Atemporal essence and existential freedom in Schelling

Alderwick, C. (2015) Atemporal essence and existential freedom in Schelling. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 23 (1). pp. 115-137. ISSN 0960-8788 Available from: http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/29182

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Publisher's URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.977219

Abstract/Description

Although it is clear in Schelling’s 'Freiheitsschrift' that he takes an agent’s atemporal choice between good and evil to be central to understanding human freedom, there is no consensus in the literature and no adequate account of how to understand this choice. Further, the literature fails to render intelligible how existential freedom is possible in the light of this atemporal choice. I demonstrate that, despite their differences, the dominant accounts in the literature are all guilty of these failings and argue that this is due to their misunderstanding of Schelling’s conception of the relationship between essence and form. After outlining what I take Schelling’s account of this relationship to be, I return to the 'Freiheitsschrift' to demonstrate that with this account in mind we can make intelligible Schelling’s claims about the agent’s atemporal act, and the possibility of existential freedom on his account.

Item Type:Article
Additional Information:his is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in British Journal for the History of Philosophy on 11 November 2014, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09608788.2014.977219
Uncontrolled Keywords:Schelling, Freiheitsschrift, freedom
Faculty/Department:Faculty of Health and Applied Sciences > Department of Health and Social Sciences
ID Code:29182
Deposited By: Dr C. Alderwick
Deposited On:21 Jun 2016 11:25
Last Modified:23 Jun 2016 05:43

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