Pedagogy and its Paradoxes in Castaway Fictions from *The Swiss Family Robinson* To *Lord of the Flies*: Changing Representations of Subjectivity and ‘The Child’

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Abstract

This thesis aims to broaden the scope of inquiry into castaway fiction for or about children by mapping the changing epistemological approaches to subjectivity, within five castaway novels spanning the early nineteenth century to post-World War Two. The novels include *The Swiss Family Robinson* (Johann Wyss, 1816), *The Coral Island* (Robert Ballantyne, 1857), *Kidnapped* (Robert Louis Stevenson, 1886), *A High Wind in Jamaica* (Richard Hughes, 1929) and *Lord of the Flies* (William Golding, 1954).

Taking close textual analysis as my default research method, this thesis is concerned with analysing how the child castaway materialised and evolved out a shift from religious hegemony and Humanist pedagogy operating in *The Swiss Family Robinson* to that of scientific rationalism and post-war postmodernism in *Lord of the Flies*.

As a means of identifying and exploring the castaway child through these paradigm shifts, I have developed a psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theoretical framing for my analysis that draws on Jacques Lacan’s ‘The Mirror Stage As Formative Of The Function Of The I As Revealed In Psychoanalytic Experience’ (1966), and Julia Kristeva’s *Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection* (1980). These theoretical approaches to the relationship between subjectivity and language enhance my readings of how these castaways advocate historically specific language structures through which subjectivity is produced and can be read dialogically.

Chapter one will analyse how the castaway child materialises in *The Swiss Family Robinson* as a ‘knowable’ subject of Enlightenment pedagogy influenced by three key works: namely John Locke’s *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Emile* (1762) and Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* (1919). Developed through this intellectual triad, I interpret Wyss’s novel as representing the beginnings of the epistemological child castaway, which evolves dialogically.

The following chapters will investigate how this ‘knowable’ child is gradually destabilised through increasingly fragmented representations of the castaway child, developed through the epistemological contexts of scientific rationalism, Darwinism, psychoanalysis, and post-war postmodernism.
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Finally, I must express my gratitude to the five authors whose works inspired each and every page.
Abbreviations

*The Swiss Family Robinson*  
TSFR

*The Coral Island*  
TCI

*Kidnapped*  
K

*A High Wind in Jamaica*  
AHW

*Lord of the Flies*  
LOTF

*Robinson Crusoe*  
RC
**Introduction**

This thesis investigates the changing representations of subjectivity in castaway fiction for or about children from the early nineteenth century to post-World War two. The texts under consideration are The Swiss Family Robinson (Johann Wyss, 1816), *The Coral Island* (Robert Ballantyne, 1857), *Kidnapped* (Robert Louis Stevenson, 1886), *A High Wind in Jamaica* (Richard Hughes, 1929) and *Lord of the Flies* (William Golding, 1954). Castaway fictions since Homer’s *The Odyssey* have recounted stories about shipwrecks, islands, spatial and psychic dislocations that most often feature male protagonists and precarious encounters with the ‘other.’ The castaway subject manifests at the intersection of journey and catastrophe that traverses the boundaries between land and sea, while character development is explored through this subjective position of involuntary displacement. The question of how the castaway child materialised and evolved through these tropes during my chosen trajectory is central to this thesis.

This diachronic approach to reading germinated through an observation I made while undertaking a Masters degree in Children’s Literature. I began to consider why and how three of the novels I had been studying by Wyss, Hughes and Golding constructed such different representations of the castaway child. Subsequent close readings suggested that these changes develop through a paradigm shift from dominant religious discourse to the hegemony of scientific rationality: a shift that produces the assured certainties governing castaway children in TSFR to a nihilistic lack of any such assuredness in LOTF. The recognition of this shift led to the question that went on to form the basis of this thesis; how is the shift from religious faith to scientific rationality articulated in other novels between TSFR and LOTF?

The immediate problem raised here was choice of texts. Given that close textual analysis is my default research method, the need to manage word count became of primary concern. I already had three novels to support my basic premise of a paradigm shift, and given there was no intention to offer an overview of all relevant castaway publications, the decision to plot the period through five novels in total was based on a practical judgment. The grounds for excluding texts were varied, and the following were considered: Frederick Marryat’s *Masterman Ready, or the Wreck of the Pacific* (1841), Jules Vern’s *The Mysterious Island* (1876) and H.G Wells’s *The Island of Dr Moreau* (1896).
Marryatt, a retired Royal Navy Captain, initially intended to write *Masterman Ready* as a sequel to his children’s favourite book, TSF. However, as stated in the preface, he found himself unable to fulfil this promise due to what he deemed as the novel’s gross geographical and factual errors leading him instead to write a corrective text. As Joseph Bristow states,

*Masterman Ready largely duplicates the strategies of Wyss’s novel. Just as the Swiss Family Robinson export their homely values to the tropical extravagance of their new habitat, so too does the Seagrave family in Marryat’s story turn their island over into a little world of domestic bliss.*

Thus despite his efforts to remedy Wyss's errors a very similar story materialises, involving the Seagrave family who while travelling to Australia are marooned on an island after being shipwrecked. A trustworthy sailor called Masterman Ready was the only member of the crew to help them escape, and he too finds himself cast away with the family and their female maid. Ready represents what Marryat describes as ‘the practical man’ to complement the father's moralising and ‘theoretical’ tone. This supplementary division is the most significant difference between both texts since Wyss constructs Father Robinson as the only didactic source well versed in all areas such as science, pedagogy, history and morality. However, the same overarching Enlightenment ideals prevail in both texts by way of Enlightenment pedagogy, the nuclear family, and moral didacticism. Thus rather than repeat the same discussion initiated by Wyss twice, I sought to move the investigation forward.

Verne’s castaway narrative is no doubt worth discussing for its take on island living that draws heavily on RC and TSFR. However, since this thesis is interested in texts, which prioritise the castaway child, Verne’s character combination of four adults and a single adolescent destabilises this focus. Wells’ text, on the other hand, focuses on the science fiction castaway, which is a category of fiction that no doubt warrants further research, but lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

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There have been a vast number of texts written in English, French, and German that feature castaways following the translation of RC in the eighteenth century. Jeannine Blackwell states that 128 Robinsonades were published in Germany alone during the eighteenth century while Kevin Carpenter’s extensive bibliographical study lists just over 500 Robinsonades and desert island stories published between 1788-1910 in England. Penny Fielding also informs us that forty such texts were published between the period of 1840-1875 in France alone.

Not all of these texts featured castaway children nor did they specifically address a child readership. This trend according to Andrew O’ Malley changed in the latter part of the eighteenth century as the castaway child began to be associated with the phenomenon of Enlightenment pedagogy. The same themes of pedagogy and colonialism concerning critics of English Robinsonades and Adventure Fiction run through these international texts according to the above critics. Listing all the castaway texts excluded from this study and justifying their exclusion is simply not practical due to issues with language and the nature of this thesis. As stated, my rationale for text selection reflects a particular aim to address existing criticism's limited pedagogical and colonial interpretations of the castaway texts in question by seeking out alternative discourses. Taking the most common motifs that inform modern critical discussions about the child castaway in terms of pedagogy, shipwreck, isolation, family, the island and the abject ‘other’ I aim to look beyond the conception that they simply emulate RC’s ethos of individualism, colonialism, and capitalism. I question the extent to which a colonial motif is viable in the face of what I interpret as the beginnings of the fragmented castaway subject that continues to manifest within later texts. Thus, in an attempt to trace what I interpret as this alternative history of castaway fiction, I selected texts that continued to develop the fragmented castaway child. Stevenson’s K provides an intellectual gateway between TCI and AHW’s castaways for two significant reasons. Being a post-Darwinian text K conveys a heightened degree of religious scepticism beyond that which TCI introduces in this trajectory. This scepticism in terms of God's questionable agency over the castaway

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7O’ Malley lists these three ideologies as those dominating modern criticism of the Robinsonade. 19.
child progresses even further in AHW and LOTF. This shift also correlates with the increasingly fractious relationship between castaways and their families, the island and the abject ‘other’. Furthermore, K also incorporates nineteenth-century ideas about child psychology in relation to Darwinism. This relationship later informed twentieth-century preoccupations and fictional representations of the child as made evident by Hughes's text and its initial reception. Ultimately the process of excluding texts revealed that TCI and K, shared the narrative tropes of castaway children, and like AHW, illuminated some transitional stages in the paradigm shift between religion and rationality observed in TSFR and LOTF, making them appropriate for selection. 

While making these preliminary selections, I equated the periods of shipboard life that feature so heavily in K and AHW with desert island existence because it offers a version of castaway existence due to the similar isolation suggested, the similar unmooring from the familiar and the known of each situation. Indeed, the ship may well be considered a manufactured island that allows writers to explore the same dynamics as that of the island. Despite the difference between the seemingly stable fixity of the island, and the floating, drifting uncertainty of the ship, both locations are similarly shaped by the initial shock of unknown, unfamiliar, self-contained environments. In both island and shipboard scenarios, the hope for escape is always mitigated by the need to survive and the need to make viable the strange castaway life. Thus, the shipboard existence of K and AHW need to be seen as a continuity of castaway narrativization, rather than a rupture to its coherence.

The Problem of Starting Points

My initial research question of ‘what happened in between?’ also served to establish the parameters of this thesis and its scope of inquiry from 1816 to 1956. LOTF was always the intended conclusion because I had noted that, unlike earlier novels, it was devoid of religious discourse. The research was designed to plot that change and not to investigate what subsequently happened. Without discounting the merit of castaway texts written after LOTF, such as, Scott O'Dell's Island of the Blue Dolphins (1960), Michael Morpurgo Kensuke’s Kingdom (1999), Terry Pratchett’s Nation and Narration (2008) and Yann Martell’s Life of Pi (2011) they were excluded because they fell outside the remit of my original question.
Furthermore, choosing TSFR as a point of departure into this investigation raises two concerns related to the inclusion of a translated text within a selection originally written in English and the origins of the castaway child within fiction.

Johann Wyss originally wrote TSFR in German and the text was subsequently published in two volumes between 1812 and 1814 under the editorship of his son Rudolf Wyss. The first unabridged English edition, which I refer to in this thesis was published by William Godwin in 1816 and includes a translation of Wyss’s preface that details the author’s pedagogical aims. This preface, which is often excluded in later editions, pays homage to Enlightenment pedagogy, as I will discuss in chapter one. Although this edition is not in essence Wyss’s original work, it stands as the most evenly matched amongst later English translations.

The story of this resourceful Swiss family\(^8\) marooned on a South Pacific island while travelling to Australia has been translated extensively since its first publication. It is arguably one of the most influential and well-known castaway novels, and yet it is so based on many retellings. Translators freely revised the story with the most known example being Swiss Baroness Montolieu’s French translation in 1814. Additionally, with over three hundred English editions speculated since 1840\(^9\) the question of authorship and originality is complicated further. Editors and translators added to or changed the plot and adjusted the moralising tone of Father Robinson’s didactic character as they saw fit. TSFR’s popularity and extensive circulation clarify the extent to which the text penetrated the English language and British culture thus validating its position in a study of castaway fiction originally written in English. As Gillian Lathey states in *The Role of Translators in Children’s Literature: Invisible Storytellers*, this novel ‘is one of the most intriguing instances where a translation becomes far more popular than the source text, since the story is nowhere near as well known in German-speaking countries as it is in the UK and the US.\(^{10}\)

The question of tracing Wyss’s original story amongst these editions is a labyrinthian task and a detailed investigation into the text’s publishing history, which although necessary, lies beyond the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of this study I have chosen to focus on what I interpret as the text’s overarching theme, which

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\(^8\)The family is not given a last name in the text. Despite Wyss's title, the name Robinson alludes to Daniel Defoe's classic castaway narrative *Robinson Crusoe*, which as I will discuss, inspired Wyss to write his pedagogical version.


survived later translations, and as I will argue throughout this thesis, incited a discursive continuity in later castaway fictions for or about children. I identify this theme as synonymous with Enlightenment pedagogy’s epistemological approach to the knowable child inspired by Daniel Defoe’s classic castaway text *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe* (1719). As Blamires states, Wyss’s principle aim when writing, was to provide his sons with ‘a practical, moral and religious education’ inspired by John Locke and Jean Jacque Rousseau. European writers including Wyss embraced Enlightenment pedagogy’s approach to education and its modification of RC’s castaway experience.

This quintessential castaway text, said to have been inspired by the real-life story of the marooned sailor Alexander Selkirk, is set in the seventeenth century amidst a backdrop of British colonialism, exploration, and the slave trade. Written predominantly in the first person, Crusoe retrospectively tells his story of how as a young Englishman he defied his parents' wishes and set sail in search of the world and commercial gain. Hazard, success, and catastrophe are intermittent during his various voyages. Crusoe survives a storm, escapes enslavement at the hands of pirates and experiences commercial success as a plantation owner in Brazil before eventually becoming shipwrecked and castaway on a Caribbean island near Trinidad while sailing on a trade route to Africa for slave labour. The themes of shipwreck, individualism, survival, desert island living and the ‘other’ all work towards emphasising Crusoe’s industrious ability to master his castaway condition.

RC’s morphology into the Robinsonade and Adventure fiction during the nineteenth century continued to articulate these themes while focusing on the child subject. Gérard Genette clarifies how pervasive this relationship was while discussing genre and the praxis of thematic transpositions amongst texts. Genette argues this point in light of RC’s international translations and adaptations that are said to have encouraged the ‘naturalisation’ (emphasis author’s own) of empire amidst the masses:

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11 The full title of the novel is *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Of York, Mariner: Who lived Eight and Twenty Years, all alone in an uninhabited Island on the Coast of America, near the Mouth of the Great River of Oroonoque; Having been cast on Shore by Shipwreck, wherein all the Men perished but himself. With An Account how he was at last as strangely deliver’d by Pyrates.*


13 Two novels followed namely *The Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe; Being the Second and Last Part of His Life, And of the Strange Surprising Accounts of his Travels Round three Parts of the Globe* (1719) and *Serious Reflections During the Life and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe* (1720). Neither are as widely recognised as Robinson Crusoe (1919).

[T]he original Crusoe was English, so every nation wanted to have its own national Robinson Crusoe – hence such works as Joachim Heinrich Von Campe’s The German Robinson (1779) and Johann Wyss’s Swiss Family Robinson (1813). The latter in turn became a model, thanks to the stroke of genius that inspired the author to shipwreck an entire family, thus doing away with solitude and Man Friday.\textsuperscript{15}

Genette points to the significance of RC in developing an international model of Enlightenment values that disseminated through translations and castaway fictions that followed. The cultural impact of these translations exemplifies the way anthropocentric discourses cannot be contained solely within the nation that produced them validated by the fact that Defoe was British, Campe was Swiss, and Wyss was German. As I will discuss in the following section, the relationship between RC and Enlightenment pedagogy is essential in understanding the transition from the knowable to the unknowable castaway child within fiction. This discourse frames the knowable child subject within a series of conditions related to didacticism, the sovereign father, religious hegemony, the governable island space, and immunity to the abject ‘other.’ This thesis investigates how these conditions change in later texts following their initiation in TSFR, by drawing a parallel between them, and varied epistemological representations of castaway subjectivity, approaches to narration and gender.

It is important to state here why I have chosen to focus on how TSFR developed this discourse even though it was not the first text to establish a relationship between the castaway child, Enlightenment pedagogy, and RC within fiction. Joachim Heinrich Campe’s Robinson the Younger 1780, first written in German as two volumes and then published in English as a complete volume in 1781, which Campe translated himself, precedes TSFR in this aim. The text has much in common with TSFR beyond a complicated publishing history; according to Martin Green by the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 724 editions of Campe’s

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid. 303-304.
story circulating nationally and internationally. Like TSFR, Robinson the Younger was also extensively translated and edited in later publications. Campe was a German Enlightenment educator, and he was also heavily influenced by Rousseau’s Enlightenment model of education. Both begin with a preface dedicated to Enlightenment pedagogy and are narrated in the first person by a didactic father intent on teaching his children the benefits of Enlightenment ideals. Ideals grounded in religious hegemony and industry adapted through the tropes of castaway experience that include shipwreck, isolation and a governable island setting in the vein of Crusoe. However, one fundamental difference is that the father and children in Campe’s text are not castaways themselves. The castaway element comes in the form of a young hero called Robinson Krusoe whose story set 200 years earlier is recounted by the children’s father while he along with his family reside comfortably in their home in Hamburg. The story is told over a period of thirty evenings during which the children often interject with commentaries and questions about Robinson’s episodic adventures that begin after he defies his parents’ wishes about voyaging to the Caribbean. Following a series of misadventures at sea, he is eventually cast away on a desert island, during which he learns to thrive at island living.

It is this format of indirect castaway experience that Wyss changed in TSFR, which proved to be influential in later castaway texts as Genette states above. TSFR developed this relationship between the child and an unmediated castaway experience that continued to develop diachronically as later texts focused on exploring the child castaway and the narrative possibilities this created. Furthermore, since both Campe and Wyss intellectualise the child castaway through the same lens of Enlightenment pedagogy and religious hegemony, taking TSFR as a point of departure does not alter the epistemological trajectory of my investigation into changing representations of castaway subjectivity.

Despite having discussed my rationale for selecting the texts that begin and end this study, I fully acknowledge the need for an extended investigation that would consider the discontinuities and continuities between them and a wider chronology of castaway fiction. However, this consideration would require an extensive research platform beyond that of a PhD thesis. There is no doubt that my text selection has influenced the critical outcomes of my research, hence the reason why I do not

present this thesis as a definitive approach to studying these novels individually or as part of a wider body of work critically identified as castaway fiction.

As a means of addressing my initial research question, I have had to impose some restrictions on selection criteria beyond the chronology already discussed, thus, a brief explanatory note as to why these texts were chosen among other possibilities is as follows.

**Literature for Children**

The major theoretical knot posed by this thesis stems from the intertwined debates about children’s literature and the constitution of childhood. Both debates are far-reaching, with ongoing scholarship analysing various points of departure and critical developments through an increasingly interdisciplinary and globalised lens. For now, the first debate is a key concern because of the implicit question, what makes it possible to consider TSFR, TCI, K, AHW and LOTF as children’s literature? I could simply point to the position occupied by some of the selected novels, notably K, TCI, AHW, or illustrated versions of TSFR under the ‘classic children’s literature section of bookshops. Or I could point to the ongoing inclusion of LOTF on school examination curricula. Or I could cite the inclusion of all of these texts on reading lists for university level ‘Children’s Literature’ programs where they are studied to establish both a history for ‘Children’s Literature’ publishing and to rehearse the debates that seek to deconstruct and reconstruct the academic field and its object of study. But these arguments would ignore the fact that there is no short or equivocal answer to the question since the very idea of ‘children’s literature’ is itself contested. While children’s literature has a substantial history, the beginnings of which are often disputed, its treatment as an academic discipline gained ground around 1970. The intellectual prejudices of those advocating the study of more ‘serious’ adult (mainstream) fiction in ‘the English Literature establishment’ fuelled this delay. As Karin Oberstein points out, this bias was suspicious of ‘claiming a complexity or
difficulty for something that is regarded, by definition, as simple, obvious and transparent.17

Socio-historical and bibliographical studies had already emerged by this point with works such as Harvey Darton’s *Children’s Books in England* (1932) and Phillipe Aries’s *Centuries of Childhood* (translated into English in 1962). Margery Fisher’s *Intent Upon Reading* (1961), John Rowe Townsend’s *Written for Children: An Outline in English Language Children’s Literature* (1965) and Mary Thwaite’s *From Primer to Pleasure: An Introduction to the History of Children's Books in England, from the Invention of Printing to 1900* (1963) traced the shift in children’s literature’s history from didacticism to entertainment. As Lucy Pearson states, some of these earlier studies advocated ‘implicit ideologies’18 about childhood innocence, child readers, and their needs, which later criticism challenged. Poststructuralist approaches to children's literature emerged alongside developments in mainstream literature criticism, which challenged liberal humanism's essentialist concepts about identity, Leavisite concepts of the literary canon and the ambiguous nature of binary oppositions within language following Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist theories. Changes in Britain's post-war political and social landscape influenced a tide of altering perspectives on race, gender, and class. Journals such as “Children’s Literature in Education” (1970) and “Signal Approaches to Children’s Literature” (1970) reflected these shifts in criticism as exemplified by Peter Hollindale's article, which challenges such ideologies in children's literature (1988). The relationship between psychoanalysis, child development, and children's literature also developed with Bruno Bettelheim's study on fairy tales *The Uses of Enchantment* (1976) and Nicolas Tucker’s *Suitable for Children* (1976). The International Research Society for Children’s Literature established in 1972 sought to cast a wider focus on children’s literature, and Bob Dixon’s *Catching them Young: Sex and Race and Class in Children’s Fiction* (1977) spoke out against the marginalization of working class characters, racism and restrictive gender roles portrayed in children’s literature. As Peter Hunt states, all literature carries with it ‘some ideological freight’19 which in the case of children’s literature and castaway fiction more specifically began to be reviewed.

As a means of further contextualising and justifying the selection of texts in focus I will introduce the most salient points of these discussions relevant to my investigation, and develop them further in subsequent chapters. The scope of inquiry is necessarily restricted to the aims of this study, which I fully acknowledge offers a partial rather than extensive engagement. Looking into the history of children’s literature and conceptions of childhood provides a fruitful point of departure since these debates concern prevalent questions about composition and purpose that persist within existing criticism.

The French historian Phillipe Aries in *Centuries of Childhood* (1962) famously argues that modern conceptions of childhood hail from the seventeenth century when childhood began to be understood as a distinct phase of life that differed from adulthood. Aries’s search for images of the child in iconography, poetry, sculptures, fashion and other cultural productions led him to conclude that before then ‘there was no place for childhood in the medieval world’ since its representation was minimal. High infant mortality rates and child labour, for instance, were contributing factors to this minimal representation. Yet with the advent of the nuclear family, medical advancements, emphasis on morality and innocence, print culture and Enlightenment ideas about the civilising power of pedagogy, perceptions and representations of the child and childhood gradually evolved. Chris Jenks describes this paradigm shift as one ‘from obscurity to the centre stage.’

Although widely influential in assessing historical and socio-cultural conceptions of children and children’s literature, Aries’s study has been scrutinised on account of methodology and accuracy. Linda Pollock, for instance, takes issue with Aries's claims because his study investigates French historical artefacts, which renders his findings as culture specific. Pollock also argues that in the Middle Ages parents were in fact ‘aware of the individuality of their offspring’ and catered to their needs accordingly. Similarly, Shulamith Shahar in *Childhood in the Middle Ages* (1990) contends that concepts of childhood did exist to a large extent within Western Europe between the twelfth and

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fifteenth century. Shahar discusses the way that Medieval writers addressed three stages of development which in modern terms can be understood as infancy, childhood and adolescents. Adrian Wilson summarises the general issue with Aries’s claim by explaining that its essential flaw lies in the suggestion that since French society in the Middle Ages ‘lacked our awareness’ [emphasis author’s own] of childhood that by extension there was no awareness at all.

However, children's literature critics such as Zohar Shavit maintain that despite Aries's problematic claims, the modern child developed throughout Europe via the same ‘cultural institutions’ he discusses, which include the nuclear family, education and a marketable readership. It is in this sense that Aries traces the origins of modern conceptions of childhood, which is not the same as arguing that ‘the child' simply did not exist before these developments. Furthermore, a sustained argument in Aries's study is that childhood is evolutionary rather than static because it is socially constructed in this way. As such any particular needs that the child is thought to have are subject to the same ideologies fuelling these constructions.

When it comes to discussing the origins of children's literature similar tensions, ensue in light of categorising texts specifically written for children and understanding how they developed in accordance with these discourses. John Townsend famously states in his historical account of children's literature that 'before there could be children's books, there had to be children,' (3) while tracing this point in history to the pedagogical and literary advancements of the seventeenth century. The ‘needs' of the child as distinguished from those of adults ‘gained recognition' by moving away from the Puritan doctrines of the innately sinful child towards the socially progressive child developed through epistemological approaches to childhood and pedagogy presented by Locke and Rousseau. This stance along with recommendations that children’s reading material should be both educational and pleasurable led to the development of a commercial book market for children led by John Newbury. While critics such as Shavit agree that literature written specifically for children emerged hand in hand with these developments in the seventeenth

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24 James Schultz in *The Knowledge of Childhood in the German Middle Ages*, 1100-1350 (1995) also labours this point aiming to disprove Aries's thesis statement. Taking the premise that ‘knowledge of childhood is culturally constructed’ (10) Schultz gives an exhaustive account of examples wherein pre-Enlightenment sermons, chronicles and epics, for instance, terms are used to refer to ‘those who are not yet adults'(22).


century, Gillian Adams suggests that such ‘ahistoricism’\textsuperscript{27} equates children’s literature with a specific marketing history. Thus to state that children’s literature did not exist before the seventeenth century would negate texts read by and to children such as William Caxton’s \textit{Aesop’s Fables} (1484), folktales, fairy tales, the Bible and religious tracts. Furthermore, to state that texts become children’s literature only when they address an implied child reader would negate those texts originally intended for adult readers but which children read and still read today\textsuperscript{28} such as Daniel Defoe’s \textit{RC} (formulating the basis for the castaway texts being considered) and Jonathan Swift’s \textit{Gulliver’s Travels} (1726).

This debate about the origins of the child, their ‘particular needs’ and children’s literature, has led contemporary critics to question what David Rudd describes as the extent to which these needs are or have ever been ‘the child’s own.’\textsuperscript{29} Underlining this investigation is a child/adult dichotomy that questions whether children’s literature is possible at all. Jacqueline Rose’s seminal text entitled \textit{The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction}, takes this question as the premise of a thought-provoking investigation, which has amounted continuous attention within criticism since its publication. Writing during the 1980’s when cultural criticism had already penetrated theoretical debates in literature, psychoanalysis, politics, and philosophy, Rose sought to integrate these ideas into an examination of the field of children's literature. Taking C.M Barrie's Peter Pan as an example, Rose investigates the story's socio-cultural history as a means of exposing a specific adult desire to develop and maintain an idealised image of the ‘actual’ child as a homogenous entity through fiction. Rose explores this discursive function by asking how this child is constructed in language, what it serves and who is actually speaking. It is through these questions that Rose problematizes an idea of unmediated access to the knowable child, surmising that such a concept is ‘impossible’ since there is no distinction between this adult desire and the constructed child within fiction.

Moreover, in \textit{Children’s Literature: New Approaches} Karin Lesnik Oberstein not only finds great merit in Rose's arguments but further suggests that children's literature criticism is itself bound by this same ideology in its attempt to ‘[find] and


[fix] the child\textsuperscript{30} within literature by ‘knowing how to choose the right book for the child.’\textsuperscript{31} A search aimed at aiding ‘actual’ children in developing their socio-cultural relations. The intrinsic adult/child dichotomy of writing and reading about children will always according to Oberstein render this aim as dependent on the ideologies of the adult writer about the implied reader, thus inversely reinstating the paradox Rose discusses above.

Perry Nodelman however, suggests that this paradox positively defines children’s literature’s purpose. In \textit{The Hidden Adult} Nodelman discusses this praxis of adult ‘intentions towards child readers’\textsuperscript{32} as the shadow text within children’s literature that ‘ambivalently’ strives to both ‘teach and please’ the implied reader. Ambivalent in the sense of attempting to provide readers with the knowledge adults think they need to better themselves while allowing them to indulge in ‘the childishness adults think or hope they like.’\textsuperscript{33} Nodelman’s premise rests on the idea that children’s literature aims to fill the child reader’s gaps in comprehension about the adult world. Alternatively, David Rudd has scrutinised the way such approaches focus on the child reader as socially constructed while negating to address the power and voice that this reader wields within society both in terms of its production and reception.\textsuperscript{34}

Rose and Oberstein’s compelling insights have extensively contributed towards developing these debates and tensions along with their cultural resonance. While the paradoxes that both critics discuss have influenced my own readings of castaway fiction, it is important to acknowledge why they are often critically opposed. The predominant concern is that neither account for examples where existing criticism approaches children’s literature as an ambiguous field of inquiry. Multiple perspectives to do with education, parenting, translation, publishing, consumerism, culture, race and gender are indeed considered as contributing to this ever changing discourse. A discourse that is continuously represented through changing theoretical approaches that include narratology, cultural studies and psychoanalysis all of which steer debates into new areas of research. I thus agree with David Rudd who argues in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{31}Ibid. 5.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid. 181.
\end{flushright}
response to Rose that it is important to strike a balance between this idea of
collection and ‘children’s literature’s social, cultural and economic reality.’

This need to move beyond essentialist meanings also relates to an issue this
thesis raises in terms of text selection. The issue itself is concerned with the ongoing
debate surrounding questions about what ‘qualifies’ as children’s literature and in turn
what it is for. Some scholars have categorised AHW and LOTF as transgressive texts
that do not qualify for explicit and implicit reasons, despite both appearing on school
curriculums within England and Whales. Peter Hunt, a longstanding specialist in
the field, for example, takes this stance:

*Children’s literature’ is a fairly elastic category, but there are
certain books that a small amount of thought should surely exclude,
notably (and notoriously) William Golding’s The Lord of the Flies,
routinely taught in British schools.*

While Hunt acknowledges that LOTF is ‘routinely' read in schools he claims,
without elucidating that it is not children's literature or rather that it ‘should' be
excluded from this category. This absent justification for dismissal generates a
paradoxical silence in that the matter of exclusion does not warrant further discussion
because the grounds of inclusion are presumed obvious and knowable.

In terms of this presumption and suggestion, one must then ask why does Hunt
consider LOTF transgressive and what is it transgressing? Hunt’s position reflects the
boundaries and conditions of children’s literature as a ‘category’ of fiction, which he
elaborates numerous times elsewhere while focusing on its function. Identifying a
number of usages Hunt suggests that children’s books help child readers to ‘[acquire]
literacy’, ‘[expand] the imagination’, ‘[inculcate] general (or specific) social
attitudes’, ‘[deal] with issues or [cope] with problems’ or ‘racism’ all of which belong
to the development of a polyphonous ‘matrix’ of possibilities. Hunt in another essay
further states that since concepts of ‘children’ and ‘childhood’ are subject to change in

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35 Ibid. 20.
terms of ‘time, place, gender, and perceiver’ then one must, therefore, accept that the
‘corpus of texts’ which constitute children’s literature ‘is unstable.’ 39 Thus, if ‘the
forness is judged differently by different generations and by those with different
interests’ clearly then by Hunt’s admission essentialist statements about children’s
literature and their implied audience are unfeasible, rendering his approach to
Golding’s LOTF problematic.

Chapters four and five will explore how AHW and LOTF highlight the
unstable relationship between transgression and applicability (for) due to their
departure from earlier castaway fiction’s totalisable approach to child and ‘other’ that
has shaped conventional readings. Critics have considered this longstanding debate
about applicability in terms of content, context, language, function, author and
readership in ways that have yielded multiple perspectives. Going back to Harvey
Darton’s Children’s Books in England (1932), which was among the first historical
surveys of children’s books, the one unifying principle identified is that these books
focused on giving child readers ‘spontaneous pleasure’ rather than didactic tutorials
aimed at ‘[making] them good.’ 41 Darton, therefore, excludes educational books and
primers by default. 42 However, Darton retreats when it comes to assessing ‘what
qualities ‘constitutes a children’s book’ (emphasis author’s own) concluding that
such examination falls within the remit of psychologists, empiricists and theoreticians
rather than historians. 43

Children’s literature critics have since taken on this investigative milieu, while
challenging Darton’s claim that children’s literature is simply entertaining, focusing
instead on what Roderick McGillis and others describe as its dual purpose that ‘sets
out to instruct and delight’. 44 Whether these “lessons” are educational, ideological or
sociocultural, critics discuss how they work towards making children’s books
distinguishable from general literature in ways that move on from early accounts that
focus on theme and reading capability. Myles McDowell exemplifies this tendency in
his essay ‘Fiction for Children and Adults: Some Essential Difference’ (1973)

41 Darton, Frederick Joseph Harvey. Children's Books in England: Five Centuries of Social Life. Cambridge: Publisher not
identified, 1932, p.1 Print.
42 Darton however, airs caution about excluding widely read books such as Robinson Crusoe and Gulliver’s Travels in lieu of the
above definition, simply because they were not written with child readers in mind.
43 Ibid 10.
44 McGillis, Roderick, “Criticism is the Theory of Literature: Theory is the Criticism of Literature.” Ed. Rudd, David, The
suggesting that ‘children’s books are generally shorter’, focused on action ‘rather than
description and introspection’ while stories tend to develop simply ‘within a clear-cut
moral schematism’ conveying a sense of optimism. This formulaic definition
negates an entire history of child protagonists’ subjective representation and fails to
account for the popularity of considerably lengthy books such as Robinson Crusoe
and Harry Potter as well as dual address and readership.

In an attempt to move beyond these limitations, scholars have tried to define
the filed in terms narratology by focusing once again on the unique relationship
between adult writers and child readers. Barbara Wall’s highly influential study The
Narrator’s Voice is an early example, providing an insightful view into historical
changes of modes of address since the nineteenth century. Using this trajectory Wall
aims to delimit oppositional ideas about readership; ‘if a story is written to children,
then it is for children, even though it may also be for adults’ (emphasis author’s
own). Wall identifies two voice pairs ‘that take part in the narrative
communication.’ These are the narrator (the voice telling the story) and the narratee
(‘a shadowy being within the story whom, it can always be shown the narrator
addresses’, ‘dear reader’ for example). The implied author (‘the silent instruct-or’
and ‘all-informing authorial presence.’) and the implied reader (‘the reader for
whom the real and implied authors have, consciously and unconsciously, shaped the
story.’) Wall suggests that the complex arrangement of these voices has varied
historically some being more successful than others in balancing the unavoidable act
of ‘writing down’. This act is a conscious consideration by the adult writer to
‘descend’ to the ‘supposed comprehension of the narratees’ by adjusting vocabulary
and expression, without compromising meaning.

Furthermore, adjustments have varied in terms of how overt or covert this
consciousness is. Comparing modes of address from the nineteenth century to the
twentieth, Wall states that early children’s fiction tended to use double address aimed
at both adult and child readers, taking into account for instance parents who read to
their child (teller – surrogate). Authors of texts such as The Water Babies and Just So

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45 McDowell, Myles. “Fiction for Children and Adults: Some Essential Differences.” Children’s Literature in Education 4:1
47 Ibid. 5.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. 6.
50 Ibid. 6-7.
51 Ibid. 16.
stories, for instance, expected parents to read aloud to their children and so included irony or other material aimed at entertaining them also. With the turn of the century, however, single address became the dominant form while the presence of the dominant adult waned. Wall contends that the reason why some nineteenth-century Adventure fiction including TCI and K, have remained popular is because they incorporate these narrative techniques.

I will discuss the extent to which my research upholds these claims throughout the following chapters, by investigating how each castaway text under discussion approaches narrative address and the representation of adult authority figures in varied ways. Unlike Wall, I will, however, attempt to offer a further explanation for these shifts by drawing on the changing representations of castaway subjectivity within my chosen trajectory, and how this relates to the paradigm shifts in epistemological approaches to the ‘child’. Furthermore, Wall's idea of dual address, whereby a text addresses both child and adult reader simultaneously has contributed to the development of studies in crossover fiction, which problematize claims that LOTF and AWJ cannot be considered children’s fiction based solely on an idea of readership. Wall joins a number of scholars who have demonstrated the unfeasibility of early essentialist definitions such as those set out by McDowell above. As Nikolajeva states when investigating three contemporary texts ‘that address an ambivalent audience’ in terms of dual readership, such ideas do not hold up to scrutiny in lieu of their complex approaches to address, genre, plot, setting, character, perspective and temporality. Phillip Pullman’s Northern Lights (1995) is offered as an example of the ‘growing number of novels which bridge the gap between young and adult audiences’ as well as breaking down assumptions regarding narrative simplicity and readership.

Sandra Beckett in Crossover Fiction: Global and Historical Perspectives states that ‘crossover fiction blurs the borderline between two traditionally separate readerships: children and adults.’ Rachel Falconer in The Crossover Novel: Contemporary Fiction and its Adult readership rationalises the long history of the crossover phenomenon, according to the relationship between readers and the

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53 Ibid. 78.
subjective resonance of multiple voices represented within such texts.\textsuperscript{55} Falconer has more recently focused on the crossover phenomenon in Young Adult fiction, citing Golding’s \textit{LOTF} as an early example along with George Orwell’s \textit{Animal Farm} (1945) and J.D Salinger’s \textit{Catcher in the Rye} (1951). Turning to Bakhtin and Kristeva, Falconer suggests that in the absence of ‘essential categories of existence’ within contemporary culture readers seek out fiction that resides on the borderline, as a means of making sense of the world. Not only does this growing trend once again destabilise essentialist readership divisions, but it also acknowledges shifts in conceptions of childhood, adolescence and adulthood in terms of what is deemed suitable reading material. As Falconer states, the dystopian tone of Golding’s novel was once deemed unsuitable, while ‘in contemporary YA, violence, death and apocalypse have become the norm rather than the exception.’\textsuperscript{56}

One could argue at this point, however, that if \textit{LOTF} is considered a YA text, how can it be included in a study of general children’s fiction. Although the nineteenth-century castaway texts I focus on in this thesis are treated under the umbrella term of children’s fiction within criticism, Barbara Wall, however, states that they were in fact aimed at adolescent boys. Citing \textit{TCI} and K as examples, Wall points out that ‘writers of Adventure fiction wrote books for adolescents, not children’, which is why they ‘maintained an attraction for an adult readership as well.’ With their focus on the adolescent boy hero taking his maiden voyage into the world these books would today be considered as ‘young adult novels.’\textsuperscript{57}

Wall raises some important points here, which when added to Falconer's reading of \textit{LOTF} sees these texts on an equal footing categorically. However, as I will discuss in the following section, since the castaway setting can be traced back to Defoe's \textit{RC} as a source text, any definitive division between children's, YA and mainstream castaway fiction is untenable. The texts investigated in this thesis highlight rather than resolve ambiguities to do with the child/adult dichotomy of readership, which according to some critics is gradually dismantling. Marah Gubar for instance not only questions this analysis of distinctions but also claims that the future of children's literature lies in its suspension. In her essay ‘On Not Defining Children's Literature,' Gubar problematizes various approaches taken by ‘definers'. Gubar states that in their


attempt to seek out essentialist characteristics that are unchanging, ‘definers’ are lead towards ruling out ‘relevant material’\textsuperscript{58} rather than accept that childhood and children’s literature resist and have always resisted fixed meanings. In the vein of Oberstein, Gubar calls for critics to embrace the field’s ‘messiness and diversity’\textsuperscript{59} rather than seek to conquer it through definition.

**Interim Summary**

In terms of defining children’s literature I agree with David Rudd’s critical assessment that, since there is no such thing as an ‘essential child’ nor an ‘essential children’s book’, an ‘essential definition is impossible’. He does, however, attempt an explanation which rests on the idea that children’s literature addresses ‘constructions of the child’ that ‘display an awareness of children’s disempowered status (whether containing or controlling it, questioning or overturning it.’ Furthermore, in lieu of the adult/child binary opposition facing much criticism, Rudd acknowledges that both are as much invested in the dialogical discourses that prevail within the field by way of writing, production and readership, which has increasingly come to be recognised as ‘border country’.\textsuperscript{60}

It is evident from the above debates that children’s literature is a non-static field of inquiry that resists essentialist claims about construction, composition and audience because it continues to develop within a complex critical framework. This critical trajectory suggests that both synchronic and diachronic considerations are too heterogenous to provide scholars with any definitive answers, which in itself suggests that children’s literature is not nor has ever been intrinsically totalizable. As I will discuss in the following section, the castaway child within fiction played a substantial role in the configuration and expansion of these debates, providing a platform for the child/adult dichotomy and polyphonous discourses, with which children’s literature critics continue to engage.

With that said, the grounds for my text selection are not, cannot be definitive. But nonetheless, in various ways, at various times, TSFR, TCI, K, AHW and LOTF have


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid. 212.

all been positioned by both commercial and educational institutions as suitable books for children: as books to be read by (or to) children – however the latter is defined.

**Origins of the Castaway Child and the Pedagogical Subject**

The genesis of the castaway genre within literature for and about children is concurrent with the birth of the ‘knowable child’ of Enlightenment pedagogy, which privileged an empirical understanding of identity. Three key works are central to this: namely John Locke’s *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Emile* (1762) and Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* (1919).

This pedagogical story and child subject begin with the work of John Locke, a medical practitioner and social reformer whose empirical approach to knowledge acquisition contributed to a radical change in the way childhood was perceived. Lock’s child, rather than innately sinful and in need of immediate salvation as had been claimed by earlier Christian thought, was instead in need of an education beyond the church. Influenced by the Cartesian philosopher Rene Descartes and his dualistic approach to how the mind and body operate in a synchronous way, Locke developed his pedagogical thinking by associating learning with experience.

Unlike his predecessors, Locke rejects the premise of innate ideas and instead argues ‘that our knowledge comes to us through our senses,’ advocating that knowledge is acquired through the practice of sensation and reflection essentially rendering the child ‘a product of his education.’ Being able to reflect on one’s experience through memory meant that this sensory material could be ‘grouped through associative connections in the mind to create knowledge and an understanding of the world.’ Locke’s ideas thus formed the basis of what came to be known as English Empiricism and its ‘determination to trust only what is made evident to the senses or experienced directly’ whilst rejecting ‘introspective speculation as a source of valid knowledge.’

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Furthermore, this systematic approach to individual consciousness opened up the opportunity of shaping subjectivity through carefully selected experiences later developed by Rousseau. Under Locke, the child was conceived of as a neutral site (a ‘tabula rasa’), not a sinful one, on whom socio-cultural ideals could be inscribed via lessons. The child thus became ‘knowable’ to his/her teachers, parents, family and peers as a ventriloquised construct of their discourses.

This idea of the knowable child as a secular subject of empiricism rather than the innately sinful subject of religious determinism and rationalist thought essentially worked towards the broader ambition of classical humanism. Locke’s study on knowledge acquisition stemmed from a belief that ‘he could greatly aid mankind in realising what sort of things they could actually know about,’ which contributed towards the classical humanist belief ‘in stable subjectivity and perfectible knowledge.’ Locke’s emphasis on the child and its education acted as a nodal point through which these approaches to civilising humanity and its future generations could be achieved. As Michael Davis states, ‘this emphasis on interwoven strands of memory as fundamental to the self’ was modelled on Locke’s theories and developed in the early nineteenth century, as a touchstone for debates regarding progressive and regressive socio-cultural patterns of behaviour.

The widespread approval of this utilitarian approach to producing the right kind of citizens for the future paved the way towards what was to become the perennial didactic relationship between an omniscient adult and the child, one that influenced a number of prominent European educational reformers. These included the Enlightenment’s leading pedagogue, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who drew on Locke’s theory of the homogenous child in his treatise on education, *Emile* (1762). Structured as five stages of development, Rousseau’s model emulates the corporeal and mental landscape of the first literary castaway, Daniel Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), by ‘islanding’ the child and his omniscient tutor within an imagined space:

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71 According to Rebecca Hightower, *Empire Islands: Castaways, Cannibals, and Fantasies of Conquest*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. xiii Shakespeare’s *The Tempest* (1611) provides the first literary account of castaway experience. Due
The condition is not I confess, that of a social being, nor is it in all probability Emile’s own condition, but he should use it as a standard of comparison for all other conditions. The surest way to raise him above prejudice and to base his judgements on the true relations of things is to put him in the place of a solitary man... Let him think he is Robinson Crusoe himself.\textsuperscript{72}

For Rousseau, pedagogy and a fictional castaway experience are synonymous with the construction of the child figure as a nodal point through which Enlightenment and Western European ideals\textsuperscript{73} can be achieved, as a future generation strives to develop a Crusoe-esque ‘settlement\textsuperscript{74} of their own. Rousseau’s emphasis on a return to nature and self-sufficiency is elucidated here in the image of a desert island, stripped from the material corruptions and anxieties of society. He offers an alternative foundation to education that moves away from the academic societies of Europe, deemed as ‘schools of falsehoods’\textsuperscript{75} and their colleges that churned out ‘hypocrites, always professing to live for others, while thinking of themselves alone.’\textsuperscript{76} Rousseau's educational model worked towards cultivating the child's acquisition of knowledge through first-hand experience. It is only once his pupil has mastered his senses via natural inquiry under a watchful eye that Rousseau deems him ready to re-join society at the age of 25, enriched with these valuable lessons, echoing Locke’s ideas of ‘perfectible knowledge’ and a ‘perfectible society’.

Among those influenced by Rousseau’s treatise was Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, a member of Switzerland’s Helvetic Society that sought social reform by bringing education to the masses. A series of setbacks as an unsuccessful clergyman and politician made Pestalozzi aware of the dangers of social inequality and the injustice of children working in factories. Spurred on by these concerns, Pestalozzi set his sights on resolving the impracticality of Emile’s isolated education by setting up schools, which met with varying degrees of success. His first attempt was an


\textsuperscript{75} Ibid: 200.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid: 9.
industrial school for poor children set up in Neuhof (1773-1799). After its closure due to a lack of funding, Pestalozzi began to reassess how his plan for social reform via education could succeed.

He focussed on two interrelated questions: What is man [sic] and what does he need? Merging the ideals of classical humanism and Enlightenment pedagogy here, Pestalozzi found his answers in the idea that man is perfectible and what he needs for this to be achieved is education. As Stibler states, these questions convey ‘sympathy between the macrocosm and the microcosm.’ Pestalozzi’s hope for social reform via children’s education was finally achieved in 1800 when he established an educational institute in Burgdorf Castle and subsequent teacher training schools. Pestalozzi’s model met with widespread critical acclaim and glowing reports, as his aspirations for the betterment of society via education resonated across Europe.

Just as Locke, Rousseau and Pestalozzi sought out social reform through the child as a pedagogical subject, a counter-discourse of religious opposition emerged. Upon its publication, Rousseau’s Emile was caught up in the rising tensions between the Catholic Church and the Enlightenment philosophers, due to its privileging of secularist didacticism over Godly omniscience and a religious education. The ‘child’ was essentially at the centre of a turf war. A warrant was issued for Rousseau’s arrest in Paris, while the Archbishop Christophe Beaumont took it upon himself to write a pastoral letter condemning these seemingly irreligious teachings, which led to the banning, and public burning of Emile.

Beaumont challenges Rousseau’s abandonment of original sin in favour of imagination within his teachings, claiming that such an inclination would incite an immoral disregard for ‘the doctrines of the holy scriptures and of the church’ that aided in keeping watch over the ‘Christian Youth’. Book Four of Emile, entitled ‘The teachings of a Savoyard Priest’ received most condemnation due to its admittance of religious pluralism, and for encouraging Emile to practice religion with a casual scepticism instead of paying lip service to Holy Scripture from an early age. This approach to religion fuelled Beaumont’s fears regarding the dangers and inadequacies of substituting Godly didacticism with a freethinking omniscient tutor:

79 Ibid: 516.
‘Left to itself, into what errors, into what excesses would youth not throw itself?’

In a rallying summation, Beaumont condemns the book as ‘an abominable doctrine, suited to overturning natural law and to destroying the foundations of the Christian religion’ whilst pitting ‘subjects against the authority of their sovereign.’

Despite this public vilification, Rousseau responds to the Archbishop’s attacks as a means of making clear his religious affiliations and the intent of *Emile*, which was, first and foremost, aimed at improving humankind’s present and future social relations. This debate between God, tutor, the individual and society was essentially played out within literature for or about children thereafter. Identifying these associations and their inherent paradoxes is integral to understanding how and why existing scholarly research into castaway fiction for and about children is anchored within a tradition of Enlightenment pedagogy and colonial interpretations both shaping and confining the genre.

**The Nature of Enlightenment Pedagogy’s Paradoxes**

The paradoxes begin with the impossible condition of immunity (escape), standing at the heart of Rousseau’s idealistic attempt to situate Emile in the position of ‘a solitary man’ (*Emile*, 177) away from the civilised world in the vein of Robinson Crusoe. Rousseau perceives Crusoe’s isolation in which ‘all man’s needs appear’ as representing the path towards achieving Enlightenment pedagogy’s grand narrative of a perfectible society.

This is a tendency that Pierre Macherey identifies amongst writers who locate in *Robinson Crusoe* the old as much as the new’ a ‘manifestation of a lesson, or idea’. Furthermore, this relationship between the child and the island narrative upholds what Judith Plotz identifies as a prominent feature of the robinsonade’s ideal of ‘keeping the child a world, or at least a treasure island, apart from their adult counterparts. And yet, despite Rousseau’s claim that Emile’s condition is not that of a ‘social being’, the didactic strength of his pedagogical model relies on the impossibility of such independence.

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80 Ibid: 530.
81 Ibid: 768.
Rousseau’s pupil is certainly not left to his own devices. Emile’s tutor takes on the role of creating a dialogue between the subjective language informing his past socio-cultural relations and experiences, (as an expert in all things from the dangers of swaddling, physical exercise, class distinctions, religion and marriage) and his pedagogical subject, within this allegedly isolated world.

This conscious praxis of negotiating what I call ‘pre’ and ‘castaway’ subjectivity illustrates the presence of the liminal castaway body as an inherent trait of the genre. It is a trait that problematizes claims such as those made by William Targ in relation to castaway fiction, that ‘man’s dearest individual wish is to be cast away on a desert island’ in ‘answer to the problems presented by the civilisation he has himself created.’ Targ’s understanding of the castaway condition as a romanticised ideal of escaping ‘civilisation’ and its ‘problems’ neglects to address the inherent liminality of such an experience. There is no instantaneous cutoff point/escape that separates the castaway body from its pre-castaway subjectivity since memory constantly plays a role in the re-emergence of these conditions while cast away. This inherent condition manifests within Rousseau's model of education in the form of Emile's remedial lessons, which penetrate his alleged isolation.

The illusory nature of this freedom in terms of both Emile’s isolated space and his individuation is born out of a reactionary stance. Locke’s proposal of child development and education assumes that the child possesses a neutral composition comparable to soft wax that simultaneously renders them vulnerable to adverse stimuli. Thus, although Defoe’s narrative provided writers for and about children with a means of bridging the gap between didacticism and entertainment, Crusoe’s independence was a risk they simply could not afford to credit. In this respect, the castaway child becomes subject to the double bind of standing for both escapism and autonomy in the name of Enlightenment pedagogy, a position that negotiates what O’Malley identifies as the ‘benefits of a pedagogical scene’s illusion of a real experience and the pitfalls of succumbing too far to that illusion.’

The extent to which this illusion is played out within the texts in question relates to changing representations of castaway subjectivity and their varied epistemological lenses. Before discussing the castaway child further, it is important to

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review how critics come to overlook this epistemological relationship in their quest for readings of the knowable and colonial castaway child. I begin by introducing Rebecca Weaver Hightower’s study since her work explicitly addresses castaway fiction as a genre in and of itself, rather than a body of fiction divided into sub-genres. I then move on to discuss the robinsonade and adventure fiction; the two interrelated sub-genres often used to describe SFR, TCI and K within criticism. Additionally, since LOTF is often categorised in opposition to these categories, understanding their structural and symbolic conventions within criticism is essential in further identifying the grounds on which the novel is thought to be transgressive. Finally in light of these informative readings, I will call for a more expansive approach to the castaway child within fiction that acknowledges texts such as AHW and the importance of epistemological interpretations of castaway subjectivity along with their diachronic representations within fiction.

The Colonial Castaway

In *Empire Islands: Castaways, Cannibals and Fantasies of Conquest*, Rebecca Hightower offers an expansive and sustained reading of castaway fiction spanning a period of five hundred years. The study begins with the late fifteenth-century voyages of Columbus and includes an analysis of *The Tempest*, RC, TSFR, TCI and LOTF to name a few. However, neither K nor AHW are included in Hightower’s study; the significance of which will be discussed in due course. The overarching argument is that castaway narratives convey colonial endeavours.

*The story is familiar: a castaway, brave, lucky, survives a shipwreck and initial despair to make the perfect home of an alien island, meanwhile evolving, himself, from survivor to colonist.*

Situating these fictions solely within the colonial encounter as Hightower does facilitate in enveloping the castaway child within an unalterable and knowable discourse linked to a particular pedagogical function. The ‘pervasive consumption’ of castaway fiction amongst generations of readers is said to represent these readers’

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‘real-world desires’⁸⁸ that are in turn constructed through a nation’s subconscious desires for colonial conquests. Citing *TSFR* as an example Hightower argues:

*In narrative after narrative, the ‘father’ or patriarch’s command over the island and the others on it, becomes codified into a form of island colonial law. In The Swiss Family Robinson, for instance, the Robinson father’s wishes serve as law in every respect of island life.* ⁸⁹

Father Robinson’s patriarchal ‘command’ over the entire island including its inhabitants is ‘codified’ into a reading of ‘colonial law’, which Hightower contends is ubiquitous in all novels within her study, reflecting a lesson in colonial rule. Hightower briefly comments on the origins of this pedagogical praxis by drawing on the relationship between Defoe, Enlightenment pedagogy and castaway fiction, stating that narratives modelled on Crusoe’s experiences ‘packaged empire for children’ preparing them ‘for their enculturation into Imperial society.’ ⁹⁰

Hightower’s reading of the colonial castaway from Defoe onwards is by no means an isolated approach. Susan Maher in her study of the nineteenth-century Robinsonade for instance states that ‘the island setting, then, from Defoe on, serves as an archetypal laboratory for a society’s ideology’⁹¹ that revolved around expansionist ideas of Empire. This association between RC, the colonial castaway and pedagogy encapsulates the bedrock of the Robinsonade; a term originally coined by the German writer Johann Gottfried Schnabel in 1731 following the publication of desert island stories inspired by Defoe’s classic. As O’Malley states in his highly informative study of the Robinsonade, these texts that followed on from RC featured ‘the shipwreck or other misadventures and the survival of individuals or small groups, typically Europeans, in remote locales.’ ⁹² Again referring to *TSFR* and *TCI* as examples along with Robert Louis Stevenson’s *Treasure Island*, O’Malley discusses how the

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⁸⁸ Ibid. xxiii.
⁸⁹ Ibid: 81.
⁹⁰ Ibid. 38.
Robinsonade advocated ‘a masculine-coded ideology of colonial adventure’\textsuperscript{93} which tied in with ‘attendant discourses of pedagogy.’\textsuperscript{94}

These same principles associated with the Robinsonade also form the basis of what critics term Adventure fiction; a further classification often used to describe castaway novels such as TSFR, TCI, K and LOTF. Peter Hunt explicates this connection by stating that ‘the tradition of the adventure story, with its undercurrent of imperial exploration’\textsuperscript{95} can be traced back to Defoe and the Robinsonade. Margery Fisher further advocates this relationship in her genealogical study of British adventure fiction, concluding that:

\begin{quote}
It is ultimately the spirit of Crusoe, which breathes through the books I have been discussing. Frontier tales in which a place is explored and brought under domestic rule are also cast-away tales in the sense that the characters must act on their own initiative and at least partly, without the benefits of civilisation.\textsuperscript{96}
\end{quote}

Adventure fiction here is subsumed by its perceived inheritance from the Robinsonade by way of pedagogy and colonialism, which according to Fisher generated a formulaic pattern of events that instigated a Pavlovian Response in readers. In \textit{Empire’s Children}, Daphne Kutzer similarly argues that children were ‘colonised by the books they read.’\textsuperscript{97} Drawing evidence from the rate at which such novels were published during the height of Britain’s colonial enterprise, Kutzer contends that Adventure fiction functioned as a means of naturalising empire by conveying an underlined message that it was ‘good’ for children.\textsuperscript{98} Citing TCI as a chief example, Kutzer considers how Adventure fiction’s tautological function staged a discursive ideology aimed at preparing young readers (predominantly British white males) to embody a nationalist identity through Empire. Thus, just as Hightower assumes that the castaway genre represents an underlined colonial intention Kutzer also argues that the same applies to Adventure fiction.

\textsuperscript{93}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{94}Ibid. 57.
\textsuperscript{96}Margery Fisher \textit{The Bright Face of Danger} Kent: Hodder and Stoughton Children’s Books, 1986. 293.
\textsuperscript{98}Ibid.
Richard Phillips in *Mapping Men and Empire* also acknowledges this relationship between readers and Adventure fiction, which he contends ‘[constructed] a cultural space in which imperial geographies and imperial masculinities were conceived’ from Defoe to the mid-twentieth century. This relationship as Joseph Bristow has previously argued developed because ‘British culture had invested so much energy in glamourizing male heroes’ within an Imperialist ideology advocated in the school curriculum and children’s nineteenth-century literature. Yet unlike Bristow, Phillips explores this idea of masculinity within a broader sociocultural and political context of change and plurality. Phillips, like Joseph Kestner in *Masculinities in British Adventure Fiction* (2010), both contend that writers appropriated the story of Crusoe to explore the changing, rather than static relationship between masculinity and imperialism. The concept of masculinity is itself explored as a sociocultural construct of behavioural codes informed by imperialist practices. At one end of the spectrum is early nineteenth-century depictions of colonial rule, of which Ballantyne’s fictions are considered most representative. Such essentialist depictions are said to have later shifted toward a sceptical current by the late nineteenth and early twentieth century depicted in the works of novelists such as Rudyard Kipling, Robert Louis Stevenson and William Golding.

I agree with both critics that Defoe’s novel established a physical and psychic narrative landscape whereby writers could both affirm and contest colonial ideologies, or as Phillips states to both map and ‘unmap those colonial constructions’. However, that which concerns me is the way both critics exemplify a tendency in criticism to associate RC predominantly with a colonial discourse that forms the basis of evaluating later castaway texts. Kestner, for instance, suggests that TCI advocates RC’s colonial ‘motifs’ in terms of travel and encounters with the ‘other’ in a way that influenced the style of writing thereafter. Kestner identifies Ballantyne’s novel as both the ‘signature text of the mid-century Victorian adventure narrative’ as well as ‘one of the most famous of all Robinsonade tales descended from Daniel Defoe’s 1719 masterpiece’ conveying themes of shipwreck and exploration. Not only does this reading restrict the study of Robinsonades and Adventure fiction within the

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101 This transition was far from seamless. British writers such as G.A Henty still wrote adventure stories dominated by xenophobic and racist attitudes that romanticised colonial ideologies.
104 Ibid.
colonial encounter, it further exemplifies the way these two categories of fiction are used interchangeably. This stance highlights the issues with attempting to define castaway fiction in certain terms and draws attention to the need for further investigation into this slippage by discussing the question of genre more closely.

I must note at this point that this thesis does not aim to resolve this slippage by defining castaway fiction in exclusive terms. As Maria Nikolajeva states ‘there is no agreement among scholars as to how to define a genre, nor what genres there are.’ Nikolajeva contends that genre itself cannot categories fictions in absolute terms since its ‘borderlines are fluent and dynamic.’ They shift in accordance with the publication of transgressive texts since texts ‘participate’ rather than ‘belong’ to a genre. Furthermore, as Nikolajeva suggests ‘every text can participate in more than one genre’ since generic categorisations depend on critical ‘purpose’ which certainly rings true for my research. While I do not propose a definitive explication of the castaway genre my research still requires a generic bearing that would unite these texts and enable a comparative reading by way of conformity and transgression as well as understanding why existing criticism focuses on colonial interpretations.

Returning to Genette once again, this typology can be understood in terms of archetextuality; the classification of texts into genres involving an idea of transtextuality. The latter term refers to ‘all that sets the text in a relationship, whether obvious or concealed with other texts.’ Genette’s theory is developed in three works entitled *Architext, Palimpsestes*, and *Paratexts* written between 1992 and 1997. This series deals with a wide range of structural approaches to genres that include what Genette terms intertextuality, metatextuality, paratextuality and hypertextuality. Hypertextuality deals with what Genette terms as ‘any relationship uniting a text B ([hypertext]) to an earlier text A ([hypotext]), upon which it is grafted’ and can assist in understanding how RC has become a dominant influence on the production and reception of castaway fiction. Among other examples, Genette refers to RC as a hypotext and Robinsonades along with juvenile adventure fiction as hypertexts since they continue to articulate themes of travel, isolation, colonialism and empire in the vein of Defoe’s novel. As discussed existing criticism focuses on the same

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106 Ibid. 58.
108 Ibid. 5.
109 Ibid. 303.
continuation of ideas, yet that which differentiates Genette’s approach to the castaway child is an idea of simplicity. Genette claims that due to readers’ expectations, Robinsonades are ‘reduced to narrative plots of adventure’ focusing on ideas of shipwreck and the island setting, in a way that negates the hypotexts’s ‘more serious’ and ‘nobler’ aims of empire.

To interpret the castaway child and its relationship to RC in this way is to undermine the complexities of its diachronic construction, and polyphonic interpretations, which as this thesis argues is far from simple or trivial. Furthermore, Genette’s static reading of the Robinsonade opposes his own arguments about how this relationship between hypotexts and hypertexts function. Although this relationship is developed through a series of writerly and readerly expectations, hypertexts are said to modify, transcend and expand the genre within which they operate.

Thus taking this idea into consideration, I argue that the castaway texts under investigation function as hypertexts through which the theme of the epistemological child castaway evolves from the knowable to the unknowable subject. Before explicating this intervention into existing criticism further, I will introduce the remaining two hypertextual themes often associated with castaway fiction, which are isolation and the island setting. Both of which are predominantly interpreted through a colonial lens.

**Isolation, Absent Present Parents**

As discussed Rousseau modified Crusoe’s isolation from civilisation in his pedagogical model by including the paradoxical presence of a tutor in *Emile*. Although Wyss adopted this stance in his own castaway text through the inclusion of a didactic father figure, there is a tendency in later castaway fiction to physically separate the child from their parents. They materialise instead as an absent presence developed through the castaways’ memories of home-life. As I will discuss in subsequent chapters, this shift from parental presence to absent/presence corresponds to altering epistemological representations of castaway subjectivity and the gradual shift from the knowable to the unknowable castaway child within these fictions.

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110 Ibid. 231.
Critics often overlook the significance of this paradigm shift when situating the castaway child within a framework of colonial and pedagogical assumptions.

For instance, Robert Kiely suggests that ‘the universal truth’ about ‘boyish adventures’ within fiction is that they are only possible ‘when the limiting authority symbolised by the male parent is absent.’ Kiley cites TCI and K as examples, which once again exemplifies the slippage between castaway and adventure fiction since he traces this convention back to RC. Despite the absence of parental authority, the opposite of which is vital to Rousseau’s Enlightenment model of education and Wyss’s TSFR, the same ideology of the knowable child applies, which Kiely clarifies when setting out the benefits of a boy hero’s isolation:

_They discover in their life outside conventional society unexpected, almost superhuman powers of survival, limitless reserves of ingenuity and courage, which natural catastrophe and enormously unfavourable odds have no capacity to destroy._

Such ‘super-human powers’ and ‘limitless reserves’ render boy heroes as possessing extraordinary capabilities and potential, which are said to be indestructible in the face of any challenge. The child protagonists of Adventure fiction are thus idealised for what they can achieve during their time ‘outside conventional society.’ An idea that chimes well with the way Rousseau idealises the potentiality of his student on two counts; living beyond conventional society, albeit paradoxically, enhances the development of a perfectible individual and secondly the child’s capabilities are knowable to its adult counterpart.

This idea that parental separation acts as a catalyst for adventures within fiction is a widely held view within criticism often interpreted as a predominant theme in children's literature generally due to many examples provided in the mid nineteenth-century. Grenby maintains this view along with John Rowe Townsend

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112 Ibid: 264.
stating that the diminished authority of parental figures freed up protagonists for adventures.\footnote{This idea is also conveyed in Gibson, Lois Rauch, and Laura M. Zaidman. “Death in Children’s Literature: Taboo or not Taboo?” \textit{Children’s Literature Association Quarterly} \textbf{16.4} (1991): 232-34. Print.}

\textit{The death of the parents leaves the child like castaways, exiled from the world they have known and forced to make a new life on the rocky shore on which they have washed up... these children have to fend for themselves and learn to renounce their childhoods, as much as any desert island castaways.}\footnote{\textit{Problematic Shores}. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991. 115. Print.}

Despite a change in the way this adult/child dichotomy functions, signalled by the presumed absence of parental figures, the same pedagogical desire to fix the child within a series of expectations remains. This desire is also clearly evident in colonial readings of parental representation in castaway fiction. For example in her study of how British desert island stories rework the themes of Empire and pedagogy from Defoe’s RC onwards, Loxley equates a shift in parental authority with colonial discourse. When comparing TSFR with TCI, Loxley states that although ‘parental authority governing intellectual and educational development is absent’\footnote{Ibid. 125.} in TCI, the ‘monstrosity of [a] colonial other’ is still ‘excessively marked’ and set against the ‘differential story of a European identity’ that is ‘fixed in essential humanity’.\footnote{Grenby, M.O. \textit{Children’s Literature}. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2008. 118. Print.} Loxley’s invocation that Ralph’s identity is ‘fixed’ mirrors the totalitarian account of Lock and Rousseau’s sought-after knowable child developed within TSFR.

Although Loxley recognises that the pedagogical model established in Wyss's novel has changed due to the physical absence of parents in TCI, she sees no adjustment in the flow of knowledge that operates the adult/child dichotomy.

My concern with this approach is that it subordinates the narrative voice of fictional castaways to the romanticised ideals of Enlightenment pedagogy again restricting the way TCI and castaway fiction can be interpreted. By simply equating the novel’s representation of parents with a more covert approach to maintaining colonial desires, Loxley paradoxically overlooks the uncertain space that exists between Ralph’s narrative voice and a clearly defined omniscient influence, which a
colonial/knowable subject/ivity relies on. To overlook this space is to overlook the onset of the castaway’s fragmented narrative voice and its susceptibility to changing epistemological discourses related to the self and ‘other’ as K, AHW and LOTF illustrate. These texts point to a relationship between this continued fragmentation, the increasing decline of parental influence and the changing representations of castaway subjectivity informed by Darwinism, Psychoanalysis and post-war nihilism. Furthermore, these progressive fractures are also interwoven in the changing representation of the island setting; the third prevalent theme associated with castaway fiction.

**Island/world apart**

The island setting often features as a space to explore the physical and subjective demarcation of castaways from their conventional socio-cultural relations and environment. As I will argue in subsequent chapters, this unfamiliar landscape metaphorically functions to either stabilise or destabilise the castaway within the familiarity of bounded ideologies. The earlier texts within this chronology function to reinforce a parallel between the island as a governable space, and the governable castaway child, while later texts progressively countermand this relationship. The relationship itself was popularised following Defoe’s depiction of Robinson Crusoe’s ability to thrive as a castaway. It was later made applicable to children’s literature following Rousseau’s pedagogical model in which the island served as an extended metaphor for constructing the knowable and governable child already discussed. This conceptualised space “free” from socio-cultural influences inspired Wyss’s TSFR, which although set on a physical rather than conceptual island stands in the same pedagogical stead. The text draws a steady parallel between the governable island and child castaway through Father Robinson's didactic omniscience and faith in God. As Stuart Hannabuss contends in his study of the island within fiction, following RC the island had ‘become a metaphor for the classroom or the learning laboratory' which in the case of Wyss's novels is said to materialise as ‘a travelling classroom.'

In this sense, the all-knowing father neutralises this seemingly foreign island space and constructs a rebounded sovereignty in the face of the unfamiliar.

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This praxis of neutralising the unfamiliar through the island/body extension is a predominant concern amongst critics who analyse the setting from a colonial perspective. Hightower, for instance, argues that the castaways ‘control the naturally bounded space of the island as they control the naturally bounded space of their bodies.’ Diana Loxley also contends that the island setting within TSFR and TCI represented a platform for writers to develop an ‘ideal discourse’ [emphasis author’s own] of British imperialism that simulated ‘the language of conquest, masculinity, supremacy and authority.’ The island is said to have functioned as ‘the ultimate gesture of simplification’, that ‘[drew] a line around a set of relationships, which [did] not possess the normal political, social and cultural interference.’

To claim that the ‘ideology of British colonialism’ is simply recreated without ‘social and cultural interference’ is to overlook that the castaway partakes in a liminal negotiation between his/her pre-castaway and castaway subjectivity. It is due to this conscious negotiation (the analysis of which bears an epistemological variance) that the castaway body cannot be said to operate outside of ‘cultural interference’ be it in terms of colonial ideology or other.

Loxley thus overlooks what Rod Edmond and Vanessa Smith describe in their historical and cultural investigation of islands as the ‘suggestive congruence between islands and individuals’ that is maintained through a ‘dialectic of boundedness and connection.’ The island as they suggest is an interactive site where those who enter by various means including shipwreck, encounter existing habitations and inhabitants and grant them meaning through their own pre-existing conceptions of the world. This view echoes the summation of Greg Denning’s ethnographic and cultural study of the island and beach crossings in which he states that each Voyager brings to these sites the ‘the old’ by way ‘of habits and needs’ and the ‘new’ in the form of ‘the changed world.’

Furthermore, Edmund and Smith argue that since ‘human cultures are not typically sharply bounded or homogenous’ the relationship between the individual and the island is neither static nor representative of a continuous ideology. Although

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121 Ibid. 3.
these critics focus on the ethnographic and cultural theorisation of islands rather than on castaway fiction, their understanding of the changing discourse between individuals and the island space resonates well with the aim of this thesis. To understand the paradigm shift from the knowable to the unknowable child castaway within my chosen trajectory of fictions, I too will negotiate this changing relationship between castaways and the island space in relation to changing representations of epistemological approaches to the self and ‘other’.

What seems immediately problematic with my text selection is the inconsistent feature of the island as a space traditionally associated with castaway experience. My rationale for selecting these texts both appeals to the limits of this trope and aims to broaden its function by considering the intrinsic relationship between the island as a space and the sea/ocean out of which this space is created. The word ‘is-land’ as Gillian Beer notes referring to its meaning in the Oxford English Dictionary is a compound word that includes both elements of water and land: ‘water-surrounded land.’

Peter Hay develops this point further in his article entitled *What the Sea Portends: A Reconsideration of Contested Island Tropes*, by stating that the sea is the element that distinguishes island psychologies, from other metaphorical spaces such as urban ghettos, mountains and deserts that convey an ‘island effect’ through ideas of isolation and remoteness. Both sea and island, Hay argues are intrinsically linked to the development of bounded sensibilities and identities that are neither confined nor delimited entirely, due to the on going process of geological change. ‘The Ocean’s very restlessness, the retreat – and – advance rhythm of its tides the moving land-sea forwards and back, accentuates the temporality and contingency of island boundaries.’

It is this transitory, and especially ungovernable nature of the sea that destabilises conventional and essentialist ideas of the island as a steady boundary on which steady identities can be constructed. This convention which Enlightenment pedagogy premises in equating the ‘knowable’ child/castaway with the knowable manageable space of an island, is exemplified in the above colonial readings of the relationship between the island and the castaway within fiction.

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126 Although Hay remarks on the difference between these settings he does not, however, offer any examples of texts that develop the ‘island effect’ he identifies. It can be assumed that such texts would include classics like *The Lion the Witch and the Wardrobe* in which the child protagonists experience a world beyond their daily life, while being able to return at will. This example of ‘island effect’ thus differs from the island setting I discuss on the count of subjective agency and a history of ideas contextually associated with castaway narratives as discussed.

This thesis broadens the scope of inquiry into this relationship by locating its gradual destabilisation in relation to altering representations of subjectivity. In K David is rendered a castaway while a prisoner at sea and on an island, while Emily's castaway experience in AHW takes place solely at sea. As I suggest above, the ship functions as a form of manufactured island, creating the same conditions of isolation and displacement as that created by the island landfall. Thus, the ship and the island are continuities in the formulation of the displacements and shocks of castaway experience. Both these novels function in challenging essentialist ideas about spatial and subjective configurations of the castaway child through active engagement with the ‘restless’, unbounded and formless sea that resists the idea of a stable identity. Furthermore, as I will discuss in each chapter, this progressive destabilisation corresponds with the development of the fragmented castaway body and its fractious relationship with God, family, and the abject ‘other’ since TCI.

Finally, LOTF leads us back to island castaway existence, and as I note earlier, it is the novel where rational discourse has excised the religious from its narrative. Existing literature on the novel suggests that it is a reactionary text set against the foundations of empire and the tradition of the ‘knowable’ castaway child, especially in comparative readings with TCI. For instance, Green identifies LOTF as a famous ‘anti-adventurous' retelling of the Crusoe story, while Kiely states that the novel is ‘a serious variation on the theme of boys' adventure' that ‘must have been intended in part, as an antiromantic antidote to the escapist genre’. But to reduce LOTF to a mere anti-robinsonade narrative loses sight of the novel’s position in a continued discourse of shifting ideas about the relationship between the child castaways and subjectivity. After a plane crash, which according to Phillips’s assessment of the novel is ‘the modern equivalent of [being] shipwrecked’ a group of British schoolboys are marooned on an unnamed island. The crash maintains the trope of an interrupted journey that leads to a violent separation from ordinary life, while further destabilising the gradual slippage between the bounded island space and identity. As Gillian Beer states ‘it is the technology of the aeroplane which has most changed the island concept' in the twentieth century. ‘The aeroplane has dislimned the tight boundaries of the shoreline.'
Sea voyages both fictional and non-fictional have been closely aligned with ideas of Empire and nationalism throughout history. As Beer states elsewhere ‘the silvery pathways in the wake of ships’ often acted as ‘threads linking Imperial England to its possessions overseas.’ The implication of the aeroplane in LOTF problematizes this connection between a well-trodden path and identity in a way that has significant implications for the way castaway subjectivity is developed within the text. It is developed through a narrative uncertainty that intensifies the fragmented castaway to the brink of annihilation, while bringing essentialist approaches to subjectivity and the knowable child to an end as I will discuss in chapter five.

**Interim Summary**

Overall then, existing castaway fiction scholarship privileges a colonial ideology that dates back to Defoe’s RC and its pedagogical influences. This approach focuses on the idea that British colonial rule was disseminated via mass readings, aimed at developing a preparatory discourse encouraging juvenile readers to accept and maintain their colonial inheritance. Thus it would appear that castaway fiction and as such, its child characters, are marooned within Enlightenment pedagogy’s desire for the knowable child, amounting to what Jacqueline Rose defines as ‘the cult of childhood.’ This is an appropriate time to reintroduce Rose’s seminal work on children’s literature presented in *The Case of Peter Pan or the Impossibility of Children’s Fiction* since it traces the origins of this ‘desire' as a ‘continuity in children's fiction which runs from Rousseau’ and his ‘outdoor education for boys.’ Rose parallels the construction of the ‘child’ figure in children’s literature with its cultural dissemination, contending that both germinate from an ‘investment by the adult in the child’ which ‘fixes the child and then holds it into place’ for the purpose of recapitulating and maintaining positive cultural values. This desire Rose argues dates back to Locke and Rousseau’s pedagogical conceptions in which the child and its relation to the world becomes observable and knowable ‘in a direct and unmediated way’; a view that influenced the production and reception of children’s

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133 Ibid: 43.
135 Ibid: 3-4.
literature thereafter.\textsuperscript{136} Rose’s diagnosis of the child/adult dichotomy and paradox informing children’s literature raises fundamental issues with the way castaway fiction for or about children is often perceived within existing research. The critics discussed above are also motivated by the same desire in their colonialist readings, which sees the castaway child continuously negotiated within a ventriloquial Enterprise of Enlightenment ideals that leads to its anonymisation. That is to say that this totalitarian account fails to accommodate diachronic readings in which these characters can be argued to participate in an on going discourse of alterability.

Although I agree with Rose’s questioning of the relationship between the child in literature and its socio-cultural relations, I see the need to move beyond the paradoxical adult/child dichotomy she discusses. As David Rudd argues in response to Rose, rather than holding ‘on to remnants of a Romantic child figure’ and ‘continu[ing] to rehearse grand narratives about the origins of children’s fiction/literature, we need to probe more carefully the materiality of texts and their often conflicting and unstable discourses.’\textsuperscript{137} Rose and the aforementioned critics develop a critical cul-de-sac that hinders this possibility due to an endless rehearsal of this grand narrative that insists on a fixed socio-cultural desire to articulate the knowable child within fiction.

It is precisely at this point of diagnostic closure that this thesis begins to reconsider the type of discourse Enlightenment pedagogy and its appropriation of the castaway child initiated. As I argue throughout this thesis, in developing a discourse between castaway experience and pedagogy, Rousseau developed the epistemological child figure and its assimilation into a socio-cultural discourse of subjective influences and negotiations. The castaway within fiction represents first and foremost this split subject of negotiation, which in \textit{Emile} and TSFR takes the form of a didactic mediation between the child castaway and the physical presence of a tutor. It is the stability of this presence that gives an illusion of wholeness/knowability. However, this thesis questions the limited scope of inquiry into this negotiation by tracing its growing instability and asking what the castaway child represents beyond an initiation into a totalitarian account of the knowable and colonial subject. It is as a result of this question that my interpretation of the castaway subject is concerned with its fluidity and malleability. Thus in returning to the epistemological castaway subject, I interpret

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid: 8-9.
Rousseau’s pedagogical model as having initiated the possibility of constructing the diachronic castaway subject from TSFR onwards. While the castaway texts that follow TSFR continue to articulate a liminal discourse of subjective negotiations, the discourses that emerge vary according to historically specific approaches to subjectivity, by way of scientific rationalism, Darwinism, Psychoanalysis and post-war modernism/postmodernism. In the face of these changes, static colonialist projections become unfeasible, while the castaways’ relationship with God, their parents, the island and the abject ‘other’ continuously alter.

In identifying how each text represents a different epistemological approach to castaway subjectivity in line with dominant discourses about the self and ‘other’ at the time of writing, I do not argue that there is a radical break between them but rather that they articulate a continuation of ideas. Ideas related to the paradigm shift from the knowable to the unknowable child castaway. In this sense the thesis explores the possibility of what Mikhail Bakhtin identifies as dialogism; reading the intersectional discourses in and between novels.

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\text{[At} \text{ any given moment, languages of various epochs and periods of socio-ideological life cohabit with one another... Thus at any given moment of its historical existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form.}\]^{138}
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In Discourse in the Novel written in 1935 (published in 1973) Bakhtin re-evaluated the way the novel was interpreted within criticism as a genre. At this time, the same Formalist techniques used to study poetry by way of stylistics (‘Poetic language, individuality of language, image, symbol’ and ‘epic style’\(^{139}\)) were being critically applied to interpreting novels, which according to Bakhtin, failed to


\(^{139}\) Ibid. 266.
accommodate the multi-voiced (heteroglot) ‘prose of novelistic discourse.’ The novel Bakhtin states participates in an open-system of communication that reflects on pre-existing discourses to construct additional discourses through a responsive praxis in light of changing socio-cultural influences. At the heart of this dynamic is the simultaneous operation of two oppositional forces within language/ ‘utterance’; the ‘centripetal’ ideologies regulating and unifying socio-cultural norms and the centrifugal forces that interrupt these norms through heteroglossia in the form of multiple perspectives. This opposition is continuous and residual within dialogism. Thus heteroglossia undermines a sense of monologic meaning.

It is in this sense that synchronic and diachronic readings of castaway fiction can be read alongside each other as a continuation of ideas. As Clive Thompson argues, the implication of Bakhtin’s ideas on genre is that ‘the validity of abstract generic typologies that hypostasize a group of texts synchronically is denied in favour of a diachronic perspective where the operative factor is transformation.’ Thus for Bakhtin, reading novels within a series of homogenous and unchanging generic codes, as for instance critics do in terms of the castaway child, constitutes a stilted praxis that rejects the possibility of diachronic discourse. Yet unlike Bakhtin, I do not consider monologic texts as pure sights of closed discourse that cannot be interpreted dialogically. For instance, according to Bakhtin's theory TSFR should be read as a monologic novel since only one voice is articulated. Father Robinson's didactic narrative voice maintains synchronic centrifugal forces without opposition.

However, rather than interpret this text within a closed system of meaning, I focus on the way it opens up the possibility of constructing the epistemological child subject within castaway fiction as a discursive subject of alterable signification, drawing as it does on RC as a hypertext. As Bakhtin states ‘genre lives in the present, but always remembers its past, its beginning’ [emphasis author’s own]. Thus what renders a text as seemingly closed or open is extrinsically determined through approaches to reading, as made evident by my choosing TSFR as a point of departure to embark on a dialogical investigation of the castaway child within a broader spectrum of residual discourses.

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140 Ibid.
141 Ibid. 272
In order to read the castaway child dialogically and diachronically within a range of epistemological contexts, it becomes necessary to understand how subjectivity is itself contextually determined and represented as such within language. To do so, I will draw on Jacques Lacan’s symbolic body framed in ‘The Mirror Stage As Formative Of The Function Of The I As Revealed In Psychoanalytic Experience’ (1966), in which subjectivity is considered a socio-historical and contextually fluid language. Although Lacan's theory grants us an insight into the workings of subjectivity, it does, however, focus on the developing subject; a position which differs from that of the castaway subject in extremis fighting to re-gain a sense of selfhood following a violent “separation” from the socio-cultural forces governing their subjectivity. It is for this reason that I will also turn to Julia Kristeva who in Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1980), explores the relationship between subjective breakdown and language when a subject is confronted with a disturbance that threatens the cohesion of their bounded self within meaning. Furthermore, Kristeva’s ideas concerning the construction and representation of the abject ‘other’ within language assists in understanding how the enemy within these texts changes according to changing representations of castaway subjectivity. ‘Theory as it relates to children’s literature’ states Roderick McGillis, ‘is interested in how society situates children at any time in the past or present,’144 which is a question concerning this thesis. These post-structuralist approaches to identity and its attendant discourses, interpret ideas related to the self and ‘other’ as sociocultural constructs of language and its mutable contexts, rather than on fixed terms.

‘The Mirror Stage’ and the Fluid language of the Castaway Body

The most salient point of departure when analysing these concerns is to begin with the question of subjectivity, both as a praxis related to identity and as a readable language that denotes fluid signification. In ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the ‘I’ as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience’ (1966) Lacan draws on child development theories developed in the 1930s by the psychologist Henri Wallon, to analyse how infants are initiated into a world of meaning and signification through language. A succinct summary is as follows:

The mirror-phase is a vital moment in the constitution of a human subject and typically occurs at the age between six and eighteen months. A child, which is still helpless, unable to speak and without any control over its motor activities is confronted with the image of its own body in a mirror or some equivalent. Its immediate reaction is one of jubilation, as the image shows it a functional unity it has yet to achieve. The child thus identifies with an image it will become, but that image is illusory, and the child's identification signals the beginning of a dialectic in which recognition is simultaneously a form of misrecognition.145

In a corporeal sense, the child is posited within a framework of fragmented unity while simultaneously viewing itself as an assembled body. The tension here lies between a lack of ‘control over its motor activities' and ‘functional unity' and an image of potentiality. A specular identity is born from this split, and the child embodies a threshold through which a series of negotiations take place between the imaginary and symbolic structures of human existence.

Based on the mirror stage, the imaginary state focuses on the subject's relationship to its body, which constructs a primordial sense of self prior to objectification. The symbolic order is the realm in which this sense of self is coordinated within a language of signifiers. The relationship between the two are clarified by Yiannis Stavrakis as follows:

If the imaginary, the field of specular images, of spatial unities and totalised representations, is always built on an illusion which is ultimately alienating for the child, his or her only recourse is to turn to the symbolic level, seeking in language a means to acquire a stable identity... In that sense it is a certain subordination, an exercise of power, that constitutes the condition of possibility for the constitution of subjectivity.146


This process is not strictly confined to linearity, as the child is already embedded within the symbolic constructions of language even before they are born, exemplified by the practice of naming and pedagogy. Also, it is not assumed that the symbolic stage provides the subject with a ‘stable identity’, but rather that a more coherent sense of self in relation to ‘other’ is attempted through language and the identification of difference. This ‘other’ as Karren Coats states has ‘multivalent dimensions’ constructed within a language of ‘societal structures’ that codify conceptions about family, education, race and gender for instance. The development of a more ordered self-awareness emerges through this discursive negotiation in which the imaginary phase is not entirely overcome, but subject to ‘subordination’ via a sense of coordination through these structures. It is this system of interrelated socio-cultural signifiers that constitute a pre-existing symbolic order, which determines and guides the child’s sense of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Locating the principle agency of order within language that determines a more cohesive identification of the self within the symbolic realm is central to this thesis since it enhances my reading of the dialogical castaway child within fiction. Lacan refers to this determinable power as the ‘name of the father’, and its malleable characteristic is essential to my readings of castaway fiction. As Lacan states in ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’ (1956):

> It is in the name of the father that we must recognise the support of the symbolic function, which, from the dawn of history has identified his person with the figure of the law.\(^{148}\)

That which constitutes the ‘law’ by which subjectivity and identity are constructed has been subject to change since the ‘dawn of history.’ Although this praxis involves an established ‘figure’ determining the law of symbolic order, it is alterable due to its discursive articulation within language and discourse. Thus, the inherent workings of this system of self-conscious identification are paralleled with the possibility of fluid representations throughout changing historical and socio-

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cultural contexts, introducing the idea of dialogic subjectivities and their influences over time.

As Stavrakis states: ‘it is the name of the father, the symbolic and not the real father, who is the agent of this power, the agent of symbolic Law.’ Without being restricted to a single parental figure or entity the ‘agent of this power’ is diversified within language and subject to change. Yet ultimately within this framework a condition is established whereby the following occurs:

If the subject is to emerge in and through language, the symbolic has to be accepted, the laws of language have to be recognised. For that to happen the idea of Law has to be instituted.

Operating within this condition requires a detachment from the illusion of self-sufficiency embodied in the imaginary stage of Lacanian development, and a move towards the acceptance of an externalised structured power. This power is in itself, governed by an instituted language of signifiers established within a socio-cultural context. Subjectivity, language and by extension, the law of the father, are historically and culturally specific concepts.

Acknowledging this relationship between language and subjectivity affords the possibility to reassess the way existing scholarly research on castaway fiction for or about children is preoccupied with the ideals of Enlightenment pedagogy and colonialism. Hightower, Kutzer, Loxley and Fisher are among those critics who assume that TSFR paves the way for colonial interpretations because of its connection with Rousseau’s Enlightenment pedagogy. It is important here to acknowledge once again that this ‘knowable’ and stable subject is an inherent feature of Locke and Rousseau’s larger concerns. Concerns for the betterment of European society via education and Liberal Humanism’s civilising quest for a perfectible society and selfhood that both rely on two assumptions: selfhood is homogenous and the language through which it is represented, is fixed.

Lacan’s approach to subjectivity and language disavows these essentialist assumptions, by proposing that language and its attendant discourses are culturally specific rather than fixed. As Peter Barry states in his assessment of Lacan’s approach

to language and subjectivity, the classical ‘humanist notion of unique, individual selfhood is deconstructed',¹⁵¹ as a consequence of post-structuralism's scepticism towards grand narratives and totalizing truths concerning identity. Identity in this sense becomes readable as a product of language and socio-cultural forces so that far from being an ‘essence' is instead a ‘tissue of textualities.'¹⁵² Since all literature is a socio-cultural product of language, essentialist ideas about its meaning and interpretation are subject to the same scepticism.

Once the inherent liminality of the castaway is understood and traced through its evolutionary trajectory within these novels, it becomes clear that castaway subjectivity cannot be limited to a reading of the name of the father as a continuous representation of the same synchronic socio-cultural influences that Hightower and others assume. As McGillis argues, the language of subjectivity is ‘endlessly inventive.'¹⁵³

Integrating Lacanian readings of subjectivity within children’s literature criticism is a praxis that has developed within recent years, especially within the field of Young Adult fiction. With this poststructuralist approach to reading, critics such as Robyn Mc Cullum and Karen Coats move beyond liberal humanist debates about the knowable child within children's literature by reconsidering the nature of this construction in light of changing socio-cultural influences. Coats, for instance, utilises Lacanian theory to explore the importance of reading in shaping children's subjective and intersubjective relations. In Through the Looking Glass Coats argues that the fiction children and young adults read develop the socio-cultural language /name of the father through which their ideas of selfhood are negotiated with regards to race, gender and culture. Through this approach to subjectivity, Coats states that the child subject is ‘constituted again and again in and through language'¹⁵⁴ in a way that ‘dismantles the notion of an authentic self'¹⁵⁵ as propagated by Enlightenment pedagogy. Robyn Mc Cullum also advocates this idea as a means of investigating the socio-cultural impact of the production and consumption of YA fiction in relation to its implied readers. He defines adolescence as ‘the period during which notions of

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. 16.
selfhood undergo rapid and radical transformations’ and couples this negotiation with
the idea that subjectivity ‘is intrinsic to narratives of personal growth or
maturation.’

Mc Cullum argues that these narratives assist implied readers’ in
coming to terms with selfhood through a dynamic praxis of reading. Mc Cullum
incorporates both Lacanian and Bakhtinian theories about the way identity is socially
constructed within language into his analysis of ‘dialogic conceptions of subjectivity
in adolescents and children’s literature.’

He refocuses the question away from
whether the child subject can exist within fiction as a liberal humanist ideal toward an
investigation into ‘what kind of subject’ is presented and ‘what are the conditions of
its coming into being.’

As with Coats, Mc Cullum argues that readers integrate
these shifting socio-cultural representations into their conceptions of selfhood through
reading as a means of better understanding their place in the world.

This negotiation, which both Mc Cullum and Coats advocate as essential to
readers of adolescent literature particularly, informs my reading of the castaway child.
Although this thesis does not focus on the implied reader per say
these critical
approaches enhance my understanding of how the liminal castaway clarifies this
negotiation following their physical ‘separation’ from the socio-cultural forces (the
name of the father) from which they originate. What this liminal praxis illustrates is a
need to exist within a relational body of signifiers through which subjectivity is
granted meaning during a time of uncertainty. It is this need for subjective survival
that manifests into a compulsive repetition to negotiate pre-castaway memories while
castaway; an inherent theme running throughout castaway fiction.

To illustrate this point more clearly I will turn to Freud’s ‘fort-da’ process
explained in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (1920) which conveys the potential
disruption of such negotiations in the face of a traumatic event such as war. As the
castaway body is subject to disruption in terms of a violent separation from home,
Freud’s fort-da principle grants us the necessary insight into how such a body reacts
to destabilising events. Freud developed the fort-da principle by observing his
grandson’s response to the physical absence of his mother each time she left the room.

This absence gives rise to what Freud perceives as a need to overcome a sense of

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156 McCallum, Robyn. *Ideologies of Identity in Adolescent Fiction: The Dialogic Construction of Subjectivity*. New York:
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid. 4.
159 This approach has been applied to castaway fiction by critics such as Hightower and Kutzer who argue that the consumption
of these novels aided readers to develop a sense of colonial subjectivity.
anxiety through the reconfiguration of, and substitution of this lost body, into one that he could exercise control over repeatedly when required. The child is described as playing a game of disappearance and return, in which an object is thrown away in the corner of a room and then retrieved. This act is repeated several times, and the same words are repeated during each part of the game. ‘Gone’ (Fort) is uttered while the child throws the object and ‘there’ (da) is spoken once it is retrieved. Despite initially being considered an act that contradicts the economy of the pleasure principle, by which individuals seek to maximise their comfort and minimise their sense of anxiety, this pattern of behaviour was related to an idea of trauma management. By repeating the anxiety resulting from the mother’s absence, the child can manage it via an idea of substitution and reconfiguration. This game was considered by Freud to signify a clear meaning:

*It was related to the child’s great cultural achievement – the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he had made in allowing his mother to go away without protesting. He compensated himself for this, as it were, by himself staging the disappearance and return of the objects within his reach.*

This symbolic achievement is understood as the child's ability to substitute the loss of one body (that of the mother) via a reconfiguration of another (the toy) in an attempt to deal with its absence. Indeed it is questionable to what extent absence can be argued, given the play of reconfigured bodies, yet it is this sense of malleability through language which is of pressing value to this thesis. The absence is substituted via a play on possibilities in which permanent loss is seemingly evaded. Lacan interprets this praxis as signifying the child's accession into the greatest socio-cultural achievement within a symbolic context. This achievement relates to the acceptance of a need to continually exist within signification to avoid the alienation of existing as an unprocessed body within language. Lacan describes Freud’s ‘genius’ discovery to an imperative way of understanding the mirror stage:

And from this pair of sounds modulated on presence and absence ... there is born the world of meaning of a particular language in which the world of things will come to be arranged.¹⁶¹

Lacan identifies this the compulsion to repeatedly substitute anxiety of alienation for a world of signifiers slides as a coping mechanism, which clarifies how the ‘mirror stage’ model acts as a medium through which the body is stabilised within socio-cultural relations. He illustrates the necessity of Freud’s observations in developing this idea of a playful substitution of signifiers, which enables meaning and an idea of loss to be evaded. This game of accepting the loss of an ungovernable self by repeating it as a governable one is representative of the child having mastered the language of subjectivity, initiated through the mirror stage.

The castaway is also made to engage in this system of fort-da as a means of conveying an idea of subjective survival through the ongoing negotiations of their pre-castaway subjectivity within memory. It is through this repetition that castaways tell the story of a subjective need to govern their body/image in the face of traumatic circumstances. Despite the varied clarity of the name of the father being repeated while cast away, the same principal compulsion to survive is represented. Thus, in this sense the castaway is a split subject of these negotiations, operating within a position where historically specific language structures governing epistemologival approaches to subjectivity can be inversely represented. As Mc Cullum states in relation to the theme of displacement in adolescent fiction:

The positioning of characters in the margins of, or in a transgressive relation to, a represented society or culture provides a way of exploring the interplay between subjectivity and agency, and of interrogating the dominant cultural and social paradigms for the construction of subjects.¹⁶²

The castaway occupies this position of displacement, operating as it does within ‘the margins’ of routine subjective relations. Although McCullum speaks of displacement as a theme in contemporary YA fiction, which differs from the attendant discourses of castaway fiction such as island and sea related settings, pedagogy, and colonialism, the possibility of exploring ‘dominant’ subjective models however still ensues. Castaway fiction provides a platform to explore their breakdown and inversion, calling forth a dramatic rehearsal of Freud’s fort-da principle as a necessary means of subjective and physical survival. Thus, although Lacanian theory affords an insight into the way subjectivity is constructed within a socio-cultural context, as well as a means of reading this construction as a dialogical praxis throughout history, this issue of subjective breakdown calls for further inquiry. Given that this thesis deals with castaways in extremis, it is necessary to understand the effect this schism has on the way their already embodied subjectivities are articulated and negotiated. It is a negotiation that is often overlooked within existing research due to its focus on the knowable and stable castaway child embedded in colonial ideology.

Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection, which supplements a Lacanian approach to subjectivity enhances my reading of this split subject in extremis and in negotiation. It does so because it is concerned with understanding the construction of subjectivity through a crisis of signification and meaning within language. As Kelly Oliver states Kristeva’s theoretical approach to subjectivity is interested in both ‘how the subject is constituted through language acquisition and in how the subject is demolished with the psychotic breakdown of language.’163 Abjection is an experiential state of liminal ambiguity in which the subject’s desire for stability and meaning is in crisis threatened by uncertain boundaries of identification. As Kristeva contends:

*The abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I.*164

*For abjection, when all is said and done, is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies.*165

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According to Kristeva, the abject is marked by elements of contamination, which threaten the body’s sense of unity and self-control. Witnessing a corpse, for instance, could provoke a feeling of revulsion: its lifeless state becomes unfamiliar in life, thus threatening the symbolic order of the living body defined through socio-cultural codes that govern subjectivity in a Lacanian sense. Crime and its perpetrators also exemplify a threat to these codes of order via disorder, which instigates a need within society for their sequestration. The ‘ambiguous’ is the space between unfamiliarity and familiarity that defers symbolic meaning, making the body/society inoperable through fear and rendering its expulsion essential.

The codes and regulations of society are thus articulated through this praxis of disturbance and rejection thus safeguarding the ‘primers’ of ‘culture.’ As Anne McClintock argues ‘abjection traces the silhouette of society on the unsteady edges of the self; it simultaneously imperils social order with the force of delirium and disintegration.’ These ‘unsteady edges of the self,’ projected through the body and its symptoms of known or presumed fears, enable the dialogue of order and disorder within a society to be articulated.

Kristeva developed these ideas at a time in which the fixed relationship between linguistic signs and meaning considered by Structuralists such as Ferdinand de Saussure were being challenged by the emergence of poststructuralist thinkers including Jacques Derrida, Gerard Genette, Roland Barthes, Tzvetan Todorov and Shoshana Felman. This group actively responded to structuralism and semiotics in particular, through essays written for Tel Quell magazine in the 1960s. Kristeva reflects on her response to this relationship between universal signifiers and meaning within language stating that she aimed to ‘dynamize the structure by taking into consideration the speaking subject and its unconscious experiences on the one hand and, on the other, the pressures of other social structures.’ Kristeva puts human experience front and centre in her analyses of this negotiation between subject and meaning within language, unlike structuralist approaches that focus more on the system within which the subject operates. The pressures of this negotiation and praxis are according to Kristeva unstable, thus

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166 Ibid. 230.
calling for a need to analyse the subject in eventual articulable crisis; a crisis that
Kristeva while drawing on Bakhtin’s work identifies as dialogical and representative
of ‘the transformations, the life and the history of discourse.’

It is in this sense that Kristeva’s deject (the straying subject in abjection) splits through a dynamic negotiation between subjectivity and a loss of the bounded self within socio-cultural terms in the face of ruptured meaning and threat. Acknowledging this crisis thus both negates a stable relationship between subjectivity and language while affirming the need to continually re-negotiate a sense of unity between the two. As the deject faces a loss of his/her articulable self, a discursive space is thus constructed whereby agents of subjective power are re-worked into identification through an oscillation between the unfamiliar and the familiar. Drawing on Lacanian approaches to subjectivity and Freud’s fort-da principle that considers how the subject is driven by an underlining need to renegotiate a sense of power and agency in the face of trauma, Kristeva focuses on understanding this experience through abjection. It is this praxis that Kristeva states has eluded traditional theorists such as Locke who investigate the relationship between language, identity and experience as an invocation of the unified subject. Rather than acknowledge these dynamics of subjective negotiation, such approaches instead seek to define ‘the truth of the subject by listening to the narrative of a sleeping body – a body in repose, withdrawn from its socio-historic imbrication.’ A similar stance is taken in existing castaway criticism. As discussed critics tend to overlook this dynamic and as such the relationship between the progressively fragmented castaway child and changing epistemological approaches to representations of self and ‘other’ within castaway fiction, in favour of pedagogical and colonial ideologies.

Kristeva’s question of ‘[h]ow can I be without border?’ which circumnavigates the concept of abject experience, is directly related to castaway experience in two ways. Firstly, the schism between ordered and disordered experience brought about through a violent ‘separation’ from home calls forth the liminal re-negotiation of selfhood as a means of subjective survival. This necessity develops as a need to reconstruct a link between castaway subjectivity and the

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170 Ibid. 13.
defining boundaries of socio-cultural codes (name of the father) through which identity is articulated and given meaning. Otherwise, the castaway would devolve into an inarticulate subject subsumed by ambiguity. This potential abject condition is continuously ‘expelled’ through a re-articulation of these codes via memory retrieval. The extent to which this is possible varies in relation to the changing epistemological representations of the castaway child that include religious hegemony, scientific rationalism, Darwinism, psychoanalysis and post-war nihilism. Each chapter will explore the gradual breakdown of this negotiation throughout this trajectory, which in turn corresponds to the transition from the knowable to the unknowable castaway child.

Secondly, I will also seek to explore how abjection corresponds to the changing manifestation of the enemy. The texts under investigation begin with the knowable child subject immune from abjection in TSFR operating within a governable island setting. This sovereign state of cohesion developed through an omniscient narrative voice aligned with religious and pedagogical discourse, however, gradually declines beginning with the manifestation of the enemy in TCI as an external subject. Yet even this relationship between the castaway body and the abject ‘other’ is not wholly divisible, since according to Kristeva, the deject casts ‘within himself the scalpel that carries out his separation.’174 What follows from TCI is a progressive slippage between the boundaries of self and ‘other’, which gradually disintegrate in LOTF with its underlined message that the enemy of man resides within.

**Issues with Psychoanalysis**

Utilising psychoanalytic theory to enhance my research into castaway fiction does, however, raise a number of concerns. In broad terms, they include psychoanalysis's questionable explication of the child subject studied through the lens of developmental stages that obfuscate gender, race and agency. While a thorough debate of these concerns lies beyond the scope of this thesis, I will briefly discuss their history and explore the extent to which Lacanian analysis contributes to and challenges these concerns.

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174 Ibid. 8.
Firstly, in premising the idea that the child is defined by homogenous stages of
development Lacan’s theory echoes (but is not analogous to) an essentialism that
dates back to early nineteenth-century child psychology studies. These studies
imbricate the child within scientific debates concerning human origins and behaviour
that retained Enlightenment pedagogy’s quest for a workable understanding of a
progressive and regressive society based on Western European ideals. As I will
discuss in chapter four, Darwin’s *Origins of Species* (1859) influenced the way child
development began to be investigated as a subject of scientific inquiry by the likes of
Henry Mouldsey (*Responsibility in Mental Disease*, 1884), Herbert Spencer
(‘Principles of Biology’ 1864) and James Sully (*Studies on Childhood* 1896).

It can be argued that Lacan’s model of development also imagines a universal
child in its assumption of ubiquitous cognitive stages. However, his theories account
for the possibility of alterable subjective influences through an understanding of the
malleable name of the father, thus unfastening the knowable child from the confines
of the adult/child dichotomy. I do not argue that Lacanian theory dissolves this
relationship entirely. As is the case with Rousseau and the above scientific
approaches, the idea that the child or indeed any subject can be adequately explicated
through a single system of thought be it Enlightenment pedagogy, Darwinism or
psychoanalysis remains problematic. One concern, for example, is that the history of
ideas associated with these disciplines tends to be driven by partisan politics that
privilege a specific history of Western European thought and male dominated culture.
Furthermore, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters, these influences have been
informed by and contribute to Europe’s history of classifying itself in relation to the
‘other’ for variable goals related to pedagogy, economic gain, religion and racial
supremacy.

As well as contributing towards an existing discourse of racial discrimination
this research into human relations advocated a significant degree of gender inequality
through the marginalisation of women. The influence of these attitudes extended to
the types of literature being produced for children. Just as white male practitioners
and thinkers dominated nineteenth-century political, pedagogical and scientific
disciplines, the same can be said for protagonists of castaway fiction. Margery
Hourihan explores this inequality in relation to the male hero in adventure fiction.
These literary figures are argued to convey a longstanding narrative of male
dominance disseminated within Western culture as early on as Homer’s *Oddysey* and Defoe’s *RC*. The heroes of adventure fiction are said to mirror the superiority of white European men who are natural masters of the world thus dominating ‘the historical record’ from which women are ‘largely obliterated’. The first part of Hourihan’s argument although valid requires further deliberation as my readings of TCI, K, AHW and LOTF will show that such clear-sighted racial supremacy is not always feasible. Instead, I argue that throughout my chosen trajectory there is a developing ambiguity between the castaway and the abject ‘other’. However, I do agree with Hourihan’s claim that this narrative marginalised women, which is made evident when considering the ratio of male to female castaway protagonists within fiction as my text selection exemplifies.

Richard Hughes’s *AHW* focalizes a female castaway, yet the extent to which she can be considered a hero or anti-hero in conventional terms is a complex matter. In chapter five I will investigate the impact that this male dominated narrative has on the way the female castaway child can be interpreted, by assessing how Emily's character transgresses its conventions, both in terms of the castaway tradition and in terms of twentieth-century gender politics. Utilising Lacanian theory to enhance this debate may seem reductive since feminist critics have argued against its stance on women and their psychosocial function. Returning briefly to Lacan’s Mirror stage it is important to acknowledge that when the child transitions (never completely, however) from the imaginary to the symbolic stage, this process activates a dissonant relationship between maternal and paternal agency. This dynamic is dependent on the child severing his/her attachment to its mother in favour of actualizing their desire to exist coherently and socially within a symbolic order associated with its father.

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176 Ibid. 158.
177 It must be noted that this ratio was not strictly mirrored in terms of readership. As critics have argued, towards the mid-nineteenth there was a shift in children’s literature aimed at both girls and boys with didactic and religious texts such as Thomas Day’s *The History of Stanford Merton* (1783-1789), John Newbary’s *The History of little Goody Two Shoes* (1765) and Mary Martha Sherwood’s *The History of the Fairchild Family* (1818-1847) towards a gendered split. Although Adventure Fiction and the School Story, for instance, was aimed at boy readers, while domestic novels were aimed at girl readers, these types of fiction had a dual readership. For further details see Phillips, Richard. *Mapping Men and Empire: Geography of Adventure: A Geography of Adventure*. London: Routledge, 1997. Print, see Nelson, Claudia. *Boys Will Be Girls: The Feminine Ethic and British Children’s Fiction, 1857-1917*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1991. Print and Salmon Edward. *Juvenile Literature As It Is*. London: Henry Drane, 1888. Print.
It would thus seem that women are both excluded from and subsumed by this language that governs socio-cultural relations in a way that renders their voice and position within these relations as marginal. Feminist critics such as Judith Butler and Luce Irigaray have scrutinised this phallocentric premise. As Irigaray points out, maternal agency is restricted to the physical function of childbirth and breastfeeding relegating women to the periphery of language and meaning, while paternal agency is associated with the name of the Father that grants the child subjective and socio-cultural signification.

However, there is an argument to be made that this phallocentric reading misinterprets Lacan’s overarching claim of subjective equilibrium between both sexes. Lacan’s approach to subjectivity as set out in the mirror stage is by his admission a response to Freud’s phallocentric focus advocated in *Totem and Taboo* (1913). Freud accounts for the drives that generate child development, sexual difference and social relations, identifying three main cognitive functions. These include the *id* (a demand for instant gratification also known as the *pleasure principle*), the *ego* (an awareness of acceptable and unacceptable socio-cultural relations and behaviour) and the *superego* (an overarching authority of social forces used as a reference to regulate the *ego*). Freud often turned to literature as a source of inspiration for his theories. By reworking the Oedipus myth, Freud suggests that during a child's psychosexual development (between 3-6) all male children embody a latent sexual desire to eradicate their father so as to poses their mother while all female children embody a latent sexual desire to eradicate their mother and possess their father. During this phallic stage, children experience anxieties about their sexual desires: boys are said to act in fear of being castrated while females are driven the same fear that manifests as ‘penis envy’. These anxieties are finally resolved through the male child's identification with their father and the females’ identification with their mother, in a way that establishes oppositional relations that help constitute the *superego*. Unlike Freud, Lacan stresses that a child’s desire for the phallus is neither biological (a penis) nor innate, but instead a desire embodied by both sexes driving the child’s transition from the imaginary to the symbolic stage of subjective development. As Lacan states in *The Signification of the Phallus* (1958) this phallic drive ‘forms without regard to the anatomical distinction between the sexes.’

By emphasising that this drive is ubiquitous regardless of sex, Lacan moves away from the binary opposition dominating Freud’s analysis by advocating a new way of thinking about castration in terms of a linguistic rather than biological lack embodied by the split subject. It is a lack that is never entirely overcome, which is why we continuously strive to negotiate subjective meaning through language. As David Rudd states, Lacan ‘remove[s] the biological essentialism from Freud’s interpretation of the Oedipal scene’ in that ‘nobody has the phallus, though it is undoubtedly desired by all.’\footnote{Rudd, David. \textit{Reading the Child in Children’s Literature: An Heretical Approach}. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. 41. Print.}

For Lacan gender is always socially constructed through language. A proposition that has lead feminist critics such as Jane Gallop, Julia Kristeva and Jaqueline Rose to defend and advocate the use of Lacanian criticism within literature and cultural studies. These critics argue that a reading of what the child rejects in the imaginary and seeks in the symbolic stage cannot be reduced to a discussion about the mother/father or female/male dichotomy. This stance they argue fails to recognise how Lacanian subjectivity unfixes essentialist ideas about selfhood such as those propagated by Humanism.

It is in this sense that it becomes possible to debate the female castaway as occupying a position within and beyond a tradition of western European male-dominated ideologies as I will discuss in chapter four. Not only does Emily’s character contribute towards demythologizing this construction by bringing the fragmented child and its embattled relationship with God, family and the abject ‘other’ into focus, but it also articulates a further epistemological representation of the castaway child in light early twentieth century post-war and psychoanalytic concerns.

**Summary and Conclusion**

In utilising Lacan’s psychoanalytical approach to subjectivity to investigate the changing epistemological representations of the castaway child within fiction, I do so with the above considerations in mind. As I will discuss in subsequent chapters, psychoanalytic approaches to children’s literature have proposed new ways of reading as made evident by the insightful research of critics such as David Rudd, Kenneth Kidd and Karren Coats. It must be stated that in utilising Lacanian theory and
Kristeva’s understanding of identity in relation to the abject ‘other’ to enhance my research, I do not propose that these approaches simply eradicate Liberal Humanism’s essentialist ideas about a ‘core’ self. I fully acknowledge that in their attempts to do so, another form of essentialism is proposed. Identifying subjectivity as a construct of sociocultural influences is to argue that identity is determinable and totalisable in and through these ideological discourses. As Robyn McCallum explains the issue facing such poststructuralist responses to Liberal Humanism especially within children’s literature lies with being able to ‘conceive of the relationship between an individual and society without structuring this relation in opposition in which one term is privileged over the other.’ Negotiating a way out of this intellectual cul-de-sac is thus one way in which critical approaches to children’s literature can move beyond the essentialism dating back to Rousseau’s pedagogical conceptions. Mc Cullum manages these tensions by drawing on Bakhtinian and Lacanian analysis to argue that individual agency manifests as a conscious negotiation of sociocultural influences, which are diachronic rather than static. My research into castaway fiction coincides with this anti-essentialist stance, while also considering Kristeva’s insights into abjection in attempt to broaden the scope of inquiry beyond existing colonial interpretations. I argue that the castaway child’s agency and ability to survive is represented through their conscious negotiation of pre and castaway subjectivity, which varies over time. Furthermore, I will argue that this negotiation is dialogical in that it conveys a parallel relationship between the shift from the knowable to the unknowable child and changing epistemological approaches to subjectivity in relation to a sense of self and the ‘other’.
Chapter One: The Swiss Family Robinson and the ‘Knowable’ Body

Introduction

This chapter analyses how *The Swiss Family Robinson* (1816) presents castaway children through a didactic model of education by focussing on its narrative influences and strategies. As a literary product of Enlightenment pedagogy and its essentialist paradox identified in the introduction in terms of the knowable child, the text pays homage to the following three influences. John Locke’s empirical approach to child development set out in *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693), which conceives of the child as a homogenous tabula rasa, devoid of original sin acquiring knowledge through direct experience. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Emile* (1762), which combines Locke’s premise with Daniel Defoe’s castaway setting in *RC* (1719) to formulate a didactic adult/child dichotomy that advocates escaping from the civilised world through the paradox of immunity. These influences on the novel are set out from as early on as the preface. Before examining the ideological implications that this preface conveys in terms of what story will be told, it is first necessary to address how the preface itself functions by design, to uphold this discourse.

In *Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation* (1997) Gerard Genette explores how the preface, along with other textual elements that ‘surround’ and ‘extend’ a literary work are involved in the ‘complex mediation between book, author, publisher, and reader.’ In broad terms, Genette categorises these elements as internal/peritextual (such as titles, prefaces, the author’s name) and external/epitextual (such as an author’s correspondence, interviews and diary entries). Genette further distinguishes between various types of prefaces and their function. The one most relevant to discussing TSFR is what Genette terms the original assumptive authorial preface, which ‘has as its chief function to ensure that the text is read properly’ [emphasis author’s own]. According to Genette the introductory position of such a preface provides a platform for writers to explain why and how readers should read the book that follows. This guiding directive is mainly informative conveying details about ‘the origin of the work, the circumstances in which it was written, the stages of

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181 Ibid. i.
182 Ibid. 197.
its creation’\textsuperscript{183}, determining ‘who’\textsuperscript{184} the reader is and provide an author’s ‘statement of intent.’\textsuperscript{185}

As I will discuss, all of these directives are present in the preface to TSF, which works towards introducing the pedagogical ideology that runs throughout the text. However, given the complex history of the text’s authorship as noted in the introduction, further discussion about the applicability of Genette’s term is warranted. To reiterate the basis of this complexity, TSFR can be argued to have multiple authors due to the text having been translated, edited and revised many times since its original publication in German (1812), rendering the question of authorship as open to debate. Furthermore, although the Swiss pastor Johann Wyss is credited as the original author whose name appears on the title page, it was, in fact, his son Johann Rudolf Wyss who edited his Father’s manuscript written twenty years prior in instalments for the purpose of entertaining his four sons. The 1816 English translation (Godwin) I refer to in this thesis for reasons already discussed, includes a translated preface which critic John Seelye attributes to Johann Wyss. However, due to the above sequence of events, the preface can also be attributed to the text’s editor Rudolf Wyss. Thus although the preface maintains the functioning criteria of what Genette terms as the original authorial preface, I fully acknowledge that the question of who authored the preface remains unresolved. As a means of dealing with this concern, I will turn to what Genette deems as ‘official’ paratext, and by extension, the official authorial preface. That which renders a paratextual message official, according to Genette is when ‘the author or one of his associates accepts responsibility for it.’\textsuperscript{186}

Ascertaining to what extent one can assign the role of ‘author’ or ‘associate’ to Wyss and his son is thus unlikely to prove definitive, yet what is certain is that both Wyss and his Son are both active participants in this negotiation, and were in consultation with regards to publication. It is by this admission and on Genette’s terms that I identify the following preface as an original assumptive authorial preface, which has a guiding function aimed at conveying the text’s origins, the author’s intent and who the implied reader is. In light of the complications discussed, I would also add that the preface sheds light on the implied author of the text. I agree with Marilyn Edelstein’s remarks that as the preface is situated on a threshold between the introduction and the

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid. 210.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid. 212.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid. 221.
story, the author’s ‘prefatory voice seems to occupy a narrative level somewhere between that of the implied author and a “real” (or historical) author.’ By implied author, Edelstein refers to what Wayne Booth terms as the real author’s second self, standing ‘behind the scenes’ as either ‘a stage manager, as puppeteer or as an indifferent God’ constructed through the praxis of writing, whose views may or may not correspond to the narrator’s. Seymour Chatman summarises, the implied author as ‘the source of our sense of the fiction’s underlying values and beliefs – its ideology.’ This brings us full circle to discussing what ideology the preface presents and how it is maintained through an introduction to the potential narrator, implied author and reader.

It appeared to his apprehension, that a book not less useful than entertaining might be formed, by transporting in fancy a single family from the civilized world, and placing it in the midst of savage nature...There is no book that has been more universally read and approved, for the opening of the infant mind, than The Adventures of Robinson Crusoe.

Acknowledging the importance of knowledge derived from experience, the text is positioned within a model of education and civil practices. In the vein of Rousseau, pedagogy and entertainment are integrated and mediated through Defoe’s classic castaway setting to create a model composition through which a perfectible society can be created and sustained. Shortly after its publication, Defoe’s RC had permeated the literary scene across Europe, and by 1726 the novel had enjoyed seven reprints in England alone. It is thus no surprise that Crusoe is referenced with the air of familiarity that denotes a household name. As O’Malley argues, Defoe’s novel had already ‘coincided extraordinarily well with the dominant pedagogical ideas of the age’ and with the pressing importance of education in the eighteenth century it ‘quite easily found a place in the emerging children’s literature and culture of the

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period.’\textsuperscript{192} Two further examples are Mary Wollstonecraft’s \textit{Original Stories From Real Life: With Conversations Calculated to Regulate the Affections, and Form the Mind to Truth and Goodness} (1788), and Richard and Maria Edgeworth’s \textit{Practical Education} (1798).

Finally, after asserting the ‘universal’ importance of Defoe’s tale in the ‘opening’ of the infant mind, the same tension between freedom and the knowable child that characterises Rousseau’s pedagogy is simultaneously foregrounded and defused:

\begin{quote}
In other points the present work is entirely different; for example, in painting the family scene, in developing the different characters of the members that compose it, and in the perpetual attention given by the father to instruct his children in different sciences and arts and to forward and mature their moral and intellectual natures.\textsuperscript{193}
\end{quote}

TSFR is thus set apart from its literary counterpart in the way it neutralises the risk of granting these child castaways complete freedom. The development of individual selves, who are independent in ‘character,’ is paradoxically set against the children’s status as ‘members’ who ‘compose’ the ‘family scene.’ This act of neutralisation highlights what O’Malley summarises as Enlightenment Pedagogy’s dichotomy, which frames the ‘benefits of a pedagogical scene’s illusion of a real experience’ whilst safeguarding against ‘the pitfalls of succumbing too far to that illusion.’\textsuperscript{194} From the outset, Father Robinson, is presented as the main protagonist and narrator capable of managing this tension between freedom and guardianship, therefore, fulfilling the conditions of this dichotomy and as such advocating the pedagogical ideology of which the implied author ascribes. Thus what is introduced here is the relationship between Father Robinson’s narrative omniscience and the ‘knowable child’ body that will permeate the novel throughout. It is a relationship fuelled by his ability to construct this ‘scene’ of pseudo-isolation as a space in which

a didactic tutor/parent, well-schooled in science, art and morality, can speak and be spoken of via the achievements of his pupils/children.

What this preface also introduces is the implied reader, which in turn further bolsters the pedagogical premise of the implied author. The text is directed towards ‘friends of children’ (emphasis author’s own) identified as parents and teachers who are likely to ‘put this book into the hands of the children under their care, or shall read it with them.’\footnote{Wyss, Johann David. “Preface.” Preface. The Swiss Family Robinson. New York: Penguin, 2007. 1. Print.} The child reader is expected to be between the age of ‘eight to fourteen’\footnote{Ibid.} possessing general knowledge about history and geography acquired through a primary school education. These reading suggestions serve two purposes, the first of which relates to what John Stephens describes as the blending of the implied reader into the ideal reader ‘who will best actualise a book’s potential meanings.’\footnote{Stephens, John. Language and Ideology in Children’s Fiction. London: Longman, 1992. 55. Print.} The second purpose relates to what Barbara Wall describes in her analysis on the evolutionary mode of narrative address in children’s literature as establishing a dual audience, referring to an author’s awareness ‘that adults too might read their work.’\footnote{Wall, Barbara. The Narrator’s Voice: The Dilemma of Children’s Fiction. London: Macmillan, 1991. 35. Print.} According to Wall this form of address is enhanced when adult readers are ‘comfortably’ positioned in texts as either ‘observer-listener’ or ‘teller-surrogate.’\footnote{Ibid. 36.} In the case of TSFR, their authoritative position is clearly delineated from the preface and is also maintained throughout the story via Father Robinson’s didactic narrative voice. A ‘conjunction of interests’\footnote{Ibid. 35.} is thus established through pedagogy, which aligns both these knowable adult and child readers with the ideology of the implied author, whilst acting as a precursor for conveying what type of narrative voice and child castaway will follow. The implication of advocating any such ideology within children’s literature is as Stephens states aimed towards the ‘socialization of the child’ and teaching them how to operate within varying socio-cultural discourses that construct ‘subject positions’\footnote{Stephens, John. Language and Ideology in Children’s Fiction. London: Longman, 1992. 56. Print.} for them to embody. This preface stresses these positions and their imbalanced power structures in light of the adult/child dichotomy through the overt identification of both adult and child implied readers.

Hence chapter one discusses in detail how these interests shape characterisation and subjective representation, both of which are focalised by Father
Robinsons’ as he teaches his castaway sons Fritz, Ernest, Jack and Francis the value of Enlightenment virtues. Virtues, which manifest through a family of castaways working hard to maintain their faith in God and industry whilst cultivating the island into a self-sufficient microcosm of Western civilisation.

The question of why and how an ‘enemy’ manifests as a partial, rather than an actual threat in TSFR will be considered in light of this narrative technique. I will also consider to what extent this type of enemy exemplifies the transitional period between the age of discovery and colonial discourse within literature. The text is preoccupied with presenting its European castaways as endeavouring to maintain a productive passivity on their island Arcadia as opposed to engaging with hostile invaders, in a way that corresponds with early eighteenth century approaches to natural history. I will further argue that this emphasis represents the novel’s Christian and pedagogical ethos of a teleological subjectivity that promotes an idea of the secure subject, immune to abjection.

My attempt in this chapter to trace the relationship between TSFR, Enlightenment pedagogy and the dialogically epistemological castaway does not negate colonialist interpretations entirely. Rather, it seeks to expand and re-evaluate ways of reading the genre, by understanding how the castaway body is represented as a subjectively liminal construct which articulates a dialogic rather than a fixed, epistemological discourse.

The Deliverance of Claimed Bodies

Then God said, “Let us make man in our own image, according to our likeness” ... So God created man in his own image; in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. (Genesis 1:26).

The first thing we did on finding ourselves safe on terra firma, was to fall on our knees, and return thanks to the Supreme Being who had preserved our lives, and to recommend ourselves with entire resignation to the care of his paternal kindness.  

The novel begins on a ship during a raging storm. On board is a Swiss family who left their homeland following the chaos of the Swiss Revolution (1798) and their financial ruin. Father Robinson, mother Robinson and their sons Fritz, Jack, Ernest and Francis, who are aged between 5 and 12 are sailing to Australia in the hope of re-establishing themselves there. After weathering the storm for seven days, the Robinsons escape on makeshift rafts, and land safely on an island in the South Pacific near New Guinea, which is to become their world and home for two years. After narrowly escaping death, this shipwrecked family, on reaching land, fall to their knees in unison, to signify that their faith has not been shaken. Their first act as castaways is to thank a Christian God for their deliverance and devote the remainder of their lives to ‘his paternal kindness.’

This act of communal prayer sets forth three framing points, which are reiterated throughout the narrative. The hand of God is credited with bringing about their existence as bodies of survival. This unified ‘thanks’ signifies an open line of communication between these surviving bodies and God: God is thought to have spoken through them, and they in turn reply with appreciation. Finally, this line of communication will stay open, because they devote their castaway bodies with ‘entire resignation’ to God, signifying that all their future conduct will henceforth be carried out in a manner that befits devout subjects.

From the outset, then, these castaway bodies are first and foremost bodies of affirmation. They affirm the existence of God, which is simultaneously other (as a power that constructs bodies of survival) and inside them (as a power that is articulated through these bodies of survival). Within these negotiations, the castaways are made in God’s own ‘likeness,’ an image that is solidified and mobilised on ‘terra firma,’ thus unifying Heaven and Earth on common ground, rendering the island itself as a place of worship and blessings.

Through prayer and pledge then, these surviving bodies, although seemingly desolate, are established as claimed subjects through God’s will in this initial landing scene. The language, which these already integrated bodies speak manifests within religious discourse, which the Swiss pastor speaks fluently. Father Robinson’s narrative omniscience begins to develop through this introduction marking him as a professional practitioner of this language, allowing him to speak on behalf of God, himself and his family. In fact, it is through his voice that the story is told as a first-hand account of events, and this same voice focalises both events and
characterisations that unfold. Essentially, Christianity’s continuity is maintained through a sustained memory of this language, its codes and practices, which instigates the liminal negotiation between pre- and castaway subjectivity.

The narrative goes to great lengths to establish a parallel between a sustainable image of divine power and these castaways, which has the effect of shaping the family’s future experience according to a looped discourse that refers consistently to this image, although not in the sense of blind worship and idolatry. Significantly, this ethos inspires a productive doctrine that the castaways actively set out to fulfil on a daily basis: ‘In such a situation as ours, every member of the family must be actively employed for the common good.’

An interactive discourse between faith and productivity ensues on the island, which they manage, with relative ease, to turn into an Arcadia. John Seelye summarises this relationship observing that the novel ‘was born on the high tide of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the progressive improvements men could make to their world thanks to the power of God-given reason.’

Father Robinson’s omniscience, which has thus far been established via his proximity to God, is further strengthened by the ‘progressive improvements’ he and his family make on the island, under his expert surveillance and instruction.

Fruitful Labours and a Governable Island

After thanking God for their deliverance, the Robinsons immediately unload the cargo they salvaged as a result of their careful planning during the storm. Out of the seven rafts made to carry the family safely to the island, one is dedicated to carrying ‘provisions for the support of life,’ including tools, food and animals. These castaways quickly establish residence on the uninhabited island, transforming it into a governable space with relative ease. Each chapter is devoted to conveying the achievements and discoveries made by this remarkable family, including commodious habitations, an abundance of beehives, sturdy staircases, ladders, a bridge, a salt mine, two farm houses complete with an abundance of animals, a boat, a weaving machine, a basket making device, and a sugar press. As William Targ states, ‘the end is an

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Utopian dream come true.' Significantly, this productivity pays credence to Father Robinson’s vast practical knowledge gained from his readings of ‘different books of travels’ which enables him to organise his family to the best of their abilities.

At this point, it is necessary to question the extent to which the novel attributes these achievements to the Almighty in whose image these castaway bodies are cast. Given its reliance on Father Robinson’s existing knowledge of mechanics, science and engineering, to what extent is the relationship between God and the family’s productive ethos of ‘the common good’ rendered insufficient by this supplementary means of achieving success? The answer is given early on in the novel, via Father Robinson’s ‘system of education,’ which he advocates as the family are planning their safe evacuation from the sinking ship during the storm:

I explained to him as well as I could, the power of Archimedes’s lever, with which he said he could move the world... God sufficiently compensated the natural weakness of man by the gifts of reason, invention, and the adroitness of the hands; and that human meditation and reflection had composed a science, called mechanics.

In the midst of a storm, Father Robinson adroitly engages his sons in a plan of escape by manufacturing makeshift rafts. Rather than give way to blind panic, he instigates a plan that is not only calmly executed given their severe circumstances, but also serves as an opportunity to impart an essential lesson to his children. Indeed, this is the lesson on which all future lessons on the island will be based. Poignantly, at the moment when their world seems to be coming to an end, Father Robinson conveys a theory that ‘could move the world.’ Weakness is met with the strength of God’s ‘gifts of reason,’ extended through science, another language in which Father Robinson is fluent. The power of this language is naturalised because it is a product of God’s invention. Rather than being subsumed by the technical achievements made on the island, God’s power and agency is aligned with Father Robinson’s possession of such knowledge. Speaking this already constituted language, Father Robinson represents a

totalisation of God’s image, the lessons of which are disseminated among the other
castaways through his didactic endeavours. Embodying the roles of engineer, pastor,
Father, husband, natural historian, mechanical engineer and stentorian adjudicator of
acceptable and deviant behaviour, Father Robinson is what John Seelye calls ‘a living
textbook of universal knowledge’ and ‘a virtual encyclopaedia of miscellaneous
knowledge.’

Father Robinson’s subjective liminality is marked by his ability to develop his
sons’ education and in turn by his ability to draw on memories of his expert
knowledge and skills, leading to the resounding success of their castaway experience.
The question of Father Robinson’s ability to remember these subjective influences is
never in doubt. As Marita Sturken asserts: ‘Memory establishes life’s continuity’ and
‘as the means by which we remember who we are, memory provides the very core of
identity.’

With these conditions in place, the novel develops a thread of didacticism and
illusory immunity from the civilised world, reminiscent of Locke and Rousseau’s
belief that they ‘could greatly aid mankind in realising what sort of things they could
actually know about.’ Father Robinson’s liminal narrative voice, conveyed through
his uninhibited memory whilst castaway premises classical Humanist and
Enlightenment pedagogy’s faith in a ‘stable subjectivity and perfectible
knowledge.’ As discussed in the introduction, Wyss’s novel corresponds to the
three demands of Enlightenment pedagogy as a model of education ‘in which all
man’s needs appear.’ These include constructing a pseudo-space of isolation away
from civilisation in the vein of RC (‘let him think he is Robinson Crusoe himself’);
developing an omniscient tutor capable of acting out liminal negotiations between
these seemingly separate spaces (a tutor who knows ‘what a child is capable of
learning’); and constructing the knowable body of the child within this space using

\[\text{214 Ibid: 177.}
\[\text{215 Ibid: 2.}

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didacticism and the adult/child dichotomy (‘to raise him above prejudice and to base his judgements on the true relations of things’\textsuperscript{216}).

As Martin Green argues, TSFR ‘makes a cult of authority’ in that ‘all pleasure are family pleasures, and the individual’s other relations, to God and nature, to landscape and work, are aspects of his family life.’\textsuperscript{217} Although Green’s assessment is well founded, there is no searching analysis of how the novel works towards maintaining the paradoxical demands of Enlightenment pedagogy. Diana Loxley brings these implications closer to the fore when stating that ‘the text’s ideological trajectory gradually unfolds’ through a narrative strategy that ‘prominently installs the source of all meaning in one place alone.’\textsuperscript{218} That place being the character of Father Robinson. However, because Loxley conceives this statically composed image as complete unto itself, the necessary negotiations that make this condition possible within the novel are once again neglected. The question of how Father Robinson’s omniscience upholds the implied author’s pedagogical ideologies is represented within Father Robinson’s ability to maintain the ‘family scene’, which is most apparent when the paradoxically autonomous identities of each family member are analysed. John Seelye argues that the four boys ‘are complex creations, each sharing both admirable and regrettable traits’, which their Father ‘works to correct.’\textsuperscript{219} What he does not discuss however is the centrality of these ‘creations’ to representations of a workable model of Enlightenment pedagogy.

The true authentication of Father Robinson’s omniscience and subjectivity can only be understood within its extensional capacity for generating knowable bodies, which represent a liminal continuation of his own uninterrupted pre-castaway subjectivity. The close textual readings that follow highlight how each family member serves as a readable embodiment of this dynamic, which essentially authenticates Father Robinson’s plurality. Their identities are conveniently developed within the categories of hunters, scientists, philosophers, waywardness, wife and mother: a well-rounded microcosm of nineteenth-century society which showcases Father Robinson’s prowess when it comes to dealing with all categories of men and women.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid: 177.
The Autonomous Paradox of a Family of Selves

As they make their escape from a sinking ship, guided by Father Robinson’s ‘paternal care,’ he outlines his family’s character as follows. Mrs Robinson is described as being ‘the most tender and exemplary of her sex,’ while ‘little Francis, a lovely boy six years old’ is said to have the ‘happiest dispositions.’ Fritz, the eldest at fourteen, is ‘full of intelligence and vivacity,’ while his younger brother twelve-year-old Ernest is said to be ‘of a rational reflecting temper, well informed, but somewhat disposed to indolence and the pleasures of the senses’ and ten year old Jack is described as ‘a light-hearted, enterprising, audacious, generous, lad.’

Father Robison’s clear-sightedness when it comes to introducing each member of his family initiates a narrative trope that continues throughout. There is no suggestion that any further depth in character or introspective thoughts, for instance, lies beyond the remits of these open-plan characterisations. The suggestion of any such independence would both undermine the observational skills of an omniscient patriarch and defeat the rules of Enlightenment pedagogy and the knowable child. Critics have often noted that such external characterisations were common in early didactic children’s literature utilised in what Maria Nikolajeva describes as ‘plot orientated narratives focussed on what characters do rather than how they feel about what they do.’ Nikolajeva further states elsewhere, that reflections of a child’s inner thoughts developed much later in Western Children’s literature. This chronology certainly rings true with the varying narrative strategies and epistemological approaches to the child and subjectivity employed in later castaway narratives, which I will discuss further in the following chapters. That which needs to be addressed at present is how the text develops a parallel between the external characterisation of the child castaway and the development of Father Robinsons’ subjective representation. It is a parallel, which emerges through Father Robinsons’ unwavering devotion to education and remediying each of his son’s flaws during their castaway experience in a way that inversely credits him with their varied strengths and successes. The family are all his champions in as far as they each excel at a particular skill that highlights their Father’s own intelligence and knowledge.
Ernest, the second eldest of the Robinson children, is initially described as a ‘rational’ young boy with a ‘reflecting’ disposition. These founding traits are the mainstay of his philosophical character, which is often developed during intellectual sparring sessions with his Father whilst in the midst of various pursuits and discoveries. Father Robinson, in his parental and didactic role, consistently manages to showcase his own specialist knowledge by promoting and correcting Ernest’s cogitations. Ernest as Father Robinson states is a deep thinker who earns plaudits for his knowledge of wildlife, natural phenomena, the ethical question of skinning animals and inventions. His general life motto is that there are no limitations within the praxis of thinking, a perspective that sees him being bestowed with various honours such as a ‘young philosopher’ and ‘Mr Professor.’ Ernest’s character is reminiscent of an Enlightenment thinker preoccupied with a studious and empirical mind capable of enquiring into areas of philosophy, science and discovery. He possesses a neutral masculinity that befits the scientific exploration and organisation of the world rather than its colonisation.

Although his scholarly character is invested in the generic image of someone who is always fond of reading and reflection these traits are found to have practical uses during his castaway experience. The responsibility for this transposition lies crucially with his Father’s ability to act as the necessary linchpin between knowledge and experience. Ernest’s ideas and ‘discoveries’ are what Father Robinson calls ‘useful [thoughts]’ yet, critically, it is only with his Father’s didactic intervention that they can become geared towards maintaining the family’s doctrines of productivity and wellbeing. For instance, although Ernest discovers manioc ‘roots’ in the forest, it only becomes ‘a beneficial discovery’ when his Father informs him of their nutritious potential to ‘furnish’ the family with ‘the means of existence’ to survive for their entire castaway lives if they are carefully prepared in a way with which Father Robinson alone is familiar. Additionally, Father Robinson’s scientific

224 Ibid. 398.
225 Ibid: 338.
227 Ibid. 230.
prowess is made evident through his teachings. Whilst the family is deciding where best to construct their home on the island, Ernest displays a knack for botany, offering scientific ‘comments and inquiries,’ which are ‘interrupted’ by his Father, who challenges his hypothesis based on an absence of scientific ‘proof.’ Ernest’s knowledge and discoveries are thus continuously conditioned by a necessary lack of scientific conviction, his Father, who is relied upon to ‘explain all’, continuously supplements.

The conditions of this relationship are also evident even during instances that see the two positioned on an illusively equal footing. When Ernest returns from a hunting expedition, both he and his Father are initially ‘ignorant’ of what type of animal Ernest has killed. Father Robinson teaches his son the skill of deductive reasoning, by first asking him to examine to ‘what family of quadrupeds it belongs’, then narrowing ‘its name among the animals who give suck’ and finally identifying its exact name by taking a closer look at its ‘its teeth.’ Guided by Father Robinson’s extensive knowledge of animal habitation, they manage to ascertain that Earnest’s animal is a kangaroo, and he is finally congratulated for ‘killing an animal at once so rare and so remarkable.’ Thus, although these negotiations suggest collaboration it is saturated with inequality: Ernest’s independence as a philosophical and scientific thinker is paradoxically determined by his Father’s affirmations. Reminiscent of the adult/child dichotomy that governs Enlightenment pedagogy, of which this novel stands as a workable model, these examples of didactic reasoning see Ernest develop as a dependant and knowable body. They do so in as far as his successes are never autonomous and because his ideas belong to one of many categories of knowledge his Father already possesses and masters.

Jack, the third eldest son, provides further opportunity for this condition to be worked towards. This ‘light-hearted, enterprising, audacious’ lad excels at hunting and sportsmanship, thus representing an alternative model of civilised man for which his Father can take credit by way of promotion. The emphasis of his physicality predates the muscular Christianity of Thomas Hughes’s Tom Brown’s Schooldays (1857), which is explored in the following chapter. Being ‘on every occasion the most active’ of his brothers, Jack’s athleticism proves highly beneficial when it comes to

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228 Ibid. 133.
229 Ibid: 255.
231 Ibid: 68.
manual labour and securing food. However, as an independent virtue, it is once again subsumed by his Father’s work ethic and commitment to maintaining the family’s wellbeing.

Jack’s fearless dexterity is regularly praised and shines through whether capturing wild animals or contributing to family meals through the difficult task of catching lobsters. As he is ‘the nimblest of them all,’ and is often called on to assist in maintenance and construction projects. Crucially, however, every time Jack’s strengths are described, he operates under supervision, constantly acting on his Father’s orders to provide ‘effective means for accomplishing’ his explicit ‘wishes.’ Given this reliance on his Father to mediate every task, Jack, like his brother Ernest, is never independently credited with his successes. Their skills, which are necessarily embryonic, make these characters readable embodiments of their Father’s plurality and omniscience. This dynamic is more obviously pursued in the continuous narrative of fault and correction throughout the novel. As an annexe to the virtues discussed above, we are told that both sons possess defects in character.

Ernest is ‘disposed to indolence and pleasures’ and his character is plagued by gluttony and slothfulness, which, as moral transgressions symbolising two of the seven deadly sins, serve to broaden his Father’s intellectual and spiritual repertoire. He is often referred to as having a ‘glutton instinct’ when it comes to his sweet tooth, and his lethargy comes across in his love of labour saving devices. For instance, after helping to catch and tame a donkey, we are told that ‘the slothful Ernest was highly delighted’ by the prospect of having their ‘loads carried by a servant.’ However, these flaws are never allowed to go unchecked. Upon realising that Ernest had failed to collect sea salt for fear of getting his feet wet, Father Robinson wastes no time in reminding his son that ‘every member of the family must be actively employed for the common good, and not be afraid of wetting his feet.’

Jack’s shortcomings, on the other hand, present a new set of challenges in relation to the transgressions of his cavalier attitude, which requires Father Robinson to protect his son from the dangers of his own impetuous character. Although Jack embodies an active disposition that is in stark contrast to his brother’s sluggishness,

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233 Ibid: 324.
235 Ibid: 75.
236 Ibid: 92.
he lacks Ernest’s ability to rationalise events and circumstances. Such tensions require resolutions, which only Father Robinson, with his expert knowledge in all areas, can provide. Jack’s impatience and ostentation see him develop into a figure whose imaginations are never trusted (often exaggerating the size and strength and of his prey) and require constant correction. Jack is prone to boasting after almost every feat, and he favours ‘savages, warfare, and encounters.’ His actions are governed by passion rather than reason. Even his athleticism, which makes his Father proud, is practised with such recklessness that it occasionally evokes a sense of fear in his Father. Although praised by his father for his bravery and utilitarian intentions, Jack’s reckless abandonment of common sense acts as a narrative trope that effectuates the need for his Father’s didactic model of supervision.

These necessary corrections and shortcomings work towards legitimising the anxieties surrounding the ungoverned child of Locke and Rousseau’s pedagogy, whilst simultaneously neutralising them through a didactic authority capable of negotiating his pre-castaway subjectivity (in terms of religious and scientific knowledge) whilst on the island. Civilisation and its laws thus liminally manifest as codes within this pseudo-space of isolation, highlighting the promise made in the preface to isolate the family ‘from the civilised world, and placing it in the midst of savage nature.’ This praxis of education reflects Rousseau’s pedagogical paradox that insists Emile’s condition ‘is not that of a social being.’

All the boys are in a sense their Father’s protégés, because they are all under his surveillance and instruction, yet it is his eldest son who is favoured with the most well-rounded leadership qualities. Fritz is often praised for his behaviour on the island, meeting his Father’s approval in ways that are set as examples for his brothers to follow. This privilege is worked towards gradually as Fritz increasingly assimilates the polyvocal competence of his Father in a way that his other siblings, who excel in certain areas but not all, do not possess. Unlike his brothers, this ‘handsome curl-pated youth full of intelligence and vivacity,’ is not faced with the same moral and intellectual trials, and his superiority is soon affirmed as the text unfolds. Being ‘so much stronger and more intelligent than the others,’ he is the only son who is

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238 Ibid. 127.
239 Ibid: 382.
regularly chosen to accompany his Father on expeditions and also engages in successful solo endeavours. After harpooning a tortoise, for instance, he composes a plan to clean the shell and fill it with clean water for his mother to use whilst carrying out her domestic chores. Upon this suggestion, his Father cries: ‘Excellent, excellent, my boy! All honour to the founder of the pure water-tub! This is what I call thinking for the general good.’²⁴⁴ [Emphasis author’s own]. Fritz is marked as a utilitarian thinker and a practitioner of social welfare; he exhibits a certain degree of promise in these areas that the others only embody to a smaller degree. Within this structure of controlled identities, it is only Fritz, the eldest son, who is accorded great authority that is almost but never equivalent to his Father’s, since crucially Father Robinson’s voice maintains control over the narrative until the very end.

Wife and Mother/Madonna

Mrs Robinson, ‘the most tender and exemplary of her sex’²⁴⁵, is not subject to the same trials of development and correction as her sons. Her character remains in tandem with the initial idealism of its presentation throughout the novel, never straying from her exemplary skills as a wife and mother. We are first introduced to her on the sinking ship: ‘she encouraged the youngest children, who were leaning on her knees’ with a comforting presence while her husband, who ‘owed them an example of firmness,’²⁴⁶ led them in prayer and then in a plan of escape. This virtuous, Madonna-like image represents the way mother Robinson’s character is defined by and domestically subsumed in her serving the needs and desires of her family. Her superior powers of observation are deemed invaluable in as far as they provide emotional insights into her husband’s true feelings. As Father Robinson tries to hide his grief on the sinking ship, he states that his wife could see through this pretence: she alone can ‘read’ his ‘inmost thoughts’ and ‘perceiv[e] the anxiety which devoured’²⁴⁷ him. Mother Robinson thus serves as his supportive helpmate.

A contract of narrative supplementation is developed here as mother Robinson’s voice and character are essentially bound within Father Robinson’s mediation. Accompanied by the angelic image of the Madonna figure, the capacity to

²⁴⁴Ibid: 228.
²⁴⁵Ibid. 23.
²⁴⁶Ibid. 11.
understand her patriarch, and as such her family serves to illustrate an efficient model of Enlightenment pedagogy and the ideal family. As Nina Auerbach states in *Woman and the Demon*, there was a tendency at this time in art and literature to domesticate angelic images within the home so they could act as 'pious emblems of a good woman’s submergence in her family.'

Whereas Father Robinson is granted a polyvocal power of articulation through his various roles, mother Robinson is denied this possibility and her character exists solely as a subject on whom this power can be exercised. As Townsend argues, 'women’s place remained in the home' during the early nineteenth century and her ‘feminine virtues’ included ‘piety, domesticity, sexual submission and repression.’ However, given her role’s contribution to the novel’s general development of an efficient model of Enlightenment pedagogy, mother Robinson’s role cannot simply be interpreted as peripheral. Her contribution lies in her effectiveness in assisting her family’s efforts to grow and in her husband’s attempts to make this happen. Although she does not lead her husband’s didactic project, the characteristically ‘feminine’ support she represents is essential to its success.

For instance, she possesses an ‘enchanted bag’ which contains things for her family’s ‘good pleasure.’ While the pleasures and excitements of the male members of the family allow for a reading of their character development, her interests work towards strengthening her deferential position. Mother Robinson’s greatest joys come from plates, dishes and flax ‘because to persons of decent habits they were articles of indispensable necessity.’ These objects, whether salvaged from the shipwreck or fashioned out of crude materials by her husband, signify a well-ordered household that works towards domesticating their castaway experience to an uncanny degree and maintaining Father Robinson’s values.

The relationship between female domestication and the successful implementation of pedagogical ideals was, according to Henrich Pestalozzi, one of the foremost influential Enlightenment pedagogues, greatly significant. As discussed in the introduction, Pestalozzi drew heavily on Rousseau’s pedagogical ideas to reform Switzerland’s educational system as a means of reforming society at large. In his

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works *The Evening Hours of a Hermit* (1780) and *Leonard and Gertrude* (1781-1787), Pestalozzi describes human interaction and development through the interrelated areas of family, occupation and the state, and places God at ‘the centre of all these circles.’ The role of the ideal woman within this system was to be at the centre of her family, attending to their needs, while her husband dealt with the outside world. Despite this seeming divide between a microcosmic and macrocosmic world, Pestalozzi sees ‘a close connection between the function of woman in the life of family and the nation’ due to her innate civilising powers. In the case of mother Robinson, I would argue that she embodies these same ideals. Her position takes root in domestication, yet she is credited with the family’s ability to lead a civilised castaway life modelled after their Swiss home-life.

If her joys strayed from domestic and family priorities, then this would suggest an independence that lies beyond the boundaries, which the narrative tirelessly prescribes. Her subjectivity is thus shown to exist purely within these laws as she has no desire to move beyond them, much to her husband’s continued praise.

The following instance of her strained emotional articulation reaffirms this position. Following the construction of a bridge worked on by her husband and sons, this grand achievement is unveiled to her. Father Robinson describes how his wife partakes in their celebration with a ‘silent calm enjoyment’ that proceeds with a heartfelt embrace. The summation of her delight is a summation of her character’s subsumption within the dynamic of Enlightenment ideals. Her voice, although actively portrayed in her domestic and civilising duties, is constantly deferential to her husband’s overarching didactic authority, rendering her simultaneously anonymous and profound. She, like her sons, is subject to a paradoxical individuation, constructed through Enlightenment pedagogy’s overarching aim of improving society and all relations within it, emphasised through the external characterisation of her feelings. They are stated without further elaboration because the implied author assumes that the implied reader will universally recognise them or at least they should.

The approach to family in TSFR is thus conveyed within this three-part paradox of illusive immunity, individuation and the knowable body as exemplified in the above readings of the subjective negotiations between its members. The

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negotiation is certainly one sided and necessarily limited to external characterisations, which fulfil the text’s epistemological premise whereby the child’s subjectivity is anonymised by didacticism. As Dorrit Cohn remarks, ‘the more conspicuous and idiosyncratic the narrator, the less apt he is to reveal the depths of his character’s psyches, or, for that matter, to create psyches that have depth to reveal.’ This overtly didactic narrative voice does undergo shifts in later children’s literature affecting the creation and ‘depth’ of child character’s subjective representations, which is made particularly evident when analysing the origins and evolution of castaway fiction, as I will discuss in the chapters that follow.

Before doing so, it is important to understand how these prescriptive principles and approach to subjectivity are also worked towards in the novel’s approach to death and the praxis of ‘othering.’ The examples of death that will now be analysed seek to claim and affirm this body in the name of God and Heaven, relying once again on the same assumptive reasoning that informs Locke and Rousseau’s approach to identity and its construction.

In the beginning was the word: God, the Father and Legitimised Killings

In her analysis of Mrs Sherwood’s *The History of the Fairchild Family* (1818), Claudia Nelson usefully highlights the centrality of death in one of the earliest examples of English children’s literature. Death was developed as a ‘Calvinist theme’ of religious didacticism. There is a ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way to die in this tradition, which depends on how far the individual in question adheres to or strays from religious doctrine. Sherwood is, according to Townsend, the most formidable of the didactic writers of children’s literature, such as Maria Edgeworth and Mrs (Sarah) Trimmer, of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Indeed, her bestselling book *The History of the Fairchild Family* was ‘designed to strike the fear of hellfire into every child’s soul.’

Sherwood’s approach to how ‘Good’ deaths unite is made evident in stories such as ‘A Happy Death’, which depicts the final moments of a dying boy on his

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deathbed. Charles fixes ‘his eyes on one corner of the room’ and is overcome by ‘a kind of heavenly and glorious expression’\textsuperscript{259} because his faith in God means his soul has been saved and set on a path to be united with its maker in heaven, the place in which he will one day be re-united with his Christian parents. As Gillian Avery states, this type of ‘death in a state of grace’\textsuperscript{260} was considered both a responsibility and a sought after ambition for many nineteenth century parents.

Examples of how ‘bad deaths divide’ are exemplified in cautionary tales with devastating outcomes, such as the ‘Story on the Sixth Commandment,’ in which Mr Fairchild takes his children to see a convict hanging on a gibbet. On the site, he tells them how the dead man ‘who first hated and afterward killed his brother’\textsuperscript{261} had succumbed to sinful ways, causing his mother’s madness and eventual confinement.\textsuperscript{262} Condemned to a life of solitude, and no longer able to integrate with mainstream society, her physical isolation runs parallel to her son’s spiritual isolation from heaven following his death.

Sherwood’s literary deaths convey a relationship between the child and God and between earthly and heavenly homes, which can be traced in TSFR and its island setting. Although Sherwood’s unyielding approach to the fire and brimstone assuredness of Calvinist ideology is not replicated, the novel still promotes the idea that whether a death is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is influenced by parental and religious didacticism. However, this good/bad dichotomy works in two moderated ways.

As I will discuss, the narrative focuses more on the idea of ‘good’ death as a means of establishing a coping mechanism for family unity in the face of castaway experience. Secondly, and unlike the strict Calvinist approach, ‘bad deaths’ are dealt with in less stringent terms, as a means of ‘othering’ potential enemies through the subtlety of suggestibility, rather than as a way of identifying and condemning sinners in certain terms. Both approaches to death, in turn, offer insightful ways into further enquiring about how subjective representation is developed.

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid: 59.
Death, the Individual and Subsumption

In the face of death during the storm that renders them castaways, Father Robinson delivers the following speech:

My children, said I to my four boys who clung to me in terrible alarm, God can save us, for nothing is impossible to him; but if he sees fit that we should not be saved, we must not murmur at his decree, but rely that what he does is most for our good; that we shall be near him in heaven, and united through eternity. Death may be well supported when it does not separate those who love.263

As is the case with their survival, the Robinsons are resigned to God’s will in the face of death: these bodies are constructed in both instances as a coherent entity sharing the same fate. In the event of death, it is confirmed that their loving and pious souls would be welcomed in the sanctuary of Heaven, which bears some semblance to Sherwood’s doctrine that ‘Good deaths unite,’ so long as those dying are devout evangelicals. However, this confirmation exists solely in Father Robinson’s narrative voice, as he adopts a position outside the group, which is immediately articulated in the following lines:

I myself began to feel my confidence in Providence increase as I beheld the affecting group. Heaven will surely have pity on them, thought I, and will save their parents to guard their tender years?264

This discursive splitting of the family into pitiful children and surviving parents works towards maintaining the conditions of Enlightenment pedagogy in terms of the knowable body, the homogenisation of experience and the subsumption of individual identities. As is the case with the link between the genesis of these castaway bodies and faith in God and Heaven, this particular encounter with potential death affirms Father Robinson’s direct and omniscient communication with a compassionate God. Both these certainties regarding how the body is affected in life

264 Ibid. 12.
and in death work towards rendering the body a totalisable and determinable entity that then becomes a knowable discursive product.

The narrative here assimilates the one-dimensional way in which the body and the acquisition of knowledge are presented in Enlightenment ideals, without analysing what causes us to know what we know and hence become who we are as a result of this knowledge gained from experience. Locke exemplifies this incumbent omniscience by stating that God is ‘Author and Maker of all things.’ There is thus no need to prove or reflect upon this idea beyond the proof of faith alone. Given that this founding body is seemingly known and trusted, those bodies who love, learn and die in her name, including the Robinsons, are all imagined to be subject to this unquestionable truth based on a perceived discursive continuity between their bodies and scripture. These associations in TSFR are never questioned in death because they are based on a knowable founding body, just as Father Robinson, who is a mediated embodiment of this knowledge, is never questioned. Presenting God’s cycloramic certainty in terms life, death, heaven and earth thus infuses the narrative with a new annexe of religious subjectivity that controls the living castaway body. This is how an image of the eternal posing body is constructed.

Furthermore, faith is represented as a ubiquitous experience in the narrative, affecting all practitioners (‘those who love’) in the same way. This parallels Father Robinson’s views on education, which stem from Locke’s idea that all individuals are born in the form of a ‘blank slate’ and are ready to be homogenously shaped by knowledge and experience. This homogenisation, which characterises Father Robinsons’ didactic approach to education, occurs once again as individuation is subsumed by a family unity that is referential to a collective subconscious. As a result of didactic convention, the affected group is speakable as a single body in a way that calls for the suspension of difference between the subjective values of an omniscient tutor and his subjects. The value of a single life is measured in terms of how it contributes to the successful maintenance of this cohesion. Subsumption is at work yet again, as the individual is caught in the tiered architecture of divine intervention that works towards the preservation of family unity. An individual death would bring an end to the preservation of this image and to that of a tangible God whose intervention is said to make this possible.

This sound unity is also maintained when the idea of an enemy is introduced. TSFR is unique among the novels discussed in this thesis because it develops the idea of an enemy on the ambiguous grounds of potentiality rather than the solid grounds of a physical face-to-face meeting. I will explore how a competing discourse between potentiality and actuality is framed within the idea that these castaways are both physically and subjectively impenetrable.

The Impenetrable Castaways

Aside from the dangers of wild animals and tropical storms, this family of castaways endeavour to be constructive rather than destructive or engage in combative behaviour. Even whilst hunting, Father Robinson ensures that the animals are killed without ‘unmerited a suffering,’ (the question of merited suffering remains ambiguous and will be discussed in due course), making a point of educating his sons on how this can be achieved. This peaceable stance is facilitated by the fact that there are no definitive enemies to contend with during their experience. However, despite this physical absence, Father Robinson alerts his sons to possible threats that warrant the preparation of defence. Whilst teaching archery as a body strengthening exercise, he states:

_It is nothing less than an imitation of the arms used by a valiant nation remarkable for their skill in the chase... every Patagonian is armed with this simple instrument, which they used with singular dexterity. If they desire to kill or wound an enemy, or an animal, they fling one of the ends of this cord at him, and begin instantly to draw it back by the other, which they keep carefully in their hand, to be ready for another throw, if necessary._

Here Father Robinson elides the physical development of children and defence against potential threat and enemies. Thus, violent impulses are displaced away from

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266 This also becomes evident in the chapter titles throughout the text, some of which are as follows: ‘Construction of a bridge’ (Chapter 8), ‘Construction of a ladder’ (chapter 10), ‘The bake house’ (Chapter 20), ‘Useful occupations and labours- Embellishments; a painful but natural sentiment (chapter 24), ‘Spring; - spinning; - salt mine’ (chapter 32).
268 Ibid: 262-263.
Father Robinson and his sons onto the Patagonians. It is notable that the identity of a potential enemy is caught up in the evident slippage between the enemies of the Patagonians and the Patagonians as enemies. Without explicitly stating that they represent a group of threatening bodies that could appear in opposition to the Robinsons, the narrative’s disclosure of their capabilities in matters of conflict suggests that it is a necessary consideration. Furthermore, this uncertainty also naturalises Father Robinson’s awareness of these violent skills as a precautionary measure. He does not explicitly describe the Patagonians as savages who may stand in opposition to them or their faith, thus condoning ‘merited’ violence. Their treatment in the text is not developed through the opposition between ‘wild’ and ‘domesticated peoples’ that dominated ethnographic literature in the eighteenth century. Ter Ellingson for instance succinctly describes this opposition in terms of a ‘discourse of European hegemony, projecting cultural inferiority as an ideological ground for political subordination’ that informed later writers such as H. Rider Haggard.

The issue of oppositional threat is however not clearly disavowed. Identifying these skills as violent becomes increasingly difficult given that this system of defence is caught up in the idea of capturing rather than killing the ‘enemy’ or ‘animal’ – a process, which is described as ‘a singular art.’

[But] if they wish to take an animal alive, and without hurting it, they possess the singular art of throwing it in such a way as to make it run several times round the neck of the prey… the poor animal is at length so entangled, that he can neither advance nor retire, and thus falls prey to the enemy.270

Thus one could argue that this ‘exercise’ can also be seen as honouring and mastering a skill developed by accomplished individuals, adding to the integrity of Father Robinson and his lesson. However, the issue of whether the Patagonians are either admirable or abject bodies remains unresolved. At first, there seems to be a readable difference between ‘enemy’ and ‘animal,’ given their distinction. Despite

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both being subject to the same process of ‘wounding’ and ‘killing’, however, there is the possibility that the ‘enemy’ could indeed be a fellow human.

There is no such disavowal when it comes to detailing how an animal can be captured using such Patagonian methods. Notably, the animal is here transformed into ‘prey’ and its pursuer into ‘the enemy.’ In this context of justifiable hunting and preservation, humans are thus equated as being the ‘enemy’ without any of the aforementioned hesitancy. Constructions of the ‘enemy’ are thus malleable according to an idea of justifiable reasoning, which tends to detour around the idea of human combatants fighting each other.

Seelye argues that enemies are not explicitly represented in TSFR because the novel is a ‘transition narrative’ positioned between the age of exploration and colonialist hegemony, which differentiates it from later castaway texts, like TCI, wherein the castaways ‘are constantly threatened by hostile natives, generally depicted as cannibals.’ The only enemies Seelye identifies on the island are the meddlesome monkeys, whose destructive behaviour causes the Robinsons much distress. Although Seelye’s comparison between the two novels is one that warrants further scrutiny in terms of how TCI is perceived to articulate a more ‘direct’ approach to colonist intentions (as the following chapter will analyse), I do agree that there is a difference.

The enemy is constructed (it is the Patagonians, not the Robinsons who are the aggressors) as an absent presence that might disrupt the pacifist utopia of the island and displaced as a possibility that is both disavowed and maintained. This indecision ties in more generally with the Christian ethos of the text, which is arguably non-combative. The clarity and emphasis that TSFR places on land cultivation and island successes oppose the contentions surrounding the explicit identification of an enemy in a way that accords well with the novel’s historical specificity. The novel’s non-combative stance favours an ordered space and castaway subject that ties in with the eighteenth century’s classificatory system, established during the first wave of Imperialism.

In Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation, Mary Louise Pratt traces the changing ideas of European imperialist expansion represented through travel writing between 1750 and 2007. With the rise of natural history in the

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eighteenth century, the world was projected as a new field of ordered visibility, brought about by the investigative research of European travelling intellectuals.

The eighteenth century classificatory systems created the task of locating every species on the planet, extracting it from its particular, arbitrary surroundings (the chaos), and placing it in its appropriate spot in the system... with its new written, secular European name.\textsuperscript{272}

The initial role of the eighteenth-century natural historian was to attempt to catalogue the world’s data into a ‘secular’ referential system that made ‘European’ sense, and was therefore essentially non-combative. Pratt states that the role of the naturalist was not transformative, in that they would seek to ‘do virtually nothing in or to the world’ other than convert ‘raw nature into the ‘systema naturae.’\textsuperscript{273} Nature historians were essentially compliant with the world through their descriptive accounts and observations of it in the language that they had created, rather than exploitative of it. This shift did eventually occur later on in the century, as travel writing and Natural History became a precursor of colonial and Imperialist conquests and the financial trading that followed (this link is also made by Ellison above). The unknown, having become known and desirable through these writings, rapidly shifted away from being the subject of socio-cultural research and classification to being subject to ‘overtly imperial articulations of conquest, conversion, territorial appropriations and enslavement.’\textsuperscript{274}

Pratt adds that this shift from the casual observer to the conqueror was also represented in what she terms ‘survival literature,’ meaning ‘first-person stories of shipwrecks, castaways, and mutinies.’\textsuperscript{275} Although Pratt’s examples of this type of mainstream literature focus on the themes of sex and violence and do not include an analysis of the castaway novels within this thesis, I do find great merit in her argument when analysing TSFR’s approach to cultivation and the abject ‘other.’

Seelye and Pratt’s understanding of socio-historical transitional narratives and ideas informs my understanding of why the Patagonians are presented as a potential rather than actual threat to the Robinsons. There is an additional thread to this discussion.

\textsuperscript{273}Ibid: 33.
\textsuperscript{274}Ibid: 38.
\textsuperscript{275}Ibid: 84.
that I need to explore, given my earlier analysis, which situates TSFR within the intellectual framework of Enlightenment pedagogy. This discourse of partiality surrounding the idea of the enemy manifests in my readings according to the dynamic of the knowable body and perfectible knowledge already established by God, Father Robinson’s omniscience, their bountiful island living and the impenetrable family in the face of death (the eternal posing body). As I will discuss, these elements of the novel work towards establishing the ultimate physical and subjective state of being that was sought by Enlightenment pedagogues, in which ‘stable subjectivity and perfectible knowledge’ resist any perforation by way of the abject ‘other.’

To understand why these partial enemies cannot be fully realised as abject entities in the novel, I will draw on Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection in *Power of Horror: An Essay on Abjection*. Kristeva frames the systematic conditions through which the ‘abject other’ is constructed:

> The abject has only one quality of the object – that of being opposed to I.\(^{277}\)
> For abjection, when all is said and done, is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies.\(^{278}\)

As discussed in the introduction the abject, according to Kristeva, is marked by elements of contamination, which threaten the body’s sense of unity and self-control. Witnessing a corpse, for instance, could provoke a feeling of revulsion: its lifeless state becomes unfamiliar in life, thus threatening the symbolic order in which the living body seeks to organise themselves. Crime and its perpetrators also exemplify a threat to socio-cultural systems of order via disorder, which instigates a need within society for their expulsion.

The praxis of abjection thus has the potential to manifests diachronically as a regulatory socio-cultural and as such ideological discourse. Anne McClintock, in her analysis of Kristeva’s theory, for instance, argues that ‘abjection traces the silhouette of society on the unsteady edges of the self; it simultaneously imperils social order


\(^{278}\)Ibid: 209.
with the force of delirium and disintegration." These ‘unsteady edges of the self,’ projected through the body and its symptoms of known or presumed fears, enable the dialogue of order and disorder within a society to be articulated. According to this argument, the idea of an enemy becomes readable as an abject force that would necessarily have to be rejected by the body as a means of survival.

This theory of abjection enhances my understanding of why TSFR approaches the subject of the abject ‘other’/enemy as a non-threatening unseen presence. In TSFR, God is a sufficient stand-alone principal authority that manages the castaway bodies without creating a destructive schism between their pre-castaway and castaway subjectivity. Life, death, science, productivity and didacticism are all referential to God’s image; a subjective pattern that organised their pre-castaway existence also. There is a clear sense of the ‘closed field of forces’ regulating these bodies and their subjectivities in a Lacanian sense, which have essentially remained uninterrupted in Father Robinson’s memory following his family’s violent ‘separation’ from their home and civilisation. As C. Butler states, ‘Lacanian analysis lends itself particularly well to texts featuring moments that reorientate characters’ sense of themselves in relationship to the world.’

It is this aspect of reorientation that Kristeva takes further with her theory of abjection, by discussing how this renegotiation functions during instance of potential subjective breakdown. In the case of the Robinsons, this potential is never actualised because the conditions for breakdown are neutralised on two counts.

As discussed their pre-castaway symbolic order materialises on the island as an uninterrupted mediation of their embodied ‘I’ which faces the threat of inarticulation that would render them as abject bodies in an to themselves. There is no ambiguous space between their island and pre-castaway subjectivity that could threaten their symbolic breakdown in this way. Secondly, the Patagonians cannot represent an opposition to this embodied ‘I’ because this ‘I’ is impenetrable. It is an ‘I’ that exists as a clearly defined self that revolves around the implied power of God as the name-of-the-father governing subjectivity. Family unity, pedagogy, their bountiful island and the eternal posing body, which in the event of death will continue to be protected in Heaven, all revolve around God’s omniscience as mediated through

Father Robinson’s narrative voice. Furthermore, according to Kristeva, the abject ‘is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies.’ Given the way the novel constantly reiterates the ‘religious, moral and ideological codes’ of God via Father Robinson’s didacticism, the ‘other side’ hardly ever surfaces to the extent to which the castaways are themselves subsumed as knowable products of these ideals. When it does surface, it is an unthreatening and mediated presence represented through the Patagonians in a non-combative tone.

There is no sufficient reason to consider the Patagonians as a potential threat to the systematic framework of the knowable body because the narrative discourse advocates its self-sufficiency. As a product of this essentialist system in which nothing/no one can exist in opposition to God’s own strength as a rival power, these castaway bodies become impenetrable. This concrete belief in a sovereign Judicator is coupled with an absence of urgency with regards to subjective individuation in life, in death and naming an enemy, which suggests that, as long as God/the name-of-the-father is legible, the castaway body is secured. There are ‘no unsteady edges of the self,’ as it is a secure self/‘I’ that prevents abjection from being fully formed on the island on these grounds.

In identifying this body and its inherent immunity from the abject ‘other,’ I have also identified the type of castaway body that haunts the genre’s criticism from TSFR onwards. Crucially, however, as a body, it can only exist within the remits of Enlightenment pedagogy and its paradoxes, a fact that is often overlooked by the critics who view TSFR as initiating the model of colonial conquests and wish fulfilment that came to define the genre within existing research. Furthermore, I shall discuss how such monophonic interpretations discredit an understanding of TSFR as a precursor to a continuing parallel between epistemological approaches to subjectivity and representations of the castaway child.

**Critics and a Single Subjective Aim**

TSFR is clearly a literary product of Enlightenment pedagogy maintained through a discourse of subjective negotiations between family, death and the abject ‘other.’ Although critics do not offer the same correlative analysis, they do imply a connection in their summative account of the novel as an archetypal narrative of
colonialist ‘wish fulfilment,’ which as a concept complies with Enlightenment pedagogy’s approach to the knowable body(ies) of self and ‘other.’

_The Swiss Family Robinson, presents the family as both the practical and moral foundation of empire. It is the family, working together, that tames the wilderness... It is difficult to imagine a more vigorous endorsement of the family as the most proper and profitable social and political unit._

For Grenby the Robinsons’ castaway experience presents the family as a ‘political unit’ that survives and thrives, which assumes a self-articulatory and straightforward manifestation of an empire-building narrative that requires no further explanation. Additionally, in equating hegemony with empire, Hightower situates her ideas in a Lacanian reading of subjectivity and further argues that Father Robinson’s ‘command’ over the entire island and its inhabitants is ‘codified’ into ‘colonial law.’ This law is said to manifest as his body moves from the status of ‘survivor’ to that of ‘colonist’ and ‘monarch’ of all he ‘surveys,’ representing a recurring theme and process of all the castaway narratives considered within her five hundred year study. Father Robinson’s control over his family and their surroundings is said to represent the way ‘colonial island narratives recodify imperial cultural desires for natural colonization into fantasies of self-discipline governed through the family dynamic.’ This socio-cultural ‘need’ is likened to Freud’s understanding in Totem and Taboo of the normalisation of socio-cultural ‘fears’ and anxieties within the construction of relative institutions such as marriage. With this in mind, Hightower’s perspective of castaway fiction and ‘the subconscious thoughts and drives of generations of writers and readers’ assumes that all literary castaway characters’ subjectivities, from TSFR onwards, are formed.
within the remits of ‘colonial drives’ and the ‘European Imperial self.’\textsuperscript{288} Margery Fisher follows the same line of argument, focusing on the narrative’s ‘open didacticism’ regarding the nurturing of a ‘well-managed colony’\textsuperscript{289} inspired by the ‘spirit of Crusoe.’\textsuperscript{290}

While Grenby, Hightower and Fisher acknowledge the importance of RC to the construction of the castaway child, citing TSFR as an example, I am concerned with the way existing scholarly research utilises this relationship solely in terms of its assumed coloniser bearing on the genre. As I discussed in the introduction, we do not need to look too far to identify the constraints of this critical tendency. Castaway fiction is thus marooned within the Romantic ideals of Enlightenment pedagogy. Colonialist readings fail to move beyond the desire for the knowable body, which, to quote Jacqueline Rose again, defines ‘the cult of childhood’\textsuperscript{291} and stems from an adult need to ‘[fix] the child and then [hold] it into place.’\textsuperscript{292}

The castaway child is as I argue a literary representation of the socio-cultural influences that govern pre-castaway and castaway subjectivity. In the face of changing epistemological approaches to subjectivity by way of science, Darwinism, psychoanalysis and post-war postmodernism, static coloniser projections of castaway fiction, become unfeasible because they fail to take into account the essential lessons of the liminal castaway body that TSFR offers. I must clarify that TSFR’s homogenous approach to subjectivity cannot simply be regarded as denying the representation of child subjectivity altogether. Granted, the above approaches to characterisation do indeed adhere to what Bakhtin refers to as a monologic text in which a single voice with a single message is articulated. Closing the investigation here at this point of didactic ideology would, in the case of studying castaway fiction for or about children, disregard the way TSFR initiates a discourse of the epistemologically dialogical child through this approach to subjectivity and its negotiations. The child is indeed essential when it comes to constructing, representing and articulating Father Robinson’s subjectivity, which although reflects the narrative’s overarching pedagogical ideology, is collectively achieved. It is for this reason that TSFR negotiates Crusoe’s hypertextual theme of a solitary man through

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid: xxiv
\textsuperscript{290} Ibid. 293.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid: 3-4.
the family, as each member plays an inversely active role in strengthening this ideology. As McCallum rightly states in his study on representations of subjectivity in Young Adult fiction, the ‘formation of subjectivity is dialogical’ in that identity is ‘formed in dialogue’293 with others and an engagement with social and cultural ideological codes. Understanding the TSFR’s epistemological approach to subjectivity through a post-structuralist lens provides a better understanding of how these negotiations function within the power dynamic that characterises children’s literature in terms of the adult/child dichotomy and the ‘knowable’ child. Consequently, this investigation clarifies the conditions upon which later approaches can be identified as analogous, evolutionary or transgressive.

Summary

As such, my summation of TSF and its pedagogical (epistemological) approach to the castaway child, mediated through themes of family, death and the praxis of ‘othering’ offers an understanding of castaway subjectivity as inherently epistemological. This interpretation is a departure from existing research that focuses on the way the novel advocates a colonial ethos, inspired by Defoe’s classic, that later castaway fiction is modelled on. Without denying its connection to socio-cultural concerns surrounding empire, my methodology aims to move beyond these limits by highlighting how such a prescriptive approach to subjectivity does not equate to this liminal principle evoked when representing the castaway child. The texts focused on in this thesis are cultural products that generate a non-static socio-cultural dialogue of changing epistemological ideas regarding the self and the ‘other.’ The liminally subjective castaway cannot by its very nature be limited to a reading of the name-of-the-father as a continuous representation of the same synchronic socio-cultural influences, as Hightower and the above critics assume. As Karren Coats argues in her Lacanian approach to Young Adult novels, ‘the substantive conditions of subjectivity are time bound and culture-specific, rather than atemporal and universal.’294

As TCI will now serve to illustrate, the grounds of the knowable body are set to change. With the onset of an abject ‘other’ that actually rather than potentially

threatens the castaway body, the certainty of self and ‘other’ in terms of God is simultaneously called into question. It is questioned on the level of omniscience and that of earthly and eternal protection. A certainty that TSFR as a founding model of negotiating a ‘healthy’ relationship between the castaway body, family, death and the abject ‘other’, relies. TCI advocates that God as a standalone principal authority is not enough to manage these ideas. This sees religious doctrine being supplemented by scientific observations, changes in the representation of family, island living and the praxis of ‘othering’ along with an alternative approach to castaway subjectivity as the narrative voice passes over to the child protagonist.
Chapter Two
The Coral Island and Scientific Rationalism: Introducing the Fragmented Self
and Other

Introduction

Robert Michael Ballantyne is credited as one of the most influential authors of adventure fiction for children of the nineteenth century, placed alongside Frederick Marryat (1792-1848), G.A. Henty and W.H.G. Kingston (1814-1880), whose novels featured heroic male protagonists taking on the excitement and challenges of living in distant parts of the world. Ballantyne's stories resonated with a young British audience, predominantly upper-middle-class boys, to such an extent that a national fundraiser was organised by Harrow school students upon his death ‘to immortalise the novelist via a statue.’ Their school-life had no doubt been livened by these stories of island adventures, exploration and heroism in an age that was fascinated with discovery and colonial conquests. Ballantyne’s seven-year career working for the Hudson’s Bay Company in Canada provided the young Scottish author with ample inspiration for novels such as *The Young Fur Traders* (1856), *The Coral Island* (1858) and *The Gorilla Hunters* (1861). His time was spent occupying various posts trading goods with native Indians and exploring Canada's vast and diverse landscape during fishing and hunting expeditions. According to Eric Quale's biography, the budding author was also enthralled by the stories of explorers such as Thomas Simpson, who visited his Red River post.

Ballantyne's novels tapped into a growing juvenile readership, which developed according to changes in education and industrialisation. Literacy rates rose due to increasing state intervention in education, with the first parliamentary grant being offered in 1833 to subsidise Church of England Sunday Schools for the poor. This state interest continued to be reflected in the 1839 appointment of school inspectors and the development of teacher training colleges in 1846, all leading

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296 Ibid. 42.
towards the 1870 Elementary Education Act that made school attendance compulsory. Furthermore, this growing readership was also reflected in the 1850 Public Libraries Act that allowed boroughs to establish their own free libraries, offering wider access to literature and informative materials while partaking in a local culture of learning. Literature had at this point become both more affordable and accessible through the steam press and high-speed railways, which distributed books, newspapers and magazines.²⁹⁷

Running alongside these developments, was the growing production and consumption of juvenile periodicals. TCI coincided with the second wave of this nineteenth-century phenomenon, occupying a threshold between the Religious Tract Society’s didactic moralism with contributions from the likes of Mary Martha Sherwood, and the more secular tones of Empire, Muscular Christianity and science exemplified by The Boy’s Own Magazine. Here, entertaining stories were combined with articles on natural history, science, travel and geography.

The relationship between muscular Christianity and the boy reader developed in the mid-nineteenth century via Charles Kingsley’s Westward Ho! (1855) and Thomas Hughes’ Tom Brown’s Schooldays (1857). Early nineteenth-century juvenile periodicals, such as Evangelical Miscellany (1805-1826), with their religiously didactic content, had largely given way by the mid-century to stories about ‘patriotism and the public school code, which embraced manliness, honesty, sportsmanship, loyalty and chivalry.’²⁹⁸ A cohort of young male adventurers and schoolboys emerged within literary magazines and novels, focused on redefining masculinity and entertaining their young readers. As William Winn states, Kingsley introduced the literary figure of the boy ‘hero who always fought victoriously' while spreading ‘the doctrines of the English Church.’²⁹⁹ Hughes depicted this battle and prayer mentality within the school, advocating that ‘Christians were under the obligation to fight with their bodies, minds and spirits against whatever was false.’³⁰⁰ Emphasising sports, physical fitness and teamwork, the idea in Tom Brown’s Schooldays was that this muscular Christianity could be taught in an Arnoldian-style Rugby school, and would later serve Tom and his friends on the battlefield when need be. This male dominance,

²⁹⁸ Ibid. 16.
³⁰⁰ Ibid. 69.
empowered through Christian discourse, began to naturalise the right to rule in a colonial sense, thus moving away from androgynous \(^{301}\) depictions of religious devotees within children's literature: such as the castaways in *The Swiss Family Robinson* and Maria Edgeworth’s child characters developed within a strict code of didactic moralism.

Although TCI does, to some degree, register these ideologies in its focus on a young British castaway adventurer called Ralph Rover, it does so at a remove. As I will discuss, its contextual framing is not solely sustained through religious doctrine, as is the case with TSFR. Nor is it solely sustained through an idea of imperial strength and superiority, which includes, as Daphne Kutzer argues, ‘the advocacy and glorification of military force to both expand and maintain the Empire’ and the apparent ‘promotion of White Europeans’ over ‘darker skinned non-Europeans’. \(^{302}\)

Furthermore, the text’s contextual framing moves beyond an idea of muscular Christianity towards the inclusion of other dominant discourses of the mid-nineteenth century, beginning with the increasing prevalence of scientific inquiry. By the time TCI was published, the sciences had entered a period of significant proliferation in terms of education, research and literature. As Cannon Schmitt states, such prominence was evident in changing school and university curricula and the development of specialist organisations. He lists the following institutions and societies as examples: The Astronomical Society (1820); The British Association for the Advancement of Science (1831); The Entomological Society (1833); and The Royal School of Chemistry (1845). \(^{303}\) ‘In short, nineteenth-century readers found science constantly before them.’ \(^{304}\) Diana Dixon describes this changing attitude towards science and education from the early to mid-nineteenth century as one that developed through the pages of children’s magazines such as the *Boy’s Own Magazine* (1855-1874). Early articles that focussed just on natural history were supplemented with pieces about Physics, Chemistry and how to conduct experiments at home. Educational boards took a keen interest in promoting science in schools, with reports such as the Clarendon Report (1864) making recommendations for

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\(^{304}\) Ibid. 462.
further study in these fields signalling a more diverse approach to pedagogy compared to the earlier insistence on a morally didactic education. Furthermore, due to rapid industrial development, Britain’s present and future economy depended on the acquisition of technological knowledge amongst its workforce. As Laura Otis states, the existing curricula had to change so as to better prepare ‘the new professional classes for modern life.’

These epistemological advancements also had a bearing on questions of selfhood and its origins, which became topics of secularised discourse that shifted anxiously away from the incalculable deductions of religious determinism. As Otis suggests, the question of ‘what it meant to be human’ was being re-investigated:

_The rapid development of industrialisation, physiology, evolutionary theory and the mental and social sciences challenged the traditional view of people as uniquely privileged beings created in the divine image. While religion remained a powerful social and ideological force, it became increasingly difficult for educated writers to refer to a ‘soul.’ Too many other fields offered alternative explanations of human behaviour, from muscle reflexes to inherited memories._

TCI conveys the momentum of these shifts in socio-cultural attitudes to the self and ‘other’ by aligning Ralph's narrative voice with a tangible mechanism of proof and causation through scientific observation. The text invests in an idea of scientific credibility — whether related to discoveries or analytical observations about castaway experience and the natives whom Ralph encounters while a castaway – which is given more credence than religious determinism. This need for proof signifies a shift away from Enlightenment pedagogy’s assumptions concerning the acquisition of knowledge, divine omniscience and the knowable body, towards questioning how we know what we know. As Kutzer states, Ballantyne ‘was influenced by Victorian theories on race and evolution, ideas that were in the air even

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307 Ibid. xxvi.
before the publication of Darwin's *The Origin of Species*\textsuperscript{308} the following year. As I will discuss, Ralph’s pre-castaway and castaway existence is causally linked to heredity and scientific discourse as well as God, rather than religion alone. Where TSFR relied solely on religious doctrine as a utilitarian method of defining the castaway body and annihilating threats of the ‘other’ in both life and death, TCI, with its epistemic approach to origins and identity, seems to shift anxiously away from religious determinism.

This chapter will examine how Ralph’s narrative subjectivity is shaped by multiple epistemological influences, which renders any defining focus untenable. Furthermore, as I will argue, this shift away from the monolithic forces governing castaway subjectivity in TSFR by way of religious discourse and didacticism, initiates the fragmented castaway body and its relationship to the ‘other’, which continues to develop in the remaining texts within this trajectory. What my analysis will show is that this epistemological shift towards the dissonant ‘I’ of castaway subjectivity, begins to destabilise Enlightenment pedagogy's knowable child subjectivity advocated by Rousseau and Wyss. These changes are related to an experimental approach to narrative voice, the questionable supremacy of family, a disturbance of the utopic island ideology, the distinctive rather than potential threat of enemies, and convoluted distinctions between the self and ‘other’ developed via an insistence on proof rather than faith in God. Furthermore, I will also challenge existing scholarly research that suggests TCI is a quintessential colonial novel by discussing how these uncertainties muddy the distinction between the knowable body and abject ‘other’ on which colonial readings are founded.

**An Innate Ruling Passion Supplementing Divine Power and Experimental Techniques in Narration**

R.M. Ballantyne’s TCI tells the story of three boys named Ralph Rover (15), Peterkin Gay (14) and Jack Martin (18): these characters are established through Ralph narrating his younger self and his early disposition toward travelling as an older

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man. Ralph’s innate ‘ruling passion’ for adventure leads him to the coasting trade, until aged 15, with his parents' consent, he sets sail on a ship called the ‘Arrow’, voyaging to the islands of the South Pacific. While on the ship, he meets Peterkin and Jack, and the three become ‘the best and staunchest friends that ever tossed together on the stormy waves.’ Stories are exchanged regarding the inhabitants of the coral islands, and things seem to be going well until the ship is caught up in a storm. On the sixth day of their voyage, the three boys are cast overboard by a violent wind, and with some difficulty land safely on the coral island, while the remainder of the crew are unaccounted for. The first half of the text tells the story of their island living, bountiful in both pleasures and domestic occupation, which is then disrupted by the unexpected landing of two enemy tribes. Forced to choose sides, these castaways engage in battle and assist in the killing of one chief. Sensational scenes of cannibalism and bloody violence ensue. Not long after the favoured tribe leave, their island living falls prey to a second disruption by way of British pirates who eventually kidnap Ralph forcing him to join them in their illegal trade with natives on neighbouring islands. The three boys are eventually reunited following Ralph's escape and join forces to save a young Polynesian woman called Avatea who is due to be killed for wanting to convert to Christianity. After the failure of their initial plan, the opposing chief Tararo captures and imprisons them on his island, yet the subsequent Christian conversion of his tribe brought into effect by a local missionary, sees the boys succeed in ‘freeing' Avatea.

TCI is told in the first person, and Ralph is not only given a voice but is also given space for unsupervised roving. Ralph's innate 'ruling passion' and independence galvanise his body and spirit into action, as we are told on the very first page, which introduces us to the narrator and his relationship with his family:

Roving has always been, and still is, my ruling passion, the joy of my heart, the very sunshine of my existence. In childhood, in boyhood, and in man's estate, I have been a rover... At any rate, we knew that, as far back as our family could be traced, it had been intimately connected with the great watery waste. Indeed, this was the case on both sides of the house...Thus it was, I suppose, that I

[310] Ibid. 9.
came to inherit a roving disposition... It was not long after this that I began to show the roving spirit that dwelt within me.\textsuperscript{311}

Father Robinson’s omniscience develops as a \textit{scriptio continua} narrative between, God, didacticism, and family values, whereas TCI breaks with this model of Enlightenment pedagogy by focalising a young boy and his adventures. It employs a child protagonist whose narrative voice is governed first and foremost by his innate ‘passion’ for voyaging, and a ‘wish’ to be ‘landed’\textsuperscript{312} on one of the coral islands, he has learnt about in stories. His passion to explore these remote lands requires an embodied experience to be fully articulated and knowable: thereby establishing Ralph's character as the necessary linchpin. As John Townsend states, this change in narrative voice was considered ‘a sophisticated technique for the day and for boy’s writing.’\textsuperscript{313} Eric Quale elaborates by acknowledging its function of allowing the author to stand ‘back from the character to derive the full benefit of the part he sets him to play, not merely using him as commentator of events.’\textsuperscript{314} This innovative means of storytelling resonated so well with juvenile readers because they were able ‘to identify themselves with the heroes of the tale,’\textsuperscript{315} without ‘the curbing hands and interfering restrictions of dreary chaperones’\textsuperscript{316} that permeated earlier novels. The absence of these ‘chaperones' does, however, warrant further scrutiny.

Barbara Wall identifies Ballantyne’s narrative technique as the predominant reason behind TCI’s (along with other adventure fiction like Robert Louis Stevenson’s \textit{Treasure Island} (1883) continued popularity amongst contemporary readers. Wall’s informative account of the changing patterns of narrative voice in children's literature throughout the nineteenth century (and beyond) notes an emerging trend in the second half of the century when authors such as Ballantyne began to experiment with different modes of address to appear more child centred. Arguing along the lines of Townsend and Quale, Wall suggests that these experiments were aimed at ‘[eliminating]’ ‘the moralising which had plagued, and continued to plague, adventure stories.’\textsuperscript{317} Ballantyne is argued to have aided this search for what

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{311} Ibid. 1.
\item\textsuperscript{312} Ibid.10.
\item\textsuperscript{315} Ibid. 124.
\item\textsuperscript{316} Ibid. ii.
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Wall terms single address, in his use of a child first-person narrator who was ‘friendlier, kindlier and more individual’ than his didactic counterparts. However, I agree with Wall that this tension was not entirely overcome. Maria Nikolajeva succinctly summarises this tension as the ‘asymmetrical power position’ that exists between ‘two unequal subjectivities, an adult author and a child character’ that often defines children’s literature. Wall herself notes that Ballantyne’s narrative approach in TCI straddles this power divide since the narrator is Ralph’s adult self, who exists ‘only to tell the story’ of his childhood adventures in a play on distance that essentially maintains ‘a comfortable adult perspective.’ In this balancing act, Ballantyne utilises the position of a retrospective narrator, whose reliability is thus implied as less questionable and naïve than that of a child narrator.

Gerard Genette’s typological approach to narrative theory can help to clarify this negotiation. Firstly, Genette distinguishes between two questions related to ‘who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?’ and ‘who is the narrator’ or who ‘sees?’ As Nikolajeva states, Genette’s questions are particularly useful when discussing the ‘asymmetrical power position’ she identifies above. In the case of TCI, there is no clear distinction between these two roles, as the narrator is extradiegetic (external to the action as an adult), and simultaneously homodiegetic (present in the story he tells as a child). This extradiegetic-homodiegetic approach is according to Nikolajeva often used in children’s literature where an adult narrator tells the story of him/herself retrospectively as a child. Having identified this spatial and cognitive gap in TCI, one can better understand its attempted mediation in the way the story is focalized through Ralph as a young castaway.

This act of focalization then partially relinquishes adult control over the adult/child dichotomy advocated by Enlightenment pedagogy and exemplified in TSFR but does so illusively. This is an important distinction that alludes to the

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318 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid. 229
complex power struggle that the text maintains yet attempts to avoid in terms of narrative voice. Indeed as the remaining texts in this thesis will serve to illustrate, this attempt continues to be explored through various narrative techniques that work towards a gradual destabilisation of the knowable child castaway, which in turn reflect changing epistemological approaches to subjectivity.

Ralph’s relationship with his parents also exemplifies how his focalisation acts as a means of evading these tensions. Existing critics identify Ralph’s largely absent parents as a plot device aimed at developing Ralph into an independent colonial adventurer. Such readings, as I will argue, negate a more nuanced reading that reflects changing epistemological approaches to family relations, the self and ‘other’ prevalent at the time of publication. Before explaining this view further, I will outline why critics privilege colonial readings when noting this shift from an explicit didactic presence of parental authority.

Rebecca Weaver-Hightower argues that the novel is a tale of ‘seamlessly maintained discipline and order’, showing how the ‘law of the father endures on the island even when the "father" is absent', since ‘the three young men maintain the discipline of good imperialists without direct coercion from parental figures.’

Hightower interprets the name-of-the-father governing Ralph’s castaway subjectivity in a Lacanian sense: as a fixed imperialist discourse. That which is in play here is an essentialist reading of subjectivity.

Diana Loxley takes a similar stance when assessing Ralph’s relationship to his parents. Loxley reasons that the ‘gradual dropping of the conspicuous narrative voice’ of ‘earlier books’ that ‘revealed itself as so explicitly didactic and oppressive’ (specifically citing TSFR) means that ‘adult intention’ becomes ‘more absorbed into the story.’ Ralph’s absent/present parents are thus representative of a more covert approach to conveying adult desires: which in the case of TCI is focused on telling the nineteenth century’s ‘differential story of a European identity’, ‘fixed in essential humanity’ by way of colonial intentions.

What both Hightower and Loxley achieve, by codifying Ralph’s absent present parents in terms of a determinable colonial discourse, is a rehearsal of

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330 Ibid. 125.
Enlightenment pedagogy’s adult/child dichotomy that anchors subjectivity within the unchanging language of the knowable child body. Both critics also suggest that this trope was initiated in children’s literature by TSFR. This argument is reminiscent of what Jacqueline Rose terms as the paradox of children’s literature, which features an unrelenting desire to ‘[fix] the child and then [hold] it into place’, formulating ‘the cult of childhood’ which stems from Locke and Rousseau's pedagogical theories. Furthermore, both Loxley and Hightower's colonial interpretations rely on the idea that the essentialist knowable body of Enlightenment pedagogy is constructed and made accessible in TCI. This ‘essential humanity' goes against my reading of the name-of-the-father as a constantly evolving epistemological narrative that explains changing approaches to and representations of castaway subjectivity. As I will clarify, Ralph’s narrative voice is instead governed by dispersed subjective influences out of which a fragmented rather than fixed subject emerges.

Negotiating Ralph’s subjectivity within a strict colonial ideology defies the ‘the substantive conditions of subjectivity’ that ‘are time bound and culture-specific, rather than atemporal and universal.’ The alterable nature of this language, subject to extrinsic epistemological approaches to identity, chimes well with the way that Ralph’s pre and castaway subjectivity manifests through partial, rather than dominant influences. His ‘ruling passion,’ an emphasis on lineage rather than explicit didacticism and God’s questionable authority relate to mid-nineteenth century epistemological ideas on religion, scientific rationalism and hereditary discourse.

With this in mind, I offer an alternative reading of Ralph's family relations and their function that does not negate colonial interpretations entirely, but rather aims to suggest alternative influences. The influence and power that Ralph's parents have over their son are equivocally bound up in an abstract idea of inheritance as opposed to any tangible teachings, which in turn, provides Ralph with a paradoxical freedom to ‘roam.’ Ralph's impending future appears to be inescapable, bound up within a framework of inheritance and continuity. This idea is structured within ‘both sides of the house’ in a way that invalidates the possibility of any alternative while condoning all future adventures through the idea of family convention. Positioned within his very bloodline, this innate passion is set as the very precursor of his current and future

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332 Ibid. 43.
castaway body, which correlates chronologically with the emerging scientific
discourse of biology as the basis for human behaviour. Gregory Mendel (1822-1884),
influenced by the French naturalist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck, had by this time
pioneered the study of genetics via his research into the patterns of trait inheritance
within botany, discussing how dominant, recessive characteristics of plant structures
filtered down from parent to offspring. As Kutzer observes, TCI is preoccupied with
biological inheritance rather than didactic supervision and registers the mid-
nineteenth century emergence of alternative ideas of selfhood, based on scientific
rationality.\textsuperscript{334}

It is not that religion and God have no role to play in how Ralph’s experience
is told, nor that they do not shape his castaway subjectivity and events that unfold; but
rather, they are proportioned to this idea of lineage, inheritance and passion: unlike in
TSFR, in which it is the institution through which all other bodies and experiences
manifest. For instance, on the day of Ralph’s departure, his mother gives him a Bible,
making him promise to ‘never forget to read a chapter everyday.’\textsuperscript{335} During the storm,
when Ralph fears for his life, he recalls his mother’s final plea:

‘Ralph, my dearest child, always remember in the hour of danger to
look to your Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. He alone is both able
and willing to save your body and soul.’\textsuperscript{336}

With this idea of a workable faith in progress, strengthened by Ralph
surviving the storm and shipwreck, the relationship between survival and the grace of
God, which permeates TSFR, continues. However, two crucial differences exist in the
clarity of its articulation. Firstly, this relationship between God and the survival of the
castaway child is muddied by Ralph’s declaration prior to the shipwreck. We are told
that becoming a castaway is a longed for ambition.

\textit{And often did we three long to be landed on one, imagining that we
should certainly find perfect happiness there! Our wish was granted
sooner than we expected.}\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{334} Kutzer, M. \textit{Daphne. Empire’s Children: Empire and Imperialism in Classic British Children’s Books}. New York: Garland
\textsuperscript{336} Ibid. 11.
Deciphering what and who is in control of these castaway bodies is uncertain due to competing ideas of agency. Coupling this wishful thinking with the fact that Ralph’s character is galvanised by an innate ‘roving’ passion, the authority of God over the construction and maintenance of his castaway subjectivity is problematic. Secondly, unlike the Robinson castaways, who while insistent in their prayers, reiterate Locke’s premise regarding God as ‘Author and Maker of all things’\textsuperscript{338}, Ralph and his fellow castaways, often neglect to acknowledge this connection. As Ralph admits during his first day of exploration, when witnessing the coral island’s beauty, ‘I am ashamed to say, I very seldom thought of my Creator, although I was continuously surrounded by the most beautiful and wonderful of His works.’\textsuperscript{339} God in TCI is a distant memory of the narrator, with a presence that is dependant on the condition of Ralph’s memory, highlighting once again that this story is being told retrospectively. The adult Ralph states he will enact his duty as storyteller ‘in as far as’ his ‘memory serves’\textsuperscript{340} him, which suddenly renders his narrative credibility and faith subject to uncertainty, and akin to a cognitive rather than spiritual capacity.

No such complexity or tension is raised by father Robinson’s faith: he is clearly moulded in the image of God, whose agency and memory is without question. Ralph’s faith in God instead resembles David Hume’s post-Lockean understanding of the relationship between religion and subjectivity, as a negotiation between patterns of knowledge and memory set out in his \textit{Treatise of Human Nature} (1740).

Unsatisfied with his predecessors’ approach to understanding knowledge acquisition, Hume refers to Locke’s Empirical approach to associative learning, in a footnote, placing him amongst the philosophers ‘who have pretended to explain the secret force and energy of causes.’

\textit{None of them have any solidity or evidence, and that the supposition of an efficacy in any of the known qualities of matter is entirely without foundation. ... But the principle of innate ideas being allow’d to be false, it follows, that the supposition of a deity can serve us in no stead, in accounting for that idea of agency, which we search for in vain in all the objects, which are presented}

\textsuperscript{337}Ibid. 10.
\textsuperscript{340}Ibid. 21.
to our senses, or which we are internally conscious of in our own minds.\textsuperscript{341}

This post-Lockean shift in understanding the self regarding the mental processes of human consciousness draws on a scientific orthodoxy that questions how we know what we know, while simultaneously revisiting the relationship between God and human agency set up by his philosophical predecessors. Mental faculties are divided into the two associative forces of memory and imagination, which Hume states enable the mind to form patterns of referential knowledge. These patterns are thought to emerge via impressions (sensations, passions and emotions) and ideas (faint images of sensations, passions and emotions formed as thoughts). Over time, they are said to become habitual and customary as this patterned process of connections formulate into expectations and predictions, which is how experience is managed and perceived.

Hume's approach may appear similar to Locke's association of ideas given that it is in part a reactionary response to the pre-existing Cartesian hypotheses on the subject; however, there are two distinct differences. First, the body is framed within a different set of criteria based on a more scientific approach to patterns of behaviour. Hume identifies an interactive resonance between the conscious mind and experience that calls for an analysis of the psychological connections involved, beyond the idea of the mind as ‘tabula rasa.’ The mind is not assumed as being a homogenous entity that responds to experience in a universal way, but rather it is the pattern of experience itself that is subject to homogenization. This argument also allows for the idea of cultural diversity and that individuals will have varied experiences.

Furthermore, unlike Locke’s approach to religion, the idea of faith and religious practice is inevitably considered to be a product of such habitual patterns and behaviour. The evidence of God’s existence and agency as the architect of subjectivity (‘maker of all things\textsuperscript{342}’) is not assumed to be an unquestioned certainty. Hume’s dissatisfaction with Cartesian and Lockean theories is based on the concern that the proof provided by both is debatable, lacking, as he suggests, ‘solidity or evidence’ because ‘somewhere in the proof they assume the very claim they are trying to establish.’\textsuperscript{343}

Thus, the implication that arises is that God and science face a separation of powers or at least that this relationship is inversely structured. There is no practical measure of God’s omniscience and agency over the human body beyond this scientific measure of associative thought patterns and habitual reasoning. Hume’s mechanistic approach to these connections thus provided an idea of why one believes in God in a way that moved beyond the abstract view that one is simply born to believe.

It is not the objective of this thesis to debate the merits of these schools of thought. However, it is necessary to consider how this growing preoccupation with establishing evidence, cause and agency, would increasingly be used to explicate human behaviour, and how these ideas were reflected in changing approaches to castaway subjectivity, family, ‘othering’ and justifiable killings within these fictions.

Through Ralph’s introduction and his initial castaway experience, it becomes clear that his ‘roving passion’ is the predominant influence governing his pre and castaway subjectivity, while God and family relations are influential to a lesser degree. Ralph’s survival can be attributed to both wishful thinking and God’s will, though as part of his history and ‘bloodline’, his parents are influential too, assuming an automated pattern of trait inheritance as opposed to overt didacticism. Ralph is thus introduced as a character whose subjectivity is represented through dispersed influences signifying the onset of the fragmented child castaway (governed by multiple agents of power) within this trajectory of castaway fiction. The name-of-the-father governing his pre-castaway subjectivity is not bound up in a single source from which the image of the castaway body runs parallel. Although not yet discordant with each other (an idea developed in the following three novels), TCI does begin to insinuate this as a possibility.

Ralph’s dispersed subjective ‘I’ carries on throughout the text which is particularly evident in the way the narrative goes to great lengths to develop his scientific skills of observation and utilise them as a means through which he identifies the abject ‘other.’ However, the effect of investing Ralphs’ subjectivity with various influences, which are powerful in questionable degrees, and to a certain extent independent of each other, renders the identification of these ‘abject’ bodies as

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fragmented and questionable in turn. It is for this reason that clear-sighted colonialist readings become untenable.

**Casting the ‘Other’ In the Name of God and Scientific Reasoning and Amidst Its Tensions**

_They told me of thousands of beautiful fertile islands that had been formed by a small creature called the coral insect, where summer reigned nearly all year round... Where, strange to say, men were wild, bloodthirsty savages, excepting in those favoured Isles to which the gospel of our Saviour had been conveyed. These exciting accounts had so great an effect upon my mind, that, when I reached the age of fifteen, I resolved to make a voyage to the South Seas._

Here, during Ralph's first voyage before becoming 'cast away', he excitedly conveys his fascination with the sailors' stories regarding the Coral Islands of the southern seas. Although not identified as enemies from the outset, two distinct types of inhabitants are established early on in the novel: those who have been saved by Christian missionaries, and those who have not. In the event of Ralph encountering such inhabitants, religious conviction can be relied upon to distinguish between allies who are 'favoured' converts and those 'wild, bloodthirsty savages', who are not 'favoured.' In light of this, religious discourse can be interpreted as playing a similar role to that in TSFR, where practised faith produces a stable subjectivity predicated on identification with an external being – God, the father, i.e. the law of the father.

Despite the implication that Christianity is the primary source through which the abject ‘other’ can be distinguished, the narrative spends little time developing its doctrines as stable principles governing Ralph’s castaway subjectivity. Religious affiliations are uncertain as Ralph readily admits that while a castaway, he ‘rarely thinks of his Creator.’

A series of revelations about these abject bodies are instead legitimated predominantly through his keen knowledge of science and observational skills, reflecting the Christian/scientific influences governing his pre-castaway

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346 Ibid. 20.
subjectivity. The following examples provide an insight into how Ralph’s omniscience is established through his skills as a scientific observer, which play a significant role in how the abject ‘other’ is later identified.

Following the shipwreck, Jack proves extremely capable in the practice of island survival having ‘read a great deal about the South Sea Islands.’ Ralph states early on that Jack too ‘has been a reader of books of travel and adventure’ all his life. His ‘good education’, coupled with being ‘lion-like’ in his actions, inspires respect and admiration in his fellow castaways; and provides them with the guidance they need to become organised bodies who will continue to survive. All his knowledge and talents are attributed to him alone, rather than the bestowed blessings of any external deity. As Claudia Nelson posits in her study on the changing patterns of Victorian boys’ fiction, TCI ‘engages in secular didacticism, especially in urging the merits of fact-laden books.’

The importance of such epistemic knowledge materialises further after the castaways narrowly escape a shark attack during one of their daily expeditions around the island: which leads to them opting for a safer way to observe and explore marine life in a secluded cavern: the ‘Water Garden.’ Here, they ‘began to get an insight into the manners and customs of its inhabitants, and to make discoveries of wonderful things,’ ‘the like of which’ they had ‘never before conceived.’ Spurred on by their scientific inquiries, they become engrossed in recording tidal activity:

*The tide rose and fell with constant regularity, instead of being affected by the changes of the moon as in our own country, and as it is in most other parts of the world... Every day and every night, at twelve o’clock precisely, the tide is at the full; and at six o’clock, every morning and evening, it is ebb. I can speak with much confidence on this singular circumstance, as we took particular note of it, and never found it to alter.*

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348 Ibid. 23.
349 Ibid. 9.
352 Ibid. 98-99.
This instance works schematically towards establishing Ralph as a reliable source of epistemic knowledge in various ways and capable of commanding his island space. Ralph is fashioned as a knowledgeable observer of natural phenomena through his use of discursive terminology. His knowledge moves beyond the realms of his ‘own country’, as it includes an awareness of ‘most other parts of the world’ thus nurturing an all-encompassing perspective and intimacy with worldly associations. A sense of faithfulness to factual truth materialises via scientific research derived from accurate observations. There is ‘much confidence’ in their research on the tide because a strict timetable is kept and demonstrable proof is recorded via ‘particular’ note taking.

These secular actions chime well with the investigative research of European travelling intellectuals: developing scientific classificatory systems in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries aimed at ordering the natural world according to referential type and species. Linnaeus’ *System of Nature* (1735), which developed a classificatory system of the world's animals and plants, and Theodor Schwann's cell theory (1839), which promoted the scientific inquiry of plants as living organisms, are two influential examples. Embodying the scientific advancements of the Western world, an exchange between knowledge and power is already at work in terms of the way Ralph makes sense of his island living. The island as such is, for the time being, brought under control through his powers of observation and scientific knowledge in a way that parallels Ralph’s pre-castaway subjective influences. This parallel between pre-castaway subjectivity and the castaways’ relationship with the island, which is also apparent in TSFR, further advocates the liminal condition of castaway experience.

Ralph declares his sympathies for those whose ‘want of observation’ prevents them from engaging with their surroundings, which he equates with a ‘very common infirmity of human nature.’ Setting himself apart from such disregard, he informs us:

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353 In "Recasting Crusoe: Frederick Marryat, R.M. Ballantyne and the Nineteenth-Century Robinsonade." *Children's Literature Association Quarterly* 13.4 (1988): 169-75. Web. Susan Naramore Maher argues that the castaway’s timetabled habitation on the island signifies a ‘daily regimen that helps preserve their identity as English boys.’ However, something is left unsaid within this idea of ‘Englishness’, which does not specifically address how such timetables work towards certifying Ralph’s omniscience on epistemological grounds, representing the liminal nature of the castaway body and its changing subjective patterns within the genre.

I have now for a long time adopted the habit of forcing my attention upon all things that go on around me, and of taking some degree of interest in them, whether I feel it naturally or not. Nothing escapes his notice or interest, be it volitional or forced. ‘All’ being italicised in such a way emphasises the extent of his observational capabilities, privileging Ralph's narrative voice with a masterful insight into the world and, presumably, its inhabitants. Whereas Father Robinson's castaway subjectivity is dominated by the written word of the Bible, both Jack and Ralph are established as rational subjects of scientific discourse as the narrative identifies the grounds on which the abject ‘other’ is identified for the first time. However, the issue of retrospective narration and the accuracy of what it conveys is in question. The above quote is attributed to the older narrator (Ralph’s adult self) who has developed these heightened skills over time. The extent to which the young protagonist also possesses these skills is thus overshadowed by this chronology of development and acquisition. This narrative discrepancy contributes to the overarching ambiguity regarding what the novel advocates, which is heightened through the castaways’ encounters with the ‘other.’

The First Encounter

We now observed that the foremost canoe was being chased by the other, and that it contained a few women and children as well as men - perhaps forty souls altogether; while the other canoe, which pursued it contained only men. They seemed to be about the same in number, but were better armed, and had the appearance of being a war-party.

During a daily trip around Coral Island, Ralph catches sight of two canoes racing towards the shore. This sighting marks Ralph, Jack and Peterkin's first human encounter since the shipwreck. There is a sense of anticipation regarding the intentions of the two groups of natives, due to the description the sailors gave earlier in their stories about the two categories of men inhabiting the South Sea Islands. They

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356 Ibid. 137.
are presumed to be either redeemable or irredeemable savages, depending on their religious affiliations.

However, on sight alone, it is not possible to determine the religious affiliations of these two tribes. Within this space of narrative uncertainty, a solution is implied; having already developed Ralph as a scientific observer, his observations take on a hue of credible fact. First, Ralph notes a combative urgency between the two groups: one is being ‘chased’ by the ‘other’, which is ‘better armed’ and has ‘the appearance of a war – party.’ Unequal measures of power are introduced, which leads to the second distinction: namely, that the crew of ‘souls’ are being pursued and victimised by mere ‘men.’ In both cases, these distinctions are underpinned by the same fragmented approach to identity governing Ralph’s subjectivity. Rather than being clearly defined as non-enemies, the men with ‘souls’ manifest as potential allies, given their apparent spiritual status. Through this potential, their adversaries paradoxically manifest as bodies lacking a soul that can be saved, while the complexity of these relationships pays tribute to Ralph’s observational skills.

The distinction between the fellow human group and the abject ‘other’ group continues to resonate in the commentary on the fight between the two tribes. Although Ralph describes both parties as ‘incarnate fiends’ who ‘looked more like demons than human beings’357, the chief of the ‘war-party’ is stripped entirely of any redeemable sense of humanity on both religious and scientific grounds:

He was tattooed from head to foot, and his face, besides being tattooed, was besmeared with red paint, and streaked with white. Altogether, with his yellow turban – like hair, his Herculean black frame, his glittering eyes, and white teeth, he seemed the most terrible monster I ever beheld.358

The chief is comparable to an infernal beast that opposes the Christian potential of the tribe with ‘souls’, confirming Ralph’s initial distinction between the two. Without possessing the capacity to acquire the codes of Christianity and scientific rationalism that inform Ralph’s subjectivity, the abject other is materialised

357 Ibid. 138.
358 Ibid. 138-139.
within an economy of opposition and perversion that configures Kristeva’s systematic understanding of the praxis of ‘othering’:

*For abjection, when all is said and done, is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies.*

Kristeva’s account of subjectivity in terms of abjection relies on the dialectic between two bodies: the observer and the observed. For Kristeva, the observer and observed are different fragments of the same embodied subjectivity, held together in a power relationship that secures the privilege of the observer, and their subjectivity. TCI emphasises a complete lack of similarity between the chief’s alien body and that of the castaways, who are in turn rendered privileged observers, yet this praxis of othering signifies how subjectivity, abjection and non-subjectivity are bound together in a dynamic of defence and aggression.

Thus the subsequent killing of the chief is justified on both religious and scientific grounds (the two predominant influences governing Ralph’s castaway subjectivity). His presence not only endangers the spiritual growth of the islanders who possess the capacity to acquire Christian values, but he also threatens the castaways’ power to impose them. The principles of abjection and justifiable death are also legitimated on scientific grounds, as the chief threatens to prevent the future evolution of other bodies that possess the potential to acquire these ‘codes’, deemed ‘civilised’ markers of Western European ideals. As Kutzer states, Ballantyne was influenced by the evolutionary debates of the time; this interest can be traced through his account of the ‘savage’ chief, whose primitivism threatens what these castaways stand for.

The account anticipates the retrogressive evolutionary ideas that emerged alongside colonialist and imperialist attitudes during the latter part of the nineteenth century in the field of criminal anthropology: including the pseudoscience of

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physiognomy and atavism. The question of ‘what it meant to be human’ attracted diverse inquiries in social, cognitive and physiological fields of inquiry often for exploitative means. In the nineteenth century, for instance, the rationalisation of white supremacist ideology, imagined the existence of a benighted body of natives who could at once be stigmatised, and made the target of an "Enlightened civilising" mission. Philosophers such as John Locke in Second Treatises of Government (1690); and Emmanuel Kant in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), had already stated that a group of ‘other’ races existed who needed guidance from the expertise of the more civilised body of Europe. These perceived racial distinction gave rise to the ‘othering’ of alien bodies. As Thomas McCarthy states in Race, Empire and the Idea of Human Development, non-Europeans, characterised as ‘barbarous or uncivilised', were ‘declared to be in need of tutelage', which came in the form of colonial and imperialist practices. As the characterisation of the chief/enemy makes evident, however, not only is his body untreatable, but it stands in the way of those whose are, and must, therefore, be expelled.

The character of Avatea, a saintly woman accompanying the tribe of ‘souls’, embodies a tangible example of why this is so and what is under threat. Avatea represents the positive possibilities of her tribe’s future because she already carries the values and behaviour identified as ‘Christian’ and civilised in the narrative. Ralph is ‘struck by the modesty of her demeanour and the gentle expression of her face.’ Despite having ‘the flattish nose and the thick lips of the others’, she is distinguished by her skin tone, which is ‘a light brown colour’, leading the castaways to surmise that ‘she must be of a different race, closer to their own ‘white’ ideal and therefore on the margins of abjection. She is a liminal body in that she is neither native nor white, neither subject nor non-subject. As such, she is more available to be enlightened (i.e. colonised) than the other natives encountered.

It is not simply that she is a woman in danger that concerns these castaways, but that she is in possession of divine characteristics and unusual beauty according to European standards. Ralph’s initial observations are certified later on, as we are told.

365 Ibid.
that Avatea is part of the Samoan tribe, one of the first to have converted to Christianity. While this potential and eventual religious connection is made, the historical significance of Avatea’s name and what it represents is also central to the book’s preoccupation with scientific and hereditary discourse. Avatea (also known as Vatea) is a recognised mythological figure of the Cook Islands (specifically, the Polynesian islands around which TCI is set), who shares a divine connection with the Gods. William Wyatt Gill, from Bristol, became a member of the London Missionary Society in 1851, and travelled to the South Pacific: where he collected and recorded these myths in a volume entitled Gems From the Coral Islands (1855). In a later collection, the origin of Avatea is explained as follows: ‘Vatea, the father of gods and men, was half man and half fish’; and ‘is the son of Vari-Ma-te-takere (‘the very beginning’), who was made ‘not born.’ Through Avatea ‘we gain the first idea of majesty as associated with divinity. The ocean is his; his children, born like ourselves.’

Despite the obvious differences of gender and hybridity, there is an uncanny resemblance between Ballantyne’s Avatea and this mythological figure. The Cook Islands’ Vatea came to exist from a kind of Immaculate Conception, ‘associated with divinity’: he was made ‘not born.’ A similar divine connection is also made in TCI. After the castaways inquire about her name, the chief points to her while uttering the name Avatea; and then to the sun, after which he ‘raised his finger slowly towards the Zenith, where it remained steadily for a minute or two.’ This poignant connection between Avatea and the object of light and energy that sustains life on earth leads Peterkin to declare that ‘she is an angel come down to stay here for a while’, albeit an ‘uncommonly black one.’ Avatea’s identity thus falls within the margins of heaven and earth, human and inhuman. Even though this divine connection is implied rather than ascertained, given that Ralph, not ‘quite satisfied’ with this idea, presses for a more rational explanation to no avail, the narrative still sustains rather than discredits both religious determinism and scientific rationalism. Then there is the issue of progeny and lineage. Amid the proliferation of hereditary discourse and evolutionary theories prominent in the mid-nineteenth century, Avatea’s body and the sanctity of what it represents translates into a model for the future.

367 Ibid.
368 Ibid, 20.
370 Ibid.
Thus, rather than relying solely on the idea of divine omniscience when it comes to deciding who to fight and who to defend, there is an overarching preoccupation with rationalising these decisions via the more secular terms of scientific and evolutionary thought. This supplementation represents an epistemological break from the Lockean ideal of God as ‘Maker of all things’.\textsuperscript{371} It marks a shift towards a more tangible body of facts that Hume and later nineteenth century scientists such as Darwin sought to understand, which affects the type of castaway, God and abject ‘other’, constructed.

As I have argued, these discursive influences shaping the text's approach to the abject ‘other' articulate three varied yet intercommunicating 'types' of bodies based on the same liminal foundations. The chief represents an abject body that lacks a redeemable soul and the potential to acquire one, set against the redeemable savagery of other native bodies. The continued legitimacy of the white castaway body that possesses the power and vision through which these distinctions can be made is also verified.

At this point of first encounter, where the castaways are invaded by two opposing tribes and assist in the killing of the abject chief they identify, this novel would appear to be embedded in an idea of colonial conquest. The privileging of Avatea, who as we later discover, is in love with a Christian Missionary, chimes with the book's legitimising of colonial conquests through a missionary enterprise in the vein of muscular Christianity. However, I now wish to disturb this colonial argument somewhat: by illustrating how the knowable body sustaining these ideas through Ralph's character is set on a path of misadventures and an identity crisis that reflects his fragmented pre-castaway subjectivity.

The Initial Crisis and The Onset of Uncertainty

Following on from the first encounter with the two tribes, in which Ralph, Jack and Peterkin assist in the killing of the now abject chief, Tararo, the chief they help save, thanks them for their intervention and returns to his island. After a brief period of peace, the castaways themselves encounter a series of baleful events. Ralph

is captured and kidnapped by British pirates\textsuperscript{372} who invade the Coral Island while roaming the Polynesian islands, illegally trading in stolen sandalwood. Taken on board their schooner, Ralph is held in involuntary servitude and forced to aid the captain in his illegal negotiations with the tribespeople from the neighbouring islands. During one of these encounters, Ralph is re-acquainted with Tararo on the island of Emo, and with the aid of a translator (a pirate called Bloody Bill, whom Ralph befriends), can engage in conversation. Ralph's questions are all to do with Avatea: he is eager to know what has become of her. Tararo tells him that she is currently living on their island but due to be killed, because she is in love with a man who is not an arranged suitor. The story then goes into great detail describing the savage practices of the islanders with whom he and the Pirates are negotiating with:

\begin{quote}
I saw that these inhuman monsters were launching their canoe over the living bodies of their victims. But there was no pity in the breasts of these men... the ponderous canoe passed over them, burst the eyeballs from their sockets, and sent the life’s blood gushing from their mouths. Oh reader, this is no fiction. I would not, for the sake of thrilling you with horror, invent so terrible a scene. It was witnessed. It is true – true as that accursed sin which has rendered the human heart capable of such diabolical enormities.\textsuperscript{373}
\end{quote}

This ‘diabolical’ scene continues to articulate the differences between the savage ‘other’ and the castaways. It conveys the acts of ‘accursed sin,’ which make such killings unjust and devoid of honour. These aimless deaths are positioned in stark contrast to the religious and scientific reasoning, which the castaways used to justify the killing of the chief. There is also an insistence on ratifying the consequences of the untreated savage body via proof. Ralph's eyewitness account is so detailed; it appears reminiscent of scientific fact: because of the steps already taken to establish his observational skills. ‘It is true’, as ‘this is no fiction.’ Claiming that these ungodly people lack religious beliefs is not enough: it must be demonstrated to


the narratee. Once again, however, it is important to question to what extent Ralph's account is reliable, given the aforementioned discrepancies regarding when these observational skills were developed and embodied fully.

Furthermore, with this evidence comes the appearance of a new enemy/other. Despite Tararo's distance from the 'diabolical enormities' practised by the chief of Emo, he is still framed as an abject non-subject, with the potential to participate in atrocities. His connection with Avatea and her potential to enter enlightened salvation is dashed: he plans on killing her because 'she won't marry the man he wants her to'\textsuperscript{374}, rendering him savage and abject. While Tararo's abjection can be said to secure the castaways' colonial intentions, that Avatea, the liminal object of potential salvation, is still in danger renders their mission, their previous interventions in salvation, and crucially, their subjectivity through which these acts are negotiated, within a state of crisis.

Here, it becomes possible to unsettle Martin Green's claim that TCI 'was, of course, a Robinsonade, drawing on and reinforcing the fashion for stories which man triumphs over nature, with obvious implications for empire and racial superiority.'\textsuperscript{375} Rather than suggest that Green’s colonial reading is invalid, I question the extent to which the novel can be considered a straightforward Robinsonade with a hypertexual colonial theme which centres on the knowable body of Enlightenment pedagogy, by continuing to illustrate how the text represents the instability of the self and 'other.'

Before the castaways embark on a mission to save Avatea for the second time, the narrative necessarily attempts to reinvent their position from potentially successful agents of power to embodying an actively successful status. After Ralph has fled the pirates and is reunited with his fellow castaways, he informs them of his experiences, as well as the danger facing Avatea. Jack responds:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Besides, having become champions for this girl once before, it behoves us, as true knights, not to rest until we set her free; at least, all the heroes in all the storybooks I have ever read would count it foul disgrace to leave such a work unfinished.}\textsuperscript{376}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{374}Ibid. 188.
\end{footnotes}
Hightower’s suggestion that the novel conforms to the tropes of mid-nineteenth century adventure fiction, influenced by a sense of boisterous heroism and ‘Victorian masculine pluck, embodying a post-Indian Rebellion for control’\textsuperscript{377}, is to some degree valid here. However, a closer reading of the dialogue complicates this view.

This dialogue of reinvention appeals to the romanticised image of ‘true knights’ conveyed ‘in all the storybooks’, rather than that of religious doctrine and scientific omniscience: which thus far have made killing a justifiable act. Here, neither God nor science is invoked as a means of reinvigorating the ‘unfinished’ mission. This irresolution opens up these bodies to a greater degree of uncertainty, furthering the idea that Ralph’s subjectivity is governed by varying rather than stable influences. Following their self-initiation into knighthood, the identity of these castaways rests on uncertain ground and so too does that of the abject ‘other.’ As Tararo is now referred to as ‘a rascally chief’\textsuperscript{378} and ‘a villain’\textsuperscript{379}, while his tribe revert to being called ‘demons’\textsuperscript{380} and savages, their transition from allies to enemies indicates an unstable rather than stable abjection.

Crucially, these distinctions made by ‘knights’ on a romanticised mission lack the conviction of religious faith and scientific reasoning. This insufficiency is confirmed by the narrative's attempts to re-navigate the focus of these castaways before their final battle. However, the task of reclaiming a more stable subjectivity through the determinable ‘other’ is constantly overshadowed by digressions that escalate into further uncertainty.

Non-Native Realignment and the Unresolved Castaway Body

In another turn of events, this skewed re-navigation comes in the unlikely form of an English-speaking native chief, converted to Christianity by The London Missionary Society. The enlightened position and civilised power that these castaways held over the savages in the initial battle is now embodied by a native (albeit Christian convert) who leads them back to their mission by elucidating its benefits.

\textsuperscript{379} Ibid. 246.
\textsuperscript{380} Ibid. 237.
After deciding to fight for Avatea’s freedom, ‘as true knights’ would, ‘a council of war’ is held, during which Ralph convinces his fellow castaways to travel to a ‘Christian Village’ called Mango and enlist the help of its Chief, before confronting Tararo. Upon arrival, they are greeted by the very man himself: ‘clad in a respectable suit of European clothes’, he welcomes them: ‘Good-day, gentlemen.’ Declining Jack’s offer of a glass of wine on board their schooner, the new Chief is keen on addressing the matter at hand. His ‘European clothes’ and greeting suggests he is on a par with the castaways in terms of civility and demeanour; while his abstinence from ‘any strong drink’ implies a sense of piousness they do not possess themselves. The Chief is presented here as a worthy didactic figure, fit to realign these bodies with their initial cause.

This act of realignment begins with a tour of the Chief’s island, during which the castaways are taken aback by its ‘peace and plenty.’ The island has adopted a European system of an orderly habitation: every ‘house had doors and Venetian windows’, and Ralph cannot help but compare ‘it with the wretched village of Emo’, where the aforementioned atrocities occurred. After witnessing this orderly neighbourhood, Ralph exclaims: ‘What a convincing proof that Christianity is of God.’ Ralph’s exclamation here again indicates an alignment between faith and evidence, resembling the intellectual arguments set out by Hume. Enlightenment pedagogy’s doctrine, which advocates the development of knowable/stable bodies via the sole subjective influence of Divine/parental omniscience as championed in TSFR, is overturned here: any such stability relies on tangible evidence of an epistemological nature.

This development is further supported by a debate between the castaways and the Chief on how the Pacific Islands were formed, in which the latter’s exegeses is based on a ‘probable theory’, ‘held by some of the good and scientific missionaries.’ This use of scientific ‘theory’ combined with religious discourse is striking here. It shores up the veracity of the same collaborative influences that supported Ralph’s credibility in a case made to fortify the success of his actions based

381 Ibid. 224.
382 Ibid. 225.
383 Ibid. 226.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid. 228.
386 Ibid.
387 Ibid.
388 Ibid. 231.
on scientific and religious reasoning. This proof of European civilisation and enlightenment through the village’s infrastructure, led by a Chief well versed in the sciences, provides the hard evidence that these bodies need to re-establish the justification of what they have been fighting for in terms of Avatea and the hopeful replication of this success. The enemies of this progress, identified in fluctuating ways, have been justly distinguished; and in the case of the Chief of the war party, justly killed.

However, rather than utilise this pivotal moment of realignment to immediately set the castaways on their way to completing their mission, the narrative takes an odd turn, as they face yet another disjunction in terms of stabilising their mission on religious grounds. After having sailed to Tararor’s island with the help of their newly appointed friend ‘the teacher’ (the Chief), the castaways are sat on the schooner waiting to hear word on whether they will be given permission to go ashore and discuss freeing Avatea. The ‘teacher’ makes use of this time to enact a sermonic interlude ‘concerning the success of the gospel on those islands', yet is somewhat alarmed by the castaways' apathy towards this Christian intervention: they appear much less ‘gratified' than ‘they ought to have been.’ Prompted by his concern, he presses them further regarding their ‘personal interest in religion', warning them that their ‘souls were certainly in as great danger as those of the wretched heathen' if they had not already ‘found salvation in Jesus Christ.’

‘Nay, further,’ he added, ‘if such be your unhappy case, you are, in the sight of God, much worse than these savages (forgive me, my young friends, for saying so): for they have no knowledge, no light, and do not profess to believe; while you, on the contrary, have been brought up in the light of the blessed Gospel, and call yourselves Christians. These poor savages are indeed the enemies of our Lord; but you, if ye be not true believers, are traitors!'

The ever-sentient Chief, disappointed by their flailing enthusiasm and hesitant belief in God, identifies an untenable relationship between these castaways and Christianity. This stands in marked contrast to the impenetrable faith fuelling the

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389 Ibid. 238.
390 Ibid. 239.
cycloramic omniscience of Father Robinson; and as such, the knowable body of Enlightenment pedagogy. Their religious desensitisation is so alarming that the chief insinuates their ‘souls’ may be in fact be in danger. This schism in castaway subjectivity marks a turning point in the genre’s trajectory, which unsettles the boundaries between the knowable self and abject ‘other.’ As the following chapters will discuss, the progressive deterioration of this distinction develops in *Kidnapped, A High Wind in Jamaica,* and *Lord of the Flies,* through a post-Darwinian idea of the common descent of mankind, the unpredictable self developed through post-Freudian psychoanalysis and post-war post-modernism.

Returning to TCI now, the crisis itself intensifies, when as a result of their faith being questioned, these castaways are considered ‘much worse than these savages’, thus challenging Susan Naramore’s claim that these castaways are never ‘undermined by a loss of faith or a reversion to barbarism themselves.’ This problematic question of faith and regression has a devastating effect on the very essence of their mission. How can they claim to be pious Christian ‘knights’ advocating justice and freedom if they are dehumanised beyond those they class as enemies? The crisis becomes more pressing because it occurs at a vital moment, just before they engage in the killing of Tararo and his tribe. These bodies are in no way closer to being prepared for the war ahead; nor to being able to justify any future killings they might have to undertake for the sake of Avatea, who initially acted as the standard bearer of subjective values and hopes for the future. They are also no nearer stabilising their cause to fight for the religious conversion of these savages to Christianity. Thus how can such circumstances support Richard Phillips' following claim?

*What Robinson Crusoe seemed only to suggest to Victorian Britain*

– The Coral Island *spelt out* – *more arrogantly ethnocentric, more fervently religious, more exuberantly adventurous, more optimistic and more racist.*

My readings do not accord with these claims of arrogant ethnocentrism, fervent religion or clear depictions of racism. The Chief is represented as rebuking

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their nationalism by conveying his disappointment that British boys raised as Christians are not able to maintain a legible degree of faith. Moreover, since they are reprimanded by a converted native who holds a clearer image of religious affiliation than they do, an idea of clear-sighted racism is problematic. Even if one interprets this need for re-education as a narrative trope intended to promote the success of colonial rule, it still will not support the idea of seamlessly maintained colonial order and subjectivity put forward by the aforementioned critics. Although the Chief inversely represents the ideals of British missionaries, there is still very much an issue with the castaway body itself that prevents the articulation of these ideals.

Hightower, Naramore, Phillips and Kutzer are, in a sense, confined to the position of ideologues: who overlook the fragmented representation of these castaways. Their readings are clearly dominated by a search for Enlightenment pedagogy’s knowable/stable body regarding the self and ‘other’, which colonial ideas are presumed to preserve. Stating that the castaways represent ‘the advocacy and glorification’ of ‘White Europeans’ over ‘darker skinned non-Europeans’, as well as ‘the civilising of the spiritually dark areas of the world’, as Kutzer does, overlooks the aforementioned tensions apparent in my reading.

Meanwhile, Roderick McGillis, despite calling for a fluid approach to the name-of-the-father within children’s literature, argues that in TCI, ‘the coloniser represents a more advanced state of civilisation than the colonised', granting him ‘the right to assume a position of dominance.’ These claims cannot account for the ambiguous distinctions that emerge from an epistemological approach to the genre, in which the name-of-the-father, controlling subjectivity, is dispersed rather than fixed in ways that have considerable implications for the way the abject ‘other’ is developed and represented.

**Facing Death: Further Spiritual Struggles**

In spite of these unresolved tensions, the text continues with the mission to free Avatea. As the following brief synopsis illustrates, the ambiguity of this
relationship between faith and the castaway body suffers even further strain as the castaways face their darkest hour while kidnapped and about to die.

They arrive at Tararo’s village unarméd, having decided that their ‘only chance of success lies in mild measures.’395 This peaceful aim does not last long, as Tararo refuses to surrender Avatea. During this dispute, she is informed of a covert mission to smuggle her away from the island undetected, yet the castaways’ plan comes to an abrupt end when they are caught up in a storm while trying to sail away. The war canoe set out in their pursuit, catches up with them soon after, and they are taken back to the island and imprisoned in a cave for one month.

During their imprisonment, Ralph reflects on the fears of hopelessness that he and his fellow castaways share. Deliverance is not explicitly associated with God and Heaven. Although Ralph longs for the Bible, which he is certain, would provide ‘much light and comfort’ he admits once more to ‘regret deeply having neglected to store’ his ‘memory with its consoling truths.’396 Once more, the relationship between castaway subjectivity and religion is subject to and limited by a lessening of the grip of religious discourse. Instead, the science of cognition dominates subjectivity as Ralph articulates the human infirmity of memory retrieval and the way his faith is subject to this condition.

Although Ralph’s ability to use religion as a source of comfort fails him here, God does reappear, mediated through a passing missionary who negotiates with Tararo, and is able to convince him and his tribe to convert to Christianity. The castaways are freed shortly afterwards and are informed of the conversion upon their release and thanked by Avatea’s fiancé:

‘You have risked your life for one who was known to you only for a few days. But she was a woman in distress, and that was enough to secure to her the aid of a Christian man. We, who live in these islands of the sea, know that true Christians always act thus. Their religion is one of love and kindness. We thank God that so many Christians have been sent here; we hope many more will come.’397

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396 Ibid. 260.
397 Ibid. 264.
Although this speech makes a case for consolidating religion as a way of stabilising the castaway body and the abject ‘other’, thereby overshadowing the fragmented castaway body which I have identified, the young man’s claims cannot extinguish it completely. His belief that Christianity’s ‘love and kindness’ are enough to secure these expectations is at odds with the narrative’s insistence that God is not enough to sustain them; a threat which propagates from the castaway body and its fractured subjectivity.

Knowing that Christians ‘always’ act in a certain way implies the knowability of a stable character. A stability unsettled by my reading of the novel and its strategies for developing the identities of these castaways and the abject ‘other.’ Instead, there are no clear articulations of the enemy, mission, castaway subjectivity or Christian affiliations. The only consistent idea that the narrative works hard to maintain is the epistemological certainty of science and tangible evidence. Thus these final claims fail to encapsulate the schism between Christianity and Ralph’s subjectivity, which reflects the nineteenth century’s competing epistemological discourses about the self and ‘other’ that moved away from the teleological principles of Enlightenment pedagogy’s knowable body and its stable subjectivity.

Summary

This chapter has focussed on identifying and analysing the emerging relationship between the diversified subjectivity of the castaway child, formed through multiple epistemological influences, and the onset of the abject ‘other’ within this trajectory of fictions. Castaway subjectivity and as such the abject ‘other’, are subject to and split amongst these varying influences, which include religion, family, an innate passion for ‘roving’ and scientific rationalism. Given that these influences are neither equally impactful, or stable, the identities of self and ‘other’ which they work towards constructing in the narrative are inherently fragmented as a result. This relationship continues to envelop the castaway child within increasingly fractious relations, as the following chapters will illustrate, which is why it is necessary to contextualise theoretically what conditions of the knowable body, subjectivity and abjection TCI transgresses and maintains.

Firstly, I need to clarify what I mean by fragmented castaway subjectivity and how this transgresses the typology of the castaway child set out in Enlightenment
Pedagogy and reflected in TSFR. The relationship between multiple subjective influences and the onset of the abject ‘other’ through which fragmented identities materialise, takes us back to Lacan and Kristeva’s ideas about the relationship between language and subjectivity. Lacan’s theory of subjectivity rests on the child’s recognition of itself as ‘other’ during ‘The Mirror Stage’ in which he/she experiences a discordance between his/her uncoordinated sense of self and the more ordered image reflected and perceived. Overcoming this alienation between two competing ideas of body and image in the imaginary stage is the goal that drives the child’s attempts to embody the symbolic order, guided by the name-of-the-father and its attendant discourses. As Mc Cullum states this negotiation is dependant on recognising ‘the distance between self and other’ thus forming an integral part of subjective development. The distinction between self and other during this praxis of subjective development is never entirely overcome because there is no spatial and temporal distinction between what is outside and inside the self during this negotiation. The name-of-the-father governing the symbolic order is a pre-existing external language of signification, which must be internalised and embodied for subjective development to be successful. TCI conveys this system of identification both in terms of its construction and threat of destruction. Firstly as discussed, Ralph’s pre-castaway subjectivity runs parallel to his castaway subjectivity as the name-of-the-father governing both is represented in equal measure of dispersion and ambiguity as discussed. Secondly, TCI presents the castaways’ construction and encounter with the ‘other’ in a way that inversely maintains the conditions of Ralph’s subjectivity (the abject ‘other’ is ambiguously constructed through the same conditions outlined above). This has the effect of dismantling any definite distinctions between both, given that one is reliant on the other to exist. Kristeva’s comments on the deject in the midst of abjection clarify the paradox is that; ‘I expel myself, I spit myself out, I abject myself within the same motion through which ‘I’ claim to establish myself.’ [Emphasis author’s own]. The border between self and other collapses during abjection according to the same conditions they are constructed

399 This negotiation is however viewed differently by Lacan and Bakhtin. For Bakhtin, this negotiation articulates the positive affirmation of social integration, while for Lacan it signifies a subject’s constant failure to overcome a sense of lack in relation to the ‘other.’
during the development of subjectivity in a Lacanian sense. This is made most evident in TCI during Ralph's subjective crisis, in which he fails to convince himself and others of his religious affiliations, thus rendering his body as susceptible to abjection. As Karren Coats states, the deject must ‘find some way to subdue the abject in its proper place outside the functioning of everyday life in the Symbolic’ (141) so as to remain subjectively healthy. One way Coats suggests this is achieved is through religious faith, which is a language that Ralph does not speak coherently or consistently. Thus Ralph’s abject condition prevents Enlightenment pedagogy’s knowable castaway child from materialising (a stability which critics assume is maintained through clear-sighted colonial ideals). This condition further implies a development in the epistemological evolution of castaway subjectivity, by making the negotiations between the self and other, which render subjectivity possible and readable as a dialogical (in a Bakhtinian sense) praxis more visible. McCullum clarifies this idea as follows:

[For] Bakhtin and Lacan, the idea of the subject as a unitary entity which is the source and agent of action or meaning, central to a humanist theory of subjectivity, is an essentializing fiction, which ignores the construction of that subject in relation to an other and within social and ideological discourses, and it represents, in Bakhtinian terms, a desire for the monological effacement of the other. 401

Although McCullum directs these insights toward the way Young Adult fiction destabilises liberal humanist ideals, of which I regard Enlightenment pedagogy’s quest for the knowable body to be a paramount example, there is much to be said for the way TCI, long considered a classic children's literature text that upholds these ideals, also partakes in this destabilisation. What TCI initiates in this trajectory of castaway fiction, is a dialogical narrative voice, where subjectivity is not unified through a single ‘source and agent of action.’ However, I must reiterate that even though TSFR practices a monological ideal by mediating castaway subjectivity through God and Father Robinson, I still interpret this negotiation as dialogical due to

the epistemological ideals that inspired its literary representation, which has had a
diachronic impact on the castaway genre at large. The following texts under
discussion, develop this dialogical approach to castaway subjectivity and its
fractured relations further, gradually disproving Enlightenment pedagogy’s
‘essentializing fiction’ with increasing clarity.

As I argue in the next chapter, *Kidnapped* (1886) continues to develop
castaway subjectivity within a fragmented space of liminal uncertainty through its use
of Darwinian debates and child psychology, which further illustrate the impossible
continuation of Enlightenment pedagogy’s knowable child body, identified in TSFR.
The division between the self and the abject other is strained further by these socio-
cultural influences on identity, depicted via increasingly ambiguous family
connections, the prospect of the enemy residing within the castaway body, and a
continuation of religious uncertainty. That *Kidnapped* is often excluded from
scholarly research in the field illustrates a need to move beyond didactic and colonial
interpretations, towards a dialogic understanding of castaway subjectivity fuelled by
epistemological change.
Chapter Three: *Kidnapped* and The Post-Darwinian Castaway Child.

Introduction

Robert Louis Stevenson’s *K* was serialised in the weekly magazine *Young Folks* in 1886, and fed into the demand for boys’ adventure fiction at the time. Novels such as Rider Haggard’s *King Solomon’s Mines* (1885) were highly successful, and Stevenson had already treated his adult and juvenile readership to *Treasure Island* in 1882. The Scottish-born author, a long-term admirer of Robert Ballantyne's novels wrote extensively by way of fiction, letters and essays, the most notable of which were produced in the 1880s. His work is preoccupied with ideas of travel, adventure, Evolution and child psychology all of which permeated debates on identity during the period. *Travels with a Donkey in the Cevennes* (1879), ‘Child’s Play’ (1884), *A Child’s Garden of Verses* (1885) and *The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde* (1886) are some examples.

Stephenson, ‘who moved in the same social circles as many prominent evolutionary scientists’, wrote *K* in a post-Darwinian era when questions about identity, childhood, and social relations were in the midst of re-evaluation. Julia Reid in her essay entitled ‘Psychology and Childhood' effectively summarises Stevenson's position as a writer in the late nineteenth century, amidst the shifting attitudes towards childhood and identity as follows:

> Stevenson was the inheritor of the nineteenth century’s diverse and contested constitution of childhood, in which Puritan moralism was confronted by conceptions of the natural child originating in the Enlightenment and Romantic periods and, later, by evolutionary science.

Reid argues that Stevenson’s fiction for children is primarily experimental because it shores up the residues of these ‘divergent impulses’ in playful ways.

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advocating that post-Darwinian ‘evolutionist ideas about play and the imagination stood at the heart of the new child psychology.’ 406 K most certainly disrupts the origins of the ‘knowable child’ of Enlightenment pedagogy, reflecting these latest epistemological approaches to identity and childhood, through the adventures and castaway experience of its seventeen–year-old Scottish protagonist, David Balfour. This chapter will focus on identifying how K incorporates the following epistemological approaches to the child, identity and subjectivity within the depiction of family relations, religion, island living and the abject ‘other’ in a way that underpins the late Victorian concern for the unpredictability of the self. The narrative builds on the tensions raised in TCI regarding religious determinism, parental authority and the slippage between self and ‘other’ along these epistemological lines.

Darwin’s Origins of Species (1859) greatly impacted philosophical and scientific concepts of humankind, drawing as it did, on a close connection with the animal kingdom and the evolutionary state of species. Underlining these re-evaluations was the theme of origins and what it could determine or undermine, exemplified in debates about God, physicality, the child and its place in society. As Laura Otis states, Darwinian theory ‘[conveyed] a strong conviction that “origins” are fictions.’ 407 The late Victorian ‘child’ subject grew out of this intersection between certainty and uncertainty as a field of scientific and psychological inquiry. As Cathy Urwin states, ‘Darwin’s thesis that we evolved as a species from simpler forms raised questions about whether babies and young children would more closely resemble animal forbears than do adults.’ 408 Darwin had himself conducted a series of observations on his own children, published in 1877 as ‘A Biographical Sketch of a Human Infant’ which he had begun thirty years prior. With the emergence of social development theories drawing on Darwinism, by way of Henry Maudsley’s trait inheritance theory (‘Responsibility in Mental Disease, 1884) and Herbert Spencer’s notion of ‘survival of the fittest’ (‘Principles of Biology’ 1864), the child became increasingly subject to eugenicist concerns about degeneration and arrested development. The question of positive and regressive development was at the forefront of these debates. For instance, Maudsley’s theory on nervous diseases and their genealogical evolution drew a parallel between progeny and a diseased

406 Ibid. 42
inheritance. This idea that children were inheritors of mental and social disorders through their parents moved away from Enlightenment pedagogy’s assumption of the ‘knowable’ child as a standard bearer for social reform, thus standing in stark contrast to the hopeful ‘tabula rasa’ depicted by Locke and Rousseau.

Bridging the gap between the child as a subject of scientific observation and Rousseau's romanticised ideal of childhood development were the theories of James Sully, a British pioneer in child psychology and Stephenson's close friend. Drawing on various elements of Rousseau’s treatise, Sully in Studies on Childhood (1896), equates the scientific study of children and their knowledge acquisition with observations of their physical, psychological and moral behaviour, stating that ‘science has cast its inquisitive eye on the infant.’ Under Sully’s Darwinian approach to pedagogy, the child undergoes significant changes in relation to its Enlightenment predecessor by way of becoming an object of meticulous scientific scrutiny. Rousseau is credited as a pioneer of this observational praxis, which Sully aimed to expand by way of re-evaluating the relationship between child development, God, imagination and education. Rather than agreeing with Rousseau that the ‘child comes from the Creator's hand a perfect bit of workmanship’, Sully argues that the child’s capability to be moral or immoral is subject to the complexities of the mind. These ideas developed from Sully’s understanding of the child as representing humankind’s ‘kinship to the lower sentient world’ in light of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. Deploying methods that prefigure contemporary child psychology, Sully trained observers to codify children’s behavioural patterns as a means of understanding and promoting various stages of development. Observing language, speech, imagination, morality and emotions, these professionals who, rather than assuming that the ‘knowable’ child mind warranted no investigation, were instead researching its complex thought processes in a way that reworked the familiar adult/child dichotomy permeating Rousseau’s didactic model. Thus, unlike Rousseau, Sully does not claim that the child is always knowable and homogenous in the face of socio-cultural relations. At the same time, he asserts that ‘the child’ can only be known through the investigations and interpretations of specialist observers. In its own way, this offers a good example of how the discourse/power/knowledge

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411 Ibid. 228.
412 Ibid. 8.
dynamic proposed by Foucault serves to constitute that which is observable, what can be said about the observed and who is entitled to speak those observations. Furthermore, in light of these scientific methods and observations, the child figure is moved into the regulations of the public realm, away from the privacy of the family home and the ‘hallowed retreat of the nursery’, which, according to Sully, can hardly tolerate ‘this encroaching of experiment’.\textsuperscript{413}

As the following readings of K will illustrate these epistemological concerns inform the novel as early as David’s haphazard start to his journey. They are represented through his skewed family relations, physical and spiritual vulnerabilities which then shape his castaway subjectivity and kinship with his enemies, in a way that further blurs the distinctions between the castaway child and the abject ‘other' suggested by the TCI. This epistemological mapping of changing representations of castaway subjectivity within the trajectory of novels under discussion is in turn made possible by a dialogical rather than a static understanding of the name-of-the-father governing language and subjectivity in a Lacanian sense.

**Narrative Voice and an Overview of Events**

*Memoirs of the adventures of David Balfour in the year 1751: How he was kidnapped and cast away; his sufferings in a desert isle; his journey in the wild Highlands; his acquaintance with Alan Breck Stewart and other notorious Highland Jacobites; with all that he suffered at the hands of his uncle Ebenezer Balfour of Shaws, falsely so called: written by himself, and now set forth by Robert Louis Stevenson\textsuperscript{414}. (Frontispiece: Title page from the first English edition).*

Of the five castaway novels being investigated in this thesis, K is the most episodic. Set in 1751, six years after the final Jacobite rebellion in Scotland, K tells the story of how a seventeen-year-old Scottish Lowlander called David Balfour finds himself having to leave home after the death of his widowed father, in search of his...

\textsuperscript{413}Ibid. 17.

long-lost uncle, Ebenezer. David's guardian, Mr Campbell the local minister of Essendean, informs David that he is now in line to inherit his father's wealth from his uncle Ebenezer, who lives in Cramond, a village on the outskirts of Edinburgh. David, who has never been told about his family's wealth or his relations before, eagerly sets off to discover more. Upon his arrival, a man wearing 'a tall night-cap' points a gun at him from an open window and shouts 'It’s loaded.' Following this unceremonious greeting, David’s relationship with his uncle worsens, as Ebenezer fears that David has come to claim his rightful inheritance. After a failed attempt on David’s life, he is tricked into trusting his uncle, but Ebenezer arranges a plan with his corrupt acquaintance Captain Hoseason, to have him kidnapped and taken on board a ship called the Covenant heading for the Carolinas where he will be sold as a slave ‘on the plantations.’ Under the command of Captain Hoseason, David is set to hard work while on the ship. Unused to the hardships of servitude and a life at sea, David falls ill on a number of occasions, struggling to overcome his physical and psychological frailty. He befriends a young cabin boy called Ransome, who is eventually killed by the long-standing abuse of his fellow crew, and Alan Breck Stewart, a Jacobite Highlander with whom David joins forces to take command of the Covenant, killing some men in the process. In the midst of this battle, the ship sails onto some rocks near the tidal island of Erraid, where David lands and remains a castaway for four days before being rescued and reunited with Alan in the Highlands. A further series of adventures ensues, seeing the two embroiled in a murder charge over the death of Colin Campbell, an opposing clan member whom Alan despises, before eventually escaping from the Highlands.

As this summary indicates, David Balfour is consistently dragooned into hostile spaces and environments negating any idea of settlement. In fact, what the novel conveys, as promised in the very title page, is a continuous idea of unsettlement that is not simply confined to spatial location. It is also a narrative trope interwoven within character development and narration, which as I will argue, assimilates the text’s epistemological approach to castaway subjectivity. This frontispiece, which can technically be considered as a peritextual (internal paratext) element of the text in Gerard Genette’s terms, begins to convey these ideas, as it engages with the

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415 Ibid. 22.
416 Ibid. 63.
‘complex mediation’ between book and reader. Unlike the authorial preface in TSFR, which informs readers of the narrative's aims, story, plot, narrator and implied reader contextualised through Enlightenment Pedagogy, here the frontispiece functions differently. It also establishes a relationship between the narrator and implied young readers but does so on both familiar terms, outlining a sequence of events the rapidity of which befit the fast paced action of an adventure story, and on unfamiliar terms, in light of what to expect from this hero/protagonist and his eventual sufferings. This uncertain relationship between adventures beset by suffering, which I will discuss further in due course, has caught the attention of some critics. Barbara Wall, for instance, focuses on what type of narrative voice this relationship produces and why it can be considered as innovative for children's fiction of the time.

Wall suggests that through the use of ‘vernacular first-person narration’ Stephenson 'took the first step towards creating a truly individual juvenile character' because K tells the story of a boy's conscience' while having ‘to come to terms with his own feelings.' Wall further adds that unlike the stereotypical adventure stories where action is the focal point of the story, citing Stephenson's own Treasure Island as an example, David Balfour 'is remembered not for what he does but for the efforts he has to make to come to terms with himself.'

I agree with Wall that K resonates with this blending of action and self-reflection, as promised in this frontispiece, which introduces the type of narrative voice that permeates the text according to my readings. It is a voice that goes beyond TCI in attempting to eliminate ‘the moralising which had plagued’ adventure stories by further distancing the child narrator from a ‘comfortable adult perspective.’ Although both Ralph and David are retrospective extradiegetic and homodiegetic character narrators, K further mediates the ‘asymmetrical power position’ between ‘two unequal subjectivities’ on two counts. David, unlike Ralph, who narrates as an older man, narrates his story not long after his adventures. In turn, David's focalisation is thus more illusively attuned to the ‘independence' Wall describes, because it is a self-reflective narrative voice, which as Maria Nikolajeva states ‘almost eliminates the gap between the character and the

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419 Ibid. 69
420 Ibid.
This chapter explores how this shift in narrative voice (‘independence’) can be accounted for in terms of the extrinsic epistemological context already discussed. I will argue that this contextual framing enhances an understanding of why David finds himself constantly battling with a sense of physical, spiritual and emotional instability, which render him somewhat detached from parental and religious authority. Unlike the castaways in TSFR and TCI, the novel does not endow David with a particular skill, religious faith or purpose, given that his journey and castaway experience are conveyed through an ‘appearance’ of erratic plot development. I use the term ‘appearance’ advisedly here, because rather than agree with Robert Kiely that ‘Kidnapped and David Balfour are essentially amoral’ and that the novel as a whole is ‘aimless and hectic,’ the following readings will address how Stevenson does work towards conveying a particular aim through these uncertainties. It is an aim related to the shifts as mentioned above in post-Darwinian epistemological approaches to selfhood and its uncertainties, which develop consistently from as early as when David leaves home for the first time.

**Leaving home: The Unstable Determinant of Religion**

When David decides to leave home, Mr Campbell, the local minister, hands him a letter from his recently deceased father explaining his rightful inheritance and his kinship with Ebenezer. The Robinsons had a clear aim to their journey in mind. They were headed towards the South Pacific to play a role in building an infant colony. Ralph had ventured out to sea because of his ‘ruling passion' and was in the midst of realising a longed-for ambition when the ship he was sailing on was caught in a storm. David, however, in stark contrast, has neither an explicit aim nor ambition when venturing away from home. He does not know ‘where' he ‘was going or what was likely to become of himself while the narrative makes no attempt to invest a particular skill or innate passion in this protagonist that might drive him towards carving out a future path for himself.

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David prepares to follow this uncertain path, armed only with Mr Campbell’s advice urging him to stay away from temptations and be ‘instant’ in his ‘prayers and reading of the Bible’. This somewhat generic blessing signifies a decreasing propinquity between religious doctrine, family and pre-castaway subjectivity in relation to the previous novels. Father Robinson is a pastor himself, and Ralph is blessed by his parents, as opposed to David, who is newly orphaned. This ever-mutable relationship is emphasised by the abstract way that K frames God’s authority during this parting scene. The minister hands David a Bible and says ‘That’ll see you, it’s my prayerful wish, into a better land’. Faith in God is thus intertwined with securing David’s future place in Heaven, rather than emphasised as a referential guide to the way he should live his life now.

Instead, the object given to David that will help him in life is a recipe for ‘Lilly of the Valley Water’. This herbal remedy, says the minister: ‘will stand by you all through life, like a good staff for the road, and a good pillow to your head in sickness’. Here the minister emphasises the benefits of physical health as a principal means of somatic maintenance. There is a sense of irony as the minister, a professional religious practitioner openly alludes to the distinction between somatic and spiritual healing by way of the Bible and herbal medicine. Unlike in TSFR, where the science of mechanics is attributed to God at a crucial time of suffering, this medicinal cure that will aid David’s ailing body gives no such credence to divine intervention. Thus it appears that David’s priority in life is first and foremost his physical rather than spiritual wellbeing.

Critics who interpret David's orphaned state, as a straightforward plot-device aimed at fulfilling one of adventure fiction's familiar tropes, often overlook the narrative's emphasis on physical vulnerability, and what that might mean. To reiterate the sentiments of Robert Kiely, M.O Grenby and John Townsend, this trope equates the death or absence of parents from stories with freeing up child protagonists for adventures. Although the above critics are right that adventure fiction does often feature young male protagonists leaving home to explore the world, encountering and

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425 Ibid. 13.
426 Ibid. 14.
427 Ibid. 15.
428 Ibid. 14.
overcoming obstacles, or travelling in search of imperial conquests, according to my reading, tells a different story related to the changing representation of the child castaway, its family relations and its subjectivity within fiction.

Before analysing how this enigmatic relationship between David and his family and religious uncertainty relates to the epistemological context discussed in the introduction, it is important to identify how it is developed further as a fixture that defines David’s pre-castaway subjectivity. This is exemplified during his dangerous encounter with his uncle. After his unceremonious greeting, David brings up the issue of his inheritance, upon which Ebenezer sends his nephew on an errand to retrieve some legal papers from the ‘unfinished wing’ of the house. Denied a light, and assured that the stairs leading to the tower are ‘grand’ despite there being ‘nae bannisters’, David perilously ascends these five storeys, feeling his ‘way up in pitch darkness with a beating heart’. A sudden flash of lightning alerts David to the fact that he is ‘clambering upon an open scaffold’. Overcome with crippling fear, he eventually manages to crawl to safety on his hands and knees. In spite of Ebenezer’s clear signs of malice and murderous intentions, there is a sense of uncertainty when it comes to David identifying his uncle openly as an enemy.

Now whether my uncle thought the crash to be the sound of my fall, or whether he heard in it God’s voice denouncing murder, I will leave you to guess, as I have often tried to do, for yourselves.

This uncertainty stems from the fact that God and David's body operate within separate realms, once again affirming the distinction made by the minister that God has no authority over his living body: a reoccurring condition that continues to inform David's narrative voice while a castaway. Although 'God's voice' is declared to be omniscient in as far as it both recognises and denounces the attempted murder, David is denied access to it. This predicament is similar to Stevenson's real-life religious scepticism. Before writing K, Stevenson had struggled with his faith and his right to

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433 Ibid.
434 Ibid. 38.
435 Ibid.
436 Ibid. 39.
question its doctrines, causing a rift between himself and his devoutly religious parents. In a letter written to his friend Charles Baxter he describes his parents' disappointment in him in the aftermath of informing them of his doubts, which struck them like a dreadful 'thunderbolt' causing his father to renounce him as 'a horrible Atheist'. Without a coherent name-of-the-father in God (God knows but there is no way of knowing what this knowledge could be), Christian belief is not presented as a definitive part of David’s subjectivity.

This uncertainty does not resemble the first person narrators we have encountered thus far. In TSFR and TCI, the castaways share a more sustained kinship with God, albeit in varying degrees, which informs their later distinctions between themselves and the ‘other’. There is no such promise being made here, as the truth about morality and intention lies beyond David’s narrative voice.

The second turning point that this scene raises is concerned with the way uncle and nephew are pitted against each other, which shores up the uncertainties related to David’s family, his spiritual and physical vulnerabilities. The practice of othering in K is a home-grown affair with no foreign contenders. Unlike in the previous novels, the abject other is not projected onto foreign bodies like the Patagonians or savage tribespeople. Although this idea of the enemy within is hinted at in TCI, in terms of British pirates and the castaways’ feigning religious affiliations rendering them worse than savages, it is in K that this idea is explored in greater detail.

Themes of family discord and unfit parents and guardians had already appeared in children’s literature by this time, with notable examples including Charles Kingsley’s The Water Babies (1863), Hesba Stretton’s Jessica’s First Prayer (1867) and Charles Dickens’s Great Expectations (1861). In terms of castaway fiction, this introduction of a genealogically motivated murder within the genre can be seen to reflect the changing socio-cultural attitudes towards the family during the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the institution itself took on a post-Darwinian significance. This reassessment refers to the way Darwinism was granted a socio-cultural platform by the British philosopher Herbert Spencer, who coined the term ‘the survival of the fittest' while integrating Darwinian theory (natural selection) within utilitarian economic principles. Stevenson himself notes the influence of

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Spencer on his writing in the 1887 article *Books Which Have Influenced Me*, stating that ‘no more persuasive rabbi exists, and few better.’

John Offer describes Spencer’s intellectual model that frames his understanding of identity as one in which ‘benign Nature usurped God’s design, the scientist toppled the theologian, and the psychologist and the sociologist succeeded the historian.’ Spencer championed individual rather than collective strength within society while subjecting family ties and loyalty to the struggle for existence. As Spencer argues in his seminal 1864 text *The Principles of Biology*, those individuals who are ‘most likely to live and to leave descendants [are those whose] circumstances have facilitated the production in them [of any] functional change demanded by some new external condition’.

The attempted murder of David by his uncle is akin to this struggle for survival in terms of adaptation by any means. The matter of David's inheritance renders him an external condition threatening his Uncle Ebenezer's financial survival, inducing within the latter a self-serving need for change by annihilation. The institution of family is overshadowed and negated by this power struggle for survival, which opposes Enlightenment pedagogy's model family in which the knowable child is nurtured and regulated. With the abject ‘other' permeating the sanctity of this model, and the question of religious authority over David's subjectivity, K not only poignantly reaffirms Spencer’s post-Darwinian concept that ‘human nature [is] not static’, but it also suggests that there is no alternative.

It is important to understand what dialogical conditions this first instance of abjection represents, since they influence how David engages in the praxis of othering while cast away, and for this reason, I will return once again to the ideas put forth by Julia Kristeva.

*For abjection, when all is said and done, is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies.*

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As discussed in the previous chapter, Kristeva's account of abjection, advocates the ambiguous distinction between two bodies in terms of the observer and the observed. It is ambiguous since the conditions of identifying the abject ‘other'/observed lies within the name of the father governing the observer's subjectivity and dialogical relations. Where TCI attempts (with muddied results) to distance the castaway observer from the savage/observed ‘other' through ideas of scientific rationalism, an inherited right to roam, and religion, influences carried through from Ralph's pre-castaway subjectivity; K seems unable to reconcile the divide in any certain terms. The praxis itself is as Kristeva states ‘a composite of judgment and affect, of condemnation and yearning, of signs and drives' which pertains to the simultaneous dismantling and ‘yearning’ for the stable influences governing subjectivity and the coordination of a coherent sense of self in a Lacanian sense. In the face of extremis, however, the symbolic forces driving David’s subjective coherence are unclear.

There is no definitive border distinguishing David as a deject from his abject uncle since there are no clear ‘religious', ‘moral' or ‘ideological' codes advocated beyond preoccupations with the supremacy of the physical body and its psychosomatic disclosures in the event of suffering pertaining to Darwinian and post-Darwinian concepts of natural selection and survival of the fittest. David’s pre-castaway subjectivity is thus constructed out of these unresolved tensions and uncertainties.

As I argue throughout this thesis, the castaway is an inherently liminal construct, negotiating subjective memories from the past whilst ‘cast’ ‘away’, in a bid to manage their bodies in unfamiliar circumstances. This drive as discussed in the introduction is akin to Freud’s *fort-da* principle presented in ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle' (1920). Here the child enacts a game of disappearance and return with his toys, as a means of managing the loss of his mother's presence, which represents a disruption of his symbolic existence. The castaway too manages his/her subjective disruption and ungovernable self through a consistent re-enactment of their pre-castaway symbolic order via memories. It is essentially a re-enactment of Lacan's mirror stage in which the child learns to negotiate his ungovernable sense of self and

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*Ibid. 10.*
his governable mirror image, by attaining the ‘world of meaning of a particular language in which the world of things will come to be arranged.’ In the case of K, it is thus no surprise that the genesis of David’s castaway body and the way he engages with the praxis of ‘othering’ mirror the uncertainties of his particular ‘world of meaning’ and subjectivity.

**Castaway**

David’s second deadly encounter occurs after he has been dragooned onto the pirate ship, the *Covenant*, following his Uncle Ebenezer's deceitful plan. David realises he has been kidnapped and during his first moments of consciousness, the narrative focuses on his wholly unprepared and incapable body struggling to come to terms with his situation. Being an ‘unused landsman on the sea,’ this ordeal was ‘crushing to [his] mind and body’. A parallel relationship between inexperience and affliction develops here, contrasting with the initial scenes of castaway genesis in TSFR and TCI. Unlike the Robinson family and the Coral Island castaways, David confronts his landing scene with ‘a blackness of despair’ and hopelessness.

The pivotal concern during this instance is with primitive physicality and the visceral experience of bodily suffering. David describes how he is ‘in great pain, bound hand and foot and deafened by many unfamiliar noises,' suffering from great discomfort while being thrashed by ‘heavy sprays.’ For David, the world’s order has become so grossly violated that any hope of acclimatisation is lost. His narrative voice is thus focussed on the failings of his body, which are so overwhelming that David makes no attempt to survive. The power of God is only invoked as an exodus for and from his suffering body as he prays for death and peace to come. Reiterating the minister’s claim that death is a welcome gateway towards a ‘better land’ David states: ‘The thought of deliverance, even by death in the deep sea, was welcome to me’.

The same tone of panic and capitulation is threaded through David's narrative voice during the second instance wherein he finds himself in mortal danger after having escaped the pirate ship. Here again, David's survival becomes a bitter battle played out on his vulnerable and wholly unorganised body, rendering the sufferings of

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Ibid. 57.

Ibid.

Ibid. 14.

Ibid. 58.
his ship and island extremis as adjacent. As with his first moments on board the 
*Covenant*, we are reminded that David, being ‘inland bred’ is ‘as much short of 
knowledge as of means’. Even the way he lands is an anticipation of his inability 
to cope with island living since he struggles to reach the island because ‘he had no 
skill of swimming.’ When he does eventually reach dry land, it is declared to be the 
most ‘desert and desolate’ place he has ever seen. Overwhelmed by a sense of fear 
and despair, David is assaulted by an onslaught of unfamiliar experience during his 
four-day castaway ordeal.

His initial actions of walking ‘to and fro upon the sand, barefoot and beating’ 
his ‘breast’ convey the immediacy of his discomfort. In an attempt to gain his 
bearings, David climbs a hill, which was ‘the ruggedest scramble’ he ‘ever undertook’ 
and then falls ‘the whole way’ down. After diving in the creek to see how deep the 
waters run, David is ‘all the colder for this mishap; and having lost another hope, was 
the more unhappy’. Instead of the sun coming out to dry his clothes, it begins to 
rain, making his situation even more ‘lamentable’. Unable to make a fire, he is 
forced to eat cold fish, and succumbs to ‘a miserable sickness’ but cannot ‘distinguish 
what particular fish it was that hurt’ him.

All of these mishaps signify how David as a surviving body fails to enter into 
a collaborative contract with this hostile space. By the third day of failing to construct 
any kind of shelter or feeding himself without feeling sick afterwards, this type of 
 survival takes a lethal toll on his weakening body. His ‘clothes were beginning to rot’ 
his ‘shanks went naked' and his ‘throat was very sore’. Unfortunately, he is also ill-
prepared practically, in terms of not being equipped with any useful objects that could 
help him improve his chances of survival. As he states:

*In all the books I have read of people cast away, they had either 
their pockets full of tools, or a chest of things would be thrown upon*

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450 Ibid. 118.  
451 Ibid. 115.  
452 Ibid.  
453 Ibid. 116  
454 Ibid. 116.  
455 Ibid. 117.  
456 Ibid.  
457 Ibid. 119.  
458 Ibid. 121.
Irony is being used here to critique those unnamed fictional castaways who are traditionally imagined to be fortunate, given their access to useful objects. Stevenson had read and admired Ballantyne's TCI, and Wyss's TSFR in addition to Defoe's RC were so well known during his lifetime that one could safely assume this intertextual reference acknowledges these novels. The Robinsons are an exemplary case, and the Coral Island boys do at least have some useful objects in their pockets after being washed ashore. In contrast, David's succession of disappointments provides little evidence that he is gradually progressing towards managing his body and castaway experience more efficiently as time goes by.

It is only after his body reaches a final inoperable and unmanageable state that he finally calls upon God for release. He makes 'peace with God, forgiving all men' as he prepares to die, reaching what the critic Robert Kiely states is 'a most un-Defoe-like conclusion'. While facing impending death, David once again invokes God, not as a means of endurance for his suffering body in life as is the case with the Robinsons and the Coral Island castaways, but rather as a power that will grant him passage to a better land in Heaven. God has no power to heal the suffering body; his/her power lies instead in offering the body deliverance through escape.

There are two significant points that need to be addressed here. Firstly, in both instances, on board the Brig and on Earraid, we are greeted with the first castaway body that does not draw on a particular skill or faith in the power of God to survive. David's acknowledged physical and spiritual frailty is a far cry from the resourceful Robinsons and Coral Island castaways. Secondly, in both cases, the emphasis on David's failing body constructs God as one whose power cannot transcend the realms of Heaven to aid David's suffering body on earth.

As I discussed in the introduction, the relationship between the island and the child castaway developed through Enlightenment pedagogy's modification of Crusoe's castaway experience to fulfil a didactic ideology revolving around the 'knowable' child and his ability to construct an imaginary settlement of his “own.”

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459 Ibid. 118.
460 Ibid. 123.
reiterate Stuart Hannabuss, following RC the island had ‘become a metaphor for the classroom or the learning laboratory’[^462], which in the case of TSFR and to a lesser extent in TCI, functions as a space to explore and promote the stable castaway child. K, however, destabilised this parallel between the governable island space and governable child castaway while David is bounded both on the brig and on Earraid. One is as unfaithful as the other in representing essentialist ideas about stable spaces of seclusion through which the child castaway can develop and command his/her castaway body and subjectivity. Instead, both spaces are mutually tied to the ocean and its uncertainties. As Peter Hay states:

*The Ocean’s very restlessness, the retreat – and – advance rhythm of its tides, the moving land-sea forwards and back, accentuates the temporarility and contingency of island boundaries.*[^463]

Unbeknownst to David, Earraid is not a secluded island. As he is informed by his local rescuers, it is instead a ‘tidal islet' that can be ‘entered and left' twice in a day subject to the rhythm of the tide. David is ashamed of his ignorance declaring that ‘a sea-bred boy would not have stayed a day on Earraid.’[^464] This illusive state of the island lends itself well to the unstable conditioning of David’s pre and castaway subjectivity, which along with David’s previous allusions to conventional castaways, seems to convey a sense of irony about the unfeasible nature of Enlightenment pedagogy’s knowable child castaway.

The text's concern with David's castaway body and its frailties was indeed noted by at least one of the novel's earliest critics, namely Edmund Gosse, a close friend of Stevenson. In a letter to Stevenson in 1886 just after K had been published, Gosse states ‘[it] is one of the most human books I ever read. The only romance I know in which the persons have stomach-aches and sore throats and have not cast-iron physiques that feel nothing.’[^465] Although Gosse does not name the earlier heroes of adventure fiction, David’s differentiation is marked through his realistically

susceptible body, showing signs of failure in the face of adversity, rather than exceptional superhuman embodiment.

Robert Kiely also speaks of David's physical vulnerabilities while commenting on Stevenson's alternative approach to his protagonist's body compared with ‘previous literary concepts of exploration’ exemplified in the novels of Frederick Marryat. Kiely argues that because David ‘proves to be a rather sickly companion to Alan Breck’, and because he is ‘physically incapable of defending himself’, Stevenson’s work is part of a Victorian genre of ‘romance adventure fiction’ rather than ‘imperial adventure fiction’. For Kiely, K adheres to one predominant trope that defines this genre, which is that ‘it tends not to identify its heroes’ with notable ‘national cause,’ such as Empire and colonialism. Adventure fiction between the mid and late nineteenth century developed in direct relation to colonial and imperial expansion, with works from the likes of Rider Haggard, John Buckand and Rudyard Kipling advocating colonial claims of authority in the name of Empire. To reiterate Peter Hunt, ‘the tradition of the adventure story, with its undercurrent of imperial exploration dates back’ to eighteenth-century writers like Defoe. K does not represent this colonalist ‘tradition of the adventure story’ but is instead informed by alternative epistemological approaches to identity and subjectivity. Although neither Kiely nor Gosse associate this paradigm shift and altered body with Darwinism, there are two clear parallels that emerge.

Firstly, by underscoring David's suffering body and its psychosomatic effects, the narrative essentially desensitises it from ideas of God, nationhood, and lineage in a way that chimes well with the socio-cultural impact of Darwin's ideas. Darwinism proposes that human development was dependent on an evolutionary adaptation for survival linked to the environment rather than spirituality. As Gillian Beer points out, evolutionary theory ‘raised questions fundamental to the life of humankind without making humankind the centre of its enquiry.’ The idea of design and religious agency is essentially impacted by this stance, which refocuses survival away from Christian sustainability towards the uncertain territory of the physical body and its adaptability. Stevenson was not only aware of but was very much interested in, the

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467 Ibid. 149.
470 Ibid. xxiii
impact of evolutionary ideas on the human body and its socio-cultural relations, reflected in his open admiration for Spencer's ideas.

Secondly, Darwin’s proposition that each species is ‘modified but not perfected for its present purpose’\textsuperscript{471} suggests that survival is a result of evolving human practicality rather than the consequence of faith. As with David’s failing body and the representation of God as a powerless entity unable to alter his physical state, there is no claim to apotheosis or perfectibility. In the face of impending death and the body’s inability to fulfil its primordial function, God’s role is superseded.

K has thus far been discussed as constructing an epistemologically different idea of the castaway body and God from that of earlier castaway fiction. Here, both operate in distinctly separate realms. In the face of death, this God fails to act as a spiritual resource. Unlike Ralph in TCI, David does not lament a loss of memorised scripture that could abate his suffering body. Although Ralph’s approach to religion is problematic, he still seeks comfort in faith, whereas David simply gives in to his physical and mental suffering.

David’s subjectivity has thus far developed through a technique of indecisive pluralism, and casual determinism represented through the questionable sanctity of his family relations, a partial faith in God’s capabilities, and David’s physical and emotional vulnerabilities. There is no single dominant agency governing the name – of-the father that determines his subjectivity. The remaining question is how these unresolved issues of agency operating within David’s narrative voice affect the way in which his enemies are constructed, condemned and justly killed. The abject other in K exists within the margins of opposition and similitude; a residual effect of David’s loosely defined pre-castaway subjectivity.

\textbf{Moving In and Out of Wickedness: The Unstable Determinant of Religion and the Fluctuating Abject ‘Other.’}

Following his kidnapping, David wakes to find himself bound and imprisoned on board the \textit{Covenant}. He is put to work alongside the rest of the crew, during which he makes varied estimations of them. Although David knows from the outset that these men, along with his usurping uncle Ebenezer, have conspired against him, these

\textsuperscript{471} Ibid. 151.
Acknowledgements do not conclusively determine the identity of his fellow crew as abject enemies. David sways from detesting these men to pitying them, in a series of altering observations, rendering their abject status questionable rather than conclusive. Looking ‘at the ship with an extreme abhorrence’, David’s initial assessment of the crew is that they are intolerable. However, after spending some time in their company David begins to regret his prejudice against these ‘unclean beasts’ suggesting instead that:

_No class of man is altogether bad; but each has its own faults and virtues; and these shipmates of mine were no exception to the rule. Rough they were, sure enough; and bad, I suppose; but they had many virtues, they were kind when it occurred to them, simple even beyond the simplicity of a country lad like me, and had some glimmerings of honesty._

As each of these men is endowed with a degree of virtue, kindness and honesty that fails to render them as being ‘altogether bad’, David's initial assertions are destabilised. Although this condition is not clearly articulated in religious terms, it is one that is established through the moral codes, which are active in these men even though they are later identified as enemies. Ironically his saviour, for instance, while initially tied and bound as a prisoner, comes in the form of Mr Riach, the first mate on the brig who ‘was touched with liquor.’ Riach convinces Captain Hoseason to release David's bonds and allow him to be taken to a more comfortable part of the ship. Without this intervention, it seems likely that David would have grown too weak to survive. David's weak body is caught up in a liminal state of survival, as it is both overpowered and empowered by men of ambiguous virtue, explored through the narrative's insistence on developing characters such as Ebenezer and Riach within dualistic terms, paralleled with God’s ambiguous agency.

Although the sailor's characterisations remain faithful to the novel's ambiguous representation of the abject other, there is an added element of religious ambiguity being developed that warrants further scrutiny. David's narrative voice essentially recognises ‘the rule' that is embodied by all ‘classes of man' and it is one

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473 Ibid. 62.
474 Ibid. 61.
that pertains to the idea of moral dualism. Within this fluid moral scope, the sailors are afforded a comparative relationship with David himself, who being a ‘country lad’ shares their simple traits to a certain extent, though lacking their knowledge of the sea. Although TCI implies such approximation,\textsuperscript{475} K declares this slippage between the castaway body and the abject other more clearly in its search for a grand narrative of the human condition. It is very much an epistemological condition that chimes well with Darwin’s idea declared in \textit{On the Origin of Species}, which advocates that ‘the innumerable species, genera and families of organic beings’ ‘have all descended, each within its own class or group, from common parents’.\textsuperscript{476}

Thus, what the novel’s dualistic approach to morality works towards is a post-Darwinian truth about the human condition, which sees the physical body and its subjectivity universalised through the idea of common descent. With this fluid approach to identity and religious subjectivity, David’s narrative voice, which is in itself subject to these uncertainties, gives rise to the issue of unpredictability when it comes to what may be expected of these men. Stevenson’s preoccupation with such ideas in K is by no means unique in the annals of late nineteenth-century literature. Michael Davis makes this point clear in his essay ‘Psychology and Character’ \textsuperscript{477} by stating that late Victorian literature was strongly influenced by questions raised in terms of philosophy, neuroanatomy, evolutionary theory and the infant science of psychology. All were concerned with analysing how the mind works, giving rise to a ‘fundamental unpredictability about the self, in both its internal processes and relationship with its environments’.\textsuperscript{478} Although Davis does not specifically refer to K as an example, the novel’s approach to the abject ‘other’ is most definitely sought out in this vein, as the following interactions between David and his fellow crewmen serve to illustrate.

After overhearing the Captain’s plot to kill Alan Breck, an exiled Jacobite from the Highlands, who is sailing on board the ship for a fee while carrying funds to aid the Stuart uprising, David conveys the following:

\textsuperscript{475}In the case of the native teacher’s declaration that if the British castaways were Heathens, this would render them worse than their savage enemies.
\textsuperscript{478}Ibid: 503.
They were dogs and thieves; they had stolen me from my own country; they had killed poor Ransome; and was I to hold the candle to another murder? 479

David's burst of anger here revisits the predicament of identifying his fellow crew in abject terms since the decision to fight and eventually kill two of these men is akin to the honourable prevention of what he considers further injustice. On the one hand, this idea is troubled by the steps taken in the narrative to advocate the acceptance of moral dualism as a universal human condition, rendering no man as 'altogether bad'. However, this ambiguity also continues to reflect Ralph's unstable pre- and castaway subjective influences, when it comes to determining a referential name-of-the-father capable of making such distinctions by way of religious doctrine, parental authority or a sense of nationalism. That which is made certain here is that the condition for abjection is located in the physical and psychological universality of the body, which is a residual concern of David's pre-castaway subjectivity. This principle is traced onto the body of the abused cabin boy Ransome, whose age is unknown because he has spent so much time at sea. He is described as ‘a half-grown boy in sea-clothes with a ‘look between tears and laughter, that was highly pathetic and consisted ill with this gaiety of manner’. 481 Caught between the thresholds of extremities, David cannot process this marginality, as he struggles to identify him in any absolute terms beyond the assertion that he is ‘the least wicked of that gang’. 482

Ransome presents David with the daily challenge of trying to redress these instabilities. While on board the ship, David tries hard ‘to make something like a man, or rather something like a boy, of the poor creature’. Through these attempts, we are given a greater insight into the collaborative relationship between physical abuse and subjective uncertainties, as well as the reason to condemn the individuals who are responsible for Ransome's desperate state.

He had a strange notion of dry land, picked up from sailor’s stories: that it was a place where lads were put to some kind of slavery called a trade, and where apprentices were continually

480 Ibid. 43.
481 Ibid. 44
482 Ibid. 52
lashed and clapped into foul prisons. In a town, he thought every second person a decoy, and every third house a place in which seamen would be drugged and murdered.\textsuperscript{483}

This is how Ransome is described before his eventual death during one of the regular sessions of abuse he endures. The narrative leaves no doubt that this ‘poor creature’ has been the subject of sustained violence at the hands of the Covenant’s crew. His transformation into someone ‘scarcely human’ marks the effect of his abuse. Distortions make up his reality of ‘dry land,’ which is compiled through the remnants of whatever he is told by way of stories. He boasts of his ‘great, raw, red wounds’\textsuperscript{484} to David, suggesting that his abject state of mind has distorted his ability to recognise perverse behaviour in others. This dependency on the crew for ideas of how the world works, outside their insular outlaw one, issues a statement of reciprocal consumption. The sailors consume him as he consumes their stories, to build ideas about what ‘lads’ and ‘seamen’ are like, of which he is neither completely.

It is not that Ransome is taken in by these stories, but rather that he is literally ‘taken’ in that these tales constitute the Law of the Father, the language of his subjectivity. Ransome lacks memories of life before his shipboard abuse and therefore lacks an identity constituting a system of signification. As Marita Sturken emphasises, memory provides ‘the very core of identity’\textsuperscript{485} and it is evident that in the case of Ransome, with no memory of a previous life, this is available only via the sailors' arbitrary seafaring stories. Thus, Ransome's dependence on such tales credits the sailors with the legislative position of the-name-of-the-father. But given their distorted exaggerations, there is no coherent name- of- the father providing a coherent stability for Ransome's entry into language and subjectivity. Thus the eventual death of his body has already been pre-figured by the stillbirth of subjectivity.

Thus K presents an interplay between child development and child abuse in a way that resonates well with the interplay between the discourses of evolutionary and child psychology theories during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Returning to Sully, Stevenson’s friend and founding figure of child psychology throws further light on this interplay. In \textit{Studies of Childhood} (1896), Sully Draws on Darwinism and

\textsuperscript{483}Ibid. 63
\textsuperscript{484}Ibid. 47
compares ‘the child’ with ‘the savage’, claiming that neither embodies their full capacity in terms of physical, mental and moral development. Sully argues that ‘to the evolutionary biologist the child exhibits man in his kinship to the lower sentient world’ which is why the psychologist ‘looking at infancy’ sees ‘the successive phases of its mental life’ as ‘a brief résumé of the more important features in the slow upward progress of the species’. Sully is of interest here because his theories implicitly link evolutionary progress to the acquisition of ‘proper’ human behaviour that marks the human as different from other species. Thus without such ‘proper’ human traits, a body can never be fully human and is condemned to a miserable liminal existence somewhere between the human and non-human.

David’s categorisation of Ransome as the embodiment of this ‘misery’ is brought about by this child’s inability to engage with the ‘upward progress’ of social determination. David’s account of him as ‘a scarcely human creature’ draws on Sully’s child development theory in terms of moral, physical and psychological uncertainty. Ransome thus represents an inability to exist as an unprocessed body within a coherent language of signification, which is the cause of his abject state and just grounds for David’s killing of Ransome’s abusers. Thus unlike David, who survives despite the suffering vulnerability of his body, Ransome, with his miserable liminal, not fully human existence, does not.

Summary

K, like TCI, continues to destabilise the idea of an unquestionably omniscient God, who is the divine architect and ‘maker of all things’. As with TCI, K marks a shift from the God-like parental authority initiated in TSFR. K furthers these tensions in its construction of a different type of God, a revised castaway protagonist and abject ‘other’, all of which reflect changing epistemological approaches to the ideas of the ‘self’ dominating Victorian thought. God does have a voice that David acknowledges, yet his ability to articulate this is always uncertain, whether it be denouncing his uncle's murderous intentions, praying for Godly intervention in the face of death or identifying his enemies on religious and moral grounds. God's

487 Ibid.
questionable influence over David's pre and castaway subjectivity is a theme pioneered in Stevenson's earlier classic novel, Treasure Island which ‘for the first time in English Juvenile Literature’ depicted an ‘adventure story that [was] both unmorralised and unashamed, and in which priggishness and didacticism [found] no place.’ 489 The eponymous character of Long John Silver is, as Townsend states, ‘by no means a villain’ but instead, blurs ‘the usual black and white or right or wrong.’ 490 In the absence of God, authoritarian parents or a national ‘cause' (the sailors are British) that would justify abjection, David's narrative voice is consumed by the physical and psychological emaciation of Ransome's unsound body, mirroring the concerns he has when facing death. It is the state of these subjectively and physically vulnerable bodies that is fundamental to my suggestion that they represent post- Darwinian approaches to childhood and subjectivity. The novel essentially operates on the precipice of what Sally Shuttleworth calls a ‘coming of age of the sciences of child development' and the simultaneous ‘dissolution of the boundaries of childhood.' 491

Robert Kiely’s interpretation of the novel as both ‘aimless and hectic’ 492 represents a dismissal of these connections by critics, which sheds light on the limited understanding of castaway fiction within criticism that instead focuses on themes of colonialism and adventure. Counter novels such as K are identified when Enlightenment principles of the ‘knowable body’ become untenable, thus further signifying a need for dialogical rather than oppositional readings. This approach to reading inconsistencies can help to better understand how the castaway body evolves as a continuous subject of epistemological change, as opposed to a synchronic reading of the name-of- the- father and socio-cultural forces governing subjectivity. As the following chapter will discuss, AHW continues this exploration of child subjectivity, destabilising ideas about family and the abject ‘other’ further. It does so in its examination of human agency and subjectivity in the aftermath of the First World War, post-evolutionary theory and the proliferation of psychoanalysis in the twentieth century.

Chapter Four

*A High Wind in Jamaica: The Self-Sufficient ‘I’*

**Introduction**

*A High Wind in Jamaica* (1929) by Welsh-born Richard Arthur Warren Hughes is the least featured novel in children's literature criticism amongst the five novels under discussion. Its relative obscurity is at odds with the novel's initial reception. Upon its publication in Britain (it had been published a year earlier in America as *The Innocent Voyage*) the novel became an instant bestseller, leading to an emergency reprint of twenty thousand copies in the first week.\(^493\) It also made its way onto Literature syllabuses in schools in England.\(^494\) Adding to its critical success, in 1931 Richard Hughes was awarded the prestigious Femina Vie Heureuse prize, previously won by E.M Forster for *A Passage to India* and Virginia Woolf for *To the Lighthouse*. In 1998, *A High Wind in Jamaica* was included as number 71 in the Modern Library’s Best Novels. While the criteria for such charts are frequently opaque and questionable, nonetheless inclusion is suggestive of ongoing recognition of a novel’s cultural relevance. Out of Hughes’s diverse range of fiction and plays that include *In Hazard: A Sea Story* (1938), *The Human Predicament* volumes one and two (1961 and 1973), *The Spider’s Palace and Other Stories* (1932), *Gertrude’s Child* (1966), Don’t Blame Me and Other Stories (1940), and *The Sister’s Tragedy* (1922) he is most famous for AHW, which is considered by contemporary critics to be a modern classic. The popular reception of the novel is also indicated by its adaptation to stage by Paul Osborn in 1946 under its original title (*The Innocent Voyage*), to radio in 1950 by Jane Speed for NBC University Theater, and again in 2000 by Bryony Lavery for BBC Radio 4, and later to film in 1965 (dir. Alexander MacKendrick).

In his 1994 biography of Hughes, Richard Percival Graves locates AHW between the optimism of TCI and the dark pessimism of Lord of the Flies.\(^495\) In its exploration of subjectivity within the paradigm shift from religious to scientific influences, this chapter takes its cue from Graves and asks how is AHW different

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\(^{495}\) Ibid. 178.
from TCI and what precedents are set for LOTF. In doing so, this chapter will analyse the ways in which AHW represents the child castaway though an increasingly convoluted lens of subjective uncertainties, further distorting the boundaries between the self and abject ‘other.’ Emily, a ten-year-old British girl, living with her family in Jamaica, is the focus of these tensions: her character develops via fractious representations of her relationships with God, family and her self-consciousness, conveyed through an equally fractious narrative voice.

Hughes himself had never been to Jamaica, where the novel begins, but his mother, Louisa Grace Warren, had been brought up there and so was able to tell her son ample stories about her exotic childhood and experiences. Furthermore, Hughes came to read a woman’s first-hand account of an incident that occurred just off the Cuban coast in 1822, when, as a child, pirates had captured the ship (called the *Zephyr*) on which she had been a passenger. Along with other children, she had spent about an hour with the Pirates before being released, during which time ‘they had been treated with every kindness.’ This account fascinated Hughes ‘who determined to make a novel of it’ imagined what would have happened if the children ‘had never been returned’, and how the Pirates would react if they had instead been ‘landed with this uncomfortable booty.’

The first half of the novel depicts the habitual life of a first-generation British colonial family, the Bas Thorntons, living in Jamaica during the late nineteenth century. Following a disastrous hurricane, the Bas Thorntons, along with their neighbours, the Fernandez family, decide to send their children to England in the hope of a better future. John, Emily Rachel, Edward and Laura Thornton along with Margaret and Harry Fernandez all aged between three and thirteen set off on a seemingly straightforward journey. Just two weeks in, their life takes an unexpected turn. Their ship (the *Clorinda*) is taken over by pirates, and the children are forced to spend a year roaming the seas along with their captors. The children’s life at sea is described through a series of dramatic events; Emily's brother John falls to his death, Emily undergoes a series of self-conscious awakenings, sometimes equating herself with God, while it is implied that the eldest child Margaret Fernandez reaches puberty and is sexually abused by the pirates, and Emily kills a captured Dutch captain. Following this last tragedy, the pirates, who now fear for their lives, trick a passing

cruise ship into taking the children, who are eventually granted a safe passage to England. The pirates are finally caught, put on trial and hanged in England, following Emily's testimony in court.

It is a moot point if this is a story of kidnapped or castaway experience since no geographic island is involved. However, I would argue that, despite its manufactured materiality, shipboard life provides exactly the same kind of social isolation, the same kind of abrupt rupture to social experience, the same kind of violent disconnection from the familiar and secure as does the island castaway existence. In terms of this thesis, it offers exactly the same context to explore subjectivity. It is equally a moot point if this novel can be classified as ‘Children’s Literature’. Adrienne Kertzer for instance, states outright the AHW is not ‘a children’s book’ because of the type of reader it addresses. Arguing that ‘children's literature is not so much a distinct literature as a way of reading literature’ Kertzer’s arguments pertain to a putative figure of the implied reader and what he/she should and is capable of reading. Kertzer demonstrates her point through a comparative reading of Hughes's novel and *The History of Goody Two-Shoes* (John, Newbery 1765), written with a young child reader in mind. The difference is said to lie in the way Hughes's novel ‘discourages a child reader' while encouraging adult readers who can decipher its ironic narration, depiction of truth, and amoral approach to murder. Kertzer argues that being able to tackle such questions and deal with such the intellectual and moral uncertainties raised by this novel differentiates the adult from the child reader.

Kertzer’s suggestion that children’s literature cannot include ‘challenging’ novels is an argument echoed by Zohar Shavit in her views on AHW. Shavit states that the novel describes children as ‘little murderers, which would never be acceptable in children’s literature. Both Kertzer and Shavit’s proposals echo the key debates that children's literature critics address already discussed in the Introduction: the purpose of children’s literature, what it is, which books children should read, and how these concerns relate to real readers. For Rose as discussed, children’s literature and implied child readers are cultural products of adult desires rendering both as fictional representations.

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Genealogical studies of children's literature such as Aries's *Centuries of childhood*, highlight that which is thought acceptable and not acceptable for child readers is subject to change. There is no consensus since the idea of childhood itself is constantly subject to changing socio-cultural, and political ideologies. Furthermore, research into Young Adult fiction has since made great strides in raising concerns about the validity of such claims, as a growing number of contemporary novels seek out a dual audience, thus challenging essentialist and totalising ideas about the purpose of children’s literature. Themes of displacement, abuse, death and self-reflexive explorations of identity and selfhood are indeed common. As Robyn McCallum has found in her study of Young Adult fiction which focuses on novels that deal with complex ‘narrative techniques and thematic concerns’ such as *A Game of Dark* (Mayne, 1971), *Voices After Midnight* (Peck, 1989/1991) and *I Am the Cheese* (Cormier, 1977/1991) critics typically categorise them as ‘too difficult for children or adolescents.’ These comments are said to reveal more about the assumptions that adult readers have about children’s reading and cognitive capabilities rather than child readers themselves and their right to access such material. Furthermore, McCallum stresses the important point that these assumptions are indeed subject to changing socio-cultural and educational values. As such critics should consider children's Literature within the dialogical framework of these ideas rather than through humanist ideologies that advocate ‘the concept of an essential and universal individual human subject’ out of which Enlightenment pedagogy’s knowable child originated.

There is no doubt that AHW does, as Kertzer and Shavitt state, employ complex narrative structures and themes, which in the case of the castaway texts discussed thus far, demand more from child readers. However, in terms of being deemed too challenging to be classed as children’s literature because it conveys themes such as death, murder, family and subjective discord, I would argue that these themes are dialogical, stemming from a continuation of ideas that have long since been a staple concern in castaway fiction for children as the previous chapters have illustrated. And, as I note above, the book has been placed on school curriculums,

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500 Ibid. 5.
where, as with other complex literature such as poetry and drama, children can be systematically introduced to narrative complexity. Indeed, there is a case to be made that AHW should be included as one of the texts seen to have influenced the development of what is now termed Young Adult fiction alongside William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*. According to Rachel Falconer, Golding is regarded as amongst the founders of this category because of the way his novel changed the terms of children’s literature in its foregrounding of existentialism, demanding their protagonists to ask questions such as ‘who am I?’ (88 Routledge). Despite the central importance of this introspective question to AHW, and that the novel is often compared to *Lord of the Flies*, Hughes has not, at least in my research thus far, been credited as a fellow instigator of YA fiction.

The critical legacy of the novel foregrounds its unusual and effective narrative structure which T. J. Henighan describes as ‘divided’ between a narrative “I” who tells the children’s story and who, ‘omnisciently peers into the minds of the characters when necessary, and when it suits him, self-consciously withdraws.’ Henighan notes that this ‘divided’ “I” ‘sometimes provides commentary on general matters, but remains, on the whole, such a vaguely defined presence that the narrative is also felt strongly as third person’. 502 Because the last visit to the island by this divided narrator had taken place in 1860, a long time before the story is set, the authority and reliability of this ‘witness’ are constantly in question. The undermining of reliability also applies to the omniscient narration. Moreover, on occasion, the omniscient narrator highlights the novel’s fictivity. For instance, this narrator states ‘the only way of attempting to express the truth is to build it up, like a card-house, of a pack of lies,’ 503 and that ‘it is the novelist who is concerned with facts.’ 504 In this way, the omniscient narrator is rendered unreliable through the reference to fiction and its equation to lies. Even on the final page, the narrator’s reliability is undercut through a confession: ‘perhaps God could have picked out from among them which was Emily: but I am sure that I could not.’ 505 With this unsettling narration in mind, Hughes can be slotted into modernist experiments with narration that attempt to unsettle realist

504 Ibid: 168.
505 Ibid: 175.
conventions by the likes of Hughes’s friend, Virginia Woolf506. This is especially pertinent to both Children’s Literature and the castaway genre since it amplifies a shift in narrative style already suggested. That is the shift from the pedagogic didacticism typified by TSFR’s omniscient paternalism and its model of fixed subjectivities underpinned by a belief in God, to ideals of experiential learning associated with fluid and mobile subjectivities that characterise K and TCI as they are increasingly structured through a belief in science.

Moreover, this shift in narrative brings a greater focus on depicting the subjective workings of the child's mind, which as Maria Nikolajeva states in her highly informative article "Imprints of the Mind: The Depiction of Consciousness in Children's Fiction" is ‘a relatively recent development in Western Literature’507 and even more so in children’s literature. Nikolajeva explores the various narrative modes that writers of children’s fiction employ when attempting to convey a child’s consciousness such as retrospective-self narration, quoted monologue, narrated monologue, and psychonarration as well as using a combination of such modes in a single narrative. One challenging aspect of these strategies is the subjective incompatibility between the child character and adult narrator, which some authors attempt to overcome by conveying thoughts through the vocabulary level of the implied reader for instance, while others seek to emphasise this disparity through covert didacticism or consonant psychonarration. AHW utilises this latter approach, which Dorrit Cohn introduces in her work entitled Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes of Presenting Consciousness in Fiction. Cohn considers various narrative typologies used by writers of fiction between the mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth century to depict the inner thoughts of their characters. Most critics Cohn suggests, take 'the transparency of fictional minds for granted'508, with a few notable exceptions such as Gerard Genette and more significantly, Kate Hamburger. Focussing on the ‘fixed logical and epistemological’509 structures of language, Hamburger identifies how writers are able to portray the I-Origio, that is ‘the

experience - or statement-I\textsuperscript{510} of a character's subjectivity through third person narration. Cohn explores the chronological variations of this attempt, which she argues develop more ardently in twentieth-century modernist fiction. This progression coincides with the changing representations of castaway subjectivity that I have thus far identified and elaborated through a dialogical reading of changing epistemological approaches to the 'knowable' child. Cohn's chronological exploration of this praxis, however, identifies the need to move beyond the grammatical markers Hamburg identifies to account for the 'nonverbal realm of consciousness' and the complex 'relationship between thought and speech.'\textsuperscript{511} Cohn argues that umbrella-like terms such as stream of consciousness, internal analysis and omniscient description often used when analysing James Joyce’s *Ulysses*, for instance, negate to address these concerns.

In novel's where 'fictional consciousness holds centre stage'\textsuperscript{512}, Cohn sees it as imperative to distinguish between two types of psychonarration identified as dissonant and consonant psychonarration. In the case of the former, the narrator remains 'distanced' from the inner thoughts of a character, and the latter describes how the narrator 'fuses' with such consciousness.\textsuperscript{513} This latter approach is most often (although the narrative shifts between the two at times) used in AHW in which the narrator emphasises an unmediated access into Emily's thoughts, but does so with a sense of irony which exploits her naiveté, as she is unaware of how distorted her views on the world become.

In its complexity, AHW is a product of its period. Although set in the nineteenth century, AHW is essentially a cultural product of the political, cultural and intellectual landscape of the period between the First and Second World Wars. As Deborah Parsons states in her essay ‘Trauma and War Memory’:

*The haunting legacy of the war on the processes of memory and representation was integral to the emerging cultural identity and imagination of the 1920s. Resisting representation in conventional*

\textsuperscript{510} Ibid. 67.
\textsuperscript{512} Ibid. 26.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid.
historical narrative, its trauma demanded expression in new writerly forms and strategies.  

The volatile state of Europe and its uncertainty brought ideas about national identity into question, which coincided with the literary movement of high modernism between 1910 and 1930. In AHW, Hughes, like his friend Virginia Woolf in *Mrs Dalloway*, certainly premises what Peter Barry identifies as a predominant tenet of the movement: its ‘new liking for fragmented forms, discontinuous narrative, and random-seeming collages of disparate materials.’ Richard Poole identifies the impact of the war on Hughes during adolescents and as an adult. 

Experimental narrative techniques such as ‘the stream of consciousness’ were being used at the time amongst modernist writers like Virginia Woolf. Indeed, when reviewing *Mrs Dalloway* (1924) Hughes himself not only declares his admiration for this style but also agrees with the novel’s premise that all knowledge is subjective:

> [The human mind] is itself not a microcosm (as men used to think) but the macrocosm: [it] cannot ‘find out’ anything about the universe because the terms both of question and answer are terms purely relative to itself.  

It is tempting here to identify Hughes’s historical ‘men’ with Locke and Rousseau, due to his anti-essentialist stance on the acquisition of knowledge and presumably religion. There are no fixed truths or ‘knowable’ bodies, since everything, and everyone is relative to the workings of subjective reasoning. This principle, which AHW premises, prefigures what Hughes later clarifies in his novel *The Fox in the Attic* (1961):

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His own generation really was a new creation, a new kind of human being, because of Freud! For theirs was the first generation in the whole cave-to-cathedral history of the human race completely to disbelieve in sin.\textsuperscript{519}

Freud’s intervention into the ‘cave-to-cathedral’ history of humankind with its progressive fallacy reiterates science’s rebuttal of God’s omniscience over human agency, while also offering a rational explanation for the irrationality of subjectivity. Hughes can thus be located in the ‘first generation’ of writers influenced by the new kind of grand narrative of psychoanalysis. Richard Percival Graves is amongst critics who recognise this influence and Hughes’s contribution to literary representations of childhood subjectivity in castaway fiction. As he states Rousseau’s ‘central thesis’ about childhood, although enlightening, had given rise to ‘sentimental nonsense’ about children that Hughes disrupted in his fiction;

When Hughes was writing AHW, for example, one of the best-loved children’s classics was R.M. Ballantyne’s The Coral Island. This rousing adventure story, first published in 1858, carried the message that a group of children cast away on a deserted atoll in the south seas would prove to be naturally good, decent, and self-reliant. That was not at all how Hughes saw his children; but instead of replacing the prevalent and somewhat dogmatic belief in the innocence of childhood with an equally dogmatic return to the doctrine of original sin (as Golding would do years later in his Lord of the Flies) Hughes accomplished something both far more subtle and far more profound. ... children cannot be judged in terms of adult values: for childhood, like the past is another country.\textsuperscript{520}

Graves and I have significantly different views on what ‘message’ the TCI conveys. As I argue in Chapter two, the children of TCI are far more complex and far less ‘knowable’ than Graves suggests. And as I will expand in the next Chapter,

Graves is right to suggest that Hughes pre-figures Golding’s *Lord of the Flies*. Furthermore, I interpret Rousseau’s pedagogical theories to be paramount in the construction of the epistemological child subject as opposed to just giving rise to nonsensical books about children.

At the time, other critics noted Hughes’s move to understanding ‘the child’ as a psychological entity, rather than a moral object of rationalist thought or the knowable object of Enlightenment pedagogy.

*Mr Hughes’s book is a highly original study in the child mentality.*521

*It is mainly a treatise on child-psychology, the author endeavouring to portray, in narrative form, the inward thoughts of a group of children between the ages of four and fifteen.*522

The newspaper review quoted above illustrate how AHW shores up the increasing pervasiveness of psychoanalysis as an explanatory framework for behaviour, and the extent to which the ‘child’ was considered a fit subject for this discourse. The novel is, above all, praised for its ‘clear-sightedness in the matter of child-psychology’.523 With the onset of Freudian theory in the twentieth century – which, as W.H Auden put it in his 1939 poem (*In Memory of Sigmund Freud*), developed into ‘a whole climate of opinion’ – explorations into human behaviour focused on the latent aspects of cognition. Through publications such as *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), *Totem and Taboo* (1913), and *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Freud and his disciples dealt with questions of the unconscious impulses of the mind.

The possibilities of exploring the unconscious mind were gradually worked into developing pedagogical models, exemplified in the New Nancy School’s work described by Baudouin in *Suggestion and Autosuggestion: A Psychological and Pedagogical Study* (1921). This study claimed that children were more suggestible to their environment and social relations than adults, and therefore needed to develop a sense of self-control from an early age. They were too young to be hypnotised, but

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parents were instead encouraged to whisper slowly ‘all the improvements desirable’\textsuperscript{524} to their child, while they slept, given that the subconscious was thought to be highly responsive during a state of rest. This pedagogical approach highlights how post-WW1 anxieties about the unpredictability of the self found an outlet in ideas about consciousness and its latent effects, which could allegedly be tempered and conditioned. As John Sullivan states:

\textit{The importance of the theory of the sub-conscious in modern psychology can hardly be exaggerated…it has become the seat of our morality, the custodian of our health, the arbiter of our fate... No one is likely, after the war to doubt in the first place, that human beings are suggestible.}\textsuperscript{525}

Pedagogical concerns were not unique to this period alone, as my analysis has already illustrated. Locke and Rousseau’s pedagogy championed assumptions regarding the needs of the ‘child’, which informed the child/adult dichotomy depicted in TSFR. Additionally, as in the case of K, psychologists such as James Sully had, in the late nineteenth century, already subjected ‘the child’ to scientific mediations and evolutionary debates, integrating developmental stages. AHW furthers these concerns, yet although the above reviews credit Hughes with a perceptive understanding of child psychology, my reading of the novel's treatment of the family, death and the praxis of ‘othering’ suggests something more dynamic. I see Hughes's approach as marking a further epistemological re-negotiation of the child castaway, as the carrier of a move even further away from Enlightenment pedagogy’s idea that subjectivity is a product of stable negotiations between the self and institutions of power governing subjectivity in a Lacanian sense. As the following readings will illustrate, Emily's skewed relationship with her parents, God, self-consciousness and abjection, render her in opposition to these forces during her pre and castaway experiences.


Jamaica: A Home Away from Home

AHW is unusual in that it is the only novel in this thesis to offer an extensive account of pre-castaway subjectivity via the four chapters that precede kidnap. Set in Jamaica after the emancipation of slaves, the novel opens with a scene in a ruined house called Derby Hill, which ‘had once been the centre of a very prosperous plantation.’

Two elderly heiresses, known as the Miss Parkers, live here in a tragic state of helplessness and neglect, reflecting a degree of ruin beyond their dilapidated estate, as their inherited power lies wasted during this ‘transition period.’

The two old Miss Parkers lived in bed, for the negroes had taken away all their clothes ... Presently one of the heiresses persuaded her tyrants to lend her an old print dress, and came and pottered about in the mess half heartedly... Not long after this, I believe, they were both starved altogether to death.

Existing within a threshold, these two women are trying to survive the loss of their white privilege and authority while struggling against their own anachronism in a post-slavery environment. Ironically, they lack even the basic bodily needs of food and clothing, while their sustenance is in the very hands of those who were once subjects of their oppression. Here, the unreliability of the divided narration allows this scene to be read in two ways at once, as seeing the justice of the overthrow of slavery, and as showing sympathy to the relics of white supremacy. This subversive introduction also illustrates the unreliability of family when it comes to facing political change. Unlike the inherited continuity of paternal authority that Father Robinson passes onto his children or Ralph's inherited 'roving disposition', here, the heiresses inherit a barren inversion of empire in which they are ‘starved altogether to death.’ This idea is more akin to post-Darwinian concerns of a diseased inheritance, discussed in the previous chapter.

Beginning with this transitional scene, which registers a breakdown in colonial and Western supremacy, ambiguities surrounding identity permeate the narrative. As

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527 Ibid. 2.
528 Ibid. 1-2.
an inter-war novel, AHW examines the anxieties surrounding ‘cultural identity and imagination of the 1920s’ by usurping colonial identities and exposing them as anachronisms through a modernist lens. This implies the potential emergence of new systems of power through which identity and subjectivity are shaped and articulated. That which is familiar takes on an uncanny representation, mapped as it is through its liminal transition towards the unknown, emphasised in the deadly outcome of the two heiresses. This is the ‘Jamaica’ that the future castaways inhabit: one of threshold and ruin.

This fractured introduction to the country and its inhabitants establishes a lens through which the Bas Thorntons are framed. Living fifteen miles away, they are ‘not natives of the island, ‘Creoles,’ but a family from England’, who inhabit a ramshackle estate in Ferndale often subject to earthquakes. Unlike the former castaways in this trajectory, the child castaways in AHW are part of a diaspora, registering the irresolute issues of selfhood and identity that the Parkers embody above. As Paul Morgan states, they are part of ‘an alien colonial society attempting to live ‘normally’ on a tropical island, as though still in the Home Counties.’ There is an idea of continual displacement at work within the family, as their lived experience in Jamaica is pitted against their idyllic fantasies about England:

_They all had, nevertheless, most elaborate ideas about England, built up out of what their parents had told them, and from the books and old magazines they sometimes looked at ... and going there was about as exciting as it would be to die and go to Heaven._

The idyllic world of England and its grandeurs permeates this family’s existence in Jamaica, as they occupy two worlds simultaneously. The omniscient narrative voice, however, makes no explicit attempt to resolve this dual sense of belonging, which is instead intensified via the prospect that heaven exists in Jamaica as well.

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It was a kind of paradise for English children to come to, whatever it might be for their parents: especially at that time, when no one lived in at all a wild way at home. (4)

While both parents and children consider England as an evocative idyll, Jamaica is subject to a schism of conflicting perspectives. Neither lived experience nor fantasy pay credence to any particular truth because these perspectives are subject to desire. This relationship between desire and truth is a fluid concept of subjective reasoning, rather than confirmed utopias of religious belief or nationhood, as in TSFR. This non-essentialist approach to subjectivity connects with Hughes's aforementioned claim that the mind is not a ‘microcosm' of fixed truths, but is instead relative. It is on these relative terms that the novel further develops a subjective schism between Emily and her parents.

Opposing Perspectives: The Plight of Strangers

If it would have surprised the mother, it would undoubtedly have surprised the children also to be told how little their parents meant to them... Actually, the Thornton children had loved Tabby first and foremost in all the world, some of each other second, and hardly noticed their mother’s existence more than once a week. Their father they loved a little more: partly owing to the ceremony of riding home on stirrups.

Parental significance is trumped by the children’s pet cat, in a narrative strategy that does away with romanticised ideals of family love and unity. Compared with TSFR, there is no sense of family-oriented pedagogy; or of lineage, as depicted in TCI. The narrative is instead concerned with highlighting opposing perspectives. The children embody a subjectivity that is not reliant on their parents’ approval or teachings, rendering them as strangers from one another even before their physical separation. Forming a trivial aspect of their children’s lives, Emily’s parents exist

without a definable presence. This non-definition challenges the way family is conventionally predicated in Enlightenment pedagogy, typified by TSFR, through which the castaway novel for or about children emerged and developed.

The novel continues to invest in this independence during a parting scene, in which the narrator divulges both Emily and Mrs Thornton’s subconscious thoughts, only to reveal the polarity between them. The adult Bas Thorntons decide to send their children back to England due to Jamaica’s unpredictable climate and limited educational prospects. While they accompany the children on board the ship to wish them a safe passage, the children scatter without hesitation, positively thrilled at the prospect of their journey.

*Mr and Mrs Thornton stood by the main companionway, a little disconsolate at their children’s happy preoccupation, a little regretting the lack of proper emotional scene ... Mrs Thornton shuddered: but she continued bravely: ‘You know, I think they were getting almost too devoted to us? We have been such an unrivalled centre of their lives. It doesn’t do for minds developing to be completely dependent on one person’... Emily and John had been captured, and stood talking uneasily to their parents, as if to strangers, using only a quarter of their minds.*

During this supposedly poignant moment of separation, the narrator presents a deep-seated confusion between parental expectations and their infant’s seeming lack of emotion. Feeling dejected and regretful about ‘the lack of proper’ emotion conveyed by their excitable offspring, the narrator foregrounds Mr and Mrs Thornton’s fearful awakening regarding the subjective incompatibility between them and their children. The frightening impact of this crisis is emphasised by the impetus with which Mrs Thornton defuses her doubts about her children’s affections with blissful ignorance. She ‘bravely’ attempts to redress this imbalance with the thought that both she and her husband are ‘an unrivalled centre of their’ children’s lives. Remarking that ‘developing minds’ should not depend on ‘one person’ is a stance that

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Ibid. 31-32.
wholly defies the conditions of Enlightenment pedagogy, in which Locke and Rousseau advocate that such dependence is imperative.

The narrative thus invokes a sense of tragic irony, seemingly directed towards the parental anxieties dominating the twentieth century in light of psychoanalysis and its effect on child development. This anxious tone was effectively noted in a newspaper review on *Childhood Fears* (G.F. Morton, 1925), a book designed to explain the relationship between children and inferiority complex through psychoanalytical theory (including Freud, Jung and Adler). In the review, Beatrice O’Malley describes the ‘disturbing’ effects of child psychology on parenting with its focus on ‘the hidden part of personality’, which was being saturated with psychologists’ ‘educational phraseology.’ The Freudian child, ‘gigantic in cruelty and lust, stalking like a horrible spectre through the darkness and the mud’, generated a will-o’-the-wisp mentality amongst inquiring mothers. Fearing the unknown, many understandably hurry ‘back to her own nice nursery, and resolve to shut psychoanalysts and their work out of it for good and all.’

In her desperate attempt to regain self-possession, Mrs Thornton appears to have closed that very same door, while the narrator insists that any attempt to know exactly what children are thinking is futile. This sense of incompatible subjectivities between parent and child was by no means a new phenomenon. As discussed, Sully had already opened up the child mind to scientific study, which also questioned the mother's capabilities to raise her children according to the demands of this infant pedagogy. Her role in education was that she should develop skills of observation, to assist specialists in their more scientific role. The narrator's determined preoccupation with demythologising the concept of the ‘knowable’ child is critical here.

Unlike any other parting scene discussed thus far, there are no prayers or blessings bestowed upon these future castaways by their parents, as the scene itself is chaotic and dispassionate. Represented as ‘strangers’, the novel hints at Emily’s existing autonomy and independence, marking the declining impact of parental agency within the genre. What are the controlling forces governing Emily's pre-castaway subjectivity then? To investigate this question, it is first necessary to understand the changing state of Emily's subjectivity during the first four chapters before her setting sail.

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536 O’Malley Beatrice, Rev. ‘Childhood Fears’ *The Times Literary Supplement*, 1 October 1925, 638. Print.
The Transition From Guest to Intervener: The subsumption of God’s Power in the Face of Death

The Bas Thorntons’ life in Ferndale is documented via detailed accounts of their habitual routines, the surrounding areas and inhabitants. The following describes a scene during Emily and her brother John’s short stay with the Fernandez family, who live close by in Exeter. On the morning of their visit, Emily proceeds downstairs:

*The house was empty. Presently she spied John under a tree, talking to a negro boy. By his off-hand manner Emily guessed he was telling disproportionate stories (not lies) about the importance of Ferndale compared with Exeter. She did not call him, because the house was silent and it was not her place, as guest, to alter anything: so she went out to him.*

The question of what John may or may not be saying here is paralleled with Emily’s ‘guest’ status through which narrative disclosures are conditioned. John’s stories remain ‘disproportionate’ because Emily cannot ‘alter anything’ so long as her subjective position as a ‘guest' is non-negotiable. The idea here is that truth is not fixed, because it is subjectively conditioned depending on Emily’s state of self-consciousness, which in turn is dependent on her surroundings.

Shortly after on that same morning, the narrative works towards developing this idea further during an earthquake said to have stemmed from the ‘hands of God’\(^5\), in which Emily is pitted against the so-called highest power of all. John and Emily ride their ponies with the Fernandez children to Exeter Rocks for a swim in the sea. After an hour of playing, ‘a very odd thing happened’, as they ‘heard the most peculiar sound: a strange, rushing sound that passed overhead like a gale of wind.’\(^5\)

This is the beginning of an earthquake:

\(^6\) Ibid: 16.
\(^7\) Ibid: 14.
Then it came. The water of the bay began to ebb away, as if someone had pulled up the plug.... Mouthfuls of turf were torn away: and on the far side of the bay a small piece of cliff tumbled into the water: sand and twigs showered down, dew fell from the trees like diamonds.\textsuperscript{540}

Although the earthquake is only said to have lasted ‘for a few moments’,\textsuperscript{541} destruction and violence clearly resonate in its brief description. The physical world around the children is crumbling. Although not immediately verified as having occurred ‘by the hand of God’, it is already implied, since the destructive power necessary for pulling such a ‘plug' chimes with Biblical accounts of God's command over the natural world. A sense of spectacle and grandeur is interjected into an otherwise traumatic event by the antithetical tone of magisterial beauty, which describes the violent scene: ‘Twigs showered down' and dew fell ‘like diamonds.’ Emily's reaction to the earthquake parallels this antithesis. She responds hysterically to the traumatic excitement of survival: ‘She began to dance, hopping laboriously from one foot to another'; and ‘rode her pony into the sea, and beat and beat him till he swam' while ‘yapping herself hoarse.’\textsuperscript{542}

The energy with which Emily embraces her survival surpasses the ferocity of the earthquake itself. She ‘rides high’ on her victory over death, breaking out into animalistic chanting. The savage thrill that she experiences at surviving is reminiscent of a Social Darwinist celebration of ‘survival of the fittest.’ As Herbert Spencer states in \textit{The Principles of Biology} (1864) when discussing an individual’s ability to adapt to social change, ‘those will survive, whose functions happen to be most nearly in equilibrium with the modified aggregate of external forces.’\textsuperscript{543} Indeed, as the quote below suggests, Emily is adaptive because she survives, because she has some ‘equilibrium’ with ‘external forces.’

\textit{There was nothing, no adventure from the hands of God or man, to equal it. Realise that if she had suddenly found she could fly it

\textsuperscript{540}Ibid: 14-15.
\textsuperscript{541}Ibid: 15.
\textsuperscript{542}Ibid.

would not have seemed more miraculous to her. Heaven had played its last, most terrible card; and small Emily had survived, where even grown men (such as Korah, Dathan, and Abiram) had succumbed.44

In this moment, God is most certainly positioned as one ‘external [force]’, which in Emily’s case, is depicted as trivial and non-effective. Crucially, this survival triggers a significant change in Emily’s subjectivity, as this vivid moment of empowerment becomes a referential memory that dominates her subjectivity and self-awareness from this point forth.

The complex relationship between God, death and castaway subjectivity represents what seems like a discursive continuity played out within all the novels discussed thus far. But this continuity serves to foreground a changing belief in God. Victory over death is negotiated as a moral and ethical imperative of God’s will in TSFR rendering the castaway body as a ‘knowable’ entity of Enlightenment pedagogy. In TCI, God and science are intertwined within ‘triumphs’ over the abject other; while in K, post-Darwinian concerns with physical and mental suffering create a God that occupies a spiritually separate realm, and whose influence over castaway subjectivity is irresolute. Emily’s sense of agency and strength, however, stem from the belief that she has just defeated God, unlike her Biblical counterparts Korah, Dathan and Abiram: who, we are told in the Old Testament, were killed by a raging fire and the splitting of the earth governed by the Lord’s wrath, while rebelling against Moses.

There are two important points to be made here. First, Emily's post-earthquake response constructs an oppositional, rather than a collaborative relationship with God: and thus causes a radical separation between the two. This marks the novel as the first to be analysed in the thesis where the future castaway externalises the figure of God as an entity that cannot permeate his or her body, formulating the condition of its invincibility. Second, in the antagonistic positioning of this supreme power against the child, God's sanctity is not only challenged, but it is also inversely subsumed. Although Emily does not declare herself God at this point, she embodies this position

while struggling for survival in future, solidifying the reciprocal relationship between pre and castaway subjectivity, which this thesis seeks to affirm.

Rather than agree with Stephen Knight and Ruth Sapin, who state that the novel portrays ‘morally stunted’ or ‘hopelessly immoral children’ instead, my readings suggest that Emily's post-earthquake response represents the development of a self-sufficient ‘I.’ There is a nuanced distinction between rejection and subsumption, which ideas of immorality negate to address. God is not merely rendered inactive in the sense of Lacan's symbolic order because Emily does not simply reject this power. It materialises instead as a nuanced re-working of her subjectivity and self-consciousness, releasing Emily from her initial ‘guest status.’ This shift is clearly marked, as she later declares that the others ‘didn't seem to realise the difference this made to a person's whole after-life to have been in an earthquake.’

Not long after this incident, Emily faces death once again. In the build-up to the hurricane, which occurs only a day after the earthquake, an insight into Emily's altered state and its profound effects are offered. She was ‘still saturated in earthquake': to the extent that she ‘ate earthquake, and slept earthquake' and her ‘fingers and legs were earthquake.’ This all-consuming totality of her physical and conscious existence is entirely dependent on her personal victory over God and death and points to her eventual embodiment of an impenetrable spectrum of self-sufficiency. This is further depicted in Emily's disassociation from the rest of her siblings, moments before the hurricane. 'Emily did not join them' in their march to ‘Onward Christian Soldiers’, but instead, tells herself time and again that ‘she had been in an Earthquake' - and survived. Her refusal to partake in this processional hymn, praising an external omnipotent being, acts as a poignant reminder of God’s usurpation and subsumption, further clarified during the hurricane.

As Mrs Thornton prays for the safety of her entire family reciting the Psalms, and the poems of Sir Walter Scott, Emily is otherwise engaged, placing herself as the focus of survival. In an attempt to distract her thoughts from the destruction that surrounds her, Emily draws on her earthquake experience for support:

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548 Ibid.
550 Ibid.
[The] thunder and torrential shriek of the wind became so loud as almost to impinge on her inner world ... First she held an actual performance of the earthquake, went over it direct, as if it was again happening. Then she put it into Oratio Refia, told it as a story, beginning with that magic phrase, ‘Once I was in an Earthquake’... When that was done, she put it into the Historical – a Voice, declaring that a girl called Emily was once in an Earthquake.\(^{551}\)

While the hurricane causes irreparable damage, killing her beloved cat Tabby as well as their friend and neighbour Lame-foot Sam,\(^{552}\) Emily is subsumed by her inner world perspective, which is unshakeable. Unlike the Robinsons, who embody God’s protection in the face of death, Emily’s conscious awareness of having subsumed God’s power offers sanctuary, marked in the following transitions. To begin with, there is the issue of Emily’s shift from ‘guest’ (i.e. outsider/observer) to intervener (i.e. active agent), and the impact this has on her storytelling capabilities. Emily is now able to articulate her story, from an immutable position of influence, commanding the scene in a polyphonous spectacle of narration, through which any sense of proportion or disproportion (as was the case with John’s stories) can be spoken of.

The maturation of her storytelling capabilities also marks her ability to transcend physical boundaries and even time, by commanding the space of her ‘inner world' in which she can reposition herself at will. Emily's personal triumph is reflected through her multiple voices, as she imagines various roles for herself. She becomes a self-proclaimed protagonist in what could be a fairy story (‘magic phrase’); a ‘Historical’ narrative; or a public orator (‘Oratio Refta’) with an imagined audience. All three culminate in Emily's representation of a well-rounded raconteur, able to govern an event from multiple perspectives while anticipating the perspectives others may have of her.

Emily’s triumph over God in the face of death grants her the power to be a non-guest within her stories; the articulation of which secures her self-acknowledgement via a voice that she can control (in as far as the narrator is

\(^{551}\) Ibid: 21.
\(^{552}\) Ibid: 18.
concerned). Coupled with the rejection of parental authority over her subjectivity, we are faced with a Symbolically ambiguous child in a Lacanian sense. There is no clear external name-of-the-father to which Emily subscribes beyond her personal victory, which sustains her mastery over language and freedom to self-articulate. This refusal to seek symbolic meaning outside of herself renders her a nomadic subject of Lacan’s two (the ‘Real’ will be discussed in due course) stages of existence, the Imaginary and the Symbolic Order. The Imaginary and the Symbolic as discussed, are domains of consciousness dominated by ‘The Mirror Stage.’ During this stage a child negotiates their uncoordinated sense of self with the more coherent body image reflected in the mirror in a way that marks his/her assent, that is essentially never complete, into the Symbolic world of socio-cultural meaning and order governed by the epistemologically fluctuating name-of-the-father. To do so, Lacan argues that the child must essentially give up their attachment to its mother so as to materialise a desire (the phallic drive) to exist as a coherent subject of the Symbolic Order associated with its father.553

Rather than negotiate with such external markers of meaning or become a guest within them, Emily gains a sense of subjectivity and agency by subsuming their power to develop her speaking body. This rupture here between the Imaginary and the Symbolic relates to what Julia Kristeva describes in Revolution of Poetic Language (1984) as a return to the semiotic chora. Taking issue with Lacan's rejection of the mother in the child's accession into to the Symbolic stage, Kristeva states that the child is bound to the drives that originate in its pre-lingual bond with its mother's body before ‘The Mirror Stage.’ Within this semiotic state, the child is acculturated to the sounds and rhythms of its mother's body (negativity), which eventually make symbolic (only one part of Lacan's Symbolic) signification possible in terms of grammar and syntax (stases) gaining meaning beyond the idea of aimless sound. The negotiation between the two is paramount prior to proceeding to the ‘The Mirror Stage’ and although the semiotic stage is never truly overcome, Kristeva describes the shift from one to the other as the thetic break.554 The mother essentially mediates the child’s body into signification. The relevance of this break or rupture to Emily’s pre-castaway subjectivity is that it is not entirely visible. Although she recognises God’s

power, a strength that is noted symbolically through the type of voice and language it affords her, the fact that it is subsumed internally signifies that Emily cannot distinguish between herself and ‘other.’ A stance that chimes well with Kristeva’s description of the *chora* as ‘the period of indistinction between “same” and “other,”’ infant and mother, as well as between “subject” and “object” in which ‘no space has yet been delineated (this will happen with and after the mirror stage- birth of the sign’).\(^{555}\) Emily is essentially a body in process, mobile rather than anchored, without existing anywhere specifically beyond the realms of her self-comprehension. This type of existence in Lacanian terms borders on that of the ‘Real,’ which as David Rudd explains ‘resolutely resists symbolisation’\(^{556}\) thus making it the most difficult of Lacan's three stages of existence to describe, since there is no delineated boundary between self and other. Acknowledging this position is paramount in understanding how death and abjection are dealt with while castaway.

**Continuation Of the Guest-Intervener Axis While Castaway: Killing and ‘Othering’**

During the first few weeks of sailing, the children are said to be in happy employment exploring the *Clorinda*, under the guardianship of Captain Marpole, who indulges them in their fun. However, as the ship is sailing around Cape San Antonio, Marpole is duped by what appears to be a boat in distress carrying a group of women who he allows to board for assistance. These "women" are in fact pirates dressed up as women. Unaware of the capture, the children are ‘shepherded’ into the deckhouse so as not to witness pirate captain Jonsen threatening Marpole. Even after the deckhouse is shot at, Marpole still resists giving up the ship's money and stores. Jonsen eventually succeeds: after which the children and everything else that was stolen are transferred to his ship, initiating the children's castaway experience.

At first, the children are unable to comprehend the nature of what has just occurred, failing to realise that they are now sailing on a pirate ship. With this lack of knowledge comes a degree of propriety in that they retire ‘into a display of good manners’\(^{557}\) and awkwardness, ‘not knowing what to do with their hands, or even


their legs. Unfamiliarity alters these castaway bodies on both an emotional and visceral level. Unguided, these shy bodies with their guest status are in a state of shock; only when they receive ‘the familiar comfort of a blanket under their chins’ ‘a little life did begin to return into these dumb statues.’

Uniformly conditioned by this idea of unfamiliarity, the narrative insists on representing them as a single body during this transition from guests to a more powerful, influential presence amongst the crew. The next morning: ‘The children all slept late, and all woke at the same moment as if by clockwork.’ Not until ‘their shyness was all gone’ do they begin to come into themselves individually, seeking out their identities. The oceanic space they occupy, unlike the stable island space out of which the Enlightenment castaway originated, is boundless and most certainly ungovernable. These castaways are indeed cut off from conventional means of survival by way of building shelters, procuring food, or cultivating land, rendered them unable to govern their space in a corporeal sense. These activities require a purpose, which these children do not have as they aimlessly roam the seas along with the pirates. Like David in K, food and shelter are not the predominant concerns of these castaways. Such corporeal necessities are barely mentioned following the initial comfort that the blankets afford. Instead, survival is centred round identity and belonging, reflecting the same narrative preoccupation that defines Emily’s pre-castaway subjectivity, the ungovernable nature of which, also reflects the ocean that surrounds her.

The specific events that I will discuss focus on how Emily deals with this initial life-threatening castaway transition, by negotiating her subjective position from ‘guest’ to survivor once more. I will also focus on the effects this transition has on Emily's ability to articulate and manage her brother's death, as well as attempting to come to terms with killing a Dutch pirate taken hostage. As a point of departure, it is necessary to analyse the first instance of death, which takes place soon after their castaway adventure begins.

On the following day of their capture, the ship lays anchor at Saint Lucia so that the pirates can engage in trade negotiations with the Islanders. The children are taken ashore and are allowed to observe as goods are auctioned off, after which John,
Margaret and Edward are taken to see a nativity play being performed on the island. During the performance, ‘John, in his excitement, leaned out too far. He lost his balance and fell clear to the ground, forty feet, right on his head.’ Jose, the pirate supervising them, clamours down the stairs and inspects the body, ascertaining that ‘the neck was quite plainly broken.’

There is an almost mechanical aspect to the way John’s death is narrated, devoid of speculation, sentiment or any great detail beyond physical activity. Interestingly, the same kind of rational sensibility is conveyed when the pirate’s pet monkey dies later: Jacko slipped, ‘fell plump on the deck and broke his neck. That was the end of him.’

The narrative’s analogous treatment of both animal and human death drives Richard Pool’s Darwinian reading of John’s demise: ‘The narrator’s dispassionate treatment of John implies that a human life is no more or less significant than a monkey’s.’ As well as conveying an evolutionary kinship regarding common origin and descent, I would also add that John’s death can be considered within a post-war context.

It signifies a marked shift in the way death has been managed within castaway fiction thus far. The lack of detail and certainty surrounding the event introduces a new concept of accidental death, summoning the idea that death is not always made intelligible/articulable through a religious, national or abject cause. Without these common frameworks sustaining a particular agency, this senseless accident only derives meaning from an idea of purposelessness that, in my reading, is akin to casualties of war. In this sense, the nature of John’s death draws upon the historical specificity of the novel as a post-war text, written at a time when such casualties, devoid of ceremony and rational comprehension, were rife.

The lack of rational explanation surrounding John’s death and his absence continues from this point forth. The following morning, the entire group engage in communal silence:

Yet, as if by some mute flash of understanding, no one commented on his absence. No one questioned Margaret, and she offered no information. Neither then nor thereafter was his name ever.

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562 Ibid: 44.
563 Ibid: 44.
564 Ibid: 68.
mentioned by anybody: and if you had known the children intimately you would never have guessed from them that he had ever existed.\textsuperscript{566}

John’s unspeakable death negates his existence, represented as a silence informed by a lack of ‘questioning’, ‘information’ or his ‘name ever’ being ‘mentioned.’ This ‘mute flash of understanding’ opposes Emily’s pre-castaway control over her voice, which is now subsumed by a communal silence that belongs to all of ‘\textit{them}.’ She is positioned as being a part of ‘\textit{them}’ in a way that denies Emily her aforementioned narrative empowerment, while simultaneously affecting the narrative’s disclosure surrounding John’s death. The physical and subjective displacement brought about by castaway experience silences Emily’s ability to convey any such story, as the aforementioned condition of ‘guest’ and intervener status is re-instigated. Despite the nuanced way this subjective regression is implied, it is verified in the following example, as the captain admonishes the children for turning the deck into a toboggan-slide:

‘If you go and wear holes in your drawers, do you think I am going to mend them? – Lieber Gott!\textsuperscript{567} What do you think I am, eh? What do you think this ship is? What do you think we all are? To mend your drawers for you, eh? To mend ... your ... drawers?’...They could hardly believe so unspeakable a remark had crossed human lips...For a while their actions showed the unhappy wariness of the uninvited guests.\textsuperscript{568}

The children are, until this point, unaware of their castaway plight: signified by their sense of play, which can be likened to what Hughes describes as the attitude taken by evacuated children when transported to safe areas during World War One. Having hosted seven such children from Birkenhead, Hughes was taken aback by the evacuees’ ability to deflect the tragedies of war via a sense of adventure, declaring that ‘nobody thought that the war, when it came, would first appear as a gigantic,

\textsuperscript{566} Hughes, Richard. \textit{A High Wind in Jamaica}. London: Vintage Classics, 2002: 68. Print. \\
\textsuperscript{567} A German expression, meaning ‘Oh my God.’ \\
prolonged nation-wide children’s party. This distraction now comes to an abrupt end, as the captain’s censure affirms a sense of displacement amongst the children, suddenly anxiously aware of their position as ‘uninvited guests’ on board the ship. Whether this is down to the captain’s reference to God, or his mention of undergarments, is questionable: the narrative reinstates the conditions on which Emily’s power of articulation is founded, re-invoking the unspeakable and ‘guest’ axis through which narrative disclosures are conditioned.

Moments after this scene Emily retreats to an isolated part of the ship to reassess her subjective position introspectively, in an attempt to regain her sense of agency. The narrator depicts this transitive journey, while Emily asks herself a series of questions related to her identity and self-exploration: after which she suddenly realises ‘who she was', and begins ‘seriously to reckon its implications:

First, what agency had so ordered it that out of all the people in the world who she might have been, she was this particular one... At this, another consideration: who was God? She had heard a terrible lot about Him, always: but the question of His identity had been left vague, as much taken for granted as her own. Wasn’t she perhaps God, herself?

...Well then, granted she was Emily, what were the consequences.... It implied a whole series of circumstances.

What is striking is that Emily attempts to localise her identity by distinguishing herself as being something other than a ‘guest.’ The space in which this occurs is her own, developed within the realms of introspection, whereby her subjective position as a ‘guest’ (on board the schooner) can be altered. This transition is narrated in the third person, complimenting Emily’s conscious adjustments as she embarks on a transitory journey of self-objectification that enables observation. Her
subjectivity is manageable as a malleable entity, freeing up the possibilities of identity and ‘agency’ in a way that re-energises her inner voice and articulatory capabilities.

This freedom to choose is defined by Emily’s decision that she is ‘God’, while her appropriation of this identity adheres to the narrative conditions of power and intervention. Emily consumes the ambiguity surrounding God’s identity, which her earthquake and hurricane victories have ‘left vague’ as a means of transplanting herself within this space. This negotiation marks Emily’s return to her past victories; her experience at Exeter Rocks during the earthquake; the ownership of her body that rejected fear via the internalisation of God’s biblical strength; and to her pre-castaway voice, through which the story of her strength and survival can be told.

Emily's self-interrogation is not merely coincidental here. It is carried out because it affords the strength that she needs to survive as an evolving subjectivity, signifying the inherent liminality of the castaway body that negotiates memories within the present to survive. As Paul Morgan states, ‘by capturing her at this particular moment of transition, the rich complexity of a human mind is shown at one of its most revealing stages: as it becomes aware of itself.’572

Jean-Paul Sartre, a prominent existential philosopher of the twentieth century, references this scene of Emily’s self-awareness as a succinct depiction of the ‘fortuitous and shattering advent of self-consciousness’, marking ‘the child’s’ passage into ‘otherness.’573 Emily's intuition is said to stand for ‘universal subjectivity' in that it denotes the essential negotiation between understanding one's unique position in the world and realising that difference stems from being a subject of one's consideration. Through this subjective negotiation, following a disavowal of Godly and parental influences, Emily is represented as carving out a place for herself in the world as a subject of her consideration.

Unlike the castaways in TSFR, TCI and K, Emily does not utilise the divine as a moral guideline for behaviour but instead internalises the identity of ‘God' ‘Himself’ within her own being as a restorative, subjective power. The survival of Emily's articulate self outweighs any sense of moral implications, in a narrative statement that adheres to the concerns of twentieth-century psychology, which emphasised the importance of the subconscious. Quoting Baudouin once more, psychology and Freudian culture became ‘the seat of’ morality, ‘the custodian of health, and the

arbiter of fate’, rendering ‘human beings’ ‘suggestible’;\textsuperscript{574} a human condition that informed the writing of post-war modernists such as Hughes.

Before her ‘new-found consciousness’, her subjective voice had been subsumed by the common ‘mute flash of understanding’ and ‘guest’ status, which denied her the ability to speak of John’s death and absence. Yet after she has re-negotiated her position, she is able to break this silence:

\begin{quote}
Emily by now was conducting, in her head, a secret conversation with John. She had never done so before: but today he had suddenly presented himself to her imagination. Of course his disappearance was strictly taboo between them.\textsuperscript{575}
\end{quote}

The relationship between subjective sovereignty and articulation is represented again here: given that this ‘conversation’ is conducted ‘in her head’, which defies the ‘strictly taboo’ conditions imposed on the group regarding John’s absence. John’s existence is certified through storytelling, and his silence absolved via Emily’s ‘imagination’, through which her brother is transformed into a spectral presence. Although the extent to which Emily can control her thoughts is questionable, given the ‘sudden’ way John is said to ‘present himself to her’, he does become articulable once more. Her capability of controlling the dead and re-establishing John as a discursive presence again confirms the way her subjective imagination recovers the power of her pre-castaway storytelling abilities, depicted during the hurricane. It is, however, questionable whether she indeed is fully aware of this negotiation and its power, given the consonant psychonarration used to convey that John’s revived presence is, not without consequence. Emily begins to retreat within her ‘inner world’ to such an extent that a disparity between reality and imagination develops. The ‘knowable’ child body of Enlightenment pedagogy stands in stark contrast to this image of the secular child mind and its oceanic unpredictability, accelerated from this point on. Emily begins to objectify herself as a fictional character in light of lived experience, adding a new dimension to storytelling and the way in which the abject ‘other’ is determined and made readable as a product of her volatile psychosomatic state.

\textsuperscript{574} Baudouin, Charles. \textit{The Times Literary Supplement} 1921. Print.
The Abject ‘Other’ Bordering Within.

The following instances, leading up to the Dutchman’s death, illustrate Emily’s self-objectification and fractured sense of agency. The way in which the narrative raises these concerns of uncertainty just before she kills a man introduces a new approach to abjection that moves away from the epistemological patterns of ‘othering’ discussed thus far. As the days follow on from Emily’s self-interrogation, her unstable consciousness begins to unravel. Fractured memories permeate the narrative, exemplified in her recollection of a recent confrontation with the pirate captain:

As Emily, with her newfound consciousness, recapitulated the scene, it was like re-reading a story in a book, so little responsibility did she feel for the merely mechanical creature who had bitten the captain’s thumb. Nor was she even very interested: it had been queer, but then there was very little in life which didn’t seem queer, now.¹⁷

Emily has now managed to dissociate herself from the actions, which her body is said to perform. Responsibility is unaccounted for: she has assigned it to an external ‘mechanical creature.’ Given the event in question is likened to ‘re-reading a story in a book’, as a ‘creature’, she is considered fictional, along with what and who surrounds her/it. Here, Emily’s sense of agency and bodily actions are explicitly framed within a kind of meta-fiction, sourced within her subjective power and storytelling capacities. Whereas in K, the suffering body dictated psychosomatic negotiations, in AHW, a reversal of this human condition occurs, given that Emily’s psychological state is said to govern her physical body.

This scene again signifies the effects of Emily’s subjective and narrative freedom from an externally governed Symbolic Order in the name of God, family, nationhood or the physical body. Her fractured recollections parallel her fractured identity, due to her refusal to acknowledge the existence of external subjective

institutions: an exodus which has gradually been worked towards within this trajectory of castaway fiction and its epistemological influences. The idea that Emily perceives life as mostly ‘queer’ validates her above state, while her inability to willfully control her body and subjectivity conditions her narrative presence within a diabolical state of unpredictability. Leading up to the moment when Emily kills the Dutchman, we are told that for her, ‘consciousness’ meant that ‘she was still only half aware of the secret criterion within her’; and ‘that she was terrified of it’, because despite knowing that ‘she was God Himself’, she also ‘knew that there never had been anyone as wicked as her since the world began.’ A parallel is thus drawn between power and ominous possibility, as Emily's self-sustained symbolic order is overshadowed by a threat to her castaway body and what it is capable of. Essentially, what is introduced here is the idea that the enemy lies within which as a concept, has various implications on how the narrative goes about representing the issue of abjection. Recalling Julia Kristeva’s account of abjection as that which is ‘opposed to I’ representing ‘the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies’, gives us an insight into the current state of Emily’s subjectivity. Having assimilated God’s power, thus becoming her own name-of-the-father in a Lacanian sense, these ‘codes’ are eradicated, as both the subject and object of abjection are sourced within her own ‘I’ rather than ‘opposed’ to it. As an embodied subjectivity, her existence conflates the boundaries between subject and object (already implied via Emily’s self-fictionalisation), internal and external through which identity, agency and the abject ‘other’ are given meaning. The previous chapters have focused on a chronological pattern within castaway fiction, by which the abject other and the justification of their death(s) are reasoned via proof. The pattern, based on changing epistemological approaches to identity, and the name-of-the-father shaping the castaways’ subjectivity, represents an escalating departure from Enlightenment pedagogy’s ‘knowable’ body. In AHW, this is taken further, as distinctions between the self and the other are annihilated. Unlike its predecessors, the novel does not partake in a ceremonial framing of castaway

576 Ibid. 97. Print.
subjectivity within the terms of religion, colonialism, or the physical supremacy of the post-Darwinian body. Instead, proof and agency are mapped out through the fluctuating sensitivities of Emily’s subjective consciousness, operating within the realms of its own conditions and jurisdiction.

Lacking any further framing elements beyond this unstable sense of agency, judgement, and morality, the narrative proceeds with Emily killing the Dutchman. Having injured her leg while playing a game with the other children, she is confined to the pirate captain's cabin to recuperate. During her confinement, she is unaware of events that take place, including the second capture of a passing schooner. A Dutch captain is taken hostage and held captive in the captain's cabin. We are told that he spoke no English, but tried to communicate his plan of escape to Emily by moving ‘his head' towards ‘a very sharp knife' on the floor' then ‘on Emily'579, in the hope that she would pass it to him. ‘Beside herself with terror’580 Emily seizes the knife before he can with the following consequences:

In the course of the next five seconds she had slashed and jabbed at him in a dozen places: then, flinging the knife towards the door, somehow managed to struggle back into the bunk.18

The report adequately conveys Emily's sense of panic and confusion: and the speed of the attack summons a degree of intensity associated with her fear of survival. The way her actions are consecutively grouped together and conveyed in the third person indicates a change in her agency and control. A sense of agency is lost during this crisis, marking a departure from how previous castaways engage in killing and the praxis of abjection. It is reported in a way that renders her justification of the deed as questionable. She is not working towards a particular cause other than survival; this automated response is akin to the dissociated ‘mechanical creature' Emily describes herself as prior to this scene. What also complicates an idea of agency are the references made to the Dutchman just before he is killed: ‘He reeked of some particularly nauseous brand of cigars that made her head swim,’19 This confusion is reiterated just before the struggle commences: ‘Remember that he had no neck, and

18 Ibid: 108.
19 Ibid: 105.
the cigar-reek."20 With her head swimming with chaos, death is conditioned by Emily's subjective state.

Identifying the abject other, and murder in rational terms, is an ambiguous task: especially when taking Emily's conviction that she was the most 'wicked' person in existence into consideration. The matter of proof and evidence ceases to be applicable in terms of tangible truths. In fact, proving that the Dutchman qualifies as an enemy is questionable, given that neither of them speaks the same language. Emily cannot understand that he is pleading with her for help so that he can escape and return to his family. She sees him struggle for a knife, and fears for her life. It is almost instantaneous in a way that does not account for a sense of justification outside of miscommunication. The nature of the Dutchman's death is reminiscent of John's death, in that both characters are treated as victims of a senseless accident; and in my interpretation, as casualties of war, which fail to adhere to any sense of certainty. Thus, with the narrative's emphasis on Emily's subjectively unaligned castaway body, abjection's subject/object dichotomy is no longer feasible.

Furthermore, taking the mind and its mental processes as an abstract methodology, through which subjectivity, agency, and proof of abjection is identified and articulated, raises the same issues faced by psychoanalysis during its early critical reception. This epistemological approach to identity induced doubt in some critics, who challenged the validity of claims made by psychoanalysts based on an absence of verifiable evidence. In 1920, when reviewing the work of four chief psychoanalysts (Freud, Adler, Jung and Rivers) one journalist commented that: 'Psycho-analysts are apparently in the unpleasant position of being unable to adduce the evidence on which they chiefly rely.'581 Here too, amidst the related issues of deciphering agency, morality and knowledge in terms of the sub-conscious and conscious activities of the mind, lies the same absence of tangible evidence, which Hughes faces in the novel. In my reading, this methodology is utilised as a narrative platform through which these uncertainties can be presented, rather than resolved. As Hughes admits in a letter to Richard Poole, 'you know that I rate questioning above answering as the writer’s proper function.'582 This same attitude of deliberation, rather than closure, is taken

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forward: as the narrative deals with Emily’s sense of agency, having killed the Dutchman.

While still in the cabin, ‘she tells herself’ ‘endless stories’ and sings ‘wordless songs’, until interrupted by her memory of having killed a man:

Life threatened to be no longer an incessant, automatic discharge of energy: more and more often, and when least expected, all that would suddenly drop from her, and she would remember that she was Emily, who had killed…and who was here.21

Lapsing in and out of conscious thought, Emily struggles to acknowledge what it is she has done. The memory of having ‘killed’ unexpectedly creeps up on her, interrupting her attempt to continue living an ‘automatic’ life. This confession is, however, short-lived, as she desperately tries to negotiate a sense of control over her thoughts. A stain of blood, which remains on the cabin floor where the Dutchman was killed, develops a gateway leading her back to the secular fortress of her inner world:

But presently she was singing happily, and hanging right out of the bunk to outline in pencil the brown stain on the floor. A touch here, a touch there, and it was an old market-woman to the life, hobbling along with a bundle on her back! I admit that it staggered even Otto a bit when he came in and later saw what she had done.583

Emily naively rewrites the acts of murder by inscribing its visible sign with imaginative new meaning. The dead man's blood is ironically reworked to construct the story of a live ‘market – woman’, as life and death are conflated. Although this version of the Dutchman's death implies that her status as a ‘non-guest’ is once again achieved via the act of storytelling, she can no longer control this skill. The power of her fleeting memories of what happened is too strong to deceive her: even in her imaginative reworking of the stain, which fails to ward off the ‘blood-covered face of

the Dutch captain dominating her stream of consciousness. As her fictions lose their power of sanctuary, and she loses the ‘confidence that she was God’, she begins to see everyone on board the ship including herself as a potential enemy. Without any faith in anything or anyone, the object of fear is lost, and everyone becomes the abject other. Now ‘she feared’ and ‘hated everybody’.

This corpse is a poignant reminder of the example Kristeva gives to explain the clash between the ‘Real’ and the Symbolic that gives rise to abjection. The ‘corpse’ which, blurs the threshold between life and death, represents a ‘fundamental pollution’ of self-signification and identity. To exist in the ‘Real’ is as Karren Coats argues in *Looking Glasses and Neverlands* is to ‘have slipped the boundaries of symbolization’, (22) a place where there is no negotiation with the Symbolic and in Emily’s case, a place in which the corpse can be transformed into a market woman. However, it is a place ‘at the limit of primal repression’ which Emily with her unprocessed body can no longer occupy, given the interruption of the captain’s ‘blood covered face' which violently ruptures her version of events and command over her castaway experience. Finally, as the novel climaxes in a state of anathema, she and her fellow castaways are rescued, after which the novel turns its focus on the children’s safe passage to England. This exodus is essentially illusory: the issue of abjection consuming Emily’s castaway body sits irresolute, threatening life thereon with its haunting legacy.

**Summary**

AHW is most certainly a product of its time, which represents the castaway child within a post-war Modernist intellectual framework fuelled by ideas of subjective uncertainties. The idea of God succumbs to these same principles, who far from represented as a divine presence, is instead externalised as a vacant identity that can be subsumed at will by a ten-year-old child. Furthermore, unlike the previous novels, there is no ceremonial framing of the enemy in AHW. Father Robinson (a pastor by trade) and his family have an unwavering faith in God, who as a recognisable name-of-the-father/subjective power, materialises through the uninterrupted memory of scripture, protecting these castaways from all threats in life.

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584 Ibid: 139.
586 Ibid: 139.
588 Ibid. 10-11.
and death. Evidence proving the distinction between self and ‘other’ is warranted in TCI, as we see the emergence of sub-factions competing for power over castaway subjectivity by way of scientific lineage, God and nationhood. Despite this discord, all power relations remain referential to these external institutions; while the castaway and ‘other’, remain subject/objects within/of them. In K this fragmented sense of agency is taken further, with God, family and nationhood addressed in increasingly convoluted terms and having a residual affect on the way death and the abject other are represented. Yet evidence for the justification of death and ‘othering’ are still founded on the concept of the tangible suffering body; and through it, a relatable human condition common to all.

To an extent, I agree with Colin Manlove: who in his study on changing representations of children within fiction, argues that ‘in Hughes’s story reality dismisses the idyll, whereas in children’s fantasy the idyll usually dismisses the reality.’ However, in my reading of the novel, this transition does not simply stand in opposition to the romanticised child castaways initiated in TSFR but is rather a part of the dialogical aporia surrounding pedagogy and the ‘knowable’ child. The novel comprehends and articulates the mechanisms of subjectivity – how we know what we know – the process Hume asked for in Locke; but could not be provided via Enlightenment pedagogy’s fixed ‘knowable body.’ Emily’s shifting thoughts are narrated in a way that articulates the fluctuating negotiations of identity politics as an embodied praxis, offering a conciliatory bridge between the way external institutions of power effect subjectivity, according to their appropriation and repudiation. Thus Hughes offers a close exegesis of proof on these alternative grounds, by harnessing the conscious workings of suggestibility as a secular activity that privileges subjectivity.

As I suggest above, while AHW has received some critical attention that recognises its place in modernist fiction, it has received little attention as a novel that pre-figures the bleak abjections of LOTF. The next Chapter will thus build on the arguments made in this chapter concerning subjectivity, especially the excision of family and a growing schism between God, faith and subjectivity, taking ‘the sceptical current that was fuelled by the first world war, and its gradual slide into the second’ as its focus.

590 Ibid. 78.
Chapter Five

Lord of the Flies: Strangers From Within

Published in 1954, nine years after the end of World War Two in 1945, William Golding’s LOTF, a dystopian tale of shipwrecked schoolboys, develops its castaway characters through narrative introspection in a similar manner to AHW. However, these similarities are shaped through post-Second World War anxieties and the shock of Hiroshima. Having witnessed the atrocities of war and survived, it is unsurprising that Golding begins LOTF with the aftermath of an atomic bomb. Golding himself became a seaman in the Royal Navy in 1940 and was involved in various incidents including the pursuit of Germany’s most famous battleship, the Bismarck. The novels’ schoolboy protagonists were in turn inspired by Golding’s observations of boys as a teacher, particularly from 1945 onwards following the end of the war. While teaching in Salisbury, Golding completed this, his first novel, which by the 1960s was considered a modern classic.

Given that the novel was published just as Britain began to emerge from post-war deprivation and enjoy the consumerist boom already dominating America, it is little wonder that this bleak novel was not an immediate popular success, and in America at least, it had been taken out of print by the end of 1955, though its subsequent commercial success is registered in two screen adaptations in 1963 (dir. Peter Brook) and 1990 (dir. Harry Hook). Nigel Williams adapted the novel for the stage in 1996 when it made its debut at The Royal Shakespeare Company. Like AHW, LOTF has been adopted as a set text in secondary schools and universities (as it still is) in both Britain and America, and then in translation across Europe and Asia, eventually becoming ‘one of the most familiar and studied tales of the twentieth century’ and a post-war classic example of the ‘literature of disillusionment’.

Thus like AHW, the novel is read by children, though it falls outside the definitions of ‘Children’s Literature’ proposed by Kertzer and Shavit elaborated in the previous chapter that are based on assumptions about the ‘innocence’ of children, both as characters and readers: assumptions that are challenged and reiterated in debates concerning the meaning of ‘Children’s Literature’ and its difference from books read by children. As I also observe in the previous chapter, Rachel Falconer has suggested

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that LOTF should be regarded as Young Adult fiction despite its assumed adult concern with the potential violent behaviour of children placed in extremis, since its ongoing readership by what we might call ‘non-adults’ unsettles the boundary between ‘adult’ and ‘children’s’ literature. It is this grey area, this liminal space between what is deemed to be children’s literature, and what it is not, that justifies the selection of LOTF for this thesis since it is a book about children, frequently read by non-adults.

Writing about the influences of LOTF, in an essay entitled *Fable*, William Golding identifies the contextual impact of World War Two on his novel as well as the main theme.

> Before the Second World War I believed in the perfectibility of social man... but after the war I did not because I was unable to.

 [...] 

> The overall picture was to be that tragic lesson that the English have had to learn over a period of one hundred years, that one lot of people is inherently like any other lot of people; and that the only enemy of man is inside him.  

Golding’s realisation is a characteristic post-war declaration about the ‘human condition’, which also presents a lesson learnt from Britain’s colonial and Imperialist history including the Indian Rebellion of 1857, and both World Wars. His understanding of LOTF is clearly shaped by the broad-based humanism that dominated much post-war thinking and which, as Second Wave Feminism was to argue, was also profoundly gender-blind. Golding’s two declarations ‘the only enemy of man is inside him’ and that ‘the perfectibility of social man’ is untenable are highly pertinent to this thesis since both coincide with the gradual decline in differentiation between the castaway body and the abject ‘other’ in the novels already discussed. Although Golding’s own meta-commentary on the novel has been extensively referenced by scholars researching its approach to civilisation versus savagery, good versus evil, family and war in insightful ways, Golding’s declaration is often utilised as the defining truth about the book’s intention, without locating how these ideas are constructed within the novel itself. One aim of this chapter is to explore the ways in

which these ideas play through the narrative. As I will argue, understanding the subjective narrative patterns of the text is akin to understanding how these castaways in LOTF are gradually represented as embodying a state that renders them ‘strangers from within’ – to borrow from Golding the novel’s original title. This state traces a process of abjection via the castaways’ gradually declining ability to bear witness to themselves.

This approach to subjectivity brings us to the second way in which LOTF can be differentiated from the castaway novels previously analysed. Unlike all the novels discussed thus far, there are no scenes of pre-castaway existence prior to the plane crash. The Robinson family, are introduced just as their ship sinks allowing their religious affiliations and colonial intentions to be presented. In TCI we are treated to a brief history of Jack’s seafaring lineage and experiences prior to his castaway experience. In K, we journey with the newly orphaned David from his family home before he is eventually castaway on the island of Earraid, and in AHW, there are four chapters devoted to depicting the everyday life of the children in Jamaica prior to their kidnapping.

Told through omniscient narration, LOTF instead, commences with castaway experience, evoking the chaos and confusion following the crash when nameless bodies act and interact with each other, in a way that resists tangible identification. This approach to characterisation chimes well with what Deborah Parsons describe as the ‘experimental techniques’ of post-war Modernism. The characteristic ‘fragmentation of subject and narrative,’ ‘introspective narratives,’ ‘temporal dislocations’ and ‘associative images’ associated with this movement, is reflected in the way the narrator introduces us to Ralph and Piggy. We are presented with a third person omniscient narrator predominantly concerned with Ralph’s point of view, his thoughts and changing subjectivity. As I will argue, narrative strategies pointing to the disintegration of ideas of coherent society and subjectivity places LOTF more properly on the threshold of Postmodernism, which Francois Lyotard explains as follows:

*The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself; that which denies itself the*

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As I will discuss, LOTF operates within the contextual framework of post-war postmodernism because of its fragmented characterisations and the way it ‘presents’ the ‘unpresentable’ through Ralph’s disintegrating subjectivity. I will explore how Golding’s gradual revelation that the enemy resides within adds to the repertoire of epistemological discourses informing castaway subjectivity through this socio-cultural lens of post-war postmodernism. It is perhaps due to the epistemological uncertainties of postmodernity that critics are divided on issues of parental authority, the child/adult dichotomy and the legibility of either order or disorder within a variably contested space in their readings of the novel. Without the ‘solace of good forms,’ the novel drastically departs from Enlightenment pedagogy’s critical legacy of representing the family, self and ‘other’ within fixed, knowable and certain terms.

Examining these tensions also gives rise to the question of what genre the novel belongs to, by way of children’s literature and Young Adult Fiction. As C. Butler argues in ‘Psychological Approaches to Literature’ the relationship between children’s literature and Postmodernism is contentious since ‘the didactic function still strongly associated with Children’s books would be threatened by the potential nihilism of an approach that undermines the notion of stability, either of meaning or of value.’

Through my readings of the ways in which family, the self and ‘other,’ are conveyed in the novel, I will argue that LOTF, in a trajectory that goes back to TSFR, dialogically contributes to the redefinition of Enlightenment pedagogy’s assumptions of the ‘knowable’ child. As I will argue, the novel cannot simply be interpreted in opposition to TCI as an antidote to idealised representations of castaway fiction, as it often is, given the way I associate the two in relation to a continuation of ideas regarding the literary castaway child and subjectivity.


Novels since TSFR increasingly represent the castaway body as a liminal construct that, at worst, signifies a crisis in identity formation, yet in LOTF, castaway subjectivity is threatened further by the eventual suspension of this body’s ability to act as a portal of any subjective negotiation. It is in this sense that I will argue LOTF functions beyond an idea of the adult/child dichotomy out of which the genre was initiated towards an understanding of the subjective operations through which these ideas manifest and are given meaning. This, in turn, develops into an epistemological postmodern story of the ‘human condition' as something that resists tangible meaning. It is a reading made possible by positioning the novel within the genre of castaway fiction, and focussing on the liminal nature of the castaway body that represents changing approaches to the language governing subjectivity in a Lacanian sense (fluid name-of-the-father).

**Fragmented Landing**

LOTF begins in the aftermath of a plane crash. Enemy forces have shot down a plane carrying a group of British schoolboys to a safe place in the midst of atomic warfare, leaving them marooned on an unnamed and uninhabited island. Although the narrator does not offer a detailed account of this incident, the initial characterisation of fragmented bodies stands as a psychosomatic metaphor. We are forced to piece together a series of partial disclosures as these nameless bodies try to re-orientate themselves. Ralph and Piggy are the first boys introduced, as the narrator works towards piecing together their identity gradually.

*The boy with fair hair lowered himself down the last few feet of rock and began to pick his way towards the lagoon. Though he had taken off his school sweater and trailed it now from one hand, his grey shirt stuck to him and his hair was plastered to his forehead. All round him the long scar smashed into the jungle was a bath of heat.*

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This description locates a nameless boy (until page three) and landscape that speak of disruption and displacement. His trailing jumper evokes the sudden and abrupt separation from a previous school life, which lies outside the ‘jungle,’ as meaning is developed via a relationship between limited disclosures and inferences. The boys' fair hair, for instance, is charged with a dual function of distinguishing one body while also referring to ideas related to race, class, and education.

The second character, whose name we are later told is Piggy, is introduced in a similar way. He first appears as a dismembered voice from which a body is worked towards:

‘Hi! it said, ‘wait a minute!’

... The fair boy stopped and jerked his stockings with an automatic gesture that made the jungle seem for a moment like the Home Counties.

... The owner of the voice came backing out of the undergrowth so that twigs scratched on a greasy wind-breaker. The naked crooks of his knees were plump, caught and scratched by thorns.597

Piggy’s introduction hosts a separation between his voice and body, further instigating the idea that these are traumatised bodies in the process of an uncanny realignment. I use the term uncanny in that these fragmented bodies gradually work towards familiar unification via isolated body parts. Just as the aforementioned ‘fair boy’ is granted ‘stockings’ this disembodied voice is paired with ‘plump knees.’

This issue of partial disclosures inform ideas of place also. The ‘jungle' is associated with the alternative of ‘Home Counties' and their dislocation from home. Are they on a mainland or an island? For Ralph, this becomes a matter of some urgency and is only resolved when he touches a palm tree. Without being aware that palm trees also grow on the tropical mainland, or that the type of palm tree itself can be geographically indicative of a particular island, Ralph signifies a lack of knowledge when it comes to the space he now occupies. Unlike Father Robinson or the coral island castaways, Ralph depicts a ‘common sense' approach to island

597 Ibid.
knowledge through a generic rather than expert understanding of botany, in a way that mirrors his inability to later govern his island space.

What is crucially indicative of this introductory scene is that these fragmented castaway bodies, once barely individuated, are the only portals through which the past can be negotiated. After discussing the accident, the boys come to the realisation that there are no ‘grown-ups’ on the island. Ralph tries to assure Piggy that his father, who is a commander in the Navy, will come for them. This plan is, however, short-lived:

‘How does he know we’re here?’

Because, thought Ralph, because, because. The roar from the reef became very distant.

‘They’d tell him at the airport.’

Piggy shook his head, put on his flashing glasses and looked down at Ralph. ‘Not them. Didn’t you hear what the pilot said? About the atom bomb?’

... 

‘They’re all dead,’ said Piggy, ‘an’ this is an island. Nobody don’t know we’re here. Your dad don’t know, nobody don’t know.’

Additional fragments of their accident trickle through their conversation, which denotes a familiarity with the vocabulary of war. As Owen Edwards states in relation to the novel ‘one major effect of the Second World War on Children’s Literature was that the post-war child was deemed less squeamish.’ Neither the atomic war nor the plane crash are treated as bewildering topics of conversation or confusion. This, he suggests plays a part in Golding’s naturalised approach to violence amongst his castaways.

Their parents/guardians have potentially been killed carrying with them the knowledge of their children’s existence. In this sense, despite being alive on the island, the castaways are spectres subject to the potential absent affirmation of their parent’s knowledge; ‘they’re all dead.’ Cast away from their native land and subject to a potential loss of lineage; their entire descent is in question in what can be compared to as a drastic evacuation.

598 Ibid: 2.
Their identity is thus caught up in this process of non-linear and fragmented articulation constantly in need of further substantiation. This narrative praxis chimes well with the aforementioned tenets of Postmodernism, in that ‘the solace of good forms’\(^601\) is denied from the outset. This is apparent in three ways. Firstly, memories of parents, home and socio-cultural regulations that once governed their pre-castaway subjectivities act as sporadic interjections rather than continuous principles guiding these castaway bodies. Furthermore, because pre-castaway subjectivity is established within these momentary flashes of insight, everything that is recalled is constructed as partial images of representation. Thirdly, unlike TSFR, in which the castaways maintain uninhibited memories of their motherland, the castaways in LOTF struggle to maintain such memories over time, as their intimacy with the island grows in the form of hunting and the emergence of two rival gangs competing for control.

When trying to develop an idea of what drives these bodies to survive, it is essential to keep these shifts and transitions in mind, because it is through these partial memories that we gain insight into what is being fought for and lost and how the success or failure of these negotiations effect how castaway subjectivity can be perceived as a result.

Working Out a Plan for Survival

As the scattered boys appear from all over the island gradually responding to the sound of the conch, they begin to introduce themselves to one another. However, there is a lack of free-flowing discourse between them. Rather than briefing each other on their history or engaging in a discussion about the accident, they immediately go about electing a chief. Although Jack, the head boy of a public school, puts his name forward for the role, appearing to be ‘the most obvious leader' the castaways choose Ralph instead, as he had blown the conch and ‘sat waiting for them on the platform with the delicate thing balanced on his knees.’\(^602\)

Having already determined that there are no ‘grown-ups’\(^603\) on the island and that it was just Ralph who blew the conch that led them to each other, this initial vote, marks out what these castaway survivors need most. It is a need to be affiliated with a

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\(^603\) Ibid: 17.
sense of command and to allow their bodies to be organised into a sense of belonging, which Ralph’s image as their chosen guide represents. ‘Waiting for them on the platform’ in a Godly state ready to inform and protect his disciples, Ralph conveys an aura of enlightenment, which these fractured bodies desperately seek.

Unlike SFR, TCI, K and AHW, God is wholly absent, neither thanked for their survival nor a part of negotiations for future plans. Instead, we are presented with Ralph, who like Emily in AHW, is filling a role. However, there are two fundamental differences in the way this is achieved. Firstly Ralph does not come to embody this role through a combative relationship with a Godly figure, and secondly with this absent power struggle, God does not exist as a referential power to be reconciled or reckoned with in the construction of the castaway body. Thus, with no reference to God, their first act of survival after the accident sets out to redeem a sense of subjectivity and belonging for their displaced bodies, in relation to their new circumstances. Thus, from the outset, God is does not inform the construction of castaway subjectivity.

While the crash landing serves to isolate the boys from their previous existence, there is no sense that this will be permanent and they fully expect, to be rescued. Following the above election, a rescue plan is decided upon, accompanied by the idea of having a ‘good time’ while ‘waiting’.  

“There’s another thing. We can help them to find us. If a ship comes near the island they may not notice us. So we must make smoke on top of the mountain. We must make a fire.”  

It is agreed that this is what needs to be done. Assisting their rescuers through a smoke - signal will aid their deliverance. Yet a place of return is neither mentioned nor discussed. This lack of information extends the narrative's preoccupation with constructing partial images; there is a sense of ‘home’ to which they will be returned, but this is vague and unformed. It is simply a matter of return, not home that is invested in. Working feverishly together they try to ‘keep a clean flag of flame flying on the mountain' which ‘was the immediate end and no one looked further.”

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605 Ibid: 37.
606 Ibid: 41.
collaborative, almost fraternal desire to be rescued possesses clarity and focus which
an idea of home lacks.

However, this brief lucidity of purpose and survival is short-lived, paralleled
as it is with the castaways' growing intimacy with the island, which signifies a shift in
priorities. Jack, the head choirboy insists on providing meat for the rest of the
castaways via hunting, which gradually develops into an obsession. This development
runs parallel with the decreasing clarity of their initial rescue mission and unified
desire to organise the island into a more habitable space. This breakdown begins
when Jack abandons the communal effort to build ‘shelters’ described as a ‘sort of
home’ and maintain the rescue fire, in favour of hunting pigs. His lack of concern
troubles Ralph who is forced to remind Jack of the plan:

‘The best thing we can do is get ourselves rescued.’

Jack had to think for a moment before he could remember what
rescue was.608

For Jack, the hunt represents a clear aim related to the visceral ‘compulsion to
track down and kill’ which the memory of rescue does not. The obstacles involved
in attempting to forge any domestic life on the island descend into a struggle of
maintaining an idea of return, which Jack's first sign of neglect illustrates. Jack's
neglect illustrates the struggle that the castaways are set to face from this point forth,
as well as the changing needs of survival that their castaway bodies focus on. They
began with a need to affiliate their uncoordinated bodies with a leader and so united to
elect Ralph with his divine quality, while unanimously deciding on the importance of
a rescue fire, and the building of shelters. Yet as hunting turns to an obsession for
some, corporeal sustenance is thought to be their sole means of survival, leading to
the gradual decline of their initial priorities; half built shelters, an abandoned rescue
fire, segregated groupings and a Godly leader who is no longer perceived to be
omniscient and is largely ignored.

Ralph's insistence on the original needs of the survivors are pitted against
Jack's attempt to subjectively adapt to the island. Thus these castaways begin to be
imbricated in a contentious struggle between maintaining the memories of their pre-

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607 Ibid: 53.
608 Ibid: 54.
609 Ibid: 51.
castaway subjectivity, and the progressive failure of these recollections as they forge a greater intimacy with the island. By the end of the novel, Ralph represents these failing negotiations, more drastically via a threat of their annihilation:

*Ralph was puzzled by the shutter that flickered in his brain. There was something he wanted to say; then the shutter had come down.*

*But the -*

*They were regarding him gravely, not yet troubled by any doubts about his sufficiency. Ralph pushed the idiot hair out of his eyes and looked at Piggy.*

*But the ... oh ... the fire! Of course, the fire!*

*He started to laugh, then stopped and became fluent instead.*

The ‘shutter’ here marks a breakdown of these negotiations, as up until this point, there has at least been a continual flow of language albeit plagued by ellipses. Marking the presence of the ‘shutter’ is the exodus of language itself, in terms of the effected individual, who is left feeling utterly perplexed. It marks the potential breakdown of Lacan’s ‘Mirror Stage’ whereby distinction between self and ‘other’ and the identification of the self as ‘other’ are made possible and given meaning within language. It is an unforeseeable attack, and the effects are instantaneous, leaving no time to prepare resistance. This is what makes it such a traumatising event, as the entire subjective self is transplanted and replaced with fear, disorientation, and a loss of fluency. The masterly power of the ‘shutter’ is so great because of its ability to consume thought and language in this way. Once it acts, nothing else can, as silence barricades any existing memories or potential thoughts from being formed. It is this nihilism that is often overlooked within existing criticism that evades the novel’s concerns about Ralph’s subjective breakdown by attributing the chaos that ensues on the island instead to either an absence or replication of parental/adult authority and ‘civilisation.’

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Parents/authority

Unlike its castaway predecessors, LOTF offers no formal introduction to adults and parental figures. There is no ritualised framing of parental authority governing castaway subjectivity, as is the case in TSFR, or a sense of ancestral lineage presented in TCI. Here adults and parents are constructed solely from the boys’ memories, and when the occasional boy does speak of them, it is in terms of a highly significant reference to their profession; Ralph’s father is an officer in the navy, and Piggy’s aunt owns a sweet shop. The extent to which castaway subjectivity is informed by parental authority in the novel is analogous to this peripheral information. Furthermore, this uncertainty adheres to the pattern of an increasingly fractured relationship between family and the castaway subject, which has informed my readings of the novels thus far.

Since LOTF has amassed the most critical attention and contention regarding its engagement with parental authority, the enemy and contextual framing amongst the novels explored in the thesis, identifying these tensions is necessary before attempting to introduce an alternative methodology through which castaway subjectivity and abjection can be approached. Although a comprehensive study of all these debates lies beyond the scope of this thesis, I have decided to focus on those most relevant to the topic of castaway subjectivity. These debates fall into two categories, which discuss how isolated these castaways are from adult authority and the type of enemy that is represented.

With regards to the presence of adult authority, two main camps emerge. Both are concerned with interpreting either an absence or presence of law and order amongst the castaways and on the island. The first advocates the fatal consequences of unsupervised children, isolated from adults and society. Permeating these claims of how isolated the children are, is a divide between childhood and adulthood, or an absence of such a divide through ideas of imitation and learned behaviour. Both revisit the tensions of Enlightenment pedagogy’s child/adult dichotomy, which materialise when claims of absolute freedom are conflated with complete isolation from adult authority. These complexities also relate to how critics interpret ‘the island’ as a space in which conventional society is either rejected or reconstructed. For some critics the island represents an ‘anti-society’, thus facilitating escape from the very society that the latter critics claim the island represents.
Island: School, Society or Anti-Society

The island in LOTF has been identified as an enclosed space by some critics, including Ian McEwan who likens it to a closed community in which the boys develop a ‘child-dominated world’ were ‘things went wrong in a most horrible and interesting way.’ This parallel between the absence of adults/parents on the island and the chaos that ensues resembles the fears of Rousseau’s Enlightenment pedagogy related to children’s unsupervised freedom as discussed.

The question of what constitutes adult presence on the island is however not debated. As illustrated in the above brief discussion of the initial landing scene and the events that unfold, these castaways are liminal characters who do attempt to negotiate an idea of pre-castaway subjectivity while ‘cast away.’ Plans of organisation, thoughts about parents/guardians and ideas about home and rescue are articulated and present within their memory, albeit in fragments, which negates the idea that the novel represents a clear ‘child-dominated world.’

Rebecca Hightower’s reading of absent parents in LOTF raises further issues about what constitutes their presence. In a comparative reading with TCI, Hightower suggests:

> It is this fantasy of seamlessly maintained discipline and order in The Coral Island that famously spurred William Golding to rewrite the story in Lord of the Flies. Golding shows how ‘real boys’ would react without their father’s presence and law, which means that they quickly forget and learn to ignore their father’s prohibitions against killing, revert to a state of lawlessness, and enact violent savagery.

What troubles Hightower’s claim is the idea these castaways ‘quickly forget and learn to ignore their father’s prohibitions,’ pointing to the fact that laws governing pre-castaway subjectivity must exist on the island before they can then be forgotten. Their existence is in fact specifically noted in the novel. As Roger is bullying a younger boy called Harry, he dared not throw stones directly at him because ‘round

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the squatting child was the protection of parents and school and policemen and the law,’ signifying the ‘taboo of old life.’

The presence of parental authority also permeates the novel following their segregation into combative groups as Piggy pleads reason with his fellow castaways; ‘what are we? Humans? Or animals? Or savages?’ ‘What’s grown-ups going to think?’ These questions signify an already established Symbolic Order that exists within memory, against which the boys judge themselves and their actions, thus complicating claims of complete isolation.

Hightower equates parental authority with the ‘name-of-the-father’ governing subjectivity, further validated in the comparison she makes between LOTF and TCI. Ralph, Peterkin and Jack are also physically separated from their parents throughout their castaway ordeal, and yet they ‘maintain the discipline of good imperialists without direct coercion from parental figures.’ For Hightower, distinctions between order and disorder, absence and presence lie in what parents are imagined to represent, which in the case of TCI, relates to the ‘discipline of good imperialists.’

Although I question aspects of Hightower’s unproblematic representation of colonialist subjectivity in Ballantyne’s novel, it is important to register that when the name-of-the-father is assumed to be ‘knowable’ in a colonial context, parental presence is unnecessary. The Colonialist model of identity, through which subjectivity is assumed and fixed, reflects the conditions of Enlightenment pedagogy’s ‘knowable’ child castaway, and it is through Hightower’s synchronic reading of castaway fiction as colonial, that LOTF is thought to stand in opposition.

As I will argue in the following section detailing how the novel goes about constructing the abject ‘other,’ LOTF does reflect civilisation in its abject state, but just because it is not colonial, does not mean that it is absent. The name-of-the-father governing these subjectivities is present, which is a reading that requires a dialogical rather than a monologic approach to this Lacanian concept, and an understanding that this language is shaped by changing socio-cultural approaches to identity, which in the case of LOTF, relates to post-war postmodernism. Likewise, it is a reading that requires an understanding of the liminal nature of the castaway child, through which subjective negotiations are made via memory.

614 Ibid: 98.
616 Ibid.
Ian Gregor and Mark Kinkead-Weekes approach the issue of parental authority and its presence within the novel, through an alternative reading that suggests law and order are clearly maintained. However, there is an evident slippage between parental and adult authority within this claim, gaining momentum once again through Enlightenment pedagogy’ adult/child dichotomy.

_The fact that there are no grown-ups is primarily the delight of a realised ambition. The children gather to the casual summons of the conch, they elect their leader, draw up laws, divide out function and prerogative ... It is a wonderful game played under perfect conditions in perfect surroundings; and though it acts out memories of grown-up order, it can go on all day with no interference from grown-ups._617

Contrary to Hightower’s argument, this idyll is said to represent the presence of ‘grown-up order’ rendering a total absence untenable. Memories of pre-castaway subjectivity are articulated rather than negated, although the issue of differentiating between ‘memories’ and the physical presence of ‘grown-ups' remains. If such ‘memories of grown-up order’ exist then can it not be argued that in some way ‘grown-ups’ also exist? The nature of civilisation governing the ‘grown-up’ world, which is said to be interchangeable with that of the castaways,’ must then already be in existence as an embodied and thus tangible presence transmitted through castaway subjectivity, moving beyond the question of physical presence. As discussed the castaways’ liminally embody these subjective memories, and although the clarity of these memories decline, it is this decline that signifies the representation of a past Symbolic Order on the island. It is a Symbolic Order that articulates humanity’s post-war abjection through Ralph’s shuttered state.618

In summation, these critical approaches to how adult presence or absence is constituted in the novel lack consensus, thus reflecting how the novel operates on a threshold of postmodernism, since ideas about subjectivity, agency and identity are irresolute. The island has been argued to represent a ‘closed world,’ society, an anti-society, an idyll and a microcosm of the adult world. This lack of consensus informs

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my alternative approach to managing these tensions through an understanding of how castaway subjectivity is constructed.

Because LOTF operates within the contextual framework of post-war postmodernism its departure from the confines of Enlightenment pedagogy’s critical legacy means it also refuses its ‘certainty.’ It is, therefore, this nihilism that informs my reading of how the self and the abject ‘other’ manifest within the novel, which calls for a more fluid approach to the name-of-the-father, which moves beyond the preoccupation of Enlightenment pedagogy's paradoxes. Rather than seek out oppositional comparisons with TSFR and TCI as is often the case, this method will work towards understanding how the novel represents a dialogical continuation of varying epistemological approaches to the castaway child.

**Abject Other – Strangers From Within**

In his aforementioned essay entitled ‘Fable,’ (Golding, *Hot Gates*, 1965) based on a response to questions he received from students studying LOTF, Golding states that the premise of the novel is to convey the idea/lesson that ‘that the only enemy of man is inside him.’619 It is a premise that I agree with, yet my understanding of this idea/lesson moves towards understanding how death and violence manifest in the novel due to a series of subjective breakdowns, rendering the castaways as abject within themselves.

The violent and destructive forces surrounding the four deaths, and hunt in the text, as well as the attempted murder of Ralph in its final scene, are the central pivots around which this final declaration is made. They include the death of a nameless boy only known as ‘that little ‘un’ ‘with the mark on his face’ who perishes in a fire soon after their castaway experience begins. Secondly, there is the death of the fighter pilot, who attempted to parachute to safety during the plane crash that brought the boys to the island. Landing on a different part of the island, the castaways are unaware of his presence, until Simon discovers his dead body. In his attempt to inform the others of this news, Simon himself is killed. Before Simon’s death, there is

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the killing of the pig by Jack and his hunters, which marks a shift in the castaways’ priorities from awaiting rescue to hunting. Following Simon’s tragic death, there is a heated debate between the divided castaways. With Piggy and Ralph on one side and the Hunters on the other, Piggy is killed as a rival gang member. Lastly, as Ralph becomes the object of a manhunt, the entire island is set alight and with the arrival of a Navy officer on a search and rescue mission, Ralph narrowly escapes death, at which point the novel comes to an end.

All of these events form an integral part of how LOTF is contextualised within criticism, which as Virginia Tiger states ranges from ‘religious, philosophical, sociological, psychological, political, deconstructionist and post-colonial.’ Unlike some critics who offer a symbolically oppositional reading of these deaths for each character based on Golding’s meta-analysis, I will analyse how the novel works towards uniting these perspectives in an exploration of the same issue. The issue being that their eventual abject condition is caused by a subjective breakdown, which once again underscores postmodernism’s resistance to stable representations of identity.

The Onset of the Hunt and Shutter

In an attempt to build on these ideas the following analysis will illustrate how the growing tension of these subjective negotiations and their potential breakdown via the threat of the ‘shutter’ coincides with the castaways' gradual revelation that they are their enemies. The shutter represents the physical inability to recollect essential memories, which is a praxis Marita Sturken equates with ‘the very core of our identity.’

LOTF explores this inherently abject condition by interweaving three narrative perspectives, each presenting complementary disclosures. Jack’s obsession with hunting marks the onset of a general subjective breakdown through the meta-language of the hunt. By the end of the novel this meta-language gradually develops into the only language comprehended on the island; a language through which death, violence

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and the ‘other’ are rationalised. Secondly, Ralph’s observations are managed as a navigational tool through which these subjective changes are managed and conveyed. Finally with Simon's increasingly solitary existence on the island comes his awakening regarding the fact that they are their enemy, which is finally confirmed during a confrontation with the imagined ‘beast’ just before his fellow castaways kill him.

The hunt has a crucial discursive presence in the novel because it is through its altering framework that abjection and three deaths occur. During the boys’ first meeting, Ralph is elected chief after which tensions between himself and Jack arise. Ralph states they should ‘have fun’ while waiting to be rescued, while for Jack, who has renamed his friends from school the ‘Hunters’ the main priority of the group is to ‘get food’ hunt and ‘catch things’ while waiting.

These tensions have encouraged critics such as Babb Howard to interpret the novel as an allegorical tale of society’s ‘regression from innocence to savagery’ with Ralph standing for civilisation, and Jack for savagery. However, such readings prevent the possibility of analysing the subjective dynamic between these two perspectives and how they function collaboratively to construct the hunt as a dialectic with its framework of rules.

The first instance in which this framework is introduced is when Jack, who has been designated to oversee that the beacon rescue fire keeps burning, decides to neglect his duties in favour of hunting. As a result, the fire spreads beyond control and, although not explicitly stated, causes the death of an unnamed boy with a mark on his face. This act of abandonment initiates the changing subjective state of this particular group of castaways. Jack’s lack of concern regarding rescue, indicates the beginning of their pre-castaway subjective subsumption. The more pressing concern of the ‘hunt’ claims the first death on the island.

Secondly, the death of the marked boy precipitates the initiation of the castaways’ failing memories. This is made evident when Jack attempts to excuse his behaviour to a disappointed Ralph, as he struggles ‘to convey the compulsion to track down and kill that was swallowing him up, to the extent that he had ‘to think for a

623 Ibid. 19.
624 Ibid. 27.
moment before he could remember what rescue was.\textsuperscript{627} I equate this first instance of a memory crisis with a crisis of identity that gradually escalates from this point forth. As I have already argued, pre-castaway memories play an important role in how the abject ‘other’ is constructed; Jack’s struggle with his baser impulses will have an impact on how death and the ‘other’ are represented as the story proceeds.

The hunt’s evolution begins with Jack’s failure to kill any pigs during his first attempt, which spurs him on with steely determination the second time. Jack’s emergent ‘compulsion’ to kill becomes evident as he scrutinises his tactics to develop a winning strategy:

‘They don’t smell me. They see me, I think. Something pink under the trees.’

He smeared on the clay...

‘For hunting. Like in the war. You know – dazzle paint. Like things trying to look like something else.’\textsuperscript{628}

Visual camouflage here is linked to Jack’s transformation, affecting the way his identity and desires develop. The need to kill pigs for sustenance is problematized by Jack’s growing blood-lust, which is compared to a tactic used in ‘the war.’ As the future deaths of Simon and Piggy are bound by the developing conditions of the hunt, it is important to note the implication that ‘trying to look like something else’ will have on the boys’ rationalisation of these deaths.

Unlike Jack’s castaway predecessors who rationalised the need to kill via a negotiation of the varied epistemological agencies governing their pre and castaway subjectivity, this ‘need to look like something else,’ signifies the potential end of such negotiations. For instance, there is no possibility of calling upon religious belief (TSFR), nationhood and scientific reasoning (TCI), the physically and psychologically frail body (K) or the ability to govern and articulate one's own inner consciousness and space beyond that of the ‘uninvited guest’ (AHW).

Instead, the overwhelming need depicted in LOTF is to differentiate the existing self, albeit in its initial fragmented state, from philosophical or spiritual paradigms, in an attempt to free up the castaway body so that it can fulfil the needs of a meta rather than a pre-castaway subjectivity. These concerns with detachment and

\textsuperscript{627} Ibid. 54.
\textsuperscript{628} Ibid. 65-66.
liminality are further emphasised through Jack's response to his visual transformation after masking his face with clay.

He looked in astonishment, no longer at himself but at an awesome stranger... He began to dance and his laughter became a bloodthirsty snarling. He capered towards Bill and the mask was a thing on its own, behind which Jack hid, liberated from shame and self-consciousness. The face of red and white and black, swung through the air and jigged towards Bill. Bill started up laughing; then suddenly he fell silent and blundered away through the bushes.

... ‘Come on! I’ll creep up and stab.’

The mask compelled them.629

Jack’s appropriation of visual transformation between ‘himself’ and an ‘awesome stranger’ represents his struggle with negotiating his pre-castaway and meta-subjectivity. As his recollections of rescue fade, he is ‘liberated’ from the ‘shame and self-consciousness’ of civilisation that would compel him to behave differently. Bill’s silence articulates an inability to locate his friend who exists somewhere between ‘the face of red and white and black’ and an ‘awesome stranger’/‘other.’ The uncanny and indecipherable nature of this image problematizes a sense of attributable agency; ‘the mask compelled them’ to continue the hunt along the lines of this irresolute identity.

Once again, their subjective uncertainty and the threat that this is a permanent isolation position these castaways in stark contrast to their predecessors. Although there is a gradual decline in the clarity of subjective determinism related to identifying the self and ‘other’ throughout the novels discussed, here Jack’s enthusiastic response indicates a deliberate rejection of such ideals, The nature of this enthusiasm differs significantly from Emily’s delight in AHW at having beaten the ‘hand of God’ during the earthquake, because she still operates within these subjective power relations.

In spite and because of these uncertainties, a wild pig is eventually killed, rendering the hunt a ‘success.’ Jack is eager to share his news with the others, and his account not only signifies his altering embodied subjectivity, but it also takes on another dimension:

629 Ibid. 66-67.
His mind was crowded with memories; memories of the knowledge that had come to them when they closed in on the struggling pig, knowledge that they had outwitted a living thing, imposed their will upon it, taken away its life like a long, satisfying drink.630

Here the narrative clearly illustrates the impact that the successful hunt has on Jack’s altering subjectivity as well as illustrating its growing dominance. The emergent conflict between the boys is further intensified by the fact that their ‘successful’ hunt has cost them the opportunity of being rescued by a passing ship since Jack and his hunters had failed to keep the rescue fire going. Additionally, there is yet another shift concerning what the hunt represents. The existing dynamic of the hunt brought about by the slaughter of the pig, changes as the object of the hunt shifts from being ‘a struggling pig’ to ‘a living thing.’ This turning point in the narrative introduces the possibility that all of the castaways can be perceived as ‘living thing(s)’ that might themselves be hunted.

The Onset of the Enemy Within

Ralph has escalating concerns about the collapse of order on the island due to this shift in priorities, so he calls an emergency meeting. The issues discussed include conflicts regarding the rescue mission, urgent concerns about hygiene, the reluctant building of ‘shelters’ and, most importantly, the threat of the ‘beast’ that some claim to have seen roaming the island. Admitting to himself that ‘every path was an improvisation’631 Ralph realises just detached they have become from their pre-castaway subjectivities.

With the unravelling of these ties the narrator hints that any such realignment might be impossible given that these castaways are in the process of becoming inarticulable:

Normally, the underside of the green roof was lit by a tangle of gold reflections, and their faces were lit upside down, like – thought Ralph, when you hold an electric torch in your hands. But now the sun was slanting in at one side, so that the shadows were where

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630 Ibid. 74.
631 Ibid. 81.
they ought to be. Again he fell into that strange mood of speculation that was so foreign to him. If faces were different when lit from above or below – what was a face? What was anything?  

What is so remarkable about this quote in relation to the trajectory of this thesis, is that there is a point in each novel, when the characters long to set eyes on another human face during their castaway experience. Father Robinson longs once again to behold the face of a fellow human; the Coral Island castaways, along with David Balfour, long to be amongst civilised men; and during her darkest hour, Emily dreams of returning to a life of children’s birthday parties. In LOTF, however, for the first time, the narrative produces a group of castaways that cannot recognise their own face nor that of their companions. What happens when a face, especially your own is no longer recognisable? According to Ralph, this absence carries with it the familiarity of everything else; the potential loss of both subject and object in which perspective becomes unhinged.

These faces are however not entirely stripped of symbolic value, as the language denoting subjective distortions is the same language used to denote subjective conformities. As a language, however, it denies ‘the solace of good forms.’ Just as Bill falls silent in the face of Jack’s transformation into an ‘awesome stranger’ above, Ralph too now looks upon the human face as though it were an ‘awesome stranger’ denying the familiar subjective language, through which ‘anything’ can be conveyed as having stable meaning.

In Jack’s case, this initiation of unfamiliarity gives way to the possibility that all of the castaways could be considered as potential prey, given that the hunted object shifted from being a pig, to a ‘living thing.’ Here, the narrator works towards the same idea: that the ‘foreign’ is becoming an internal and naturalised component of these castaway children rather than an externally projected entity. It is thus necessary to turn once again to Julia Kristeva’s arguments about how abjection functions as a means of distinction:

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632 Ibid. 83.
For abjection, when all is said and done, is the other facet of religious, moral, and ideological codes on which rest the sleep of individuals and the breathing spells of societies.\textsuperscript{534}

As I have discussed throughout this thesis for Kristeva, abjection marks the contamination, which threatens a subject’s position in society, thus requiring from them an expulsion of the threat so that they can continue to exist within a socio-cultural domain governed by specific codes. Lacan and Kristeva’s theoretical frameworks of identity lend themselves well to illustrating how the name-of-the-father constructs the ‘ideological codes’ as an embodied subjectivity through which these expulsions can be made. In the case of Lacan, these codes are developed through a contextually fluid language represented as the name-of—the father, which governs one’s subjective sense of belonging within a socio-cultural realm of meaning and articulation. In turn, Kristeva offers an insight into the workings of subjectivity through an understanding of what threatens these codes rendering their expulsion necessary for a subject’s coherent socio-cultural existence.

In the case of LOTF, the gradual erosion of pre-castaway subjectivity as an embodied awareness through which such distinctions can be made coincides with the emerging idea that the ‘foreign’ resides within. In Ralph’s failure to identify the human face, or ‘anything’, the edges/boundaries of the self and ‘other’ temporarily cease to exist, with the promise of becoming permanently extinguished. Ralph’s agency is thus developed through his ability to identify that the abject resides within them. Ralph’s gradual awakening to this condition goes further than just teasing out the suggestion that it might be possible, as is the case in K and AHW.

How then do these ideas affect the way in which the enemy is constructed within the narrative? The answer is provided in the final moments of the meeting, which suggest that there is no tangible distance through which such differentiations can be made. After failing to resolve the issue of hygiene, the castaways fall into a discussion about the ‘beast’ that has haunted the ‘littluns’\textsuperscript{635} on the island. As the argument draws to a head, Ralph encourages Simon to express his concerns:


‘Maybe’, he said hesitantly, ‘maybe there is a beast’...

‘What I mean is ... maybe it's only us’...

‘We could be sort of...’

Simon became inarticulate in his effort to express mankind’s essential illness. Inspiration came to him.

‘What’s the dirtiest thing there is?’

Trafficked together in this quote are the negotiations of an awkwardly awaited announcement that the narrative has been working towards, in the disturbing disclosures of their disease-ridden bodies and their abject condition. Although the narrative has played with the idea that the abject ‘other’ exists in the form of the ghostly ‘beast,’ Simon’s words return this fear to ‘mankind’s essential illness.’ Rather than attempt to identify what this ‘illness’ amounts to in symbolic terms, I want to show how the narrative structures it as a language representing the neutral context of a failing subjectivity and the effect this failure has on the representation of the castaway children in question.

Abjection’s seminal condition of that which is ‘opposed to I’, as an external opposition, is under threat. Unable to declare anything in certain terms or distinguish the self from the abject ‘other’ this fear manifests as an inability to take a stance against an explicit abject object. Their condition thus becomes one that moves beyond Kristeva’s ideas of an abject object being constructed in opposition to presumed/knowable socio-cultural codes, because there is an absence of this necessary familiarity here.

The psychological state, which this position engenders can be best described by Sara Ahmed in her work entitled The Cultural Politics of Emotion, which investigates how the abject ‘other’ is mobilised within society through a reciprocal relationship between emotions, language and bodies. Building on Kristeva’s theory of abjection, Ahmed utilises the idea of distance and projection by stating that ‘when fear exists, it re-establishes distance between bodies whose difference is read off the surface.’ However, Ahmed goes a step further by explaining what would occur when the object of fear is lost, as is the case with these castaways:

\[\text{Ibid. 95-96.}\]
Fear is all the more frightening given the potential loss of the object that it anticipates. The more we don’t know what or who it is we fear the more the world becomes fearsome.\(^{637}\)

Not only does Simon’s declaration potentially put an end to the foreseeable ‘object’ of fear in terms of a non-existent external ‘beast’ but it also gives rise to an alternative that cannot be fully recognised. With the idea that the ‘beast’ simply exists within them as an inversely abstract entity, its anticipation and resistance is rendered difficult at this stage. Thus, with this inability to anticipate and ‘know’ exactly what the abject object is, ‘the more the world becomes fearsome' to these castaways until it is fear alone that is located in Ralph’s embodied subjectivity as the novel comes to an end.

It seems that nothing, not even God can be called upon to abate or rationalise this fear of abjection, signifying the final separation between divine agency and the castaway body in the face of abjection developed within this trajectory of novels. This waning relationship began with TCI and Ralph’s inability to fully articulate and thus utilise his faith to wage war against his enemies and developed further in K as David has no accesses to Gods’ judgement when facing his murderous uncle or pirate crew. Emily although having defeated God subsumes his/her power to prevent herself from becoming abject.

**Simon and The ‘Beast’**

Following Simon’s declaration that ‘may be it’s only us,’ his fellow castaways are determined to ignore his insight as they devise a plan to deal with the ‘beast’ by warding it off through a sacrificial offering. They kill a pig, and hoist the head on a pole in the hope that the violent impulses of the imagined ‘beast’ will be satisfied. Unaware of this plan, Simon is determined to discover the truth, and so wanders alone in the mountains, until he comes across the offering, described as ‘The Lord of the Flies’, which ‘hung on a stick and grinned.’\(^{638}\) He then experiences what is clearly a hallucinatory dialogue with the pig’s head:

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‘Fancy thinking that the Beast was something you could hunt and kill!’ said the head. For a moment or two the forest and all the other dimly appreciated places echoed with the parody of laughter. ‘You knew, didn’t you? I’m part of you? Close, close, close! I’m the reason why it’s no go. Why things are what they are.’

All that the narrative has worked towards in terms of representing the enemy within is finally declared here. The fact it is narrated through the hunted pig’s head further validates the reciprocal relationship between the hunt dialectic and their gradually escalating abject condition. This voice bridges the two with a sense of clarity that the narrative has hitherto denied the castaways from articulating. This declaration that the abject enemy ‘is not something that you can hunt and kill’ externally amounts to the narrative’s declaration that it is a naturalised component of the human condition. Any attempt the castaways make to search for an alternative ‘other’ is rendered a pointless mistake, worthy of humiliation. As The Lord of The Flies says just before sending Simon away to his impending death ‘you know perfectly well you’ll only meet me down there – so don’t try to escape.’

Simon rushes to enlighten his fellow castaways who, by this point, have divided themselves into oppositional camps. However, threatened by a storm, they come together through a sense of communal fear of death to enact the now familiar ritual of the hunt:

‘Kill the beast! Cut his throat! Spill his blood!’

The movement became regular while the chant lost its first superficial excitement and began to beat like a steady pulse. Roger ceased to be a pig and became a hunter, so that the centre of the ring yawned emptily... There was the throb and stamp of a single organism... Now out of the terror rose another desire, thick, urgent, blind.

The familiarity of the hunt dialectic unifies all the castaways except Simon, as the narrative represents them as ‘a single organism,’ referring once again to a ‘thick’ ‘desire’ consuming them equally. They have all by this point assumed the language of this meta-subjectivity, embodied within them as ‘steady pulse,’ which has become the only source of comfort to them in the face of the storm and potential death. Thus with

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Ibid. 158.

Ibid. 168.
this fear of death they, unlike all their castaway predecessors, solely rely on this meta-subjectivity constructed on the island for survival, rather than the power relations of their pre-castaway subjectivities for support. In the face of death, it is the hunt dialectic that effectively becomes the name-of-the-father governing their subjectivity and the source of proof that justifies killing Simon.

As Roger decides to quit the role of being the hunted ‘living creature’; ‘the centre of the ring yawned emptily’ calling for an expected victim, which coincides with Simon’s sudden appearance rushing down towards them, as if he were a ritualistic offering:

‘Him! Him!’

_The circle became a horseshoe. A thing was crawling out of the forest. It came darkly, uncertainly. The shrill screaming that rose before the beast was like a pain. The beast stumbled into the horseshoe. ‘Kill the beast! Cut his throat! Spill his blood!’_

...

_The sticks fell and the mouth of the new circle crunched and screamed. The beast was on its knees in the centre, its arms folded over its face...There were no words, and no movements but the tearing of teeth and claws._641

From the moment that Simon occupies the space of absence within the ‘ring’, he becomes recognisable only as the ‘beast’ that fulfils the demands of the hunt, and the meta-subjectivity of his fellow castaways. The crowd recognise him only as that which is missing. The ‘ring’ makes an opening in the form of a ‘horse shoe’ and invites this ‘thing’ to take its allocated position.

Simon's identity goes through a process of annihilation and re-birth before he is physically killed. His reconstruction into the abject ‘beast' is an essential component of his death because it is only within this discursive context that his death can be justified. Once again, proof of the abject ‘other' has up until this point in the trajectory, been subject to a declining negotiation of pre-castaway subjective forces, yet here, it is articulated through a complete absence of them.

The act of killing subjects the hunters to change also, depicted through the reference made to ‘teeth and claws’ as their humanistic attributes are replaced with animalistic ones:

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641 Ibid. 168-169.
The strange, attendant creatures, with their fiery eyes and trailing vapours, busied themselves round his head ... Simon's dead body moved out towards the open sea.  

The closing lines of this event and chapter represent two oppositional ideas of death and justification. Firstly, in terms of how these castaways have come to kill Simon, I have argued, that it is a justifiable death befitting the hunt dialectic. However, the narrative also works towards illustrating the defunct nature of humanity, via the defunct mechanism through which abjection is constructed as something existing beyond and in opposition to it. Although Simon is reunited with humanity as his ‘dead body’ supersedes his ‘beast’ status in a final representation of his character, it is however channelled through an impotent and ‘lifeless’ being.

Secondly, given the above description of these castaways as ‘strange, attendant creatures, with their fiery eyes and trailing vapours' their abject nature is depicted through an overarching narrative omniscience that depicts an awareness they do not yet embody themselves. Instead, the narrative channels this self-awareness through Ralph, who is gradually made to catch up with humanity's fated ‘lifeless' condition.

‘The Shutter’: Accompanying the Abject Condition of Humanity.

Following Simon’s death, the entire island and its inhabitants are submerged in an irretrievable sense of discord. Jack and his band of hunters are consistently growing in number. Ralph, and Piggy, however, represent the other group attempting at least to resist their control. During this phase, the narrator emphasises Ralph’s attempts to shift blame for Simon's death, while simultaneously focusing on his ‘fading knowledge of the world.’

This signifies his failing attempts to reconcile his actions with the order of his pre and meta-subjectivity, which at this point stands amidst the wreckage of their rescue mission.

This crisis intensifies through the escalating power of the ‘shutter’ that threatens to end these negotiations entirely. It appears for the first time when Ralph

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642 Ibid. 170.
643 Ibid. 179.
attempts to deal with a raid on his group by Jack’s tribe, just as Simon himself is engaged in his conversation with The Lord of the Flies:

‘Sit down all of you. They raided us for fire. They’re having fun. But the’ –

*Ralph was puzzled by the shutter that flickered in his brain. There was something he wanted to say; then the shutter had come down.*

... ‘But the ... oh ... the fire! Of course, the fire!’

*He started to laugh, then stopped and became fluent instead.*

The narrative strategy here introduces ‘the shutter’ at the same time that Simon discovers their fated abject condition. The shutter’ is essentially a physical manifestation of Ralph’s failing memories in terms of both his pre and castaway subjectivity. Represented as an issue of language, the ‘shutter’ signifies a temporary breakdown of these negotiations, with its ability to subsume Ralph’s conscious thoughts. This chimes well with the significance Sturken places on the relationship between memory and identity, as the ‘shutter’ effectively renders Ralph in a neutral state of non-disclosure.

As a device used in photography, the shutter opens the aperture in a camera to allow light to pass through and be focussed on the film through which the image is captured. Without it, capturing a pose would be impossible. Furthermore, its permanent breakdown renders the pose itself irrelevant in the face of not being able to produce and contain a stable image that can be scrutinised and given meaning. In the representation of Ralph’s ‘shuttered’ state, the narrative here renders an inability to retrieve any such coherent image through which meaning can be ascertained. In a Lacanian sense, Ralph’s shuttered state threatens to break down all Symbolic meaning and its exchanges. Ralph is indeed frightened by the disorientation that this act of failing to exist in a recognisable and relational language through which he can define himself and others semantically, gives rise to.

Furthermore, Ralph’s conscious awareness of ‘the shutter’ offers a subjectively experiential insight into what it is like to embody abjection in a way that Simon’s declaration and discovery do not. My point here is that Simon’s death alone

*---*Ibid. 156.
does not simply illustrate the abject immoral nature of these castaways as some critics have stated based on a streamlined reading of religion and savagery, which fails to account for my reading of the hunt dialectic as one that is governed by laws and familiarity.

In an attempt to understand how these ideas have manifested within existing criticism, I must turn to Golding’s meta-criticism once more. In his essay ‘Fable,’ Golding refers to Simon in Biblical terms. ‘For reasons it is not necessary to specify, I included a Christ figure in my fable.’ Furthermore, Golding takes issue with his literary predecessors such as Ballantyne, who ‘raises the problem of evil’ as that ‘which comes to the boys not from within themselves but from the outside world.’ Instead of representing ‘paper cut outs’ Golding states his castaways illustrate that humankind’s ‘diseased’ and ‘fallen nature’ is alternatively located within themselves and that ‘one of our faults is to believe that evil is somewhere else and inherent in another nation.’

After referring to Golding’s ideas above, Nicola Fuller states that the death of Simon ‘a Christ-like figure: a prophet’ represents Golding's intention to symbolise the idea that ‘the garden of Eden is lost to man.’ Additionally, Fuller argues that Golding’s ‘real boys, as opposed to the idealised characters in Ballantyne’s novel’ have ‘a capacity for evil.’ This usefully invokes the ideal children that often inform critical readings of castaway fiction. Furthermore, this comparison between ‘idealised’ and ‘real’ boys is played out by a number of critics, who build on Golding's own references, while also neglecting his claim that ‘one book never comes out of another.’ There is indeed a danger of redundancy at work within such comparative readings that suggest LOTF is simply a counter text. Fuller’s religious reading is indicative of a trend within criticism. For instance, John Peter states ‘like any orthodox moralist, Golding insists that Man is a fallen creature’ and that ‘evil’ is in ‘you or I.’ Frank Kermode argues that Golding’s castaways, as opposed to

647 Ibid.
648 Ibid. 89.
650 Ibid
651 Ibid. 13.
Ballantyne’s, who subscribe to the Arnoldian school of being free from ‘original sin,’ are instead ‘studied against an altered moral landscape.’

Gregor and Weekes attempt to move beyond the post-religious associations presented by Golding to assert that even if Simon is interpreted as a ‘saintly’ figure, analysing his death on strictly religious grounds ‘accomplishes far less than one might imagine.’ It is reductive because they argue, ‘Golding appeals to no heaven to right the wrong of man and there is no God in his novel.’ Instead, it is Simon’s gradual realisation that ‘it is only us’ and that the beast lies within, which is deemed important, since this ‘particular sensibility’ is what causes the others to kill him.

Despite identifying this insightful point, Gregor and Weekes interpret the novel’s approach to death and violence in the same way as Howard Babb, as representing a socio-cultural ‘regression from innocence to savagery.’ This reference once again supersedes the need to locate how abjection is worked towards in the text, as death, violence and the ‘other’ are inherently assumed within it. Virginia Tiger comes closer to an understanding of Simon’s death as a precursor to the subjective nihilism I will discuss, by stating that his fellow castaways prefer to destroy the ‘objectification’ of their fears rather than realise their own dark ‘terrors.’

Simon’s death needs to be read in collaboration with, rather than in opposition to, Ralph’s growing realisation that justification and meaning in terms of killing, and identifying the self as ‘other’ is under threat. This is essential to understand fully how the narrative concludes with the tragic representation of these castaways’ postmodern abject condition. In a final confrontation between the two tribes, Piggy is unceremoniously killed. Roger, a member of the hunters, pushes a rock from a cliff top ‘with a sense of delirious abandonment’, killing piggy on impact. This sense of abandonment, governing Roger’s will, conveys a disturbance that resonates with the idea that the castaways are practising an anarchic Symbolic Order that fails to adhere to any certainties related to either their pre or castaway subjectivity.

It is this realisation, which puts an end to the possibility that blame and rationality can be negotiated through the ritualistic ‘rules' of the hunt that causes Ralph to run for his life. With the death of Ralph's only two remaining allies, he is

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forced to flee alone into the woods. Ralph tires turning to his former allies Sam and Eric, for support. However, they have been forced to become ‘hunters’, warning Ralph that ‘Roger has sharpened the stick at both ends’ and that they have been ordered to throw their ‘spears like at a pig’.

At a point where Ralph struggles to come to terms with his fated condition while running for his life, it is not simply the fear of death that overwhelms him. ‘Most, he was beginning to dread the curtain that might waver in his brain, blacking out the sense of danger, making a simpleton of him.’ Ralph’s anxieties related to the traumatic events that have led to this moment, including his impending death are superseded by this almighty terror of not being able to bear witness to himself any longer. This overwhelming fear of losing the ability to self-witness is akin to humanity’s true annihilation and abject condition.

This is the idea that my alternative methodological approach to the novel’s representation of castaway subjectivity has been working towards. Navigated through the patterns of subjective decline, this reading identifies a postmodern paradigm shift away from the ideals of Religion, Enlightenment pedagogy and Colonialism through which stable identities are sought within criticism. I must, however, reiterate that I do not reject the post-war context that has informed the novel's critical reception, already discussed. Although my conclusion is not positioned within the same oppositions of ‘evil’ and savagery, I still maintain that this defeat of subjective meaning is indeed connected to the traumas of war, as it offers a reflective account of its effects on the compassionate scale of human subjectivity at large.

As a means of understanding this idea within the context of individual and mass post-war trauma, I interpret Ralph’s overwhelming fear of the ‘shutter’ as the fear of no longer having access to a past or present subjective state through which his traumatic testimony can be conveyed. As Dori Laub states in her investigation of testimony amongst Holocaust survivors, the ‘loss of the capacity to be a witness to oneself and thus to witness from the inside is perhaps the true meaning of annihilation, for when one’s history is abolished, one’s identity ceases to exist as well.’ The loss of testimony equates to a loss of the ‘process by which the narrator

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659 Ibid: 211.
661 Ibid: 218.
(the survivor) reclaims his position as a witness: reconstitutes the internal “thou” and thus the possibility of a witness or a listener inside himself."\(^{663}\)

Although Laub does not refer to Lacan, Sturken or Kristeva in her analysis, the consequence of being unable to access and articulate trauma through testimony, which she describes, integrates well with their theoretical approach to subjectivity and language. In terms of Sturken’s theory that memory provides individuals with ‘the very core’ of their identity, Lacan’s reliance on memory to construct and maintain a name-of-the-father for which an embodied subjectivity attains Symbolic signification and Kristeva’s use of this law as ‘codes’ through which abjection can manifest. Laub’s argument that testimonies aid trauma recovery provides a holistic context through which these failing subjective mechanisms can be understood in the text. By holistic, I am referring to the socio-cultural context of post-war trauma inflicted on humanity that Ralph’s ‘shuttered’ condition articulates, within the language of postmodernism and its resistance to ‘stable forms.’

The narrative illustrates the possibility of what would occur if one could not reclaim the subjective posing body or the internal ‘thou’ which as I have argued equates to an end of tangible meaning, or as Laub suggests ‘the true meaning of annihilation.’ With the threatened ‘shutter’ comes the abject threat of subjective displacement, and an end to the ‘knowable’ child castaway.

By the end of the novel, there is no promise of these castaways being reintegrated in a social order situated beyond the abject fear that resides within them. Ending as it does with the island engulfed in flames, and Ralph who ‘became fear; hopeless fear on flying feet’\(^{664}\) moments before the ‘shutter’ threatens to overwhelm him completely, standing in front of a naval officer who has come to their rescue. The officer remarks that this final scene of destruction appears like a ‘jolly good show’ reminiscent of TCI, while Ralph is caught up in his ruminations:

> Ralph looked at him dumbly. For a moment he had a fleeting picture of the strange glamour that had once invested the beaches. But the island was scorched up like dead wood... Ralph wept for the end of innocence, the darkness of man’s heart, and the fall through the air of the true, wise friend called Piggy.\(^{665}\)

\(^{663}\)Ibid: 85.
\(^{665}\)Ibid. 224-225.
With this introspection, comes an irreconcilable chasm between their castaway experiences and the subjectivity that awaits them in the eyes of the officer, who unlike Ralph is not aware of its actual ruin. The idea of being saved becomes an impossibility in the face of Ralph’s true knowledge that the abject nature of humanity is not being left behind, but rather one that returns in the form of the self as ‘other’, rendering the Symbolic Order though which that world condones any sense of meaning, as essentially redundant.

Summary

As I argue, LOTF echoes Lyotard’s account of postmodernity, in terms of the decline of ‘good forms’ and grand narratives. This idea lends itself well to the annihilation of the ‘knowable’ child castaway in its original form presented in TSFR as a fictional take on Rousseau’s Emile. LOTF thus contributes to the radical redefinitions, which have shaped the way the self and ‘other’ are discursively constructed. What differentiates my analysis of the way death and abjection are represented in LOTF from existing criticism, is that it focuses on how these castaway children add to the ever changing epistemological approaches to subjectivity within castaway fiction, by way of Enlightenment pedagogy, scientific rationalism, Darwinism, psychoanalysis and post-war Postmodernism.

The society of morally upright selves so keenly worked towards in TSFR through the image of God and an insatiable need to work towards the ‘common good’ is eradicated by the time we reach this final novel. Not only is the idea of a society of selves eradicated, but it is also the individual as a discursive subject that is threatened. Chartering the transitional discourse between the ‘knowable’ and the ‘unknowable’ castaway child does not, however, rely on oppositional readings between the texts under discussion. This stance is often taken by critics such as Martin Green who argues that LOTF is a reactionary text that aims to shatter the optimistic illusion of castaway experience depicted in TCI. Instead, my approach to reading has aimed to put these texts ‘in conversation’ with one another, dialogically, to demonstrate how these paradigm shifts are constructed epistemologically. Although I do not claim this

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approach to be definitive, reading the intersections of these changes within my chosen
texts opens up the castaway child within fiction to be considered within a broader
spectrum of residual discourses.
Conclusion

This thesis has sought to investigate the changing representations of child castaway subjectivity within five novels published in the period spanning the nineteenth to twentieth century. The characters depicted in these novels are not simply functioning bodies that survive the castaway experience, but rather they are subjects worked upon by the castaway experience. But the extent to which that work transforms subjectivity is variable and traces a trajectory from fixed coherence in SFR, through to abjected disintegration in LOTF. As this thesis suggests this trajectory is closely connected to the shift from total belief in God represented in TSFR, a belief which is incrementally replaced by scientific rationality in TCI and K and culminates in the confident atheism of AHW and the bleak nihilism of LOTF. The castaway child is essentially a product of catastrophe, in that family, home life and social relations are disrupted by extreme and unfamiliar circumstances, which forces a new existence in the isolation of an island – be that a geographic land mass or a manufactured ship. I use the term disrupted rather than destroyed advisedly here since there is no final cut off point from the past. Instead, through memory, the past is integral to castaway experience and these castaways represent a dynamic negotiation between memories of their past and the associated Symbolic Order (that constitutes their pre-castaway subjectivity, and a negotiation between that pre-castaway subjectivity and the unfamiliar territory of castaway experience.

As each chapter has shown, the re-negotiation of subjectivity in the castaway context is intrinsic to all the novels, while memory of pre-castaway experience is central to that experience. The extent to which these memories can or cannot be retrieved, and what type of memories are recollected produces a spectrum through which the castaway child can be identified in epistemological terms. This spectrum corresponds to a paradigm shift from the ‘knowable’ child of Enlightenment pedagogy to the fragmented representation of the postmodern subject in post-war literature. TSFR represents one end of this spectrum, emphasising the production of ‘healthy castaway’ bodies which survive due to an uninhibited approach to memory retrieval supported through a didactic father mediating the principles of Godly omniscience. The other end of the spectrum represents ‘unhealthy’ castaway bodies produced through a fragmented approach to memory and retrieval in LOTF, conveyed through a nihilistic conception of post-war humanity. The remaining novels variably fall within
This spectrum, each representing a progressive departure from the certainties of the self and ‘other’ dynamic that underpins the founding principles of Enlightenment pedagogy out of which the castaway child began.

This thesis extends existing research by critics such as Fisher, Hightower, and Kestner that posits the castaway child within a colonial framework and reworks in new texts and contexts Rousseau’s appropriation of Defoe’s classic castaway novel RC through which he developed his enlightenment pedagogical treatise and the figure of the ‘knowable child’. My readings of castaway fiction are also informed by an idea of colonialism and empire. However, my investigation of epistemological changes in subjective representations expands the scope of inquiry and interpretative possibilities through its conceptual move beyond interpretations of RC as instigating a literary landscape of colonialisit ideology adapted within pedagogy. Instead, I suggest that RC should be interpreted as generating a space in which dialogical representations of child castaway subjectivity is explored through shifting epistemological frames as they emerge at different moments. Thus my analysis traces a trajectory from TSFR, TCI, K, AHW and LOTF that explores how castaway subjectivity is epistemologically represented through ideas of Religion and Enlightenment Pedagogy, scientific rationalism, Darwinism, psychoanalysis and postwar postmodernism. Given that my research has produced no examples of stable castaway bodies, this thesis foregrounds the idea of shifting subjectivities as a means of investigating the transition from the ‘knowable’ to the unknowable castaway child.

In an attempt to identify and explore the castaway child as an epistemological construct of dialogical subjective influences, I developed a psychoanalytic and poststructuralist theoretical framing for my analysis. This draws on Jacques Lacan’s symbolic body set out in ‘The Mirror Stage As Formative Of The Function Of The I As Revealed In Psychoanalytic Experience’ (1966), and Julia Kristeva’s theory of abjection in Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (1980). These post-structuralist approaches to subjectivity and its attendant discourses, conceive of how subjectivity is developed within language, which as such is made readable as a dialogical construct susceptible to altering epistemological discourses. While Lacanian theory focuses on explicating this process as a convention of child development, Kristeva theorises its potential breakdown during moments when stable influences governing subjectivity are threatened. The castaways represented within these novels embody
both these positions as they negotiate their already constituted pre-castaway subjectivity in extremis.

While occupying this position, the castaway develops subjective meaning in light of what agents of power they recall, with specific reference to God and parental authority in varyingly influential degrees. By recognising that subjectivity is itself contextually determined and diachronically represented as such within language, it becomes both possible and necessary to interpret the castaway subject as a dialogical rather than fixed subject of inquiry in that neither language or subjectivity are fully fixed and are both subject to change both individually and in relation to each other.

Unlike existing criticism, which tends to offer oppositional readings between these castaway novels, often pitting TCI with its perceived colonial preoccupations against the perceived savagery of the castaways in LOTF for example, I have argued instead for the innovative way they can be read alongside each other. It is in this sense that the thesis has broadened the scope of inquiry into the castaway child, as a means of challenging dominant colonial perceptions in light of dialogical ways of readings.

Taking Genette’s understanding of Hypertextuality denoted as ‘any relationship uniting a text B ([hypertext]) to an earlier text A ([hypotext])’ (5) I was able to read castaway subjectivity dialogically through a series of generic tropes stemming from Enlightenment pedagogy’s revisions of RC and their fictional transposition beginning with TSFR. These tropes included the castaways’ relationship with family (the adult/child dichotomy), religion, the island space, and the abject ‘other.’ Drawing a parallel between the ways that these tropes are represented with changing epistemological representations of castaway subjectivity, afforded me a further line of inquiry into assessing how changes in narrative voice manifested in line with these ideas.

Chapter one analysed how the Robinsons are caught in the crossover between strict Calvinist ideals and the onset of Enlightenment pedagogy’s child/adult dichotomy producing ‘healthy’ bodies that are virtually impenetrable in life and death. This family illustrates an earthly extension of God's omnicompetence through didacticism, while the child castaways are presented as possessing no inner thoughts that deviate from their father's ideals. The success of their island living provides a utopic parallel with their subjective coherence, which honours the Symbolic Order of religious hegemony that governs their thoughts and actions while cast away. Thus accordingly, the abject ‘other' materialise as a non-tangible threat, in the face of
family unity and a stable representation of the ‘knowable’ child castaway that maintains its pre-castaway subjectivity.

What this novel sets in motion is a model of the epistemological castaway subject, rather than a definitive ideology that remains constant from TSFR onwards. Taking this idea as a point of departure, this thesis has sought to challenge existing readings, which see the novel as representing the teleological colonial and ‘knowable’ child castaway, which equates with what Rose has and others have identified as ‘the cult of childhood’; a ‘continuity in children’s fiction which runs from Rousseau’ and his ‘outdoor education for boys’ (43,51). Thus through this re-examination of what discourse the castaway child initiated in TSFR, I was able to research how the novels that followed also developed castaway subjectivity through an altering epistemological lens related to, Scientific Rationalism, Darwinism, Psychoanalysis and post-war modernism/postmodernism.

Chapter two analysed how TCI questioned the autocracy of religious hegemony and the didactic father, in light of mid-nineteenth century debates about hereditary discourse and scientific proof. The dissolution between God’s omniscience and the child castaway thus begins, which is paralleled with the development of the castaway child’s fractious relationship with the abject ‘other.’ Thus the ‘other’ develops out of an equal sense of fluidity that opposes fixed ideas related to the ‘knowable’ child, on which readings of the colonial child castaway rely.

Furthermore, with the emergence of these dissonant subjective influences the development of the child castaways’ more independent narrative voice, which coincides with what Barbara Wall describes as nineteenth-century children's fiction experimental phase. According to Wall, Ballantyne was amongst those experimenting with alternative approaches to the overt adult/child dichotomy identified in earlier didactic approaches to narration such as that identified in TSFR. In turn, these experiments ran alongside a growing juvenile readership.

In chapter three, I discussed how K continues to develop castaway subjectivity within increasingly irresolute institutions of power in light of David’s relationship with his parents, family, religious affiliations, island living and the abject ‘other.’ These uncertainties are reflexive of the novel’s post-Darwinian context, and the development of child psychology studies during the late nineteenth century. Marking these shifts, is the introduction of the first physically vulnerable castaway within this trajectory, rendering this protagonist unable to adapt and govern his/her body in
extremis. The novel also develops an increasingly blurred distinction between the self and ‘other’ that premises the importance of physical strength and subjective stability in light of its epistemological context.

Chapter four dealt with the way AHW further destabilises these distinctions by exploring the idea that the enemy resides within the castaway child, accompanied by a narrative voice that seeks to highlight the chaos of these subjective negotiations. No stable symbolic agency by which she can develop her pre and castaway subjectivity and basis of abjection are determined, given the vast miscommunications she has with her parents, and the way she subsumes God's power to develop a sense of agency and control over her ability to self-articulate. Emily's fragmented subjectivity is irresolutely managed while cast away. Her shipboard life continues to reflect these instabilities, which reach an apex just before she is rescued. This chapter also analysed the ways in which the novel's approach to the child castaway reflects the contexts of post-war Modernism and its fascination with the fragmented representations of identity, which destabilised ideas about the 'knowable' body.

Finally, chapter five dealt with way LOTF presents a group of castaway children whose initial chaotic crash landing on an unnamed island stands as a metaphor for their future subjective ruin. Their pre-castaway subjectivity trickles through via fragmented memories, rendering the formation of their castaway subjectivity as subject to these recollections. In turn, parental authority (although not absent) and religious hegemony are not presented as sustainable agents of power over these castaways, whose castaway experience manifests within bloody warfare and a progressive identity crisis, rendering them inarticulable and as such unknowable by the end. Their abject state is irreconcilable as they face the nihilistic prospect of existing beyond signification developed through an end to subjective negotiations between self and other.

When analysing a novel or genre via the lens of a particular methodology and theoretical framework, it is important to concede that subsequent readings only offer partial insights into an otherwise broad spectrum of socio-cultural meaning. As such, this thesis offers only partial insights into the study of the castaway child and changing representations of subjectivity, through close readings of select few texts. Thus it offers no definitive conclusions beyond the idea that the castaway child and approaches to castaway subjectivity are dialogical constructs of epistemological ideas.
There are no doubt areas, which warrant further research such as AHWs’ representation of a female castaway and how this fares in relation to the male dominated castaway genre. A cross–study of a wider range of female child orientated castaway texts is also an area most definitely worth considering, while the methodological and theoretical frameworks developed here could also be utilised to develop readings of mainstream castaway fiction. In terms of the issues raised regarding existing colonial interpretations of classic castaway novels such as TSFR and TCI, I would also suggest the potential for revisiting those considered as such in mainstream literature. By focussing on the epistemologically dialogical castaway child, I hope to have opened up new research pathways through which to re-contextualise the castaway genre, beyond that of existing colonial interpretations, as well as alternative pathways of reading other literary genres.

My future research will focus on the parallels that can be drawn between the child castaway and stories about child refugees within literature, which are gaining prominence due in part to the current global refugee crisis. Continuing my investigation into the ways in which fragmented subjectivities are represented in children’s and Young Adults’ fiction has also led me to examine other socio-cultural mediums such as war exhibitions for children. My existing research into the ways in which the child and war are managed within these exhibitions most often at museums, (that include the following case studies: The Imperial War Museum (London), The In Flanders Fields Museum (Belgium), and The Vilna Gaon Jewish State Museum (Vilnius)) calls for a greater insight into the complexities of conveying traumatic subjectivities as stories to be told and to entertain. In turn, my research into castaway fiction has given me a greater insight into the need to question what stories are told and who is imagined to be the implied teller and audience; questions that go unanswered within these exhibitions.
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