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Knowledge, Care And Trans-Individuation: An Interview With Bernard Stiegler

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BIOS

Patrick Crogan teaches film and media studies at the University of the West of England, Bristol. He has published work on film, new media, games and critical theories of technology in anthologies and journals including Angelaki, Theory, Culture & Society and Film-Philosophy. He also co-translated Acting Out (Stiegler 2009b).

French philosopher, cultural programmer and activist, Bernard Stiegler was born in 1952. He is director of the Department of Cultural Development at the Centre Georges-Pompidou and the (affiliated) Institute of Research and Innovation. He co-founded Ars Industrialis in 2006, an association dedicated to developing critical engagement with and cross-disciplinary intervention in public debate on technological and cultural politics and policy. In an anglophone context Stiegler is most well known as the author of Technics and Time 1. The Fault of Epimetheus (1998), the first volume of a (to date) three volume series examining the costly neglect of the theme of technology throughout the course of Western philosophy (1994-2001). The remaining volumes have endured a long delay before Technics and Time 2. Disorientation was released in 2009 (2009a). In the meantime Stiegler has
published more than 20 books (including four new series) since 1994, not to mention numerous essays, interviews and co-authored projects. His work is becoming increasingly available in English and German translation.

Stiegler was a student of Jacques Derrida and shares theoretical coordinates (among them Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger) with him and other influential continental theorists including Jean-Francois Lyotard, Paul Virilio and Gilles Deleuze. Stiegler cannot be simply labelled a “Derridean,” however, and has drawn on sources such as Gilbert Simondon, André Leroi-Gourhan and Paul Valéry in articulating his different approach to the challenge of “différance.”

As he recounts in *Acting Out* (2009b), Stiegler embarked on philosophical inquiry into his major theme of technology and human becoming while incarcerated between 1978 and 1983 for armed robbery. He first studied by correspondence with Gérard Granel at the Université de Toulouse-Le-Mirail. He developed a quasi-hermetic daily discipline of reading, reflecting and writing while enduring the “suspended” existence of prison life. This enforced state of “deprived” being enabled Stiegler to develop insights about what is habitually unavailable to perception. He was, he recounts, like Aristotle’s flying fish temporarily removed from unwitting immersion in everyday experience (12).

For Stiegler human interiority must be understood as coincident with the exteriority of technically afforded existence. There is no human essence
(in mind, soul, spirit or “embodiment”) prior to, mysteriously paralleling or transcending this co-incidence. While this proposition resonates with many accounts of the prosthetic nature of human being (Derrida 1976, Lyotard 1991, Deleuze and Guattari 1988, Wills 1995, Haraway 1991), the relentless rigour with which Stiegler pursues and applies this assertion in the Technics and Time series causes one to reflect on how difficult it is in practice (including in critical practice) to undo decisively the marginalization of tekhnē that was one of the founding moves of Western metaphysics (1998: 1).

This approach laid the foundation for subsequent series such as De la Misère Symbolique (2004-2005), Mécèrance et Discrédit (2004-2006) and Prendre Soin (2008). These series and other recent works elaborate strident critiques of the globalizing corporate capitalist-driven transformation of the “program industries” and its destructive (and indeed self-destructive) undermining of the processes through which individuals and collectives co-individuate successfully, that is, continue to manage to project for themselves a viable future. Stiegler always insists, however, on the necessity of critical re-engagement with and inflection of technological transformation – digitization, convergence, realtime communication, interactivity, “psycho-technologies” (Stiegler, Petit and Bontems 2008) – as the only possible means of countering the discrediting of social and political institutions and the growing fragmentation, cynicism and nihilism that attend this loss of credit.
Cultural Capitalism, Psycho-Power and Discredit

Patrick Crogan: In *Mécréance et Discrédit I. La Décadence des Démocraties Industrielles* (Disbelief and Discredit I: The Decadence of the Industrial Democracies), you state that industrial politics must become a cultural politics of the technologies of spirit (2004b: 25). Could you elaborate on what cultural politics means here and explain why this transformation is necessary?

Bernard Stiegler: I believe capitalism today has become essentially a cultural capitalism. I simply go along here with the ideas of Jeremy Rifkin (2000) and others. I think the problem of capitalism since the beginning of the twentieth century has been much more a problem of transforming individuals’ behaviour than one of transforming matter. Of course, we continue to transform matter today, doing it even more, and infinitely more efficiently – and indeed more dangerously – than in the past. But there are no limits to the transformation of matter. Where the limit lies is in the absorption of the transformation of matter by the market. So we have been through practically a century of the cultural transformation of behaviour by industrial capitalism.

This has taken place through what I would call psycho-technologies. It has developed through what I call psycho-power. I am finding that
Foucault is very interesting in this regard with his concept of bio-power (Foucault 1976, 2004), but if we really want to use Foucault today, we have to move on to a question he didn’t ask: the question of psycho-power and the psycho-technologies.

I think too that since, around 1920 to 1930, with the development in the United States of marketing and advertising and the like, industry has consisted essentially in the harnessing of attention, the channelling of libido and the progressive destruction of what Gilbert Simondon used to call the circuits of trans-individuation (Simondon 1964). These circuits enabled affects to be constituted and to circulate, solidarities to form between individuals and for social roles and places to be created: fathers in relation to children, the division of labour and all those things, the whole range of hierarchies that formed. These are the hierarchies and the different instances that constituted one’s place in society – what in Greek would have been called the ethos of individuals. This has been turned completely upside down by these cultural industries. And I think this has become destructive of libidinal energy.

This destruction of libidinal energy now ends in extremes, in extremisms – a “going to extremes” – that find expression in France in the Front National, in some countries with al-Qaeda and in others in self-destructive behaviours, drug abuse etc. And this happens at a point when capitalism is currently discovering its own real limits in environmental terms,
in terms of the biosphere. In this regard, I believe the increase in CO\textsubscript{2} production was intended by the car producers and the oil companies, and that it now seems to be very dangerous. In Japan, which is the world’s leading motor manufacturer today, Toyota has been found guilty by the Tokyo courts and made to compensate the inhabitants of Tokyo who have fallen ill with lung diseases (Author unknown 2007: 851). This is a profound change and I think this change necessitates a genuine cultural revolution on the part of capitalism and industrial society, in the sense that it is a question now not of transforming matter, nor even of transforming behaviour, but of transforming minds – or, more exactly, of transforming drives (pulsions) back into mind (esprit), that is to say, of reconstituting processes of sublimation.

This is why I’m very interested in the so-called cognitive or cultural technologies. I’m working here at the Pompidou Centre on these problems. I believe they’re technologies that can create more intelligence, more social bonds, as well as creating turnover, trade and economy. Not in the sense of what Tony Blair and certain others call the knowledge society or the knowledge industry, because that’s an industry of control, but rather in the way, for example, the Finnish philosopher Pekka Himanen, who wrote a book called *The Hacker Ethic* (2002), develops the idea that a new organization of industrial society is being established here. I very much believe this. And I believe this can’t happen on its own, because I think industrial and economic transformations are never accomplished by
themselves. They’re accomplished either by violent revolutions, which isn’t at all desirable, or by desires for thoroughgoing reform or even for revolution in the form of an economic, industrial, technological and social New Deal (as after the crisis of 1929), and I believe we must organize this New Deal today.

I talked about Foucault a moment ago and he’s an interesting resource here, even though he never worked on this angle, but, on the other hand, he demonstrated how the communication techniques of the Greek period served both accounting and monitoring functions – he showed this a great deal in his books on bio-politics and administration – but also in the constitution of the Stoic philosopher’s “sublimation,” in the constitution of what he calls the techniques of the self, the “care of the self” (Foucault 1986), everything Heidegger would have called die Sorge. And I think this is where the central economic and political issue lies today.

And there must also be an articulation of an industrial and a cultural politics, which is a way of reconnecting with Max Weber’s argument about capitalism, because Max Weber explained very well that capitalism is a form of sublimation – more exactly, a form of organization of the life of the mind (Weber 1976). I believe this particular form is now exhausted, but I think we can reinvent another one.
PC: When you speak in your work about the proletarianization of the consumer, is that to identify the problem at the level of consumption as the centre of this dynamic?

BS: It’s a strange formulation, obviously, for a Marxist, to talk about a proletarianization of the consumer. But strange only for a Marxist who hasn’t read Marx. Because Marx’s definition of the proletariat is absolutely not pauperization. Marx describes the proletarian dimension as concerning the worker who has a skill, a *savoir-faire* and who is dispossessed of it by a machine of which he becomes the slave, of which he becomes – and here I quote Marx’s exact phrase - the pure labour power; he is solely labour power, with absolutely no intelligence or mind any longer (Marx 1938: 5).² This is exactly what Adam Smith was already saying when he analysed modes of work in the manufactories in 1776, that is to say, almost a century before Marx (Smith 1981). Except in Marx it takes on a very significant dimension. He makes a whole political theory out of it. He says that the first to be proletarianized are the manual workers. But he says also that all employees necessarily become proletarianized. Proletarianization here means de-skilling, the loss of ability (*savoir-faire*). A philosopher who is very important for me, Gilbert Simondon, calls this disindividuation, the loss of individuation, because Simondon says I can individuate myself only through the unique, singular knowledge I possess.
From the moment when marketing develops – first in the United States, then throughout the whole world - and particularly from the moment when marketing invents the service society, the service economy, we see how the consumer is himself deprived of his *savoir-vivre*. The producer was deprived of his skills or abilities (*savoir-faire*); the consumer is deprived of his *savoir-vivre*. What does *savoir-vivre* mean? To know how to cook, drive one’s car, know how to orient yourself in a landscape without having a GPS system, know how to bring up your children, to knit, to bake your bread etc. The organization of capitalism, particularly of the second capitalism, is based on a service economy that dispossesses consumers of their *savoir-vivre*. The problem is that a society without *savoir-vivre* is a society without civility. It’s a society dominated by police repression. If I don’t steal your computer, it’s not because there’s a cop who could put me in jail for it, it’s because I don’t think it right to steal your computer. This is called the superego. And it’s a form of *savoir-vivre*. The Superego is an organization of *savoir-vivre*. Moreover, human life is a life that has savour. Knowledge is what gives savour. This is difficult in English, but let me explain: the Latin root of the word *sapere* - to know - is also the etymological root of the French word *saveur*, which means taste or savour. In Latin, it is the same to have knowledge as to have “savour.”

So, the consumer, who has become entirely a consumer, in fact consumes himself. He no longer has knowledge or *savoir-vivre*. He now has
only a purchasing power. I say the proletarian of production is the person who has nothing left but his labour power, the consumer is the person who has nothing left but his purchasing power. So, he will work to earn the little bit of money he uses to be able to buy what he produces, having lost everything; he has no knowledge in work any more and no knowledge in life. So he is unhappy. This is what I call the proletarianization of the consumer. So what we clearly see today, with the development of hackers or of all kinds of “amateur” organizations in the digital networks, among the younger generation, is that they are people trying to reconstitute knowledge and to exit from this logic. The danger would be to try to return to archaic forms of life, which is clearly absurd, totally impossible and very reactionary. But, on the other hand, we have to invite the world of industry, management, marketing, engineering and design – in fact I recently ran a conference on precisely this subject here at the Pompidou Centre – to invent a new organization of society that develops new ways of creating, not a world where there are producers on one side and consumers on the other – that is to say, proletarians everywhere – but in which there are what I call contributors, as in “open source,” where people participate in the creation of the world in which they live.

PC: You have characterized the Ars Industrialis Project as having a radical and revolutionary purpose. The association calls, for example, for a new
critique that would radically alter the terms of critical discourse about culture and politics and this would be in order to promote a complete reinvention, like you were just saying, of the industrial model of production on the one hand and consumption on the other. Some of the themes that you talk about - and that *Ars Industrialis* talk about - resemble the tropes of a politically conservative discourse from a certain point of view, for example the loss of a sense of shame in today’s society, the lack of parental attention to children, and the destruction of the family unit more widely, the loss of the sense of collective life in general, whether the family, the nation or Europe. These are some of the things you’ve written about. My question is: what would the word “radical” mean today in an era when Left and Right political ideologies struggle to provide any coherent alternatives for organizing political debate or political action?

BS: This is a very complicated question. It would take a lot of time to reply to this really seriously and radically, so to speak. We do not really have the time, but I’ll try to do it all the same. First, on radicalism: I think the question we’re faced with today is radical. Without being too doom-laden about it, I have to say the question we’re faced with is that of the survival of humanity. That’s the real question. The probability of the disappearance of humanity is extremely high today. It’s the first time humanity has lived in a situation of this type. You could say there have been lots of millenarian,
apocalyptic or messianic fantasies, of course, but those were phantasmatic, messianic, prophetic phenomena. Here we’re dealing, sadly, with quantifiable facts. In terms of probability, taking mathematical models, it’s unlikely that humanity will survive this situation. Unlikely.

In my view, these are the most interesting situations. The situations where there’s little chance of doing something are the situations where suddenly there’s a stroke of genius and something happens, which in other contexts we’d called miracles. I don’t talk about miracles, but about negentropy, since, in terms of pure physics, we’re dealing with problems of entropy and negentropy here. Everything’s organized today along entropic lines, to produce entropy… because the exhaustion of energy resources is a factor of entropy. But, at the same time, the only way out of this extremely negative development is to produce negentropy. And humans are negentropic beings. That is to say, the only way for humanity to be rescued in this situation is to become more human, Nietzsche would perhaps have said more than human. Perhaps. I don’t want to say this because one can always interpret Nietzsche very badly. But here, for me, the fundamental issue – and this is where I speak of a new criticism, radical criticism, a revolution – is to rearticulate very profoundly, from the very origins of the West, the relations between desire and technology; to rethink totally these relations; to rethink completely what knowledge is, for example, as a relation between desire and technology that we call sublimation in such and such
types of condition for such a type of knowledge; wholly to rethink forms of economic and political organizations as libidinal economies, but by way of technologies – which are always technologies of the mind – and which, being technologies of the mind, enable sublimation to be produced, and drives to be transformed into desire.

This is a radical revolution, in the sense that it necessitates starting again at the roots of philosophy from the pre-Socratics onwards; readdressing all questions, in order to revise them completely. And not just philosophy, but engineering, science, economics, psychoanalysis, psychology and neurology: in short, to develop what I call a general organology. In this connection, I make the argument – *Ars Industrialis* does too, though this is mainly me – about the Superego, about the loss of meaning of collective life, about all kinds of things which you say are, in effect, conservative themes. But I would say that, before they are conservative themes, they are problems. It happens to be the conservative camp or, rather, the Rightist camp that normally concerns itself with these problems. But just because the Right concerns itself with them doesn’t mean they aren’t problems.

The question that interests me above all is: why doesn’t the Left concern itself with these problems? Because they are problems. Because the Left doesn’t have the critical apparatus to deal with them or, if it has one, it has become entirely ineffective or even dangerous. Look at the French situation, the collapse of the French Left… because it is a total collapse:
there’s no Communist Party any more; there’s a far Left that still exists but is very weak. The Socialist Party is worse than in the days of the SFIO [the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière], the old reformist party. It’s a calamity. Why? Precisely because so-called Left-wing thought has not wanted to think about these problems, which are real problems. The problem is to know how to interpret these problems. There is a way of interpreting the problems which consists in saying: we must restore authority, in the sense that repression, the police, control, exclusion, anti-immigration policy etc. must be restored. This is obviously not what I believe at all. What we need is an analysis that shows where the real problems come from. Why are there racial tensions in France, as in Australia? France doesn’t have more immigrants today than it did a long time ago. For instance at one point there was strong anti-semitism in France, which isn’t entirely unrelated to all we are living through at this moment. But, how is it that immigration is an obsession today, and not just an anti-semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-Islamic obsession. No, it’s a general xenophobia. And there’s not just xenophobia, but homophobia, the hatred of homosexuals: there’s a hatred of each against all. We are very close to the war of each against all.

It’s because the processes of individuation are destroyed. I am a great admirer of the philosopher Gilbert Simondon. Simondon developed a philosophy of individuation, in which he shows that you can’t individuate
yourself psychically if you don’t individuate yourself collectively. It’s absolutely impossible. The moment collective individuation is destroyed by marketing – because the proletarianization of the consumer is the destruction of collective individuation – psychical individuation is destroyed too. The individual who can’t manage to individuate himself suffers. And when he suffers, he needs an outlet, a pharmakon, a scapegoat. And so he turns necessarily on everything that will seem abnormal or less normal and hence produces exclusion. There is a real destruction of the superego. The theory of psychoanalysis, or rather, the practice of psychoanalysis, has consisted a great deal in arguing that the superego was something necessarily repressive and regressive. Not at all. The people who say this haven’t read Freud. Freud never said that. For Freud, without a superego there is no psychic apparatus. And I argue that the superego is currently being destroyed. A psychoanalyst told me very recently, “No, it isn’t being destroyed, because there are cops everywhere.” But I replied, “That isn’t what the superego is; the superego isn’t cops.” That’s just control. Can we say, for example, that when the Nazis entirely militarized German society that it was a development of the superego? Not at all, it was a destruction of the superego. The Superego always involves a sublimatory investment. If there isn’t this, then there isn’t any authority in the good sense of the term, because there are two senses of authority: authority in the sense of repression, which leads to authoritarianism, and the authority of the author,
the authority Antigone appeals to against Creon (Antigone says there is the authority of the divine law). And the superego is the combination of the two. Nazism isn’t a superego, it’s a barbarism. A society without superego is a barbaric society. I think today we are developing a society without superego, which clearly gives rise, in reaction, to temptations to produce a repressive, barbaric order.

Taking Care with New Technologies

PC: Can you tell us about any projects you’re currently working on that are developing from out of this position?

BS: I’m currently working on a new series of books called *Prendre Soin* (*Taking Care*). The first volume, which was published in French in January 2008 and in German too, because it’s also coming out in Germany…

PC: This is another series?

BS: It’s another series, yes. (*Laughter*) The subtitle of this first volume will be “Of Youth and the Generations” (Stiegler 2008). It’s a book on relations between the generations and, particularly, on the problem of attention. In French – and in English too – “attention” means both the psychological faculty – “attention span,” concentration – and, at the same time, civility,
savoir-vivre (manners): “to pay attention” etc. \(^3\) And this interests me a lot, because attention is, for me, the combination of what Husserl calls retentions and protentions (Husserl 2001). I analyse all human realities in terms of retentions and protentions. I try to show that retentions and protentions are always articulated or organized by what Foucault calls dispositifs, which I call retentional dispositifs, hypomnemata; and that the psycho-technologies of television or the Internet enable a psycho-power of the control of attention to be developed, but that psycho-technologies existed before, such as writing or the rituals of traditional societies; and that every society is always what I call a system of care, i.e. a system of the production of attention. Today attention is harnessed by industry in an absolutely systematic way.

We know, for example, that in the USA adolescents watch television or consume mass media for six and half hours a day, which is absolutely enormous. And we know too that the harnessing of attention by the mass media, especially when it begins very early, destroys the synaptic capacities of children, of very small babies. I’m working a lot at the moment in the footsteps of what teams of American child-psychiatrists, particularly Dmitri Christakis and Frederick Zimmerman, have done on the synaptogenesis of the brains of babies, because I think there’s something very important happening here, which is an intoxication by the attention-harnessing – or attention-destroying – systems. I’m doing a lot of work on this. This leads
me to engage with Michel Foucault’s work a great deal and often to contest his positions, because, reading the whole literature by Foucault, I’ve realized that part of what he says – particularly everything he says about education and schooling – is, in my opinion, highly problematical. So I’m working on that. I’m working also a lot on what are called the transformational technologies: the nanotechnologies, the microtechnologies, the biotechnologies etc. Here at the Centre Pompidou I’m developing work on these questions with certain researchers.

Because we’re moving towards an enormous transformation of society as a result of these technological changes. And I believe we have to create new systems of care, new systems of the creation of attention. This is what I’m working on.

PC: Today many people argue that the Internet has been destructive of attentive reading in a traditional sense, concentrated reading, long-term reading. Does digitization present to you any apparent solutions that you can see to this problem?

BS: In fact, the Internet is a pharmakon. It can clearly intensify practices of hyper-attention, as Katherine Hayles calls them (in my view, it’s not hyper-attention but “distributed attention”⁴ – Derrida would have said disseminated attention), but at the same time you can also be in a very deep
state of attention on the Internet, very sustained attention. What does Plato say about books? Exactly the same thing. He says the only real form of deep attention is dialogue; the book creates artificial, distributed attention. But this isn’t true. Foucault shows – and this is why I mentioned him a moment ago – that the dialectic in the Stoic period is created by letters, and not any longer through dialogue.

The problem isn’t the Internet. There’s no substantive truth of the Internet with regard to attention. The Internet is a dispositif that can produce loss of attention, but also increased attention. What is important is to connect the dispositifs – the pharma– together, to find intelligent connections between books, the Internet, and why not, as Katherine Hayles does, video games etc.

PC: You concern yourself a great deal with the question of education today. For example it is the thematic focus of the recent seminar series, “Trouver des nouvelles armes…,” that Ars Industrialis convened for the Collège International de Philosophie. My question is what needs to be taught today and how?

BS: I don’t know very well what needs to be taught today. I haven’t really worked on this question. For me, the main question is how one should teach today. Nevertheless, a meta-answer – very general, too general – is to
say that the split between the sciences and the humanities is a crucial error. There isn’t, contrary to what those I call the neurocentrics say, a right and a left hemisphere, with emotive people on the one side and rational ones on the other. That’s absolutely wrong. Good humanities students are rational. They aren’t irrational at all. Even if there may be people who have a right hemisphere that is more active for neurological reasons, fundamentally the activity of the left and right hemispheres is caused by cultural learning. This has been shown by a number of neurologists, who have studied brains in Asia and the West and shown that they are organized in quite different ways because, quite simply, cultural practices are quite different. The brain has a high degree of plasticity. This doesn’t mean that there isn’t a separation between the right and the left hemispheres or that there aren’t any localizations at the beginning. Of course there are. But the essential thing is external, it lies in what is transmitted.

This split that took place between the arts and the sciences about a century ago is, in fact, an organization in the service of the development of industry, an organization akin to the industrial division of labour. This means that we now have philosophers who know nothing of physics, mathematics or biology and I ask myself what they can talk about. We also have chemists, physicists and biologists who don’t even know Plato and I wonder what they can be thinking. How to make sense of a complex world like ours when you know nothing about Plato, nothing about what comes
from the humanities – that doesn’t seem possible to me. You can do things, but you are an intellectual proletarian. You are able to go a long way in effectiveness, but not in the understanding of the world. So we have to transform this.

It’s obvious and it’s an enormous task. Very complicated, but very possible. I have had students from the engineering school at the University of Compiègne who are very good scientists and very good philosophers. There aren’t just philosophers, sociologists or economists. Of course you can’t teach everyone everything. You have to organize a division of intellectual labour. That’s obvious. But we should use the new media here and, in my view, the fundamental question is not so much what we should teach as how we should teach it. And for me teaching today involves bringing new forms of hypomnemata into play. New forms of media of memory, of transmission. Knowledge is produced by these transmission media. When you have a naïve view of these questions, you believe these media are merely there to conserve a knowledge that was pre-constituted, but it’s an absolute misconception. Since Husserl, at least, we know geometry would not exist without writing (Derrida 1978). Writing isn’t just the condition of transmission of the reasoning of Euclid or Thales, but the precondition for the constitution of that reasoning. Without it, their reasoning could not have existed.
In the field of biology and physics now or in economic reality, indeed everywhere, new forms of *hypomnemata* have appeared and these new forms of *hypomnemata* have to be brought into the heart of the teaching of students. Not to teach them to programme computers – well, why not, but that’s not what I’m talking about… We have to write an organological history of knowledge. And this has to be done in a context where what I call the cultural industries – which attempt to harness attention and in fact destroy that attention – use these technologies in a way that produces a lot of stupidity, much lowering of the level of intelligence, of the level of sublimation, of the level of investment in the knowledge required by human beings… But it is the same technologies that enable us to overturn this situation. I think today we have to do with contemporary *hypomnemata*, what Plato did with the *hypomnemata* of the Sophists. You have to know that Aristotle in Plato’s Lyceum taught rhetoric. What is rhetoric? It was the Sophists’ attention-harnessing technology. Aristotle said we have to study the techniques of the Sophists to make them noetic techniques rather than techniques of psycho-technical manipulation. So, we have to do things like that today in the field of education. This is why I’m interested in the works of Katherine Hayles, because she has ideas like this. She teaches, for example, the works of Faulkner and uses a video game to do this. I don’t know if, in practice, I’d find the way she does it convincing if I went and saw it, but at any rate I find the approach very interesting. I think we have to
go a lot further than this and develop a genuine industry of knowledge, an industry of education, but totally revising the axioms of what knowledge itself is, what the transmission of knowledge is, starting the whole project over again - rather in the sense of what I was saying earlier of the relations between desire and technology.

[Translated by Chris Turner]

Acknowledgements

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Notes

1. Translator note: In English in the original.

2. Translator note: In the English translations of *Capital* this phrase is sometimes translated as “uniform labour-power” and sometimes as “homogeneous labour power” as in the edition cited in the references.

3. Translator note: In English in the original.

4. Translator note: In English in the original.

References


