seems clear that the familiar instructional strategies for drawing—perspective, proportion, value and so on—are devised to access discrete aspects from a similar perceptual territory. However, what I propose is that such codified alterations in the activities of looking have been derived or inferred from a broader purview of adapted perceptions—adaptations that operate during other moments within embodied experience. This project engages the implications of this broader sense and sensory within the visual, as located and examined through drawing. As such, the visual devices or rules in drawing are epiphenomena of the truer breadth and possibility of perception. This larger sense of the visual is inherent and nuanced—bringing the encounter with variation and subtlety of perceptual life even to those who do not engage in drawing or other expressive recording practices. Additionally, the adaptive strategies of drawing would seem to be designed (or offered) to primarily affect a goal of resemblance as measured by objective observation. The instructional tactics of drawing are key to acquiring and implementing drawing as distinct skill set, but their application may elicit a rather closed

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1 There is art historical documentation for ambiguous claims of realism applied to images which were, in fact, derived from second-hand references or schema. These were deemed as interchangeable with authentic observation—when opportunities for direct observation were unavailable. As such, schema, however unreal or untested, inhabited the visible in order to designate themselves something real: as image effort depicting a model that can be understood from visual description. See: E. H. Gombrich’s discussion of Durer’s woodcut of an armoured ‘Rhinoceros’ (1515), in Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial (pp. 70-73). Gombrich notes: “The familiar will always remain the likely starting point for for the rendering of the unfamiliar; an existing representation will always exert their spell over the artist even while he strives to record the truth.” Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation, Oxford: Phaidon Press Ltd., 1988. p. 72.
loop of expectation and comprehension, if only employed towards expectations or illusions of representation upon the surface of the drawing.²

In constructing a methodology for this proposition around drawing and its relationship to more muted modalities of perception, I have found that Paul Crowther’s writings on visual art are key for devising an analytical framework within which to discuss my research. Of specific relevance, are his models that juxtapose modes of perception as in pictorial expression versus linguistic dissemination—then applied to contrast the disposition of the vision that attends art processes against how sight is implemented towards more ordinary projects of looking. The artefact of visual art is considered within the notion of picturing⁴: a hypothesis that underscores fundamental distinctions in how imagery is engaged versus reception of linguistic revelations—or what Crowther terms thought per se. This concept articulates a central condition through which I interpret my findings, by establishing that the imagery of drawing depicts from and into a different referent—one which corresponds more closely to our reception of the external world of experience through vision. Through drawing practice, I have expanded upon these ideas to demonstrate that picturing attests to the adaptations of vision applied in service to image-centred activities, like drawing. As our lives are spent immersed in the visual, picturing arises from the relationship to our primary means for apprehending and learning (from) the world. In order to engage the response to experience through picturing and also to engage a response that will allow for picturing, we are required to shift our disposition of perception toward sensory goals whose aims—for both maker and perceiver—diverge from the ordinary objectives of visual apprehension. Of additional significance, is the phenomenological manner by which picturing further differentiates its presentation from other (i.e., linguistic) records of internal fleeting visualisation; as “picturing always involves the use of at least some material which is independent of the body’s own organs...in artifacts which...exist outside the body, and, almost always, independent of it.”⁴ Hence, the projects and products of picturing mark themselves outward into autonomous inventions—as in drawing—fashioned and translated through a perceiving imagination, then received and held within the physically independent form of artefact.

2. Seeing Cognition: On Images and ‘Thought per se’
The most familiar connotation of thought is its function in information acquisition and processing, occurring as linguistic expression, and deciphered by processes that seemingly

² See: Chapter One/Part I: Drawing and Image/Thinking Perception, 3: Wollheim’s Interesting Drawing.
³ Ibid.
transpire from inside the body. In fact, language utterances most frequently require no material other than the body itself; attending to the aural rhythms of speaking and listening. Even when verbal data is given to vision by way of a physically external document, comprehension necessitates the internal integration of those configurations of text. We transpose text as whispers of words heard inside the mind, as the precondition for grasping its intended communication. Crowther writes that “([l]anguage...can be embodied in an independent medium such as writing, but this embodiment is not a condition of its character qua linguistic.”

It is, however, possible to look upon compositions of symbols and words, in languages we do not internally comprehend, and only read these pictorially. Such image offerings would not require the same acculturation or inculcation needed for aural and linguistic comprehension. In these instances, the disclosure is limited to universally held references from objective observation, i.e., as imagery that is intelligible; provided the individual physical faculty for sight is operationally healthy. This mode of apprehension would be the only one available when lacking internalised knowledge of this as discernible language—one that keeps the revelation external to the body—rather than at levels of interior familiarity that render one a speaker. In circumstances where one is fluent in a specific verbal language—the experience of discernment conveys into understanding from the inside/out. But in purely visual disclosures, from environments perceived as external to the body, these will be attended from the outside/in. We move, are moved, are caught, or even startled, by something that appears as wholly exterior or other to conversational threads of interior narrative.


Volume Two: Plate 8. Dream Language” 2011, graphite on paper. (Work of author.)
Moreover, the artefacts of visual art possess dual discernibility, as both *percept* and *image*. The *percept* is the objective material and media, the support which is container for any *image* that portrays as expression of the artist’s interior experience of seeing and imagination. It is from this characteristic as *percept* that the art object signals its status as a unique zone of visual *imaginal* event, and the record of altered and subtle of properties of perception, which is the focus of this research. This dualistic perceptual existence within the art object is addressed by Richard Wollheim’s concepts of ‘seeing-in’⁷ and ‘twofoldness’⁸. In Wollheim’s description, the viewer apprehends the paired aspects of perception, by regarding the work of art as a “distinctive perceptual experience wherein the plane surface and its three-dimensional content are seen simultaneously.”⁹ Thus the visual art image distinguishes itself from the other products of sight—and further distinguishes itself from the temporal mobility of ordinary seeing—in that its purpose is to bring and fix private image-based impression into a shareable and enduring form. Crowther re-iterates Wollheim, in writing that “(w)hile perception of...pictorial space has some kinship with our normal viewing of the world, it is also radically separate...it suspends our natural attitude towards the visual world.”¹⁰ This suspended attitude is what constitutes the adaptations in perceptual disposition, which allow us to engage and enter the work of art. It is also what I demonstrate in the evidence of drawing practice.

When interpretations of input arrive to us as words—whether as text or speech or the internal chattering monologues of thought—these originate first in sensations that preceded the individual’s development of a capacity to render and decode language. Language follows on from earlier encounters within the sensory—particularly the visual.¹¹ Crowther specifies the imagination as a unique cognitive mode; distinguished from both linguistic-based thinking and directly experienced sensory event. He characterises “(t)hought per se” as an “idiom of mental

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² Wollheim, in *Art and Its Objects*, devises terminology in order to highlight phenomenological operations of perception in encounters with works of art. Thus seeing-in is the precondition for perceiving imagery represented in a painting or drawing—seen within an awareness and acknowledgement the artefact’s “inevitable physicality,” where the viewer is “bound to ask how we see an object—a woman or a landscape— rather than merely a marked surface.” Guter, Eran. Aesthetics A-Z. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010. (Accessed: http://dd6ih4cz5h.search.serialssolutions.com/, 4th Sept. 2014).
³ Wollheim’s concept of twofoldness argues a precondition of visual disposition in encounter with artworks that are not physically three-dimensional but instead infer this illusion while also being perceived two-dimensional substrate. “Taking his lead from Leonardo DaVinci’s famous observation that we see landscapes in the stains on a wall, as well as from Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-perception, Wollheim characterized the seeing appropriate to representations by twofoldness: the simultaneous noticing, and the phenomenological blending of both the marked surface and that which is seen in it.” Ibid. (Accessed 4th Sept. 2014.)
⁵ Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, p. 55.
representation that operates through linguistic expression, “though is also careful to avoid generalisation; acknowledging that manifestations of ‘thought per se’ are, in truth, too varied and intricate to be confined within such terms alone. The intent here is to position imagination as its own “more specialized idiom of thought that represents phenomenal items, events or states of affairs, by generating sensible qualities.”

3. Picturing

It is through its “sensible qualities” that “imagination’s quasi-sensory character distinguishes it from thought per se,” and picturing fulfills its definition as a distinct sensory assertion of cognition through imagery. As part of a total sensorium, the visual sense—particularly in relationship to touch—“has the power to comprehend a complex of...factors simultaneously...reading the presence of hidden visual aspects, as a kind of inference from those which are immediately given.” When forming an artistically enduring image the artist must apply “sustained attentiveness to both these dimensions”. It is this “sustained attentiveness” that opens onto deviations from the habitual scan and survival postures operating in our ongoing diurnal perceptual projects; thus allowing for reception from the subtle traces or edges of the visual, which comprise the focus of my drawing research. As perceptual strategy, picturing describes a manner of cognition that emerges from extended reflection on imagery; one particularly relevant when applied as method of visual consideration for transcriptional processes, like drawing.

Anyone proficient in drawing is well aware that intrusions of babbling thought per se can impede the pursuit and engagement with image. Thus, the artist must re-orient perception to assume the visual and sensory cognitive posture, that facilitates the drawing process. Within ordinary exercises of sight, our eyes range across the landscape of daily life, while an internal linguistic interpreter extracts and deciphers what is immediately pertinent—from the dizzying and infinite procession of sense impression. Such narrative thought operates as translation modality, moving the perceiver away from revelations held in imagery alone and filling in the cognitive gaps with linguistic description and association to remote events and experience. By contrast, a different mode of perceptual disposition—as applied to image-oriented cognition—is requisite for composing responses that convey into and from images, and into records that will remain and continue as images. Crowther’s appraisal is “that visual representation is an

12 Ibid., p. 5.
14 Ibid., p. 6.
16 Ibid., p. 67.
intervention on the visual. It makes the world appear differently, through the artist’s style of handling...the medium.”17 This statement supports what I find through practice research. To this assessment, I would also add that it is critical to acknowledge that the artist must first adapt the individual posture of vision, whenever entering into the process of artistic intervention or transcription. As already noted, the rules devised for drawing signal an approach that alters postures of perception; even if there is some irony in the fact that these codes seemed designed to change perception in so far as to affect simple mimicry of the literal objective view. Nevertheless, such intervention upon the sensory disposition of vision is precisely what allows more nuanced layers to become apparent, and to then be perceived and recorded; whether or not transcription hews to expected ideas of the seen or reveals as deeper appreciations of the visual. When directing sight to the process of drawing, we adjust and assume an outwardly directed posture that simultaneously applies our hands and eyes to reach further into and after vision. We isolate, distill, and/or expand aspects of what is sensed and seen, and employ sight and touch to fix our sensory impressions—framed inside the unique choreography of marks. This strategy maintains the products of vision as purely visual form that, through transformed and transformative capacity of perception, results in imagery that captures both the effects and the affects of sight. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in “Eye and Mind”, conjures the phenomenological configuration of perceptual shifts into lyrical descriptions of the “body which is an intertwining of vision and movement...immersed in the visible by his body, itself visible, the see-er does not appropriate what he sees; he merely approaches it by looking.”18

4. Insight & Inside Sight: Applied ‘Picturing’

Within this project, drawing practice has been employed to regard and detect subtle traces within perception—traces that normally hover beyond the edges of our usual capacity to notice. It is by attending these subtleties that the practice disclosures resonate with Crowther’s description of the hidden or inferred features constituent in ordinary seeing19.

18 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “Eye and Mind”, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, Galen A. Johnson, ed. & Michael B. Smith, trans. ed., Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993. pp. 123-124. The extended quotation reads as: “Strong or frail in life, but incontestably sovereign in his own rumination of the world, possessed of no other ‘technique’ than the skill his eyes and hands discover in seeing and painting, he gives himself to drawing entirely from the world...To understand these transubstantiations we must go back to...that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement...immersed in the visible by his body, itself visible, the see-er does not appropriate what he sees; he merely approaches it by looking, he opens on to the world...”
19 *Ibid.*, p. 182. Here Merleau-Ponty also articulates the degree to which vision can edit out subtle components which are integral within a perception: “When through the water’s thickness I see the tiling at the bottom of a pool, I do not see it despite the water and the reflections there; I see it through them and because of them. If there were no distortions, no ripples of sunlight, if it were without this flesh that I saw the geometry of the tiles, then I would cease to see it as it is and where it is.”
Fainter elements in the perceptible become ascertained through the shifting postures or intentions in perception that occur while drawing. Latent elements of vision (imagined and/or actual) are then gathered into the marks and mood of drawing, and can chronicle surprising insights (in-sights) from ingredients that expand our notion of the sensory field. Visual perception, as ordinarily applied and understood, is a transient affair—regulated and measured in moment-to-moment hierarchies of read versus unread, the necessary versus the insignificant. Thus, we must assume that not all emanations of possible data will display as vividly as the insistent demands of function and orientation. Within—even because of—a long engagement with drawing practice, I am aware of subtle perceptions disclosing out of the ordinary phenomenal composition of the world, rather than from origins attributable to metaphysical or otherwise otherworldly provenance. Reception and comprehension of these more muted transmissions are enabled by way of modifications in how we perceive; as in the manner of those assumed for the purpose of drawing. The visual variations encountered in this adjustment of seeing are integrated within the drawing. There they extend and continue as a discrete event of an artist’s perception that—during the moment of making—had been immediate, present and transitory. Images, once revealed and held into drawing, are transformed from fleeting glimpses of ordinary looking. Yet they do not convey an isolated singular view in the same manner as the photograph—with its literal temporality of the ‘snapshot’. By fixing a record of seeing into a drawing, an individual artist secures an additional quality of perception—that of vision as depicted from the inside/out. The resultant drawing artefact “offers a cognitively enhanced visual presentation...through a rendering which suspends (in virtual terms) that subject’s necessary positioning in time.”

Another set of priorities transforms the relationship to vision, as well as our manner of immersion in the visual, whenever we decide to chart into more enduring imagery, not only from what we see but also of what it is to see. What other elements of sight are encountered and attended, when engaged in the drawing endeavor? For contemplating or constructing images into art results, as Crowther notes, in a “state of affairs represented in pictorial space...not connected to this rigid horizon of actual visual time.”

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Part II: Extreme Observation in Practice

1. Peripheral Visions: Defining (and defying) the seen

This project considers how drawing practice detects and discloses further subtle aspects out of our sensory perception of the visual field. Findings from the practice research confirm a proposition that drawing, in itself, is a conduit for perceptual input—whether intentional or intuitive—which reveal as deviations away from routines of reception employed in more habitual operations of the sense of sight. Vision, as applied to the project of drawing—both in implementing the process and in ensuing contemplation of the recorded marks—will engage a perceptual posture that expands our appreciation of the breadth of what is contained within the sensible. Thus, drawing discloses a modality of perception in its own right.

In my own experience, I came to a facility for drawing at an early age, and in a manner that seemed effortless. The specifics of this event are analysed in greater detail in the next chapter (Chapter Three, Part II: On Auras and Occlusions). I mention this now for two reasons. First, as I recollect the facts of that experience, drawing seemed to appear from the perceptual mixture of undetected myopia and manifestations of migraine aura\(^1\). Hence, my earliest drawing efforts were, in fact, cast by an inherently affected and afflicted perceptual disposition; that is, in physiological deviations away from what is defined as, and corrected to, the normal range of vision. Such deviation is reflective of the proposition that informs the basis of my more recent practice interests. The second reason for noting the curious manner of my natural proficiency here is because I believe its circumstances contributed to subsequent resistance to applying drawing only, or exclusively, to capturing resemblances drawn literally or solely from external objective source. I had initially begun to draw in response to a variation within my visual field. While unknown to me then, this appearance (even apparition) was a manifestation of certain factors odd or additional to the ordinary measurements of sight, as applied toward navigating our way through the physical environment. At the time of my early drawing, I could not have discerned that any characteristic of vision—whether ordinary, additional or defective—was anything other than normative. How and why I began to draw is due to the presentation of curious attributes in my vision, which occurred at a time or age when I could not ascertain that any facet of my response to the visual was not the standard experience of sight. I would

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\(^1\) In the *The World through Blunted Sight: An Inquiry into the Influence of Defective Vision on Art and Character* (1970), Patrick Trevor-Roper offers analysis of how visual development and the conditions which ‘blunt’ vision profess through perceptually-driven characteristics. The myope’s interests, he suggests, favour a detailed world near at hand, while eschewing distractions of factors farther afield. Trevor-Roper speculates on the myope’s advantage in art-making by accessing a “‘peripheral’ type of imagery...usually taken for granted and rarely analysed, while those who are short-sighted, it is the sort of view they always have without their glasses.” (Trevor-Roper, Patrick. *The World through Blunted Sight: An Inquiry into the Influence of Defective Vision on Art and Character*. London: Souvenir Press, 1997. p.37.)
remain unaware of how operational anomalies and defects impacted my visual perception, until understanding was provided by detection of my flawed vision, after which corrective lenses brought sight within the bounds of what is collectively taken to be an ordinary expected disposition of seeing.\textsuperscript{24} So while unintentional, it was an altered application of vision that led to my first engagements with drawing—through and because of my inherently anomalous disposition of perception.

Later, and for a long time, I continued to draw in pursuit of purely representational rendering; prompted by a misguided conviction that conventions of resemblance were the primary and ultimate objective of figurative transcription, rather than only one aspect for evaluating the drawing’s success.\textsuperscript{25} Yet, I would invariably feel some vague dissatisfaction towards those outcomes, however skilled their execution. I now interpret this dissatisfaction as having occurred because I had unwittingly neglected to acknowledge or account for concurrent subtle features present within my visual field; subtle features not unlike those traces of sight that first presented and led me into drawing. It would not be until immersed in this current research exploration, and examining more recent disclosures of practice, that I was able to comprehend that this something else within vision—\textit{extra-sensory} elements within perception—\textsuperscript{26}—was what had prompted me to draw in the first place. As revealed and transcribed through drawing, it is these subtle traces and peripheries of perception that drive and comprise the central explorations of my research. Prior to the period of concentrated reflection undertaken for this project, I can say that I possessed this knowledge intuitively and unconsciously if, by definition, the word unconscious is understood to indicate an awareness existing below the threshold of cognisance typically associated with thought per se, with its subsequent translations through verbal narration. Hence, I cannot say that this was entirely unknown to me, in that it had been previously (and repeatedly) conveyed within the visible and decipherable process of drawing.

Again, I cite Crowther for his descriptions of the intuitive as a function that comes more often as an ineffable, rather than explicable, event. Thus, intuition reveals in apprehension or expression as response to \textit{“conceptual truths about the conditions of space-occupancy”} that then direct “behaviour as embodied subjects without us having them in mind each time we

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. Trevor-Roper’s premise here is that the one who in born to blunted sight, even after intervention of corrective lenses, retains an awareness of differences in vision, which are not readily recognisable to those whose natural vision is considered normal.

\textsuperscript{25} In his 1998 talk at Loughborough University, Richard Wollheim points out that while seeing a resemblance in the marks is the element which “acts as a check upon the artist...whether he can see the represented object in the drawing”, it is not the object itself that is sought – but rather the drawing itself, beyond that trick of mimicry, that is the true point of interest. (Wollheim, Richard. ‘Why is drawing interesting?’ \textit{British Journal of Aesthetics}, Vol. 45, No. 1, Jan 2005. p. 9)

\textsuperscript{26} I offer this term \textit{extra-sensory}, not with a meaning that attributes it as otherworldly or supernatural, but to indicate and/or describe perceptual inputs existent and available to the physical senses, which are seen—as in the case of sleep or the dream—to be additional or outside what we hold to be \textit{normal} to the senses—particularly, in this case, in regards to the sense of sight.
deploy or recognize them...*The larger part of our knowledge exists most of the time in this intuitive form, and aesthetic considerations especially so.*"^{27}

It is in knowledge derived from drawing, and from its experiences of vision that manifest into the insights of imagery, that I situate the central assertion of this research. Simply stated, my premise and purpose is to establish and explore how altered and subtle disclosures from the perceptual field are detected and delineated through drawing practice; as supported and articulated through conceptual models, like Crowther’s *picturing* and *ineffable intuition*. These alterations of perception, which are drawing’s domain, are also indicated in Wollheim’s claim that the *resolution* or success of a drawing enterprise will encompass—in addition to its surface representation—characteristics of affective expression, as in the *ineffable* function of *intuition*. These affective appraisals align with Ehrenzweig’s *hidden order*, Wollheim’s *interesting drawing*, Crowther’s *inherent meaning* and Hillman’s *thought of the heart* – as ideas from which I formulate a methodological structure to support this research. What these concepts address is the quality of what becomes revealed, when one stands back from the drawing as artefact of representation, to witness an invented image, to seek out a deeper interior, personal and unique experience of vision—that was grasped and recorded by the searching eyes and hands of its maker. Furthermore, I can also trace this newly comprehended benchmark to retrospectively locate such effective and affective expression within drawings I had made prior to the research. These realisations come out of this concentrated period of practice as study; from subsequent research reflections that attend the oft-surprising residues of my own vision. Analysis provides the conscious comprehension of how significant discoveries or milestones are revealed and sustained in the realm of *picturing*, from within a discrete invented territory, which is then entered and evaluated by the reflective spectator.\^{28}

Regardless of whether the drawing originates from the unconscious prompt of *ineffable intuition* or begins from intentional plan or design, the practice of making the drawing requires the suspension of any deliberation driven by preconception—which would then cloud the true immediacy of perception. Such a structurally reasoned thinking diverts and inhibits the ability to see and create a response to the unique moment of shape, space and form, as present and presented within the specific instance in vision. However, subsequent analysis can assist in the further and fuller comprehension of what is held and told within the drawing’s record. While

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^{28} In the essay “Why is Drawing Interesting?” Wollheim identifies that in the post-process engagement with the drawing, “the spectator...this includes, indeed it gives priority to, the draughtsman qua spectator” as maker takes on a posture of contemplation—as alteration to a distinctly different quality of cognition than engaged during the making activity of drawing. (Wollheim, Richard. “Why is Drawing Interesting?” (1998) *British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 2005.* p.9)
certain applications of analytical thinking are counterproductive to the making of the drawing, reflection brings the benefits of insight when engaged once the activity of picturing is concluded or reaches some state of resolution. It is then that the practitioner, like Wollheim’s spectator, adopts a posture of “relation between the notional viewer and the subject-matter in pictorial space” and, as with Crowther’s picturing, considers an image, now fixed and enduring. That spectator enters a reverie around the imagery, anchored within the drawing (or painting or sculpture), which “(i)instead...of being present to perception as such, it has the character, rather, of...presentness.” Presentness confers upon the work of art the continual status of perceptual immediacy; from which the participant discerns “aspects of the visible world and human relationship to it which we had not been aware of before.” Crowther’s presentness, like Wollheim’s criteria for the interesting drawing, requires adjustment in the perceptual disposition of the viewer. Specific to drawing—Wollheim notes that the viewer approaches the drawing with the knowledge of it as inventive impression rather than a stand-in for the physical— which confirms that the drawing’s revelation goes beyond the criteria of drawing instruction. Those visual directives can be applied to focus the activity of looking into the strict perimeters seeking objective details for figurative representation alone. By contrast, presentness and the interesting drawing are indicative of the additional adaptation or awareness in perceptual posture; allowing us to see beyond the result from these codified instructions; which access accurate representations but do not necessarily indicate expression of greater range and depth within the perceptual.

2. On Seeing/Drawing Fragments of Night and Day

(T)hese fragments of oneiric space, we put together after the event in the geometric framework of the day, thus turning the dream into an anatomy of dead limbs...Of the transformations of dream we barely maintain...yet it is...these transformations that make oneiric space the very seat of imagined movements.  

Figure 2.2. “The Illuminated Sleeper”

Figure 2.3. “Sleeping/Around”

This current drawing project has also facilitated a clearer understanding as to my reason for selecting on dreams and sleep as a primary content source for my drawing practice—long before undertaking this project. Dreams and sleep—along with the odd and unwelcome alterations that occur when sleep does not come—meet criteria that remain central to the research, as ordinary occurrences within the rhythms of embodied being, which can concurrently yield curious or subliminal aspects into perceptual event. Sleep, dreams and related hypnogogic events are routinely available, if not to active perception, then at least to regular (ineffable and intuitive) participation. Sleep brings regular and repeated alterations of embodied context; notable for its accompanying absence of the sensory self-awareness adjudged to be normative by day. Sleep’s interval allows, and even requires, that we cast aside what we pursue and anticipate during the waking state—to forget how we function as a consciously identified ‘I’. Thus, I can now acknowledge that my previous inherent dissatisfaction with confining the scope or goals of drawing to the more obvious realist details of vision— if carried out at the expense of attending more authentic sources of drawing

31 Volume Two: Plate 9. The Illuminated Sleeper, 2009, Graphite & gouache on paper, 142 cm x 107 cm. (Work of author).
32 Volume Two: Plate 10. “Sleeping /Around” 2007, Graphite and ink on paper, 142 cm x 107 cm. (Work of author).
interest—is addressed and answered by the fundamental question at the heart of this research. *What else then can be brought into the visible through drawing?*

When I began the research, my stated intention was to continue to engage sleep states as subject source; and certainly sleep and dreams remain an important motif in my drawing explorations. As the project and practice progressed, my efforts to orientate practice into the singular topic, of sleep and its related events, came to feel constrained and laboured. Within my practice findings, elements and expressions of altered and altering details from perception became evident in various subjects and applications of drawing—including the ostensibly observational and representational drawings, which is the same subject source I had previously regarded as too limiting. I attribute this expanded understanding to the careful contemplation applied to the practice-led research endeavour. From this, I now contend and affirm that it is the posture and habits of vision, as adapted and assumed for drawing, that awaken the subtler registers of the perceptual field, rather than in the selection of subject matter. This occurs because drawing accesses dispositions of *seeing* through which these other registers are made discernible. My research continues to cite practice examples with sleep and/or dreams as artefact source, and these continue to be significant as part of the broadened scope of my practice explorations. A particular facet of their continued significance might be because, as subject, they serve as reminder of imagination’s potential to usher fanciful visualisations, such as witnessed in dreams, into a fuller embrace of the visible33. What Crowther describes as depictions of the ‘nomologically impossible’34, may offer an easier route through which more ephemeral flickers become perceived and extended, by drawing. Again, I stress that it is from examinations undertaken in light of this research, that I now trace my prior interest in drawing dreams to a recognition of correlations between image-generation processes of dream state with image-generation expressed by pictorial inventions of drawing.

33 Analytical psychologist James Hillman writes: “Consciousness is...reflective, watching not just the physical reality in front of the eyeballs and by means of them, but seeing into the flickering patterns within that physical reality, and within the eyes as well. It is a perception of perception, or as Jung said about images: they are the self-perception of instinct. Our blind instinctual life may be self-reflected by means of imagining, not after or before events in the closet of introspection, but as an eye or ear that catches the image of the event while it occurs.” Hillman, James. *The Dream and the Underworld*, New York: Harper & Row, 1979. p. 52.

34 Crowther points out that “pictures can even present the *nomologically impossible*” with “(t)he extreme reach of picturing’s modal plasticity is its capacity to present metaphysical impossibilities.” The latter can indicate not only depictions of mythologies and/or religious fictions – but also concurrent occupations within time and space which are unfeasible within physical perceptual reality. *From: Crowther, Paul. Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, p. 39.
James Hillman noted, with regret, that “in English, we have but one word ‘image’” for describing “after-images...perceptual images, dream images, illusory images, and for imaginative metaphorical” as well as usage as “the word for false fronts and collective fantasies...”36 Thus, it is warranted to review theoretical sources, which can clarify an understanding of the vital correspondences and shared characteristics in dream events and imagery of drawing—particularly pertaining to an imagery’s fabrication and communication. While dreaming, sensory impression discloses against a blank substrate—the blankness of dreamless sleep. In his essay “Oneiric Space,” Gaston Bachelard proposed that “space relaxes and falls asleep too,” framed inside the format of night, where our body reveals its inventions of images, as self-contained depictions and narrations of some other world. As originators of our private imaginal data, we will always identify what it is we encounter there. Regardless of how partial or gestural the array before us, we fill in the gaps with the ease of imagining. When drawing, we are also re-cognising imagery from the slightest references of mark and shape—as we see our way into the making of the sketch. In Crowther’s description, ‘(t)he state of affairs represented in pictorial space...is not connected to this rigid horizon of actual visual time. It is an interpretation...that did not exist before the artist makes it.’37

Thus, the constructed portrayal of an artwork, like drawing, shares something of the image/imaginal reality of the dream. This is reinforced in Hillman’s proposition that what we imagine, can, and should be, regarded as its own distinct species of reality. What Hillman contends is that images are real because we experienced them as imagination. As events of

35 Volume Two: Plate 11. 2010, graphite and gouache on paper, 23cm x 25cm. (Work of author.)
imagination, they should not be confused, conflated, or judged by the same measures as the physical percept. Our scenic excursions inside *oneiric space* possess an additional characteristic to orient and anchor its created illusions—so that while we remain within the enclosure of sleep and dream, we are also utterly held inside the spell of this strange and other world. Colin McGinn calls this *dream belief*\(^{38}\): a state where our capacity to sense immediate and external physical reality becomes inaccessible; along with our awareness of the solid bodily borders of the self who is dreaming\(^{39}\).

Paul Crowther, like David Lewis-Williams,\(^{40}\) traces the beginnings of our constructed pictorial world to and from drawings made on cave walls, where early artists did not differentiate their understandings of “pictorial space as something ontologically different from real space.”\(^{41}\) Artistic expression is seen to have progressed through inventive formats and framing strategies, that divulge in increasing understandings of a “circumscribed planarity...the formative separateness of pictorial space...that...presents the subject in a way that is significantly different from the circumstances of ordinary perception.”\(^{42}\) As more sophisticated sensibilities and belief systems developed into the apprehension and attribution of these imagined worlds, as being contained as works of art; we came to interpret such zones of perceptual reality as being distinct from the spaces we inhabit outside of it.\(^{43}\) The artwork’s unblemished substrate or support is, like Bachelard’s description of *oneiric space*, initially blank and thus prepared to receive markings of imagination; to constitute (or reconstitute) new pictorial worlds, as brought into reality through the image. Crowther locates our ability to conceive and receive the altered worlds held within the borders of artwork to our capacity of visual imagination—the capacity that is also the basis for all human thought and understanding. Visual imagination makes possible the process of cognitive maturation, in that “imagination enables an operative distinction between the spatio-temporal present from the spatio-temporal elsewhere to open up.”\(^{44}\) The difference between invented visions in dreams and inventions of drawing can then be seen to vary only in their degrees of immersion.\(^{45}\)

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\(^{39}\) Ibid., p. 82. Of what he calls the ‘dream space’ McGinn writes: “Sleep shuts down the senses; correctly representing one’s surroundings is no longer the concern of the sleeping mind. But there is no similar intuition that sleep shuts down the imagination. I close my eyes to imagine better, and I do the same in order to sleep.”

\(^{40}\) See: *Chapter one: It would appear...PART II: Philosophies of Seeing: What else then might be discerned? 3. Origins of Images* (Historical): David Lewis-Williams’ *The Mind in the Cave*.


\(^{42}\) Ibid., pp. 52-53.

\(^{43}\) Crowther’s analysis here echoes David Lewis-Williams’ *The Mind in the Cave* (2002), by noting that in parietal art (Crowther’s italics): “pictorial space and that of the three-dimensional world were probably regarded as not clearly distinct form one another.” (p.53)


\(^{45}\) McGinn notes that there are evident psychological correspondences to the quality of emotional absorption (he calls this *fictional immersion theory*) that can occur during certain more immersive cultural encounters: films,
dream world is also a likely origin point for much of figurative imaginal output. For example, the contemporary narrative formats of film, with their temporal suspensions of time and place, are often said to have unfolded from what we know of vision, as first experienced and learnt by dreaming. Even cinema spaces, constructed for a passive detached audience, mimic the dark envoppelment of oneiric space.\textsuperscript{46}

In \textit{The Dream and the Underworld} (1979), Hillman declared that upon entering the nocturnal underworld of his title “the price of admission is the loss the material viewpoint,” so that “(e)ven if we have lost a certain extension of ourselves into physical space and the world of action, here in depth...we gain contact with the soul of all that is lost in life.”\textsuperscript{47} Like Bachelard’s oneiric space, Hillman’s underworld is not a sinister precinct, but rather a shadowy and subtle region where the soul of interior life finds its expression—unhampered physical concerns and encumbrances. This terrain maps inner depths as “not an absence, but a hidden presence—even an invisible fullness,”\textsuperscript{48} that is “less a comment on the day than a digestive process... by means of imaginative modes...takes matters out of life and makes them into soul.”\textsuperscript{49} This notion of an ‘invisible fullness’ parallels my position regarding drawing’s apprehension of the visual field, and how the disposition of drawing expands or extends perception to allow for a fuller reception of possibilities, to then include perceptual elements that might not ordinarily rise to a level of visibility.

Hillman’s dream is not image as false vision; but instead is what becomes perceptible when the restraints of reason and ego do not influence or corrupt vision. It is then that imagination can “reverse our usual procedure of translating the dream into ego-language and instead translate the ego into dream-language.” There the dreaming self is no longer slave to ‘ego-operations’\textsuperscript{50}—the ego itself is just another facet comprising a cognitive whole that, like Crowther’s thought per se, is best held in abeyance while we pursue and translate our images. In the past, when I made drawings from dreams, it was not to probe their content for hidden psychological meaning, but instead to consider and echo the mysteries of the imagery itself, and its curious processes of generation. That body of work commenced at a time when I had

\textsuperscript{46} “Dreams and film have an obvious affinity: the movie theatre is as close as we may ever get to watching another person’s dreams or sharing such a private experience with an entire audience. In Britain, the first buildings constructed for the showing of films were called ‘dream palaces’.” Barrett, Diedre. \textit{The Committee of Sleep, New York: Crown Publishers, 2001. p. 24.}


\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 28.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 96.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 95.
recurring dreams: in which I watched myself make very large charcoal drawings. So compelling were those dreams, that I then began making large charcoal drawings from my dreams. As part of my resolve to stay as close as possible to the ephemeral image-generation strategies of the dream-state, I would not consult any external material or models to guide the image appearances within these drawings. Instead, forms were allowed to materialise on the page, while I watched for their impressions to arise—in much the same way as the analogue photographer entered a darkroom, to track the developing negative, while pulling from its traces the revelation of the positive image. Also around the same time, I developed the habit of disturbing the drawing surface with water; trying to coax other muted apparitions of vision into realised form and figuration.\textsuperscript{51} The resultant surface pixilation mimicked an additional occlusive presence (always) in my visual field. However, I was neither aware nor would I fully understand this aspect and my perceptual motivation for disrupting my drawings’ sharp and tidy appearance—until later, and then only from analysis of practice in this research.\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.png}
\caption{“Paris Water Dream”\textsuperscript{53}}
\end{figure}

Underworld images are nonetheless visible, but only to what is invisible in us... perceived by means of the invisible, that is, the psyche.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51} Leonardo Da Vinci is quoted to have written "I have even seen shapes in clouds and on patchy walls which have roused me to beautiful inventions of various things, and even though such shapes totally lack finish in any single part they were yet not devoid of perfection in their gestures or other movements." Cadogin, Jean. “Observations on Ghirlandiao’s Method of Composition”, Master Drawings, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1984. From: Gombrich, E. (1966). \textit{Studies in the Art of the Renaissance I: Norm and Form}.

\textsuperscript{52} See: \textit{Chapter Three, Part IV: 2. Interrogating other evidence: Other Occlusions & Anomalies}.

\textsuperscript{53} \textbf{Volume Two: Plate 12}.Charcoal on paper. 132 cm x 100cm, 1996. (Work of author.)

\textsuperscript{54} Hillman, James. \textit{The Dream and the Underworld}, p. 54.
Hillman’s description of this interpretive paradox, intrinsic to processes of visual imagination, links the pictorial aspects we encounter in sleep’s visual phenomena—in dreams and hypnogogia—to figurative artistic depictions whose content portrays figurations of what is unlikely, or even impossible in actuality. Subject matter that conveys the fanciful or fictional into a believable representation, whether from dream imagery or religious mythologies, may further stimulate creative access to expanded and expansive views on the possibilities of visual image-making. In this sense, artistic expressions—like drawing—reveal as radical revision of what we commonly view and categorise as being real. This, in turn, makes easier the detection of altered, subtle, or unexpected qualities within perceptual experience, offered by way of the sensory engagement with or in the artistic endeavour. In Crowther’s definition of picturing, “(t)he most decisive factor here is that the picture does not mechanically reproduce it’s subject-matter, but is, rather, an interpretation of it.” His stipulation, that the visual artwork is received and perceived externally to the organs of the body, reiterates a quality from McGinn’s conditions of dream belief. Within sleep, we are cut off from sensory awareness of a physical environment that would indicate otherwise (i.e., the real), and, thus, the dream is engaged perceptually as if an actual external event rather than an internalised production of the imagination. Likewise, picturing’s apprehension of works of art affirms a similarity to the views of dreaming; though not to the same absolute degree, because “whilst positing recognizable states of visual affairs, pictures also...suspend our natural attitude to them. The picture fascinates by virtue of its striking independence and ambiguity, in relation to the constraints of the real.” The picture corresponds to the same imaginal faculty that weaves the wonders of the dream, and which is, in turn, not entirely dissimilar to adapted dispositions in perception—as evidenced in the image operations of drawing. When we seek to make or view a drawing, this transpires within the tacit understanding that we have entered a different posture of perceptual reality—one that can then invite and welcome entry of other sensory subtleties and perceptual ingredients within our point of view.

56 Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, p. 37.
57 *Mindsight: Image Dream, Meaning* (2004), Colin McGinn’s discussions around percept and image notes that we are inclined to believe the percept, but that generally “the image system and belief system are insulated from each other.” (p. 96) The perceptual experience of dreaming offers an exception as we will believe—and experience as external to us – the dream because of what McGinn identifies as fictional immersion theory. (p. 103) “Sleep shuts down the senses; correctly representing one’s surroundings is no longer the concern of the sleeping mind. But there is no similar intuition that sleep shuts imagination. I close my eyes to imagine better, and I do the same in order to sleep.” (p.82)
58 Crowther, Paul. *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (even the frame)*, p. 41.
3. On Drawing on a Dream

In my initial research plan, I proposed using drawing to consider the subtle inputs of perception as related and available to sleep states. This plan soon presented certain structural challenges to making connections between practice and content; as each manifests inside arenas of experience that are irrevocably divided from each other. Simply put, it is not possible to perceive sleep and its states, while simultaneously engaging waking perception toward the process of drawing. Even in those previously mentioned instances where I had dreamt that I was drawing, upon awakening, I found no records of my ephemeral visualisation projects, nor did any actual drawings fix this vision into external pictorial existence. Hence, I could not derive images from immediate, or at least adjacent, interplays between these precincts of perception. The perceptual posture of drawing occurs from within a discrete zone of awareness that is part of waking life, and it is that discrete zone that has become central to the interests of this research. The dedicated content area of sleep states—as in the dream—can only disclose in levels of reduced consciousness, from within a state of suspension where neither our attention nor the body can be directed to perform any truly productive or enduring physical activity. This awkward and absolute split in domains of awareness became increasingly unsatisfactory to maintain as a strict condition for the research; particularly as a study of such ruptures between areas of perception was not a central or significant focus in the research.

This realisation led me to reconsider and recalibrate exactly what it was about perception in drawing, about how it is adapted and accessed, which I sought to explore through practice research. From the start, my declared interest was directed towards perceptions and expressions from what I refer to as peripheries of vision. However, this interest does not imply examination of attributes specific to literal zones of peripheral vision, nor of the actual edges of the received ocular field. As experienced within ordinary operations of vision, those peripheries will continually fluctuate, modify and reconstitute in every shift of attitude, attention, or positioning of our bodies or eyes. Still, it may be valid to, at least, acknowledge that our exposures to the continual fact of peripheral vision may be significant as a perceptual ingredient, that then informs our appreciation of the other subtle and shadowy configurations that press up against the more conventional suppositions of seeing.59 Such hovering presences

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59 Patrick Trevor-Roper, “in The Art of the Myope”, writes “The simple physical deformity, of a rather long eyeball, which affects so the personality of the myope...may have an even more dramatic influence on his artistic style...When he looks beyond the farthest point of his natural focus, detailed vision becomes increasingly unclear with relative clarity...resembling the ‘peripheral vision’, such as the normal sighted person sees out of the corner of his eye.” pp. 36-37 (Trevor-Roper, Patrick. The World through Blunted Sight: An Inquiry into the Influence of Defective Vision on Art and Character. London: Souvenir Press, 1997.)
are potentially instructive to understanding how sight is engaged within the drawing process. A similar mode of diffusive—rather than directed—vision allows for observation into drawing to occur. The vision for drawing penetrates more deeply, and renders its results more satisfactorily, when gleaned from the assumption of a non-directed relaxation of physical gaze. Then, from what initially registers as vague or undefined form, enters the ‘seen’ as less biased sensory apprehension; a disposition which informs the view of the artist and gathers a broadened sweep of the shapes and shimmers inhabiting the visual field.  

For the purposes of discussion in this research, these peripheries, of which I speak or seek, exist within the less precisely demarcated territory of periphery; one which calls forth delineation from the edges of experience and which sit a little further beyond the border of what is usually counted, recounted, or configured within stricter definitions of what we call the real. We generally aim and attend our habituated orientation into those measures of reality that serve the interests of functioning. Because of this, it is possible and even likely that, by doing so, we reflexively overlook other components that, nevertheless, exist within the broader and overflowing ranges of embodied existence. Drawing then – as framed within this project – accesses modalities in perception that offer and explore a corrective to these oversights in everyday, or unattended, perceptual experience.

**Summary for Chapter Two: It would appear (to me)...**

In the preceding chapter, I outlined the sources of my methodology for this research project; a project that seeks to examine disclosures of subtleties in perception, as revealed within the practice of drawing. A central point in my proposition is that drawing – in and of itself – allows for apprehension of subtle, altered, yet wholly ordinary aspects held within the perceptual, because drawing represents and requires an alteration of vision, within its own operations. Thus, I explore how drawing corresponds and corroborates other perceptual products of the imagination, including our visual inventions from sleep and dream states. To support this contention, key theorists and concepts are examined in greater depth, to establish an analytical ground for examinations of the project’s questions and findings. I have given particular attention to Paul Crowther’s recent aesthetic writings; specifically in his concept of

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60 A crude illustration of how shifting visual attitude operates can be found in the apprehension of the *stereogram* or *auto-stereogram* – that manifested with the recent computer generated fad of the “Magic Eye” optical illusion. These can only be read by a diffusion of vision. It is in looking past surface focus that the three-dimensional form embedded in the two-dimensional plane is found – and must be held thus by the gaze of the eyes, lest it disappears into a field of flattened texture once again.

61 As mentioned in a previous footnote, Patrick Trevor-Roper explored the receptiveness to the vague and peripheral in vision in those who are naturally myopic, and addressed the implications of such ‘afflicted’ vision when translated through artistic angles of perception. (Trevor-Roper, Patrick. *The World through Blunted Sight: An Inquiry into the Influence of Defective Vision on Art and Character*. London: Souvenir Press, 1997.)
picturing, and his argument for the primacy of imagination as its own cognitive mode—the basis for all cognition and perception. I then included discussion of further significant sources, citing contributions from Bachelard, Hillman, Wollheim, and Ehrenzweig. In developing the methodology, I have also offered an extended consideration of sleep and dreams, and their history and significance as content area, one that initiated this research undertaking. Theoretical sources are then applied to evaluate the practice content derived from sleep and dreams, as well as from other seemingly anomalous events of vision. From this discussion, I have traced the project’s evolution toward one that encompasses an examination of drawing, as adaptive process of perception in its own right; one which can access and disclose similarities to other peripheral, subtle and/or under-noticed moments of vision and image.

In the next chapter, (Chapter Three/Methods: The Views from Here), I continue to explore select theoretical sources and ideas—now directly applied to detailed appraisals of specific examples in the drawing practice. Further discussion of Crowther, Merleau-Ponty, and Richard Wollheim is employed to illustrate their direct conceptual applications to the evidence as provided within drawing research. Specific practice examples, and bodies of work, are examined in depth for their disclosures of perceptual anomaly and alterations; traced and located as evidence attesting to the expansion and adaptation of perception—brought into the visible through the endeavour of drawing.